



CENTRE FOR AIR POWER STUDIES (CAPS)

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INDO-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER



A Monthly Newsletter on Security and Strategic Issues on Indo-Pacific Region from
Centre for Air Power Studies

From the Editor's Desk

This month was a witness to several visits and meetings by leaders of major powers around the world. The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Beijing on June 18-19 and he assured that there was no change in the US One China Policy. The US would not accept any unilateral change of status quo. The second India-france-Australia trilateral focal points meeting was held on June 20, wherein, the three countries focussed on cooperating regarding maritime security, marine global commons and environment and multilateral engagement to ensure peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region and the entire international community.

One of the major highlights of this month was Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the US from June 21-24. Extended meetings were held between PM Modi and President Biden. The visit marked a transformational point as both leaders discussed issues and destabilizing actions in the East and South China sea and further emphasised the importance of freedom of navigation and international law for securing the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, H.E. Mr Enrique A. Manalo visited India from June 27-30. Both Dr. S. Jaishankar and the Philippines Minister discussed the expanding scope of India-Philippines ties and also agreed on working and cooperating for strengthening the bilateral partnership. Both countries also focussed on mutual interests and complementarities they share as vibrant democracies and economies in the Indo-Pacific region.

This month we present specially selected opinions and cherry picks covering all this and more. Do check out our Social Media Corner for some engaging and insightful content, including debates, interviews and podcasts from eminent experts.

Jai Hind

Vol III, No 02, 07 July 2023

CONTENTS

From the Editor's Desk
Opinion/ Review/ Expert View
Social Media Corner

PEEP-IN

*U.S., India Rapidly Expand Their
Military Cooperation*

Read more about it at :-

<https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3433245/us-india-rapidly-expand-their-military-cooperation/>

QUOTE

"The dark clouds of coercion and confrontation are casting their shadow in the Indo-Pacific. The stability of the region has become one of the central concerns of the India-US partnership."

- PM Narendra Modi

Opinions/Review/Expert View

With a Visit to China, Blinken Clears a Diplomatic Path, but it's Unclear Where it Goes

Source: John Ruwitch, NPR

<https://www.npr.org/2023/06/20/1183098899/antony-blinken-beijing-china-trip-analysis> 20 June 2023



U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Monday.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken's long-anticipated trip to Beijing shows that the administration is keen to reignite diplomacy and inject some stability to its dealings with China, but whether it was a success remains to be seen.

"The trip was intended to lower the temperature, not resolve fundamental disagreements."

Blinken held talks with China's top two foreign policy officials and even had an audience with leader Xi Jinping during his two-day stop in Beijing that ended on Monday.

But Analysts say China-U.S. ties are so fraught that re-establishing a semblance of stability and balance will take much more effort and political will — which will be tested by presidential election campaigns in the United States and Taiwan in the coming months. And while both sides say they want to reduce friction, their strategic assessments of the other have not budged.

"Under ordinary circumstances a visit to

China by the [U.S.] Secretary of State would be an important visit and should have the effect of advancing bilateral relations," said Shao Yuqun, a senior fellow with the center for American Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, a government think tank.

"But this visit, while still important, is hard to gauge in terms of how much it can advance relations. At a minimum, I think, it may keep things from getting worse, and if it can do that it would be a very good outcome. But I don't know if it can make things better in bilateral ties. That's still a question mark."

Ties between the world's No. 1 and No. 2 economies have sunk to their lowest point in decades, with disagreements festering over topics ranging from trade to Taiwan. Mutual trust is running thin.

Ahead of Blinken's trip, both governments sought to manage expectations, casting it as little more than an opportunity to exchange views and to explore potential areas of cooperation. The trip was originally scheduled to take place four months ago, but was postponed after a Chinese spy balloon was tracked floating across U.S. skies and shot down.

Danny Russel, vice president of the Asia Society Policy Institute and a former U.S. diplomat, said Blinken "fully met the admittedly modest expectations for his visit: meeting with President Xi; extensive, in-depth, closed-door discussions with top Chinese diplomats; avoiding public acrimony; agreeing to a few small bilateral steps; and

unclogging the pipeline of official bilateral contacts."

The "deliverables," however, were modest, and the trip was intended to lower the temperature, not resolve fundamental disagreements, he said.

Bilateral Talks Continue, but Domestic Politics also Matters

The two sides discussed increasing the number of flights between the countries, which are at a fraction of their pre-pandemic peak, as well as combating fentanyl production and enhancing educational exchanges.

Blinken invited Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang to visit the U.S., and said he expects more visits by senior officials in both directions in the coming months.

That could help set the stage for smooth meetings between Xi and President Biden this fall on the sidelines of the G20 and APEC summits.

Analysts said the visit also allowed Washington and Beijing to signal to other countries — nervous about their growing acrimony — that they are taking steps to dial down tensions.

Where it all ultimately leads is an open question, though, particularly in light of domestic political pressures that have built up the United States and China.

"Diplomacy is always a series of tests" that are constrained by the political environment at the time, said Susan Thornton, a retired U.S.

diplomat now with the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale University.

"And our political environment on China in the U.S. has never been more complicated than it is now — and it's getting more complicated as we move toward the presidential election season."

"We can't just keep getting together in meetings and sort of airing our grievances because that will lead to just a continuing downward spiral in the relationship."

Several Republican members of Congress criticized Blinken for making the trip to China at all, saying it projected weakness on the part of the Biden administration and suggesting it could hurt America's national security.

The Basic Strategic Positions of the Two Remain Unchanged

Given the pressures, China's leaders will be watching to see if the Biden administration can make policy adjustments and follow through on promises that some in the U.S. may see as concessions to Beijing.

A bigger issue for the future of the relationship, however, may be the fact that the basic strategic positions of the two countries remain unchanged. Both sides acknowledged during Blinken's trip the need for China and the U.S. to get along better, but they also dug into positions that are seemingly at odds.

Blinken cast the relationship as one that is fundamentally competitive, while Chinese read-outs of the meetings indicated that Beijing believes that to be an inappropriate framing of the relationship.

After his meeting with Blinken, the Chinese

Communist Party's top diplomat, Wang Yi, was reported as having said "a choice needs to be made between confrontation, cooperation or conflict."

"The root cause of the trough in China-U.S. relations is that the U.S. side holds a wrong perception of China, which leads to a wrong policy towards China," he was quoted as saying.

Thornton said visits like Blinken's are good, but diplomacy cannot be sustained without common interests or a common purpose to work on — and it's unclear at this point where China and the United States can find those.

"I think we can't just keep getting together in meetings and sort of airing our grievances because that will lead to just a continuing downward spiral in the relationship," she added.

"A State of Cold and Competitive Peaceful Coexistence"

Meanwhile, in some corners of the relationship there's not even a forum to air grievances. No apparent progress was made during Blinken's trip toward re-starting military-to-military communications, which Beijing has severed despite rising tensions and recent "close call" incidents in the air and at sea.

Wen-Ti Sung, a Taiwan expert at the Australian National University's Center on China in the World and a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub, said strategic competition is the name of the game at this

point and the only thing left to do is to work out the terms on which it unfolds.

"I think we are seeing the U.S. and China settling into a state of cold and competitive peaceful coexistence," Sung said.

"There is sufficient conflict of interest by this point that a return to an engagement-oriented relationship, like we had 15 or 20 years ago, will be very hard to arrive at."

What Did Prime Minister Modi's State Visit Achieve?

Source: Manjari Chatterjee Miller | CFR

<https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-did-prime-minister-modis-state-visit-achieve> 26 June 2023



U.S. President Joe Biden and India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi toast during an official state dinner at the White House in Washington. REUTERS/Elizabeth Frantz

Last week Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi completed a four-day state visit to the United States. Modi was not only feted with a welcome ceremony and state dinner, but was also invited to address Congress for the second time during his prime ministership. These high-profile events

Modi's state visit led to positive outcomes for both India and the United States, demonstrating how important the bilateral relationship has become to the two countries.

were intended to reflect the two countries' shared commitment to peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and signify that the United States sees India as a critical partner. Judging by the attention paid

to Modi's arrival and the deals announced, both countries came away with winning outcomes, singly and jointly.

For India, the honors bestowed on Modi—a man who just a few years ago was denied entry to the United States for his role in the 2002 communal riots in Gujarat—showed to the world that far from being a pariah, he is now the powerful and accepted leader of a valued partner country. The United States also offered concrete wins. The Biden administration promised to help India increase production of electric vehicles and meet its goal of installing 500 gigawatts of wind, solar, and other renewable energy this decade. U.S. memory chip firm Micron Technology will invest up to \$825 million in a new chip assembly and test plant in Gujarat, which will be its first factory in India. On immigration, which has been a thorny issue, the United States agreed to allow a small number of Indians on H-1B visas to renew them in the United States without traveling abroad.

The United States too made symbolic and material gains. In terms of symbolic wins, the United States was able to showcase its close partnership with India—a country that also shares its deep anxiety about the specter of a rising China—and highlight the exchange of effusive warm statements between President Biden and Prime Minister Modi a mere two days after the former labelled President of China Xi Jinping a “dictator.” There were also material wins. Indian solar panel maker Vikram Solar Limited will invest up to \$1.5 billion in the U.S. solar energy supply chain. India has also agreed to join the U.S.-led Artemis Accords on space exploration

and will work with NASA on a joint mission to the International Space Station in 2024. In a huge political win for the Biden administration, India will remove retaliatory tariffs imposed on U.S. products such as chickpeas and apples without the expectation that the United States will remove its own tariffs on steel and aluminum imports that had initially led to these retaliatory tariffs.

Perhaps most importantly, both countries scored wins in their defense and strategic partnership. U.S. company General Electric has signed a memorandum of understanding with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited to produce fighter jet engines for the Indian Air Force. While the deal is subject to congressional approval, this is a huge step both

India has also agreed to join the U.S.-led Artemis Accords on space exploration and will work with NASA on a joint mission to the International Space Station in 2024.


for India, which can domestically manufacture fighter jets but not the engines to power them, and for the United States, which is very choosy about the sharing of military technology. Moreover, India's defense ministry has approved the purchase of armed MQ-9B SeaGuardian drones (a type of Predator drone) made by General Atomics, which will enhance the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of India's armed forces across domains. Currently, only some U.S. allies own Predator drones. The two countries also established a Joint Indo-U.S. Quantum Coordination Mechanism to facilitate joint research between public and private sectors and launched the INDUS-X partnership to expand their strategic technology and defense industrial cooperation. India also agreed to join the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), a U.S.-led partnership with twelve other countries plus the European Union, to create critical energy minerals supply chains.

Finally, and significantly, Prime Minister Modi was also persuaded to take two questions in a joint press conference with President Biden. Although the two leaders sidestepped public critique and offered awkward answers to a U.S. reporter's question about democracy and human rights (the less-loaded second question from an Indian reporter was about climate change), the fact that Modi, who has not held a press conference in nearly a decade, agreed to respond to reporters at all was a further indication of how important the bilateral relationship has become for both nations.

Evolving Contours of Delhi-Manila Ties

Source: Harsh V. Pant and Don Mclain Gill | ORF

<https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/evolving-contours-of-delhi-manila-ties/> 28 June 2023



Australia The Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary, Enrique Manalo, arrived in India on 27 June to take part in a four-day visit upon the invitation of External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar. Both officials held their fifth meeting of the Philippines-India Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation. Additionally, since his arrival in New Delhi, Manalo has also been engaging with various distinguished Indian foreign affairs institutions such as the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and the

In a region that is increasingly defined by cooperation based on like-mindedness, shared interests, and common concerns, the Philippines-India ties are crucial to the stability of the Indo-Pacific.

Observer Research Foundation (ORF). While the Philippine foreign affairs secretary's visit is aimed at reviewing and enhancing the status of the Philippine-India bilateral partnership, it also comes against the backdrop of an intensifying regional geopolitical landscape.

In a region that is increasingly defined by cooperation based on like-mindedness, shared interests, and common concerns, the Philippines-India bilateral relationship serves as a crucial element to the stability of the Indo-Pacific. Both democratic countries converge in securing the post-Second World War order, while also strengthening national capacities towards territorial defence and maritime security. However, throughout nearly 15 years, since the beginning of the 21st century, the relationship between Manila and New Delhi remained cordial at best despite the conducive strategic environment they both operated in.

The problem, however, centred on the lack of attention at the domestic decision-making level. While in the first two decades since the end of the Cold War, New Delhi's capacity to translate its growing material capabilities into robust external policies was limited, it still endeavoured to illustrate its willingness to forge robust ties with its Southeast Asian neighbours. However, among the Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines was not able to significantly operationalise the idea of establishing close strategic ties with India during this period, unlike its other immediate neighbours such as Vietnam, Singapore, Myanmar, and Indonesia. This can be partly explained by the domestic

perception of Manila's leadership between 2001 and 2016, which steered clear of pushing for the diversification of strategic partnerships beyond traditional and immediate relations.

However, since 2016, ties between both the Philippines and India received a much-needed boost due to former President Rodrigo Duterte's desire to prioritise the diversification of Manila's strategic partners, particularly in the realm of security. This coincided greatly with the notable developments spearheaded by Prime Minister Narendra Modi towards Southeast Asia through the Act East Policy of 2014. The period saw a series of important milestones,

such as regular high-level visits between the senior officials of both countries, a first-ever quadrilateral joint naval exercise in the South China Sea in 2019, with the inclusion of the US and Japan, and the sale of the BrahMos

supersonic cruise missiles in 2022. It was also during this period when India provided US \$500,000 to the Philippines amidst the devastating siege in Marawi in 2017, which was the first time ever India provided any country with aid, directed towards counterterrorism efforts. Moreover, in 2020, the Philippine Navy flag officer in command Vice Admiral Giovanni Carlo Bacordo highlighted how the expansion of naval cooperation with India is crucial to keep the "seas safer and more secured for everyone".

This period marked a new beginning for the bilateral relationship between Manila and New Delhi with both countries recognising the value of each other's partnership. More importantly, Manila has also embraced the idea

of incorporating India in its strategic calculus for issues of traditional security and defence, which was a stark contrast to how relations were in the past—often limited to areas of low politics. Furthermore, with the electoral victory of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in 2022, it is likely that the momentum will sustain between both countries for two very important reasons.

First, in a bid to prioritise Philippine territorial defence and maritime security, Marcos Jr. has been intensifying Manila's security engagements with its traditional ally, the US. From the expansion of the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) to the establishment of a

Both democratic countries converge in securing the post-Second World War order, while also strengthening national capacities towards territorial defence and maritime security.

framework for joint maritime patrols in the South China Sea, the Philippines and the US are continuously endeavouring to deepen and broaden the scope of their partnership. This eventually resulted in the inauguration of trilateral sea drills with Japan and a potential quad-like arrangement with Australia, which has the potential of narrowing the operational gaps within the US hub-and-spokes network in the Indo-Pacific for better functionality in securing the established order.

Amidst this reality, there is an opportunity for Manila and New Delhi to work closely within such an extended multilateral framework. While India is a major defence partner of the US, it also shares a global and strategic partnership with Japan and a comprehensive strategic partnership with Australia. All four major Indo-Pacific democracies are engaged in various bilateral and multilateral arrangements with the purpose of safeguarding the peace and stability of the Indo-

Pacific. Therefore, the chances of synergising efforts towards area-specific cooperative frameworks between the Philippines and India in the context of a wider multilateral strategic network with the US, Japan, and Australia are feasible, given that its basic operationalisation was witnessed in 2019. Such activities can be replicated and remodelled in the future given the deep convergences of all countries involved.

Second, while the Philippines has chosen to deepen its alignments with the US hub-and-spokes system, it remains steadfast in maintaining and managing ties with China. On 5 May, Marcos Jr. emphasised that the Philippines' desire to enhance its maritime security capabilities is in no way aimed at disengaging and cutting ties with China. This was again reiterated on 9 June when the Philippine President highlighted how Manila will not shift away from China. Similarly, during his lecture Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) on 27 June, Manalo explained how the maritime dispute with China does not define the overarching nature of bilateral ties between Manila and Beijing. Furthermore, as an illustration of the Southeast Asian country's unwillingness to be engulfed in bloc politics, the Philippine National Security Council noted that Manila does not want to meddle in the tensions brewing in the Taiwan Strait.

This perspective of Manila converges well with New Delhi's consistent adherence to strategic autonomy. Being the fifth-largest economy with the world's largest population and a formidable military, India has opposed engaging in bloc politics; rather, it has constantly pushed

for cooperation based on common concerns, interests, and respect for domestic sensitivities. While India continues to face tensions with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), it keeps diplomatic channels open, along with the emphasis on not taking part in any rigid coalition against a particular country. Given this level of political maturity, Manila will be able

Manila has also embraced the idea of incorporating India in its strategic calculus for issues of traditional security and defence, which was a stark contrast to how relations were in the past—often limited to areas of low politics.

to maximise its ties with a rising India without worrying about falling deeper into the US-China power competition. Therefore, India can serve as a strategic buffer amidst Manila's desire to manage relations with China on one hand and enhance security ties

with the US alliance network on the other.

Given this reality, the Philippines and India are faced with an opportunity to maximise the potential of their bilateral partnership. Positive signs have been noted towards the furthering of strategic cooperation in both the traditional and non-traditional security realms. Among such areas is cybersecurity. Given Manila's limited cyber-defence capabilities, it is crucial for the Southeast Asian country to utilise its security partnerships to further this goal. In this light, India offered operational cyber security training to the Philippines military. The Philippines and India also discussed the possible deployment of an Indian defence attaché in Manila, indicating their desire to explore new areas of security cooperation. Therefore, it is imperative for both states to continue maximising the utility of their emerging partnership given the strategic uncertainties plaguing the Indo-Pacific. However, consistency remains the most important component in strengthening any form

of strategic cooperation. Thus, the need for both countries to maintain consistent engagements is crucial to further deepen and broaden the scope of their burgeoning ties.

How Australia can Leverage France's Indo-Pacific Presence

The Interpreter

<https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-australia-can-leverage-france-s-indo-pacific-presence> 30 June 2023



Australia should ensure the 2+2 Ministerial Consultations and officials dialogues focus on meeting the needs of the region (Stephane de Sakutin/AFP via Getty Images)

The last five years have been a rollercoaster for Australia-France relations: a cancelled submarine contract, a major breakdown in bilateral ties, and now a steady recovery building towards a “bilateral roadmap”. More recently, President Emmanuel Macron’s positioning of France as a puissance d’équilibre – a balancing power – in strategic competition between the United States and China has cast doubts in Australian and American minds about France’s reliability as a long term partner in the Indo-Pacific – concern over comments by Macron in April regarding Taiwan and the response it generated are symptomatic of this.

In this context, a new options paper from the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy and Defence Dialogue – the first major report on

Australia-France ties since AUKUS – examines how Canberra should recalibrate its relationship with Paris to enhance collaboration in the Indo-Pacific.

This starts with understanding the provenance of French strategic culture, driven by a Gaullist tradition that privileges French sovereign decision making and autonomy. While France’s interests and actions align far more closely with those of the United States and its allies, France is firm in its view that it will engage in the world on this basis. The critical point for Australia is to recognise how France’s words and actions, while not always perfectly echoing its own, sit within this broader tradition of strategic thought.

While putting a lower ceiling on bilateral trust, the 2021 rupture in Franco-Australian relations has forced both sides to develop a more realistic understanding of each other. France now has greater clarity about Australia’s strategic outlook and alliance priorities. At the same time,

A tumultuous couple of years in relations can settle to a new acceptance – seeing opportunities as well as risks.

Australia miscalculated the importance of the submarines to France’s overarching Indo-Pacific strategy. While there is convergence between the two countries’ visions for the Indo-Pacific, Australia needs to understand how France’s strategic outlook and relative priorities differ from its own.

France’s more independent stance within strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific also offers opportunities for Australia. Working with France may give greater space for Australia to influence parts of the region that are reluctant to be seen to be “taking sides” with either the United States or China. In particular, Australia should consider how its language around “strategic equilibrium” might dovetail with France’s “balancing power”

position. Similarly, there may be openings for Australia and France to coordinate on the substance of messaging but generate greater influence by speaking with different voices – for instance, on human rights, regional relations with China and Russia, and awareness of malign foreign influence.

Australia must also see France's Indo-Pacific engagement in its global context. Australia should not underestimate how much French bandwidth is consumed by its ongoing role in Africa, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and broader North Atlantic security. Moreover, with most hard assets positioned around metropolitan France, distance prevents their rapid deployment to the Indo-Pacific. The French Senate has also raised questions about whether France's resource allocation and depth of strategy in the Indo-Pacific really match its rhetoric.

In working closely with France in the region, Australia must manage risks and sensitivities in frank terms. The first is around the complexity of maintaining relationships with the semi-autonomous French territories in the Pacific – in particular, how New Caledonia and French Polynesia engage in groupings such as the Pacific Islands Forum on essentially the same terms as sovereign nations, even though foreign relations and other key policy domains remain under the purview of Paris. Australia needs to be cognisant of how interests can diverge between overseas and metropolitan France and navigate this complexity over time. Canberra wants to maintain good relationships with both Paris and local authorities and populations in French territories – not least because those territories might one day become independent nations.

Resentment and distrust over France's nuclear testing last century, colonial history and ongoing sovereignty over parts of the Pacific persist.

The second risk lies in how France acts and is perceived in the Pacific. Resentment and distrust over France's nuclear testing last century, colonial history and ongoing sovereignty over parts of the Pacific persist in parts of the region. Developments in recent years around New Caledonia's status, especially the 2021 independence referendum, have added to this. More broadly, French engagement in the Pacific is often regarded as inconsistent and more top-down, with less engagement with local needs and preferences when compared to Australia's approach. There are risks to Australia's own relationships and equities in the Pacific if it perceived as being too close or sympathetic to France, or if it uncritically accepts all French positions.

Nonetheless, there are positive signs that France will ramp up its Indo-Pacific role in terms of a greater permanent military presence, an expanded diplomatic footprint, and a larger development contribution in the Pacific. Australia should look to identify challenges areas across the Indo-Pacific where France has particular advantages and capacities that intersect with Australian interests. Thematically, France has strengths it can bring to bear in development (such as environmental and climate security and infrastructure) and the governance of territorial waters (such as maritime domain awareness and exclusive economic zone monitoring).

While engaging France on French priorities gives Australia leverage to influence Paris' decision making, there is a balance to be struck between relative priorities. Australia should structure the 2+2 Ministerial Consultations and officials dialogues to focus on the Indo-Pacific.

Within this, Australia should ensure that the bilateral roadmap is framed around meeting the needs of the region. Premising Australia-France cooperation solely in terms of strategic competition will be counterproductive to effective coordination and relational influence, especially in the Pacific.

Cherry-Picks of the Month

1. Biden, Modi hail New Era for US-India Ties and Tout Deals - <https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-modi-strengthen-ties-with-defense-trade-agreements-2023-06-22/>
2. Antony Blinken in China: All Eyes on Whether US Secretary of State Will Meet Xi Jinping - <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jun/19/antony-blinken-china-visit-meetings-talks-trip-xi-jinping-taiwan>
3. The Philippines and India: A Partnership for the 21st Century - <https://www.hindustantimes.com/ht-insight/international-affairs/the-philippines-and-india-a-partnership-for-the-21st-century-101687452427863.html>
4. Japan Leveraging its Position Through its G7 Presidency - <https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/japan-leveraging-its-position-through-its-g7-presidency-simram-walia-for-inside-policy/>
5. To Balance the Quad Equation, India and Australia Must Drive an "Indo" Focus - <https://www.bairdmaritime.com/work-boat-world/maritime-security-world/naval/opinion-to-balance-the-quad-equation-india-and-australia-must-drive-an-indo-focus/>

CAPS Experts-InFocus

1. India Bolstering its Engagement with the Pacific Island Nations - <https://capsindia.org/india-bolstering-its-engagement-with-the-pacific-island-nations/>
2. India-US Jet Engine Deal and its Significance for Aatmanirbhar Bharat - <https://capsindia.org/india-bolstering-its-engagement-with-the-pacific-island-nations/>
3. Revitalising Japan's Defence Industry and India-Japan Defence Cooperation - <https://capsindia.org/revitalising-japans-defence-industry-and-india-japan-defence-cooperation/>

Debates/Panel Discussions

1. The Future of US-Taiwan Relations, with Susan M. Gordon and

Michael G. Mullen , Council on Foreign Relations - <https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/future-us-taiwan-relations-susan-m-gordon-and-michael-g-mullen>

2. PM Modi's US Visit Hailed for Partnerships in Critical Technology - <https://www.cnbctv18.com/business/pm-modis-us-visit-hailed-for-partnerships-in-critical-technology-17067061.htm>

3. Is USA Prepping Indo-Pacific for War? Will it Slash & Burn, Cut & Run, Again? | WION Game Plan - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LtzsdoUrpyQ>



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