



CENTRE FOR AIR POWER STUDIES (CAPS)

Forum for National Security Studies (FNSS)

INDO-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER



A Monthly Newsletter on Security and Strategic Issues on Indo-Pacific Region from
Centre for Air Power Studies

From the Editor's Desk

This month a high level interaction took place on September 8 which was the second India-Japan 2+2 Ministerial Defence Dialogue which focused on enhanced defence cooperation between the two to ensure stability in the Indo-Pacific. Several world leaders gathered in New York for the 77th session of the UN General Assembly on September 13. The meeting discussed issues regarding climate change, health and food security and also the need for economic recovery.

The Samarkand Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) held from September 15-September 16 attempted to expand the SCO's footprint in the Indian Ocean through involving new dialogue partners. Moreover, the fifth Quad Foreign Ministers meeting was held on September 23 which further attempted to work on ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific amidst China's expansionist behaviour. Furthermore, the plan of AUKUS to provide Australia with nuclear power-propelled submarines appeared to progress with training opportunities for Australian personnel in both the UK and the US. India's Armed Forces participated in international exercises Vostok-2022, Pitch Black-2022 and Kakadu-2022.

Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's state funeral was held on September 27 for which PM Narendra Modi visited Tokyo and several other leaders too. Post the event, Modi and Kishida exchanged their views on strengthening the free and open Indo-Pacific vision.

This month we present to you specially selected opinions and cherry-picks covering all this and more. Do check out our Social Media Corner for some engaging and insightful content, including debates, interviews and podcasts from eminent experts

Jai Hind

Vol II, No 05, 07 October 2022

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Realizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Read on more about it at :-

<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/realizing-vision-of-free-and-open-indo-pacific-by-abe-shinzo-2022-09?barrier=accesspaylog>

QUOTE

"It was important for the Quad grouping to continue working on its "constructive agenda" and "delivery of public goods."

– Dr S. Jaishankar
External Affairs Minister

Opinions/Review/Expert View

India's Northeast in the Bay of Bengal
Regional Architecture

Source: Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, ORF

<https://www.orfonline.org/research/situating-indias-northeast-in-the-bay-of-bengal-regional-architecture/> 27 Sept 2022.

The imperatives of development, connectivity, and security are inextricably linked in the modern world. On the one hand, the increasing need for greater industrial growth and socioeconomic development resonates with people's aspirations for a better life. In a globalised world, this means greater regional interactions and interconnectedness through infrastructural, sociocultural, and emerging digital connectivity. On the other hand, the process of building connectivity networks and ensuring the deliverables of development is only feasible when threats of violence, conflicts and insecurity are effectively managed. Therefore, for a geographical and political space to prosper, a secured and well-connected architecture is necessary for developmental priorities to take shape. One such region where concerns of security has vitiated the prospects of connectivity and development is India's Northeast. In the contemporary geopolitical scenario in the Bay of Bengal region, it is becoming increasingly important for India to assume a more vibrant role. This requires engagement at several levels with the neighbourhood and makes connecting with East and Southeast Asian countries crucial. The need to strengthen regional cooperation

In a globalised world, this means greater regional interactions and interconnectedness through infrastructural, sociocultural, and emerging digital connectivity.

is now being understood and acknowledged at the political, diplomatic, and socioeconomic levels.

The Bay of Bengal Initiatives for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), a multilateral institution in South and Southeast Asia, can constructively contribute to the efforts being made to enhance physical, economic, and people-to-people links. The Bay of Bengal, at the centre of the Indo-Pacific, is India's geostrategic gateway into the wider waters. Given the Indo-Pacific's increasing relevance as a geographical space and geostrategic and economic epicentre, India has a vision for the region. India advocates for a free, open, inclusive, and rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific with ASEAN centrality (1), based upon respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, the peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue, and adhering to international rules and laws (2). The Indo-Pacific is perceived as a natural geographical region that hosts "a vast array of global opportunities and challenges" (3). India has also launched the Indo-Pacific Oceans' Initiative to focus on seven central pillars conceived around maritime security, maritime ecology, maritime resources, capacity building and resource sharing, disaster risk reduction and management, science, technology and academic cooperation, and trade connectivity and maritime transport (4).

In this context, given its locational, historical, and sociocultural uniqueness, India's Northeast region has the potential to be the centre of the country's connectivity

outreach and commercial endeavours in the Bay of Bengal region. Such interconnectedness is with India's South Asian neighbours and Southeast and East Asian countries within the larger Indo-Pacific region. As an increasingly significant partner in the region, Japan has a long experience of investing in connectivity projects, especially in the Northeast.

Against this backdrop, this volume aims to capture the potential of the Northeast region as a crucial connecting space that can enhance India's cross-border diplomatic, infrastructural, and commercial interactions within the Bay of Bengal regional architecture by balancing it with the Northeast's own developmental priorities and security concerns. The volume also intends to explore the extent of Japan's engagement in infrastructural development in this region, given the country's wide experience in the field of connectivity. Japan's lead on this pillar of a free and open Indo-Pacific may prove to be a great fillip for connectivity initiatives in the region in future.

Japan's vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is nearing an inflection point. The government is faced with a choice on whether to shift its traditional strategic posture to take a firmer stance against China.

Indo-Pacific vision that promises peace and prosperity

Source: Kei Koga, East Asia Forum

<https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/09/10/indo-pacific-vision-that-promises-peace-and-prosperity/> 10 Sept 2022.



Earlier Japan is pursuing a two-pronged strategy. On one hand, it has pushed back against China's threats to territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, Japan has continuously engaged with China diplomatically and economically to shape its behaviour by using international rules and norms. The FOIP is the core of this diplomatic strategy. Its fundamental objective is to defend and enhance the existing rules-based international order.

To date, Japan's FOIP vision has been remarkably successful. Japan conducted 'tactical hedging', using ambiguous diplomacy to incorporate reactions from regional states and shape the FOIP concept over time. As current international legitimacy rests on multilateralism, this diplomatic strategy has enabled Japan to nurture international coalitions that can push back against rising challengers, particularly China.

Introduced in 2016 by Japan, the FOIP concept drew the attention of the United States and contributed to the evolution of the US Indo-

Pacific strategy. Simultaneously, Japan enhanced strategic ties with the United States, Australia and India, forging the institutionalisation of the Quad. Emphasising the importance of ASEAN unity and centrality, Japan attempted to alleviate ASEAN's concerns over its potential diplomatic marginalisation by major regional powers.

Japan has also engaged and helped to shape China's behaviour. One of the core components of Japan's FOIP is to promote quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific. It originates from Japan's 2015 Partnership for Quality Infrastructure and emphasises openness, transparency, economic efficiency and debt sustainability. Despite initial reluctance, China accepted these principles by agreeing to the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment established at the 2019 Osaka summit. Cooperation with China also benefited from bilateral summits in 2018 and 2019.

This positive strategic trend has been disrupted since 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic imposed a diplomatic hiatus that indefinitely postponed the Japan–China summit scheduled for April 2020. Meanwhile, China's assertiveness in the East and South China Seas continued to worry Japan, and its political and social suppression — including human rights violations in Xinjiang, restrictions on political freedom in Hong Kong and diplomatic and military coercion towards Taiwan — drew international attention. China's less than critical diplomatic stance towards Russia's invasion of Ukraine has shown Japan that China's perspective on international rules and norms is incompatible

with its FOIP principles.

Japan increasingly sees China as the most serious challenge to the existing international order. But tactical hedging is struggling to shape China's behaviour in a sufficiently agile manner. Japan's perception of China is also being influenced by the shifting strategic posture of like-minded states. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and other EU member states have raised serious concerns about China and are seeking security and economic cooperation with regional states to push back against China's assertiveness.

This trend points towards a closer alignment of Japan with the United States and its partners, such as Australia and India, to further strengthen diplomatic pressure and military deterrence against China. These relationships risk the formation of divisions throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Yet, if Japan is not proactive, the existing international order will be eroded, as will the ability to realise Japan's FOIP vision.

Japan must decide how far it will go to defend the existing international order that the United States and its partners have largely constructed and which has diplomatically, economically and militarily benefited Japan.

Striking a policy balance is a significant challenge, but with limited strategic options, Japan needs to make a choice soon. Japan must understand the degree of strategic commitment that like-minded states have towards the Indo-Pacific region. Many states and international organisations continue to express strong interest in increasing their diplomatic, economic and military engagement in the region. This is welcomed as their presence would enhance the region's situational awareness, particularly in maritime security. However, as the Russia–Ukraine war indicates, regional contingencies

reduce the strategic attention and commitment of external actors.

Fundamental values, such as human rights, the rule of law and democracy are increasingly important in shaping the Indo-Pacific order. Japan has been reluctant to criticise violation of these because it strictly adheres to a non-interference principle. This passive diplomatic posture makes it easy for Japan to promote its FOIP vision to non-democratic states. But there are visible, grave violations of those values — in Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Myanmar — that cannot be dismissed. If Japan stays reticent, its diplomatic posture would contradict its FOIP principles.

The roles of emerging minilateral and multilateral frameworks in the Indo-Pacific must be identified. While ASEAN has been the centre of East Asian regional multilateralism, the emergence of the Quad, the Australia–United Kingdom–United States partnership and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework complicates the future of regional institutional arrangements. Although the members of these new frameworks express respect for ASEAN centrality, this is seen as diplomatic rhetoric. Without identifying their specific roles, new institutions will lose ASEAN’s confidence and could face diplomatic opposition from some ASEAN member states.

There is no silver bullet to resolve these challenges. China may exploit them as a part of its ‘divide and conquer’ strategy. Japan must engage with like-minded states and ASEAN to clarify the strategic and institutional division of labour and to proactively protect fundamental values in non-democratic states.

Nearing the inflection point of the FOIP, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s administration has promised a ‘FOIP plan for peace’ by Spring 2023. This continues the legacy of the founding father of the FOIP, former prime minister Shinzo Abe. But the strategic environment is changing rapidly and is very different from 2016. It is Kishida’s responsibility to address emerging challenges so that Japan remains a pivotal player and contributor to peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.

Will the Samarkand Spirit Revive the Word ‘Mutual’ in World Affairs?

Source: Vijay Prashad, Eurasian Review

<https://www.eurasiareview.com/24092022-will-the-samarkand-spirit-revive-the-word-mutual-in-world-affairs->



oped/ 23 Aug 2022

Family photo of the 22nd Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. Photo Credit: Tasnim News Agency

The keyword in the Samarkand Declaration seemed to be “mutual”: mutual respect, mutual trust, mutual consultation, and mutual benefit.

In mid-September 2022, the nine-member Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) met in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, for its 22nd Meeting of the Council of Heads of State. Because China, India, and Pakistan are members of the SCO, the organization represents about 40 percent of the world’s population; with the addition of Russia, the SCO countries make up 60 percent of the Eurasian territory (the other member states of

the organization are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and now Iran). In its Samarkand Declaration, the final declaration of this meeting, the SCO represented itself as a “regional” organization, although the sheer scale of the SCO would allow it to claim to be a global organization with as much legitimacy as the G-7 (whose seven countries comprise only 10 percent of the world’s population, although the group accounts for 50 percent of the global net wealth).

The keyword in the Samarkand Declaration seemed to be “mutual”: mutual respect, mutual trust, mutual consultation, and mutual benefit. There is an echo in these words of the final communiqué of the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, which led to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. The Samarkand Spirit mirrors, for a different period, the Bandung Spirit with an emphasis on sovereignty and equality. Words like “mutual” are appealing only if they provide tangible benefits for the people who live in these countries.

As if on cue, eyes rolled in the Western press, which either did not give much weight to the meeting in their media coverage or emphasized the divisions between the countries that attended the meeting. Remarks by China’s President Xi Jinping and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi about their views on the Russian war in Ukraine shaped the headlines of the Western media. Certainly, the countries that attended the Samarkand meeting do not see eye to eye on each of the issues discussed, but they have

built trust with each other and are interested in increasing their diplomatic and economic ties, particularly related to trade.

The SCO states contribute 24 percent to the world’s gross domestic product and accounted for 17.5 percent of world trade in 2020, a volume of activity that is enticing for poorer states in Eurasia. The locomotive of this economic activity continues to be China, which is the largest trading partner of Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, India, and Uzbekistan. The advantages of trade among the countries—including energy purchases from Russia—anchor the SCO, which has become one of the key institutions for the integration of Eurasia.

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Iran became a full-fledged member of the SCO at the Samarkand meeting. Over the course of the past decade, U.S. sanctions on Iran and Russia as well as the U.S.-driven trade war against China have drawn these three countries closer together. In April 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year agreement on trade, which Iran’s ambassador to China Mohammad Keshavarz-Zadeh said “is not against any third country,” meaning the United States. Similar sentiments, but with a stronger anti-Western tone, could be heard at the seventh Eastern Economic Forum held in Vladivostok, Russia, in September 2022, where Russia’s President Vladimir Putin said, “the West is failing, the future is in Asia.”

The SCO is not merely the consolidation of Asian countries heavily sanctioned by the United States and the European Union. India, an SCO member, is a non-sanctioned state, and

Türkiye, another non-sanctioned country, is seeking to join the SCO, belying such an easy dismissal about the reason for the existence of the organization. India is a full-fledged member of the SCO and has taken over the presidency of the organization till it hosts the next meeting in 2023. India's Modi played an active role at the Samarkand meeting, and, according to an op-ed written by India's former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal, he suggested that India's membership to the SCO is part of "our commitment to a multipolar world."

Türkiye, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is a dialogue partner of the SCO and is now seeking to

upgrade its status to become a member of the organization. In 1987, Türkiye applied to join the European Union and "was declared eligible

In 1987, Türkiye applied to join the European Union and "was declared eligible to join the EU" in 1999.

to join the EU" in 1999. Told that the process is necessarily slow, Türkiye's senior officials watched with dismay as Ukraine applied to join the European Union in February 2022 and then was accepted as an EU candidate in June, jumping far ahead of Türkiye, whose candidacy has not moved forward and the accession negotiations have "effectively frozen." The Samarkand meeting was the first SCO meeting that was attended by Türkiye's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who spoke about the SCO region being the "ancestral homeland" of the Turkish people and a natural fit for his country. India's leadership in the SCO and the possibility of Türkiye's entry into the organization show that the SCO is increasingly becoming an instrument for Eurasian integration.

"The situation in the world is dangerously


degrading," noted the Samarkand Declaration. "[E]xisting local conflicts and crises are intensifying, and new ones are emerging." As the SCO met, Azerbaijan attacked Armenia—replaying the conflict of 2020—opening further tension between Russia (which is in the Collective Security Treaty Organization with Armenia) and Türkiye (which is a close ally of Azerbaijan). Adding to the confusion, clashes broke out at the border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, with Putin hastily calling the presidents of both countries to settle their differences. Modi and Xi met at the Samarkand meeting for the first time since the May 2020 clash between Chinese and Indian troops in

the high mountain region of Ladakh. No real progress has been made on the decades-long border dispute between these two large Asian powers. Such existing local conflicts not only threaten the security of the people who live in those countries but also pose a challenge to the SCO becoming more than a regional organization.

U.S.-Led Indo-Pacific Nations to Consider Emergency Chip Stockpile

Source: RIEKO MIKI, SATSUKI KANEKO and MASAYA KATO, *Nikkei Asia*

<https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/U.S.-led-Indo-Pacific-nations-to-consider-emergency-chip-stockpile> 08 Sept 2022



Members of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework will consider sharing semiconductors and other crucial products during global emergencies to avoid reliance on China. ©

Reuters

TOKYO -- The 14 nations in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework will consider creating a formal system for sharing semiconductor devices, medical products and other vital supplies during international emergencies, *Nikkei* has learned.

IPEF countries would have mutual access to these stockpiles during events that disrupt supply chains, such as military conflicts and pandemics. Specifics will be discussed during the two-day IPEF summit in Los Angeles this week.

The proposal responds to widespread reliance on China for many critical supplies, from industrially vital rare-earth elements to personal protective equipment (PPE) for health care workers.

The IPEF, a framework proposed by U.S.

President Joe Biden, was launched in May with 13 nations: the U.S., Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam. Fiji joined as the 14th nation later that month.

But the group does not include Taiwan -- a key link in the global semiconductor supply chain.

Cabinet-level officials from the member states will gather in Los Angeles on Thursday and Friday for the group's first in-person ministerial meeting. They seek to finalize a joint statement that includes the goal of establishing a crisis management mechanism for supply chains.

Improved supply-chain communications are to be part of the package. Each IPEF nation will appoint a contact person for this arrangement. Members will share data on inventory and risks as well as cooperate on alternative sources of supplies.

One proposal calls for promoting efficient transfers of critical supplies, including sharing inventory. Beyond semiconductors, the sharing framework likely would include PPE, along with rare earths and storage batteries.

If the IPEF members agree to the plan in a joint statement, preparations could begin next year.

Beijing restricted exports of rare earths to Japan following a 2010 incident in which a Chinese fishing boat collided with Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands, which China claims as the Diaoyu Islands.

U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework will consider creating a formal system for sharing semiconductor devices, medical products and other vital supplies during international emergencies.

More recently, many countries were dependent on Chinese-made products for PPE during the start of the coronavirus pandemic, a reliance that disrupted logistics and supplies.

Several IPEF members are strong in producing critical supplies. Japan, the U.S. and South Korea control nearly half of global semiconductor production capacity. For rare earths, the U.S., Australia and India produce almost 30% of the total volume. Indonesia is a major producer of medical PPE.

Some countries are unwilling to join the IPEF out of consideration for their relations with China. Some countries reportedly are reluctant to join a supply-sharing mechanism that sidelines China.

While Berlin has become more engaged in the region, it still has no clear strategy on how to approach it. Old principles guiding the Germany-China relationship are getting in the way.

Germany's Shaky Turn to the Indo-Pacific

Source: Helena Legarda, *Internatioinal Politik Quarterly*

<https://ip-quarterly.com/en/germanys-shaky-turn-indo-pacific>

29 Sept 2022



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It is two years since the German government released its first-ever Indo-Pacific guidelines, and the situation in the region and the world is now drastically more tense. Russia's invasion of Ukraine still rages on, the United States and China increasingly compete for influence, and Beijing's response to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan this summer has only increased the risk of escalation in the region. Despite these dynamics, which could have easily overshadowed other issues, the German government has successfully stepped up its presence in the Indo-Pacific, taking some steps to implement the guidelines.

In a clear expression of the government's interest in the Indo-Pacific, the region has seen a concentration of high-level visits by German political leaders. Since Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited Japan in April for his first trip to the region, President Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock have traveled to Singapore, Indonesia, Palau, and

Japan. And further trips to the region by Scholz, Steinmeier, and Economy Minister Robert Habeck are expected later this year.

But it is in the security and defense space where Berlin seems to have turned a corner. Policymakers in the German capital seem to have realized that they can no longer afford to ignore the tensions in the region. The endless debates over the German frigate Bayern's mission to the Indo-Pacific have thus given way to the deployment of aircraft to Australia to participate in the Pitch Black and Kakadu joint exercises, and to announcements by General Eberhard Zorn, the Bundeswehr's chief of staff, that Germany will further expand its military presence in the region. The plan, according to him, is to send more warships in 2024 and to continue joining drills with allies already from next year.

The Missing China Connection

While all of the above seems like a cause for celebration, Germany's approach to the Indo-Pacific and its motivation to become more involved, especially in security matters, are still on shaky ground. Even though one is now under development, Germany continues to lack a consistent China strategy, and it has not yet defined how it plans to reconcile its Indo-Pacific ambitions with its longstanding reluctance to anger the Chinese government.

Beijing is, after all, one of the main sources of the regional tensions that Berlin often refers to as justification for the need to increase its engagement. It is China that is challenging the rules of the international order in the South China Sea, that is heightening the risk of escalation

in the Taiwan Strait, and that is accelerating a process of rearmament across its neighborhood. Nonetheless, China is barely mentioned in the German government's Indo-Pacific plans or pronouncements, including the Indo-Pacific guidelines and the progress report that was published in mid-September.

Indo-Pacific, the region has seen a concentration of high-level visits by German political leaders.

In a similar vein, Chief of Staff Zorn on the one hand said that he was keeping an eye on the "enormous buildup of Chinese forces" and that the German presence was meant to send a "strong signal of solidarity with our allies" (solidarity against whom, one may ask). But on the other hand, he insisted that Germany does not want to provoke anyone with its presence and refused to take a stance on whether German navy ships will sail through the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait.

The Indo-Pacific is larger than China, and Germany is right in trying to develop a broader approach to the region that is distinct from its China strategy. India, Japan, Australia, and many others have rightly been identified as key partners. But the reality is that no Indo-Pacific strategy is complete without a clear stance and parameters on how to engage with an increasingly assertive and ambitious China.

Without this, Germany's presence in the region is likely to remain low-intensity, inconsistent, and as uncontroversial as possible, as well as prone to disengagement if tensions increase. If Berlin's objective is to defend the rules-based order in the region as a way to defend German (and European) interests and security, this is not the way to go. Indo-Pacific allies and partners from Australia to Taiwan have called on

Germany to do more, but the fear of provoking China is still holding Berlin back. Germany must stop letting Beijing dictate when and how it can operate in the region.

Dangers of a Europe-focused *Zeitenwende*

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is forcing Germany to reinvent itself as a security actor. The *Zeitenwende* announced by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, however, is for now all about Europe. Having an operational Bundeswehr and a stronger role for Germany as a security actor on the continent are important and necessary goals. But Berlin should not lose sight of security challenges further afield.

The People's Liberation Army's response to Pelosi's visit to Taiwan set a new benchmark for China's military pressure on Taiwan, which is likely to remain high after the 20th Party Congress this October. As the status quo becomes increasingly unstable, US-China competition worsens, and prospects for peaceful reunification remain dim, Beijing is likely to see intimidation as the only available option. The risk of escalation in the Indo-Pacific—whether accidental or intentional—is becoming all too real. This is a situation that Germany must be prepared to respond to, as the impact of a war in Taiwan on its interests and security would be considerable.

There is another danger to Germany's exclusive focus on the European theater and the expectation of a division of labor with a United States that is increasingly pivoting toward the Indo-Pacific. This is an arrangement that can work while there is a president in the White House

that is invested in cooperating and coordinating with allies. But things can very quickly fall apart with a more unilateral or isolationist US administration. With US presidential elections coming up in 2024, policymakers in Berlin and across Europe would do well to remember the state of the transatlantic relationship under President Donald Trump whenever they are tempted to leave the Indo-Pacific to Washington and focus most of their energies on Europe.

The German military's limited presence in the Indo-Pacific today is understandable given the Bundeswehr's limited capabilities. But the German government should already start thinking about the longer-term requirements for its armed forces and should aim at establishing

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the parameters for a stronger and more sustainable German security engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Whether through more regular military deployments, by increasing deterrence through political and economic means, or by helping regional partners with capacity and resilience building, there is much more that Germany could be doing.

The German approach to the Indo-Pacific still lacks ambition and long-term vision, and is still being held back by longstanding dogmas governing Germany-China relations. The upcoming National Security and China Strategies, however, provide a perfect opportunity to fix this. It is time for Germany to leave behind old guiding principles and develop a security policy and Indo-Pacific strategy suited to today's realities..

Cherry-Picks of the Month

1. 'Quad' nations favor expansion of U.N. Security Council permanent seats - <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/09/24/national/politics-diplomacy/quad-nations-security-council/>
2. India Opts Out of Trade Talks With US-Led Indo-Pacific Group - <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-opts-out-of-trade-talks-with-us-led-indo-pacific-group-3336475>
3. Water Wars: U.S. Counters Beijing's Reaction to Pelosi Visit With \$1.1 Billion Arms Sale to Taiwan - <https://www.lawfareblog.com/water-wars-us-counters-beijings-reaction-pelosi-visit-11-billion-arms-sale-taiwan>
4. A ground plan for India's reformed multilateralism - <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/a-ground-plan-for-indias-reformed-multilateralism/article65935206.ece>
5. India, France agreed to work towards establishment of Indo-Pacific trilateral development cooperation: Jaishankar - <https://thenewsmill.com/2022/09/india-france-agreed-to-work-towards-establishment-of-indo-pacific-trilateral-development-cooperation-jaishankar/>
6. Frugal Innovations: New Delhi's Soft Power Potential in ASEAN - <https://fulcrum.sg/frugal-innovations-new-delhis-soft-power-potential-in-asean/>

CAPS Experts In Focus

1. IAF participation in Exercise Pitch black-2022 - <https://capsindia.org/iaf-participation-in-exercise-pitch-black-2022/>
2. Indo-US Naval Engagement in the Indo-Pacific - <https://capsindia.org/indo-us-naval-engagement-in-the-indo-pacific/>
3. Abe's State Funeral and the Legacy of India-Japan ties - <https://capsindia.org/chinas-white-paper-on-taiwan/>

Debates/Panel Discussions

1. India-France Partnership And Strategic Autonomy In The Indo-Pacific - <https://www.orfonline.org/india-france-partnership-and-strategic-autonomy-in-the-indo-pacific/>
2. Ocean Nations: The 2nd Annual Indo-Pacific Islands Dialogue - <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/09/19/ocean-nations-2nd-annual-indo-pacific-islands-dialogue-event-7921>
3. IPEF trade pillar: Did India err by walking out of it? - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fX-QIFO4TDQ>
4. Crises in Ukraine: Emerging Challenges for the Indo-Pacific - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1b64deuWlQ>

Podcasts

1. After Abe As Japan's 'Compass': India, Indo-Pacific, Quad & China - <https://stratnewsglobal.com/india/after-abe-as-japans-compass-india-indo-pacific-quad-china/>
2. Europe in the Indo-Pacific Hub - <https://hcss.nl/europe-in-the-indo-pacific-hub/>



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