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VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2008 (JANUARY-MARCH)

Editor's Note ix

1. NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY 1

Shri **N.N. Vohra** states in his usual inimitable style that among the many reasons for the continuing failures of governance, a significant factor that has been responsible for the instability of the political regimes in the states and at the Centre is the nexus between crime and politics. All over India, crime syndicates have become a law unto themselves. Even in the smaller towns and rural areas, musclemen have become the order of the day. Talking about corruption and its adverse effect on society, he points out that corruption erodes the foundation of the administration and legal framework, and, hence, internal security can only be safeguarded when the government apparatus gets rid of it. He further adds that it is the prime duty of the state to discharge its constitutional obligations towards maintaining peace and public order.

2. JOINT CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS OF INDIA'S ARMED FORCES: 2008-2033 17

Air Vice Marshal **Kapil Kak** makes a judicious assessment of the threat scenario India could face during the next 25 years. While cautioning that enhancing military capacities is a highly challenging task, our armed forces in the near future will

embark on a new phase where evolving joint doctrine and capabilities will become the *sine-qua-non* for optimum operational effectiveness. He strongly advocates that while the Integrated Defence Staff of the Chiefs of Staff Committee could continue with the task of long-term force deployment planning (that requires government resource allocations), a structured and revitalised Joint Planning Committee (JPC) with a permanent staff will be the need of the hour for joint operations.

3. MILITARY MANPOWER: MANAGING QUALITY AND COSTS

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Vice Admiral **Vergheese Koithara** critically examines the issues relating to the quality and costs of military manpower. He states that unlike the civil services, it is not easy for the armed forces to improve promotion prospects by proliferating senior jobs. The forces have a rank-job correlation emanating from the organisational logic of fighting formations. Revising cadre vacancies in higher ranks and appointing full colonels to command battalions has not proved successful—rather, it may have weakened our command system. The differential between the civil and military concerning career opportunities is obvious. The author has also dealt with the issue of second career for armed forces personnel. The age factor and limited transferability of skills pose numerous hurdles for the a second career. He strongly advocates shortening of the span of military careers so that factors such as job satisfaction, career profession, pay and benefits and job stress do not come in the way of greater attraction for a career in the defence forces.

4. DEFENCE FINANCE

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Air Marshal **A.V. Vaidya** has a relevant observation to make about whether or not spending on defence is a waste of precious resources. Will it not be more cost-effective to negotiate

threats? It is a known fact that the costs involved in conducting a war are huge. The author feels that it would be better to spend on creation of a credible defence rather than go to war. He lays importance on effective deterrence rather than spending indiscriminately. On the issue of outsourcing, Air Marshal Vaidya has reservations; it can be practised only if it does not affect operational efficiency. He states that at combat unit level, it may not be practical since the defence forces have been structured to be independent by themselves. They are required to be self-contained and self-equipped in all aspects for total manoeuvrability at short notice. Talking about globalisation, he stresses that certain changes have certainly come about in the environment that necessitate corresponding changes in our thought process. Tomorrow's wars will not be fought on the international border; aspects like asymmetric warfare and internal dissensions will guide the strategies.

5. TOWARDS CONTINUOUS MILITARY EDUCATION IN THE IAF: A NEED FOR YESTERDAY

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Training is the process of imparting knowledge and teaching specific skills required to accomplish tasks under defined conditions. While education teaches the individual how to think, training teaches him how to do. Wing Commander **M. Misra** explains that the aim of modern military education is to create thinking leaders and expert learners. Tracing the background of imparting of education and training to military personnel, he comments that under the British rule, the military training was imparted to produce "fodder" for the imperial wars in Europe. The result was that India produced only administrators but not leaders. Being an optimist, he strongly feels that India as a nation is emerging as a world leader in knowledge development. It will soon be a hub of the economic revolution in the near future. To meet the challenge, we would need a

metamorphosis in military education as well.

6. SPACE SECURITY: SOME ISSUES OF MILITARISATION AND WEAPONISATION 107

Wing Commander **Kaza Lalitendra** states that there is no clear definition of a space weapon in legal terms nor has there been a consensus on what should constitute a space weapon. For example, while the RAND study restricts itself to weapons based in space, the Chinese and Russian definitions include weapons like earth-based anti-satellites or lasers too in the inventory. The author highlights America's fear of a national space Pearl Harbour. He feels it might come in the form of a nuclear detonation in space or interference by ground-based laser attacks against the American satellites that would either be blinded or dazzled. This will adversely affect the military operations by the United States against its adversary. Elaborating further, Kaza states that lately space has come to represent an economic centre of gravity for each nation and, hence, must be guarded. The stakes are high. He also warns that the race towards space weaponisation is on. It is not an easy task for most of the countries, but if at all it happens, it will be started by a superpower like the United States which has the necessary wherewithal in economic and scientific terms.

7. INTERFACE BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: A CASE FOR THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT 137

Maj. Gen. **G.D. Bakshi**, while examining the matrix of credibility and feasibility and its applications in the Indian context, states that India's existing conventional superiority has failed to deter Pakistan from challenging the status quo in Kashmir through its low cost proxy war. India, thus, needs to graduate to its next phase of strategy, viz. compellence and deterrence.

While dealing at length on the use of nuclear weapons, the author quotes Lt. Gen. K.M. Arif of Pakistan who states that both India and Pakistan are not crazy countries and if deterrence could work in other parts of the world, it was bound to work in this region as well. It was doubtful if either country would use nuclear weapons against each other. Discussing various stages of thresholds, Maj. Gen. Bakshi concludes that Pakistan's nuclear threshold has a very elastic bandwidth. The Kargil War has forced Pakistan into a flexible response strategy. If triggered, it will commence with a nuclear shot across the board and then graduate to a purely military use of nuclear weapons, first on its own soil and then on its adversary's.

8. FALSE GOSPEL FOR AIR POWER STRATEGY? A FRESH LOOK AT GIULIO DOUHET'S "COMMAND OF THE AIR"

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Michael D. Pixley rightly explains that while many interpreters have questioned Douhet's originality or the extent to which he was a pioneering theorist in a universal sense, the very hypothesis, when probed further, obscures the context of Douhet's similarities with other countries' air power pioneers. Douhet's most overt contextual limitations were his focus on Italy's unique geographic situation. He wrote as an Italian and tested his theories by applying them in Italy, notwithstanding Italy's protective Alpine barrier and short-flying distances from potential enemies. Pixley further adds that Douhet occasionally applied his theory to other countries which seemed to contradict his self-imposed geographical limitations, at least superficially. The author points out that while most air power analysts have ignored Douhet's biases and presuppositions, the overwhelming majority agrees that the framework of strategic thought that he created may be applied to any general war in the nuclear age.