



# CENTRE FOR AIR POWER STUDIES (CAPS)

Forum for National Security Studies (FNSS)

## INDO-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER



A Monthly Newsletter on Security and Strategic Issues on Indo-Pacific Region from  
Centre for Air Power Studies

### From the Editor's Desk

*This month Japan-ASEAN summit took place which emphasised renewed commitment to secure the Indo-Pacific region and also marked 50 years of their diplomatic ties.*

*In the Second Thomas Shoal, China persisted in its claims of coercion, while the US, Japan, and Australia persisted in endorsing the Philippines. The Second Indian Ocean Development Cooperation Forum was also held in Kunming by China. The Indian Ocean Rim Association and the forum share similar goals. Online participants included the heads of state of Kenya, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka.*

*Furthermore, Russia and India continued to have a mutually beneficial relationship during December 25–29 visit by India's Minister of External Affairs Throughout the month, Indian ships flying the national flag in ports in the Northern Pacific, South China Sea, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and East Africa continued their long-distance maritime deployments. Through actions taken during the Second AUKUS Defense Ministers' Meeting and ongoing efforts to establish AUKUS facilities, Australia persisted in fortifying its new forward defense posture.*

*This month we present specially selected opinions and cherry picks covering all this and more. Do check out our Social Media Corner for some engaging and insightful content, including debates, interviews and podcasts from eminent experts.*

*Jai Hind*

Vol III, No 08, 07 January 2024

### CONTENTS

From the Editor's Desk

Opinion/ Review/ Expert View

Social Media Corner

### PEEP-IN

*China's year of Strategic Decline*

Read more about it at :-

<https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/china-s-year-of-strategic-decline-2830346>

### QUOTE

*“As divisions and confrontations deepen and the world faces compounded crises, Japan will tackle the issues together with ASEAN, which is the linchpin of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’”*

- Fumio Kishida,  
Japan's PM

## Opinions/Review/Expert View

**Beijing's Claims in the South China Sea  
Roil the Philippines**

Source: Prashanth Parameswaran | Geopolitical Intelligence Services

<https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/beijing-south-china-sea/> 31 December 2023



*An airfield, buildings and structures are seen on an artificial island built by China on Fiery Cross Reef on October 25, 2022, in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. China has progressively asserted its claim of ownership over disputed islands by building ports, military outposts and airstrips. The South China Sea is an important trade route. © Getty Images*

Tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea are on the rise. The dynamics warrant wider attention given the waterway's importance to global trade, its connection to intensifying United States-China competition and the international principles at stake. But they also raise the more challenging question of how relations between Manila and Beijing are likely to proceed in the coming years. The fraught relationship has led to numerous rows in the South China Sea. Beijing's aggressive stance has also triggered disputes with Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan.

**China, backed by a strong maritime militia, is asserting its dominance in one of the world's most disputed and strategic waterways.**

In the 1990s, China triggered conflict by seizing Mischief Reef in Manila's exclusive economic zone after the U.S. closed military bases in the Philippines. The situation deteriorated again in the early 2010s when China seized Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines. Manila responded by filing an international legal case against Beijing and signing a new defense pact with Washington.

Although Rodrigo Duterte, president from 2016-2022, initially tried to align Manila closer with China and slow U.S.-Philippine cooperation, Beijing continued its harassment of Philippine fishing vessels and security forces. The situation has not improved since Mr. Duterte's successor Ferdinand Marcos Jr. – son of ousted Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos – took office last year.

**2016 International Tribunal Rules Against China's Claims**

The recent flare-ups between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea are part of a broader pattern of growing Chinese aggression in reinforcing its nine-dash line under which Beijing claims most of the South China Sea as its own. An arbitration tribunal of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in The Hague in 2016 ruled that Chinese claims in the nine-dash line are illegal. But President Xi Jinping rejected the tribunal's finding that the parts of the sea that China covets are neutral international waters or part of the exclusive economic zones of other nations.

## Incidents Flare Over the Disputed Spratly Islands

Sino-Philippine tensions have largely focused on the Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef that is part of the disputed Spratly Islands, which is claimed by multiple countries including China and the Philippines.

Over the past year, Chinese vessels have routinely blocked Philippine ships to undermine Manila's position in the South China Sea. Beijing has also fired water cannons and used blinding lasers as part of its tactics. Similar incidents have occurred before, but the Philippines is now publicizing the incidents more than during the Duterte administration.

This pattern of Chinese behavior has also become routine across the South China Sea in recent years, from vessels intruding into Vietnam's exclusive economic zone for long stretches to protests registered against energy exploration by Malaysia and the Philippines.

### China's big reach in the South China Sea



On August 28, 2023, Beijing extended its claim to most of the South China Sea under a new 10-dash line. The claims it made previously, under the notorious nine-dash line, were already rejected by an international tribunal in 2016.

Source: Defense Express

## A foreign policy tilt toward the U.S. amid Beijing's coercion

These tensions matter due to their wider geopolitical significance. President Marcos, far from continuing Mr. Duterte's pro-China bent, has instead swung the Philippines closer to the United States. He has agreed to new U.S. defense sites, plugged Manila into security exercises, signed a nuclear energy

cooperation pact and is even more vocal about his country's interests in Taiwan. This has rankled Beijing but fed into U.S. efforts to build closer partnerships in its

competition with China. The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden has repeated that military force against the Philippines would trigger a U.S. response under the U.S.-Philippine military alliance.

China's actions have also reenergized intraregional conversations among more forward-looking members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) about how to manage Beijing's actions, as a seemingly never-ending quest for a binding code of conduct with Beijing inches forward only incrementally. For example, in August, China's issuance of a new 10-dash line map, extending its territorial claims further around Taiwan and even into Indian territory, just ahead of a round of ASEAN summitry, produced a rare string of quick and united diplomatic protests from Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

Moving forward, the broader question is how Sino-Philippine tensions in the South China Sea might evolve during the



rest of President Marcos's single six-year presidential term, which lasts until mid-2028. This question will play out amid other domestic, regional and global realities. Domestically, while Mr. Marcos's headwinds now largely revolve around cost-of-living issues and some fallout from his bid to rebrand the Marcos family name, his administration will nonetheless face a challenge in sustaining a tougher posture against Beijing in the democracy with diverse voices, some of whom still see reward in economic engagement with China despite the risks. There are worries in Manila and in some other Southeast Asian capitals about where the South China Sea issue will fit on the ASEAN agenda in 2024, with the body's annually rotating chairmanship moving from Indonesia to Laos next year before moving back to countries that typically advocate for a stronger stance (Malaysia in 2025, then the Philippines in 2026). At a global level, a potential transition to a new U.S. president after elections in November 2024 could also affect the evolution of U.S.-Philippine ties and Indo-Pacific policy, even if their general trajectories remain unchanged.

Three scenarios are possible.

### **Most Likely: The Status Quo of Periodic Coercion Continues**

The first scenario, and the most likely one, is continuity. China will undertake periodic coercion against the Philippines. But Beijing will be careful not to undertake military actions that might trigger direct U.S. intervention which would result in conflict.

Meanwhile, the Philippines, which is much weaker militarily than Beijing, will continue pursuing what it views as routine activities like resupply operations as best it can while also seeking help from like-minded partners such as Australia, Japan and the U.S. to spotlight, protest and counter aggressive Chinese activities. Manila may also continue to raise this issue at ASEAN fora.

Yet at the same time, Manila would also avoid taking overly risky actions toward Beijing. From a Philippine perspective, a perceived reckless response to Chinese actions in the eyes of others might either play

into Chinese arguments that the Philippines is changing the status quo or might weaken the case for the U.S. fully supporting Manila in the South China Sea.

### **Somewhat Likely: South China Sea Tensions Escalate**

The second scenario is the escalation scenario. Though this scenario may have been seen as less likely even a year ago, it has become more of a source of worry in the past few months. In this scenario, we would see the action-reaction dynamic between China and the Philippines noted above not just continue, but escalate to a potential crisis. Beijing's coercive actions could grow bolder as its patience wears thin. It could begin not just obstructing and harassing Philippine vessels, but even sparking small collisions, boarding them, or detaining some of the crew under a real or false pretext.

In response, the Philippines and its partners may feel compelled to escalate their reaction

**The South China Sea might evolve during the rest of President Marcos's single six-year presidential term, which lasts until mid-2028.**

as well. This could take various forms, including more regularized assistance of Philippine resupply missions out to Second Thomas Shoal. The Philippines could also try to reinforce its outpost on the shoal sometime in the future to strengthen its claim.

**The Philippines could also try to reinforce its outpost on the shoal sometime in the future to strengthen its claim.**

Any of these actions would in turn increase the risk that Beijing's obstruction of one of these missions results in a potential accident, miscalculation or deliberate initiation of conflict.

### Unlikely for Now: Tensions Ease

The third scenario is cooling. This may seem unlikely for now, but the past ebbs and flows in how China, the Philippines and other external players like the U.S. have behaved on the South China Sea question suggest that it would be myopic to only extrapolate linearly from current developments.

Under this scenario, periodic China-Philippine tensions would continue in the South China Sea. But Beijing and Manila would at least find a way to routinely manage cycles of potential tensions that periodically emerge through events such as Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal or the movement of fishermen in Scarborough Shoal. This is most likely to happen due to some sort of give-and-take arrangement both leaders are able to work out on specific flashpoints or behaviors. It may also be paired with more diplomatic and economic incentives coming from Beijing.

Both sides will need to be creative in designing these arrangements, particularly

since there will be skepticism after the unrealized benefits from Mr. Duterte's China pivot and President Marcos' earlier efforts to engage with Beijing. Past Sino-Philippine South China Sea tensions also suggest that while cooling measures may work for a while, they are difficult to sustain when tensions rise again.

\*\*\*

## Japan and ASEAN Vow to Widen Cooperation after 50 Years of Ties

Source: *The Japan Times*

<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/12/17/japan/politics/japan-asean-summit/> 17 December 2023



Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (center) and ASEAN leaders join hands during a photo session during a summit meeting in Tokyo on Sunday. | POOL / VIA KYODO

Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreed Sunday to deepen relations regarding security and economic issues at a summit to commemorate 50 years of friendship and cooperation. The agreement comes as China's growing clout alters the region's geopolitical environment.

In a "joint vision statement" issued after the gathering in Tokyo, the leaders pledged to step up cooperation on maritime security, strengthen

supply chains, promote sustainable energy practices and expand people-to-people exchanges in various sectors.

The leaders also announced the launch of a new initiative for the next-generation auto industry aimed at mapping out strategies to enable ASEAN members to remain a major hub of auto production and exports.

Among other new efforts to further boost the economy in the fast-growing region is supporting digital startups as well as accelerating public and private investment to achieve decarbonization, according to the the statement.

"Based on strong mutual trust, Japan and ASEAN will tackle new challenges," Kishida said at a news conference after the end of the summit, adding that he is glad that they will take a "new step toward the next 50 years."

Indonesian President Joko Widodo, who served as a co-chair, also attended the press event, saying Japan and the bloc will maintain peace and stability in the region while adhering to international law.

The meeting came as Tokyo has been bolstering its ties with developing and emerging countries collectively known as the Global South, which includes ASEAN members, to capitalize on their growth while countering Beijing's increasing influence.

Japan regards its relations with ASEAN as strategically important, with the bloc facing the South China Sea, home to one of the world's busiest maritime sea lanes. Some of the 10 ASEAN

members also have overlapping territorial claims with China there.

Beijing claims almost the entire South China Sea, a vital trade corridor, and its increased deployment of vessels and other methods to assert its claims in disputed areas have riled nations across the region as well as Washington.

Japan and ASEAN agreed to "strengthen dialogue and cooperation for the maintenance of maritime security and safety, maritime order based on the rule of law, including freedom and safety of navigation and overflight and unimpeded commerce," the joint statement said.

Without identifying China outright, the statement said that the participating nations will "enhance maritime domain awareness as well as cooperation among coastguards and relevant law enforcement agencies, strengthen cooperation on maritime capacity building, and ensure the resolution of disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to threat or use of force in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law."

Japan announced on Saturday it would deepen ties with Malaysia and provide ¥400 million (\$2.8 million) for "warning and surveillance" equipment.

Japan agreed last month to help the Philippines buy coastguard vessels and to supply it with a radar system, and the two countries are discussing allowing troop deployments on each other's soil.

Japan expressed "serious concern" last week

**Indonesian President Joko Widodo, who served as a co-chair, also attended the press event, saying Japan and the bloc will maintain peace and stability in the region while adhering to international law.**



about "dangerous actions" after the latest tense confrontation between Philippine and Chinese vessels at in the South China Sea, which included a collision and Chinese ships shooting a water cannon.

Tokyo's substantial cooperation with ASEAN goes back to 1973 when they set up a forum on synthetic rubber to solve a trade dispute over Japanese rubber exports. Kishida said Japan will promote the exchange of young business leaders with the region.

ASEAN includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Myanmar, which has been under military rule since a February 2021 coup, was not invited to the summit.

East Timor's Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao took part in Sunday's gathering as an observer, as ASEAN has agreed in principle to admit the nation as its 11th member.

The nine participating ASEAN leaders are scheduled to join a separate summit of the 11-member Asia Zero Emission Community framework, also involving Japan and Australia, on Monday, with the focus on reducing carbon emissions.

\*\*\*

**Australia's latest strategic defence review, for instance, was prompted, in part, by the rapid modernization of China's military, as well as its increasing naval presence in the South China Sea.**

## The Russian Navy: Sinking in the Black Sea but Surging in the Pacific

Source: [gcaptain.com](https://gcaptain.com)

<https://gcaptain.com/russian-navy-pacific-surge/> 30 December 2023



*Russia's President Vladimir Putin, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Nikolai Yevmenov attend the Navy Day parade in Saint Petersburg, Russia July 25, 2021. Sputnik/Aleksey Nikolskyi/Kremlin via REUTERS*

The Alexey D Muraviev (TheConversation) China's expanding naval presence in the Pacific Ocean and the South and East China seas has become a major focus for Australia, the US and its allies.

Australia's latest strategic defence review, for instance, was prompted, in part, by the rapid modernization of China's military, as well as its increasing naval presence in the South China Sea.

According to the US Department of Defence's most recent annual report to Congress, China's navy has been strengthened with the addition of 30 new warships over the past 12 months. By 2030, the total number of ships is expected to

increase to 435, up from the current 370.

But China is not the only potentially adversarial maritime power that is flexing its muscles in the Indo-Pacific region. Russia is becoming a cause for concern, too, even though the 2023 strategic review did not mention it.

My latest research project, *Battle Reading the Russian Pacific Fleet 2023–2030*, recently commissioned and published by the Royal Australian Navy, shows how deeply the Russian military is investing in replenishing its ageing, Soviet-era Pacific Fleet.

Between 2022 and October 2023, for instance, it commissioned eight new warships and auxiliaries, including four nuclear-powered and conventional submarines. On December 11, two new nuclear-powered submarines formally joined the fleet, in addition to the conventional RFS *Mozhaisk* submarine, which entered service last month.

These figures may not look as impressive as the new Chinese vessels mentioned above, but it's important to recognise that the Russian Navy has the unique challenge of simultaneously addressing the needs of four fleets (in the Arctic and Pacific oceans and Black and Baltic seas), plus its Caspian Sea flotilla.

Furthermore, Russia's war in Ukraine has not had a considerable impact on the Pacific Fleet's ongoing modernization or its various exercises and other activities. Between early 2022 and October 2023, for instance, the Pacific Fleet staged eight strategic-level naval exercises, in addition to numerous smaller-scale activities.

## Rebuilding its Powerful Navy, Partnering with China

In addition to rebuilding its once-powerful navy, the Russians are committing enormous resources to building up naval ties in the Indo-Pacific and strengthening their key maritime coalitions.

In recent months, for instance, a naval task group of the Pacific Fleet embarked on a tour across southeast and south Asia. This tour made international headlines, but was effectively overlooked by the Australian media.

The Russian warships spent four days in Indonesia, then staged their first-ever joint naval exercises with Myanmar and another exercise later with India. The ships then visited Bangladesh for the first time in 50 years, followed by stops in Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam and the Philippines.

The tour signals a widening of Russia's scope in the region, though its most important naval partner remains China.

Also Read: [South African Navy Set To Welcome China And Russia](#)

According to my findings, between 2005 and October 2023, the Russian and Chinese navies have taken part in at least 19 confirmed bilateral and trilateral (also involving friendly regional navies) exercises and three joint patrols. The most recent was carried out in mid-2023, when the Russian and Chinese joint task force was deployed to the north Pacific, not far from the Alaskan coast.

**Between 2022 and October 2023, for instance, it commissioned eight new warships and auxiliaries, including four nuclear-powered and conventional submarines.**



## Implications for Australia and Allies

Canberra's preoccupation with China should not make us blind to other potential adversaries that could threaten our national security in the medium to long term.

According to my estimates, by the time the Royal Australian Navy commissions its first Hunter class frigate and the first Virginia-class, nuclear-powered attack submarine begins operations in 2032, the replenished Russian Pacific Fleet would have a battle force of at least 45 core warships.

This is expected to include 19 nuclear-powered and conventional submarines, supported by minor combat and auxiliary elements. Most of these units would be newly designed and built.

This clearly shows that if war someday breaks out in the Pacific, the Russian Pacific Fleet could present a formidable challenge to Australian and allied naval fleets in the western and northwestern Pacific, as well as the Arctic.

Australia's decision to acquire nuclear-powered platforms from the United States and United Kingdom suggests our intent to support and engage in long-range maritime operations with our allies, possibly as far as the northern Pacific and Arctic oceans.

And in times of crisis short of open war, Russia will also have more assets to support operations around Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean, extending its reach closer to the Royal Australian Navy's areas of immediate concern.

Finally, the deepening naval cooperation between China and Russia could become a risk factor in its own right as the two countries seek to counter the AUKUS security pact. This is especially true with the possibility of expanded joint naval operations in the Pacific.

Also read: [NATO Admiral Says Growing China-Russia Ties Raise Risk in Arctic](#)

Despite the tyranny of distance between Australia and Russia, we are no longer irrelevant in Moscow's strategic planning. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu made this clear in recent remarks blasting AUKUS as a threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

**During the Cold War confrontation in the Asia-Pacific, the Soviet Union's naval power in the region was a primary point of strategic concern for Australia, the US and its allies.**

This means Australia's navy and its maritime ambitions are increasingly being viewed as a risk factor to the Kremlin.

During the Cold War confrontation in the Asia-Pacific, the Soviet Union's naval power in the region was a primary point of strategic concern for Australia, the US and its allies. This is once again proving to be true. Canberra can't afford to ignore these developments any longer.

\*\*\*

## US Introduces New AUKUS Efforts Focused on Advanced Warfighting

Source: BNian Peng | The Diplomat

<https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4338288-us-introduces-new-aukus-efforts/> 01 December 2023



*U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin is seen during a Senate Appropriations Committee hearing to review of the National Security Supplemental Request on Tuesday, October 31, 2023.*

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced Friday that the U.S. is developing and experimenting advanced warfighting capabilities with the United Kingdom and Australia, marking a leap forward in the second phase of a trilateral alliance between the countries to bolster their Indo-Pacific presence.

Austin said the Australia-U.K.-U.S. alliance — known as AUKUS — was moving toward “innovating with cutting edge tech” in the defense industry on artificial intelligence (AI), electronic warfare and quantum technology.

The Pentagon chief met with Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles and U.K. Secretary of State for Defense Grant Shapps in Mountain View, Calif., on Friday, at the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit’s headquarters.

He said he held a productive discussion with the defense ministers and they reaffirmed their commitment to meet the goals of AUKUS.

“Again and again, AUKUS proves that we are stronger together and every day we move closer to our shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific,” Austin said.

The first pillar of AUKUS is focused on helping Australia build its own conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarine by the early 2040s and for Canberra to buy at least three U.S.-nuclear-powered submarines in the 2030s.

But the second pillar is centered on advanced warfighting capabilities between the three nations, including a series of experimental exercises with autonomous weapon systems in the waters of the Indo-Pacific region that will begin in 2024.

A senior U.S. defense official said the exercise series was “a bold new effort into testing, developing and delivering advanced maritime autonomous systems to our warfighters.”

**Austin said the Australia-U.K.-U.S. alliance — known as AUKUS — was moving toward “innovating with cutting edge tech” in the defense industry on artificial intelligence (AI), electronic warfare and quantum technology.**

“We’re using AUKUS to rapidly accelerate the sophistication and scale of systems in the maritime domain,” the official said. “Through AUKUS, we’re also building an enabling ecosystem for our three nations to innovate and share information, ideas and capabilities.”

They added that experiments were conducted with robotics and autonomous systems in South Australia in October and they are planning for a more robust integration of the systems in land and sea domains next year.

As a frame of reference for the exercises, the official pointed to autonomous systems used in

Task Force 59, a U.S. Navy task force — which has reached full operational capability with smaller AI-powered systems that carry cameras or collect information.

Marles on Friday said progress was being made “as we speak” on AUKUS pillar one, including U.S. submarine port visits to Australia, the construction of necessary infrastructure and Australian engineers training with American personnel.

**“When we look back at the significance of today’s meeting, we will see this as the critical meeting, which was a watershed in the progress of pillar two,” Marles said, describing AUKUS as changing the “character” of his nation and empowering it.**

But the defense minister said the second pillar of the alliance “has taken center stage” in the latest round of talks this week.

“When we look back at the significance of today’s meeting, we will see this as the critical meeting, which was a watershed in the progress of pillar two,” Marles said, describing AUKUS as changing the “character” of his nation and empowering it.

The second AUKUS pillar builds on Replicator, a new Pentagon initiative announced by Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks over the summer.

With Replicator, the Pentagon is pushing to develop and field thousands of autonomous systems within two years, spurring major advancements in the defense industry to meet the ambitious goals.

The Defense Department this week also announced a new working group made up of government and defense industry representatives from the U.S., Australia and the U.K. to facilitate

the development of advanced systems and warfighting capabilities under the second pillar.

President Biden announced AUKUS in 2021, touting a new vision for an alliance that will act as

a major enhancement of U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific and serve as a counter to the growing military of China.

In March, Biden laid out a firm path for Australia to develop and acquire nuclear-powered submarines, starting with a training plan for

Australian sailors to work with the U.S. and U.K. Navy at submarine ports this year.

The U.S. also began increasing American nuclear-powered submarine visits to Australia in 2023.

\*\*\*

### **Cherry-Picks of the Month**

1. AUKUS Defense Ministers Agree to Bolster Security - <https://www.marinelink.com/news/aukus-defense-ministers-agree-bolster-509887>
2. Arun Prakash Writes: Indian Navy in a threatening Red Sea - <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/indian-navy-read-sea-threat-yemen-iran-hamas-attack-on-israel-israel-hamas-war-9087994/>
3. Japan-ASEAN Special Summit: Major Takeaways - <https://www.vifindia.org/article/2023/december/27/japan-asean-special-summit-major-takeaways>
4. Rising Tensions Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea - <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/12/rising-tensions-between-china-and-philippines-south-china-sea>
5. Second China-Indian Ocean Region Forum: Agenda and Outcome - [https://www.icwa.in/show\\_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls\\_id=10303&lid=6571](https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=10303&lid=6571)



## CAPS Experts- Infocus

1. China's New 'Near-Space Command': Implication for India - <https://capsindia.org/chinas-new-near-space-command-implication-for-india/>
2. China's Grey Zone Activities in Philippine Waters and India's Stand - <https://capsindia.org/chinas-grey-zone-activities-in-philippine-waters-and-indias-stand/>
3. Exercise Bright Star-23: Global Military Diplomacy at its Best - <https://capsindia.org/exercise-bright-star-23-global-military-diplomacy-at-its-best/>
4. India's Bet on AI: Charting a Different Path - <https://capsindia.org/indias-bet-on-ai-charting-a-different-path/>

## Debates/ Podcasts

1. Indian Navy's Mega Maritime Surveillance As Houthi Launch Fresh Missile Attack In Red Sea - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3eywsLnUvE4>
2. Why is China fuming Over India-Philippines Naval Drill? - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L05ONxT-p9o>
3. South China Sea: The Philippines Has a Plan to Checkmate China | Vantage with Palki Sharma - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TNoRmKxSxao>
4. A half century of Japan-ASEAN Ties-NHK | WORLD-JAPAN NEWS - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=11C6knzhlv>



The Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS) is an independent, non-profit think tank that undertakes and promotes policy-related research, study and discussion on defence and military issues, trends and developments in air power and space for civil and military purposes, as also related issues of national security. The Centre is headed by Air Marshal Anil Chopra, PVSM AVSM VM VSM (Retd).

### **Centre for Air Power Studies**

P-284 Arjan Path, Subroto Park, New Delhi - 110010

Tel.: +91 - 11 - 25699131/32 Fax: +91 - 11 - 25682533

Email: capsnetdroff@gmail.com

Website: www.capsindia.org

Editorial Team: Air Commodore SP Singh VSM (Retd), Dr Joshy Paul, Ms Simran Walia, Mr Gaurav Sen and Mr Abhishek Sharma

Composed and Formatted by: Mr Rohit Singh, CAPS

Contact: +91 9716511091

Email: rohit\_singh.1990@hotmail.com

**Disclaimer:** Information and data included in this newsletter is for educational non-commercial purposes only and has been carefully adapted, excerpted or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate at the time of preparation. The Centre does not accept any liability for error therein. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.