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INTEGRATED DETERRENCE: UNDERSTANDING THE NEW DEFENCE STRATEGY OF USA

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of deterrence predates nuclear weapons. The basic assumption of deterrence is to deny the opponent the prospect of an easy victory at an acceptable cost. Over the years, possession of nuclear weapons has become a tool of deterrence for even peaceful democracies. It works as a threat for punishment to inflict unacceptable damage. The seven decades of maintaining nuclear deterrence as a first option to avoid war came at a high cost. Although it averted a hot war, it transformed into what we know as the cold war, which escalated into an arms race between the USSR and USA. But nuclear weapons did not prevent small-scale conventional war between states. There has been a demand to integrate conventional and nuclear approaches to deter the opposing party from starting any type of conflict. The concept of “integrated deterrence” is not new.¹ It may be traced back to the conceptual forefathers of flexible response in army, navy, and RAND Corporation publications from the 1940s and 1950s. In the 1980s, all sides of

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1. Adam Mount and Pranay Vaddi, “An Integrated Deterrence: Approach to Deterrence Posture Reviewing Conventional and Nuclear Forces in a National Defense Strategy”, Federation of American Scientists, 2021, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep27738>. Accessed on August 8, 2022.

“In terms of integrated ... we mean, integrated across all domains, so Conventional, Nuclear, Cyber, Space, Informational and it is also integrated across theatres of competition and potential conflict and integrated across the spectrum of conflict from high-intensity warfare to the grey zone”.

the defence and deterrence debates pushed for what we now term conventional nuclear integration².

The debate started again when Colin Kahl, undersecretary of defence for policy for the United States, said about the new United States strategy during the Defence One Outlook Summit, 2022, “In terms of integrated ... we mean, integrated across all domains, so Conventional, Nuclear, Cyber, Space, Informational and it is also integrated across theatres of competition and potential conflict and integrated across the spectrum of conflict from high-intensity warfare to the grey zone”. The integration was also to include all instruments of power, along with integration across allies and partners.

This article aims to provide some insight into the United States’ planned new defence policy, “Integrated Deterrence”. It will provide an overview of integrated deterrence as a strategy for combining ‘military means’ with ‘non-military tools’ to discourage adversaries. There are four components to this work. The first section, titled ‘Introduction,’ will provide a comprehensive overview of the concept based on different speeches and studies by US government executives and organisations. The second section, under ‘Integrated Deterrence: Concept,’ will attempt to describe the numerous complexities of the new defence policy. ‘Allies and Partners’, ‘Modern Technology’, and ‘Sanctions’ are the three sub-sections of this section. As the new defence strategy attempts to balance power and values, these new components in defence strategy, together with the United States’ traditional military capabilities in deterrence, are very important. The third section, titled ‘Challenges,’ will attempt to investigate the difficulties connected with the new approach, not only in its implementation but also in its conceptualisation.

2. James A. Russell, “Flexible Response and Integrated Deterrence at Sea in the 21st Century: Implications for the U.S. Navy”, *Military Strategy Magazine*, vol 8, issue 1. Accessed on September 7, 2022.

Several defence specialists have expressed strong reservations about the planned policy. Finally, the 'Conclusion' section will attempt to summarise all of the arguments for and against the suggested defence plan.

THE ORIGINS

We can trace the recommendation in the various United States' policies. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) grouped nuclear and non-nuclear strike systems in the same vertex of its new triad concept.³

The 2013 nuclear employment guidance directed "increased reliance on conventional or non-nuclear strike capabilities ..." as "a central part of reducing the role of nuclear weapons".⁴ In the 2018 National Defence Strategy (NDS), it was recommended that many layers of conventional forces be developed to help prevent the nuclear-armed opponent attack; while the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR 2018) suggested non-strategic nuclear options to enhance deterrence of aggression and nuclear use.

Adam Mount and Pranay Vaddi (2021) in their paper, "An Integrated Approach to Deterrence" showed that Russia, China, and North Korea have developed some kind of "hybrid-nuclear-conventional strategies" that envision limited nuclear and strategic conventional strikes for coercive purposes early in the conflict.⁵ The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) suggested that "integrating and exercising all instruments of power has become increasingly important as potential adversaries integrate their military capabilities", especially for managing "limited nuclear escalation and non-nuclear strategic attack".⁶

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3. US Department of Defence, 2002, <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/NPR/>. Accessed on September 9, 2022.

4. US Department of Defence, 2013.

5. Mount and Vaddi, n. 1.

6. US Department of Defence, 2018, <https://dod.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.aspx>. Accessed on September 9, 2022.

There is growing understanding in the United States about the “revisionist” attitude of China.⁷ China has already started challenging the dominance of the United States across the economic and military domains (South China Sea). China is on its way to modernising its army by 2047; meanwhile, it already has the world’s largest navy.⁸ The United States would need the help of its partners to maintain the rule-based order in the world. Realising the potential threat from this emerging power, defence experts are suggesting countering the “hegemonic” tendency of China with the help of both military and non-military options.

THE CONCEPT

“Integrated deterrence” can be explained in simple terms as deterrence in which ‘nuclear deterrence’ is reinforced with ‘non-nuclear’ and ‘non-military’ forces, without undermining the centrality of nuclear weapons. The concept underlines the understanding that nuclear weapons cannot deter all-encompassing threats. Thus, other forms of instruments are needed to deter threats. While the actual meaning and implication of “integrated deterrence” will be clear only when the new defence strategy is out, with the help of speeches and scholarly work done on the subject, it is possible to get an idea of what the Biden Administration is thinking when it refers to ‘integration’.

Defence Secretary of the United States Lloyd Austin gave the contours of the new defence strategy in Singapore. He said:

Integrated deterrence means using every military and non-military tool in our toolbox in lockstep with our allies and partners. Integrated deterrence is about using existing capabilities and building new ones, deploying

7. Angela Stent, “Russia and China: Axis of Revisionists?”, The Brookings Institution, February 2022, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/russia-and-china-axis-of-revisionists/>. Accessed on September 24, 2022.

8. Benjamin Mainardi, “Yes, China has the World’s Largest Navy. That Matters Less Than you Might Think”, *The Diplomat*, April 7, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/yes-china-has-the-worlds-largest-navy-that-matters-less-than-you-might-think/>. Accessed on September 8, 2022.

them all in new and networked ways—all tailored to a region's security landscape, and growing in partnership with our friends.⁹

Emphasising the importance of deterrence in maintaining peace and stability since the end of World War II, he said:

Deterrence remains the cornerstone of American security. And for decades we have maintained the capabilities needed to ward off conflict and to preserve the stability that lies at the heart of our shared opportunity.¹⁰

One thing which is clear from these statements is that the focus is to combine all the available military and non-military tools to deter the enemy. Realising the potential of modern warfare, there is a lot of mention of modern technology to be used in the future. Artificial intelligence and quantum computing are going to play crucial roles in modern warfare, deterring the enemy in all formats.¹¹ After witnessing the Russia-Ukraine crisis, many scholars are now suggesting that the new defence strategy of “integrated deterrence” should be the perfect combination of “deterrence by denial” and “deterrence by punishment”.¹² Deterrence by denial works with the objective of making it very difficult for the enemy to accomplish any of its objectives by using force. In this case, the enemy is forced to calculate the benefit it will achieve against the cost, which makes the enemy reconsider the decision of attacking by justifying the use of force. Deterrence by punishment works on the principle of threatening a direct attack against the enemy, with a series of conventional and nuclear weapons whose consequences are so detrimental that the enemy is forced to give up the

9. Oren Liebermann, “Defense Secretary Lays out Vision of Future in First Major Speech”, CNN, May 1, 2021, <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/04/30/politics/defense-secretary-lloyd-austin-speech/index.html>. Accessed on September 5, 2022.

10. Ibid.

11. Stephen Losey, “After Ukraine Invasion, is US Deterrence Strategy Already Outdated?”, *Defense News*, May 7, 2022, <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/05/06/after-ukraine-invasion-is-us-deterrence-strategy-already-outdated/>. Accessed on September 6, 2022.

12. Ibid.

The new defence strategy aims to create a 'seamless web' between all the components of the United States' defence architecture. The aim is to create a central response platform that can coordinate between all the departments, ranging from sanctions, and conventional military options to nuclear weapons in deterring the foe.

idea of attacking. It also involves political actions like sanctions and other political steps to increase the costs of action beyond the benefit the enemy is expecting by using force.¹³

The new defence strategy aims to create a 'seamless web' between all the components of the United States' defence architecture. The aim is to create a central response platform that can coordinate between all the departments, ranging from sanctions, and conventional military options to nuclear weapons in deterring the foe. Greater emphasis on integrated deterrence is also because of an increased threat to the United States in the 'grey zone', where the United

States is considered lacking in terms of its ability to counter-balance. The so-called 'hybrid wars' are those where countries like China and Russia are deploying all sorts of instruments from cyber warfare to the paramilitary to achieve their political objectives. Though it is not stated anywhere, it is implicit that China is the main concern behind this new defence strategy of the United States, and, of course, Russia is a threat in the Eurasian region.¹⁴ It is common understanding among defence experts that China is going to surpass the United States in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and military power in the near future. So it becomes important for the United States to look into the weak links and take proper measures on time.

ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN INTEGRATED DETERRENCE

The Biden Administration, with the intent of moving away from the policy of the previous Trump Administration, which tried to go alone instead of

13. Russell, n. 2.

14. Ibid.

strengthening the alliances, has been giving extra weightage to its allies and partners. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin, in one of his speeches, said, “We need new capacities and operational flexibility for the fights of the future”.¹⁵ In his Fullerton lecture series speech in Singapore, Austin explained:

Integrated deterrence also means working with partners to deter coercion and aggression across the spectrum of conflict, including in the so-called “grey zone” where the rights and livelihood of the people of Southeast Asia are coming under stress. That’s why we are working on strengthening local capacity and bolstering maritime domain awareness so that nations can better protect their sovereignty as well as fishing rights and the energy resources offered to them by international law. And, meanwhile, we are improving interoperability across our security network, and that includes more exercises and training.¹⁶

The greater importance given to partners in the Indo-Pacific or boosting the Cold War era alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are the steps in the direction of strengthening those commitments and gearing up support for future conflicts. In the Indo-Pacific, groups like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and security partnerships like Australia, United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS) are taking institutional shape. The United States is conducting regular exercises with the like-minded countries of India, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the UK, etc. in the region.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken has also emphasised the importance of allies and partners, and “bringing in allies and partners working across the conventional, nuclear, space, and informational domains; drawing on

15. Liebermann, n. 9.

16. “Secretary of Defense Llyod J. Austin 3 Participates in Fullerton Lecture Series in Singapore”, July 27, 2021, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2711025/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-participates-in-fullerton-lecture-serie/>. Accessed on September 5, 2022.

our reinforcing strengths in economics, in technology, and diplomacy.”¹⁷ Unlike the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the conflict between the United States and China will take place predominantly in the Indo-Pacific area. The role of allies in this region, hence, becomes critical.¹⁸

MODERN TECHNOLOGY IN INTEGRATED DETERRENCE

We can notice a greater reference to modern technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and the man-machine interface in various speeches of the US defence secretary, “What we need is the right mix of technology, operational concepts, and capabilities—all woven together in a networked way that is so credible, flexible, and formidable that it will give any adversary a pause”.¹⁹ The greater emphasis on technology also comes from the vantage point that China is advancing rapidly in developing these modern technologies, and the United States is lagging behind in major sectors.²⁰ The United States and many of its partners and allies are concerned about how Beijing will use these technologies in ways that contradict many of their key interests and values.²¹

Deterring an enemy with the use of technologies will not only require the United States to follow up on what China or Russia is doing but take a lead. Investing heavily in research and development and building cooperation with countries like Japan, India, the UK, France, etc. is the need of the hour. What is lacking from this projected concept of “integrated deterrence” is how the Biden Administration is going to implement the changes, which will be

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17. Steve Ferenzi and Robert C. Jones, “Three Ways to Improve Integrated Deterrence”, *The National Interest*, July 22, 2022, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/three-ways-improve-integrated-deterrence-203695>. Accessed on September 2, 2022.
 18. Kurt M Campbell, “The Changing China Debate”, *Chatham House*, August, 20, 2020, <https://americas.chathamhouse.org/article/the-changing-china-debate/>. Accessed on September 10, 2022.
 19. Liebermann, n. 9
 20. Tarun Chhabra, Rush Doshi, Ryan Hass, and Emilie Kimball, “Global China: Technology”, Brookings, April 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/global-china-technology/>. Accessed on September 9, 2022.
 21. Ibid.

interesting to see in the future when the new defence strategy will be out in the public domain.

With the development of new technologies like additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence, robotics, nanotechnology, cyber technology, hyper-sonics, quantum computing, and human-machine collaboration, it is widely visible that this development will be used in the weaponisation process.²² This development will change future conflicts, as cyber warfare will get stuck with the conventional military war between states. The use of drones and unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and attack will play a major role in future conflicts, and maintaining an edge over the enemy is required right now. With greater investment in Research and Development (R&D), China is building new and modern Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).²³

SANCTIONS IN INTEGRATED DETERRENCE

The attempt to combine non-military tools with conventional military options includes the use of sanctions and the dominance of the US over the International Political Economy (IPE). The US knows that the US dollar is still the largest reserve currency in the world. Approximately 59 percent of all the reserve currencies around the world are in US dollars.²⁴ Meanwhile, China is the largest holder of US dollars, amounting to \$3.13 trillion in May 2022.²⁵ So, under the new defence strategy, the aim is to use the dominance of the dollar over world trade in a way to deter the enemy without using direct

22. Adam Lowther and Stephen Cimbala, "Future Technology and Nuclear Deterrence", Wild Blue Yonder, Air University, February 3, 2020, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Article-Display/Article/2071083/future-technology-and-nuclear-deterrence/#sdendnote5sym>. Accessed on September 9, 2022.

23. Rick Joe, "China's Growing High-end Military Drone Force", *The Diplomat*, November 27, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/chinas-growing-high-end-military-drone-force/>. Accessed on September 9, 2022.

24. Serkan Arslanalp, Barry Eichengreen, Chima Simpson-Bell, "Dollar Dominance and the Rise of Nontraditional Reserve Currencies", IMF BLOG, June 1, 2022, <https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/06/01/blog-dollar-dominance-and-the-rise-of-nontraditional-reserve-currencies>. Accessed on September 20, 2022.

25. Phil Rosen, "China Has the World's Largest Foreign Exchange Reserves and it just Grew for the First Time in 2022 as the Dollar Strengthens", *Business Insider India*, June 8, 2022, <https://www.businessinsider.in/stock-market/news/china-has-the-worlds-largest-foreign-exchange-reserves-and-it-just-grew-for-the-first-time-in-2022-as-the-us-dollar-strengthens/articleshow/92067516.cms>. Accessed on September 21, 2022.

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force. In the interconnected world of the 21st century, the over-dependence on the dollar gives the United States an edge to formulate rules and agendas for world trade to a large extent. We saw how the United States was able to block almost \$630 billion through sanctions from Russia as a reserve after Russia launched an offensive against Ukraine.²⁶

China understands the new game of geoeconomics in the 21st century. Eventually, it will overcome the United States in terms of GDP, so the United States needs to maintain its influence over the international economic system.²⁷ Considering the ban of Russian banks from the SWIFT payment system, China and many adversary countries understand the immense power that the United States holds. They have already started some kind of “de-dollarisation”.²⁸ The United States needs to work with allies and partners to maintain the status quo. The attempt to create an alternative to SWIFT has already been started by various countries, including China, Russia, etc.

The biggest hurdle in front of the US defence strategy-makers is implementing the policy of using sanctions as a tool. In the past, we have seen that sanctions were just used as a political tool without having any significant impact on the foe. Also, it will be interesting to see how policy-makers will separate their actions from domestic political pressures.

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26. Joseph Zeballos-Roig, “The US Rolls out Fresh Sanctions Meant to Block Putin from Accessing a \$630 Billion ‘War Chest’ he Could use to Prop up a Battered Economy”, *Business Insider India*, March 1, 2022, <https://www.businessinsider.in/policy/economy/news/the-us-rolls-out-fresh-sanctions-meant-to-block-putin-from-accessing-a-630-billion-war-chest-he-could-use-to-prop-up-a-battered-economy/articleshow/89909168.cms>. Accessed on September 22, 2022.
 27. Ralph Jennings, “China’s Economy Could Overtake US Economy by 2030”, *Voice of America*, January 4, 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/chinas-economy-could-overtake-us-economy-by-2030/6380892.html#:~:text=China’s%20GDP%20should%20grow%205.7,ranked%20U.S.%20economy%20by%202030>. Accessed on September 10, 2022.
 28. Cary Springfield, “We are Witnessing a Global De-dollarisation Spree”, *International Banker*, August 17, 2022, <https://internationalbanker.com/finance/we-are-witnessing-a-global-de-dollarisation-spree/>. Accessed on September 10, 2022.

CHALLENGES

The whole idea of “integrated deterrence” depends upon the combination of nuclear deterrence with non-military tools. But, some scholars are criticising this strategy because they consider it will give less importance to military strength and over-focus on other aspects.²⁹ The failure of the US to save Ukraine from the invasion of Russia with the threat of “sanctions” is an example of this.³⁰ They fear this same fate is waiting for Taiwan because China is not going to be deterred by the weak response of the US from forcibly taking the island.³¹ The use of sanctions against Russia in the case of Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine has had very little effect in changing the course of the trajectory. While economic punishment might create problems, it is not enough to deter the enemy from taking aggressive steps. The US needs to maintain enough military strength to back the non-military tools when applied to deter the foe.

While combining non-military tools with military tools could be useful in providing an overall deterrence posture, there is an inferred danger of “over-dependence” on these tools to deter the enemy from using aggression against the United States’ interest.³² Many fear that the United States might

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29. Melanie W. Sisson, “America’s Real Deterrence Problem”, June 15, 2022, Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/15/americas-real-deterrence-problem/>. Accessed on September 10, 2022.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Thomas Spoehr, “Bad Idea: Relying on ‘Integrated Deterrence’ Instead of Building Sufficient US Military Power”, The Heritage Foundation, December 3, 2021, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/bad-idea-relying-integrated-deterrence-instead-building-sufficient-us-military>. Accessed on September 8, 2022.

use this new strategy to spend less on modernising and building sufficient military power to deter the enemy.³³

The response of the US to not use force against Russia and its abrupt exit from Afghanistan raises many questions about whether the US is adequately willing to use force to threaten and ultimately deter the enemy. The United States is treating deterrence as a “capability” instead of a “strategy”.³⁴ It is believed that the extra importance given to non-military tools to deter China and Russia is because of the “bias” of the US towards international relations.³⁵ This perspective puts greater value on international reputation, for which China and Russia have no fear. China and Russia, have, over time, eroded America’s position of advantage, due to a “lack of will, theories of victory, and the future looking concepts to challenge them in the grey zones”³⁶. The US needs to acknowledge the fact that there is a “deterrence gap” between its capabilities and those of China and Russia.³⁷

One of the biggest challenges in materialising the new defence strategy of “integrated deterrence” is its effectiveness in the grey zone. The challenge that China and Russia present in the grey zone is enormous. Many are suggesting including “irregular warfare” to counter their attempts to gain an advantage.³⁸ It is believed that nuclear and conventional hard power, that come with military might, are not useful in grey zones, which has been rightly pointed out by the US defence secretary while talking about a new defence strategy. The tactics of China like “salami slicing” and other forms of activities, try to undermine the United States’ security and challenge the United States’ interests without starting a direct war.³⁹ In order to handle these tactics, a proper roadmap needs to be developed.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Katie Crombe, Steve Ferenzi, and Robert Jones, “Integrating Deterrence Across the Gray—Making it More than Words”, *Military Times*, December 9, 2021, <https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2021/12/08/integrating-deterrence-across-the-gray-making-it-more-than-words/>. Accessed on September 10, 2022.

37. Ibid.

38. Steve Ferenzi and Robert C. Jones, “Three Ways to Improve Integrated Deterrence”, *The National Interest*, July 22, 2022, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/three-ways-improve-integrated-deterrence-203695>. Accessed on September 2, 2022.

39. Ibid.

The other challenge comes from the implementing perspective. The Conventional Nuclear Integration (CNI) guidelines are not without danger; if an opponent misinterprets the United States' conventional actions as nuclear escalation, it increases the potential that restricted conventional operations will escalate into a nuclear confrontation.⁴⁰ The "entanglement" of nuclear and conventional systems, according to Acton, can pose a serious risk to strategic stability (the adversary misperceives dual-capable systems such as nuclear).⁴¹ Some experts feel that integrated deterrence is required because, in a limited battle with a nuclear-armed foe, nuclear forces cannot perform deterrence while conventional forces focus on war-fighting.⁴²

Though the concept of integrating non-military tools with the military is not new, the integration of non-military tools across the spectrum of the conflict will be more tough to implement than being theorised in any policy.

CONCLUSION

Ever since it was announced as the new defence strategy of "integrated deterrence", a plethora of literature has been produced about its significance and the chances of its failure. Some timely interventions will be beneficial in dealing with a foe like "grey zone warfare", "cyber warfare", and "geoeconomics". Some believe it will add a major advantage in providing "better guidance" for the acquisitions policy.⁴³ An interesting observation that we can take note of is that the Biden Administration is trying to combine "power" and "influence" in its new policy. Though the concept of integrating non-military tools with the military is not new, the integration of non-military tools across the spectrum of the conflict will be more tough to implement than being theorised in any policy.

40. Mount and Vaddi, n. 1.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

Many scholars and defence experts believe this new defence strategy is not bringing anything new. They say it is just the addition of a new phrase to defence terminology—"more of identifying the problem than proposing a solution to it".⁴⁴

What is clear about integrated deterrence till now can be summed up in four points: first, integration of non-military tools with the military; second, covering across the spectrum of the conflict and time; third, speed is the key (faster than the adversary); and four, allies and partners. While everything will depend upon the implementation of the strategy, some scholars believe that it may be just a buzzword created by the current US Administration. Various US Administrations have had this habit of using the term which defines their government like Donald Trump's "great-power competition" or Barack Obama's "offset concept".

The United States' lack of commitment to deploy force to save its and its allies interests will be questioned again and again. The concept of deterrence works on the principle of giving a clear 'message' to the adversary that we are prepared and committed to using force in case you start the aggression. So backing all forms of non-conventional deterrence tools with strong and determined armed forces will be required. The aspect of including allies and partners in the strategy is the need of the hour. Considering China's Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the South China Sea, it is crucial to take the help of, and forge better relations with, countries in the region of the Indo-Pacific.⁴⁵ Groups like the Quad and security partnerships like AUKUS will play an important role in the new defence strategy. The future of "integrated deterrence" and how it is actually implemented remains to be seen.

44. Zack Cooper, Melanie Marlowe, and Christopher Preble, "(Dis)Integrated Deterrence", *War On The Rocks*, August 5, 2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/disintegrated-deterrence/>. Accessed on September 10, 2022.

45. Ngo Minh Tri, "China's A2/AD Challenge in the South China Sea: Securing the Air From the Ground", *The Diplomat*, May 19, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/chinas-a2ad-challenge-in-the-south-china-sea-securing-the-air-from-the-ground/>. Accessed on September 10, 2022.