

# AIR DOMINANCE IN 4<sup>TH</sup> GENERATION AND IRREGULAR WARFARE

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*4<sup>th</sup> Generation warfare is not novel but a return, specifically a return to the way war worked before the rise of the state. Now, as then, many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war. They will wage war for many different reasons, not just “the extension of politics by other means.” And they will use many different tools to fight war, not restricting themselves to what we recognize as military forces.*

— William Lind<sup>1</sup>

## UNDERSTANDING 4<sup>TH</sup> GENERATION WARFARE

At a time when established militaries are grappling with the rapidly changing nature of warfare and trying to match assets and orchestrate training regimens with roles and missions, it is important not to get saturated with terminologies that try to fingerprint the various genres of warfare. Is it sub-conventional warfare, or is it irregular warfare (IW)? What happens when sub-conventional warfare escalates to levels wherein non-state actors use tactics and equipment that lend themselves easily to conventional warfare? Amidst the din of all this debate, what happens to guerrilla warfare, wars of liberation, terrorism and proxy wars? It is in this context that 4<sup>th</sup> Generation or 4G warfare best describes the broad genre of warfare waged by non-state

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1. William Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare”, [www.antiwar.com](http://www.antiwar.com), January 15, 2004.

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actors of the 21<sup>st</sup> century against the state and irregular warfare fingerprints the micro war-fighting techniques adopted by them to prosecute 4G Warfare. In order to understand 4G Warfare, it is imperative to track when it replaced 3<sup>rd</sup> Generation Warfare. The two Gulf Wars of recent times epitomised what 3<sup>rd</sup> Generation Warfare is all about viz speed, surprise, physical dislocation and non-linear operations that seek to bypass and collapse the enemy<sup>2</sup>. 3rd Generation Warfare had

no inbuilt mechanisms for issues like reconstruction or “winning the hearts and minds of the defeated enemy”. All of a sudden, the 21<sup>st</sup> century saw a distinct shift to warfare in which the state lost its monopoly on warfare with its proven ability to win wars with mass, mobility, speed or firepower. Instead, it found itself staring down the barrel of a powder keg that comprised culturally distinct, militarily well trained and sometimes fanatic non-state actors who had perfected a ‘pot pourri’ of guerilla tactics with conventional firepower, terrorist ideology and religious Islamic fervour. Suddenly the state found itself woefully untrained to cope with such an enemy. Lo! Overnight, 21<sup>st</sup> century warfare was suddenly transformed into 4G Warfare, with military theorists groping and arguing to give it a name. With large nation-states willing to grant more autonomy to ethnic groups and engage in meaningful economic upliftment, as a means of reducing conflict, the major challenge for nation-states and democracies like India, the US and even Russia, when it comes to 4G Warfare is the increasing threat of non-state actors who are driven by religious fundamentalism primarily emerging from the spread of Islamic fundamentalism as seen in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The belt stretching from Palestine to Pakistan and running through what is known today as the Middle East has always been a powder keg from the days of the Crusades, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and subsequently, the birth of Israel and the Palestinian problem.

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2. Ibid.

With almost the entire Mid-East carved up between the US and Russia during the Cold War, some amount of artificial stability was maintained. The void created by the absence of any ideological reasons to perpetrate conflict in an established state was quickly filled by religious and ethnic struggles. The Nineties saw the civilised world slip into periods of uncontrolled IW with genocides and brutality proliferating across continents. Whether it was the Serb led genocide against minorities and the subsequent backlash from the Croats and Bosnians in the Balkans, or the Chechen rebellion, or even the resurgence of Islamic terrorism in the Middle East or the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) struggle in Sri Lanka, the world saw the emergence of a new genre of IW. Features of these conflicts include relatively uncontrolled conflict control mechanisms, with the UN emerging as the only institution that has attempted conflict resolution albeit with very low success rates. It is in the wake of this chaos that one has seen the US leading loose coalitions against those who waged war against what the US terms as the civilised world, but actually more against US interests and global dominance. **The two defining moments that changed the nature and intensity of 4G Warfare in the world and gave it a fundamentalist flavour were the Iranian revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan.** The Iranian revolution galvanised Shiite aspirations across Asia, with Iran providing spiritual, moral, financial and military support to Shia groups in diverse locations as the clerics perceived the US brand of capitalism as a threat to the Islamic faith. Not wanting to be left behind, radical Sunni groups with overt/covert aid from wealthy Saudi fundamentalists like Osama Bin Laden, started asserting themselves in semi-developed areas like Afghanistan and Pakistan, thus, creating a new, more assertive, and at times fanatic, non-state actor who would wage the most

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ruthless kind of war against established nation-states like India, the US, Russia and even China in the Sinkiang province.

#### **DISSECTING UNITED STATES AIR FORCE (USAF) DOCTRINE ON IW<sup>3</sup>**

Even though the USAF has contributed significantly in most of the 'small wars' that the USA has fought since World War II, the US Army and US Marine Corps (USMC) have always considered that warfare at the lower end of the spectrum of warfare was predominantly their domain, with the USAF mainly playing a supportive role. Keeping with this thought process, the US Army and USMC were first off the block when it came to articulating their respective doctrines for fighting 'small wars' and tackling IW. Quickly realising that warfare in the 21<sup>st</sup> century would differ significantly from wars of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in terms of methods, scope, strategy, tactics and end states, the USAF realised that it needed to hone its capabilities and operational focus by addressing the entire spectrum of operations. By doing so, the USAF wants to demonstrate both its intent and capability of staying relevant, irrespective of the nature of conflict. Air power's impact on conventional conflict is well proven. In recent times, the precision strike revolution, mobility, speed and surprise and shock effect have proved to be very effective even in sub-conventional scenarios, without paying the associated penalties of collateral damage/death to the extent that prevailed in earlier times because of the various inaccuracies of weapons. Technology has proved to be a significant factor in making the USAF relevant in IW, particularly so in recent times in the US war on terror in Afghanistan, the Kosovo conflict and continued conflict in the urban environs of Iraq. The other factor that has propelled the USAF into the forefront in IW

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3. This part of the article attempts to analyse the AFDD-2-3 on IW that was published in 2007.

is the ability of air power to facilitate reduced attrition by increasing engagement from the air, thereby allowing commanders to reduce ground forces in specific areas. Though it is recognised that ultimate conflict resolution would require 'boots on ground', air power has come to stay in IW. Like all doctrines, this doctrine too is not directional as it merely lays down certain key strategic and operational levels of IW, with specific focus on dissimilarities with conventional warfare. The key issues that are addressed relate to the following:

- Complexities of irregular warfare.
- Air force capabilities that are required to address these complexities.
- Blending air power capabilities into a joint war-fighting model that transcends Services to include civil and paramilitary organisations.
- *The last major issue that is discussed throughout the doctrine and that could be of great significance in the Indian context comprises the various processes to retain the existing command and control structure for the employment of USAF assets with particular reference to a unity of command and an airman remaining in charge of employment of air power as he knows the capabilities best.*

## FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINAL STATEMENTS

It is important to understand the reasons for large air forces like the USAF to look closely at developing an effective doctrine for IW. It was also becoming increasingly evident that smaller nations and non-state actors were increasingly finding it difficult to 'fight conventionally' or traditionally. After years of brainstorming and assigning difficult terms like 'small wars', 'sub-conventional war', Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO), Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN) or guerrilla warfare, it was considered appropriate to assign a generic term that encompasses the entire spectrum of warfare below conventional warfare. Thus, as per the USAF, IW is defined as:

*A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. IW favours indirect and asymmetric approaches though*

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*it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.*

As seen, the definition is simplistic, covers a wide and easy canvass, and from an Indian perspective, allows us to even categorise border skirmishes like the Chinese incursions into Arunachal Pradesh and the Kargil conflict as IW. Flowing from the definition are some concepts that lend a lot of weight to this genre of warfare that has existed for thousands of years whenever unequals have warred against each other. The difference now being that victory by the larger protagonist is becoming increasingly more difficult, thus, forcing him to question his basic tenets of warfare. Some key takeaways from the USAF doctrine are:

- Irregular warfare concentrates on asymmetric and innovative approaches to erode an adversary's overall war-waging potential.
- By no yardstick is IW a lesser form of warfare in intensity. In fact, it is a notch above conventional warfare in terms of speed, ferocity and unscrupulous war-fighting techniques.
- The main challenge for air power in IW is developing capabilities to fight both a conventional and IW side by side.
- More than in any other form of warfare, air power in IW focusses not merely on military objectives alone, but on the end-state of winning legitimacy.
- Unlike classic air power roles, IW missions have no fixed templates – hence, they need to be flexible and responsive, attributes that lend themselves easily to air power as compared to land and sea power. This alone strengthens the case for increased involvement of air power in irregular warfare.

More than specifying missions and roles, there is a feeling that the USAF doctrine is reaching out to airmen to integrate their capabilities with those of the other Services in order to prosecute what they see as a long war against terror and unseen enemies. There is an attempt to look beyond the articulated strategic capabilities of air power that enable it to influence conventional war almost all on its own, and look at joint war-fighting capabilities. In that context, the doctrine attempts at educating airmen on the characteristics of IW, the importance of the war for legitimacy and the resilience required to wage long IW conflicts like the ones being waged in Iraq and Afghanistan. In that context, we in India too need to leverage the competencies of air power in the fight against non-state actors. More importantly, there is a need to sensitise all echelons of leadership on the nature and complexities of 4G/IW.

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### **EXPANDING IRREGULAR WARFARE**

To imply that the non-state actor focusses mainly on the population and government while trying to make the military irrelevant, as implied in the USAF doctrine, is not entirely correct. With a wide range of lethal weapons and the concept of 'proxy war' creeping in, non-state actors, with active support of the state, have the wherewithal to engage security forces with some amount of success just as the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and Hizb-ul Mujahideen have done in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the Hezbollah achieved in Lebanon. Today's non-state actor has the capability and does manage to muster external support to focus on, and impact, all three structures of a nation viz government, population, military. How does he manage it? The information technology revolution has made it possible for a non-state actor to effectively interface on a daily basis with the intelligence agencies of a supportive state and undermine the day-to-day functioning of a legitimately elected government. The tools of coercion have proliferated

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alarmingly, making it easier than before to intimidate and exploit the local population and take on underprepared paramilitary and police forces. Taking on the established military along conventional lines with sophisticated weaponry has become commonplace across the world. One needs to look no further than the tactically well thought out engagements by the Shia militia in Basra, the Hezbollah rocket tactics in Lebanon and the remote controlled Lashkar-e-Tayyeba operations in Mumbai during the 26/11 terror attacks. Further south and within the subcontinent, the LTTE has taken on all organs of the Sri Lankan state simultaneously with significant success over the years. The only difference being that the direct aim of IW is not to topple the government, but to influence its downfall after weakening it significantly. Thus, contrary to contemporary perceptions, 4G and IW in the 21<sup>st</sup> century have progressed to include military targets as Centres of Gravity (COGs) and not only the local population.

#### **INDIAN ARMY'S DOCTRINE ON SUB-CONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

Following the relative success of their WHAM (Winning the Hearts and Minds of the People) campaign in J&K in recent years, the Indian Army came out with their doctrine on sub-conventional warfare in 2006. Though the doctrine attempts to address various types of conflict at the lower end of the spectrum of warfare, it essentially remains a doctrine for the conduct of COIN. Where it falls short is in its inability to provide clear directions for conduct of counter-terrorist operations and other forms of 4G Warfare, including urban operations. With the Indian Air Force (IAF) having supported the Indian Army in COIN operations, in both J&K and the Northeast for over 50 years, one would have expected that employment of air power would have featured in the doctrine. Granted that there is widespread reluctance to talk about offensive employment of air power in COIN operations within our own



geographical boundaries, there is very little mention of even the employment of non-kinetic roles of air power like casualty evacuation and air mobility that are so important for successful prosecution of sub-conventional warfare. However, what is commendable is that an honest attempt has been made at articulating the nuances and difficulties of waging war against non-state actors by a force that is probably the most battle-hardened in this genre of warfare.

### **AIR DOMINANCE IN 4G/IW**

Air dominance as a concept is not new. Douhet propounded it with vigour during the early years of air power. Goering and the Luftwaffe aimed for it over the skies of Great Britain in World War II but failed. The Israelis stunned the world with their brand of air dominance in 1967 and 1982, and the IAF displayed its prowess by dominating the skies over East Pakistan in 1971. The last big battle in which air dominance was conducted as a stand-alone air campaign paved the way for spectacular all-round success during the Gulf War of 1991.

Since then, the quest for air dominance has seen different approaches being followed. While the US and a few other Western Air Forces have focussed on a platform-centric and technology intensive-based approach to air dominance that cuts across the spectrum of war and seeks the desired effects, smaller air forces like the IAF have had to tailor their approach based on specific threats and availability of limited resources. To give a typical example of the first approach, the F-22 story is all about air dominance, with the entire case for air dominance in the West revolving around the capabilities of platforms like the F-22 and the Typhoon, and their capability to roam the skies like heavyweight boxers, armed to the teeth, aided by unblinking Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) sensors and facilitators like Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) that ensure total situational awareness in conventional war-fighting. The IAF's SU-30 MKIs are also geared with similar capabilities and have all the typical characteristics of air dominance fighters that have so comprehensively been

**Air dominance is: “The ability of a nation to exert relentless pressure on an adversary from the medium of air and space to achieve strategic objectives/ or effects across the spectrum of warfare.”**

showcased in recent times. But what happens when you have high altitude battlegrounds like the ones in Afghanistan, Kashmir and Kargil, or the densely populated urban landscapes of Baghdad, Gaza and Mumbai, where enemies are unknown and targets are fleeting, capable of being tackled primarily by small and compact teams — a far cry from the established norm of large formations of aircraft sanitising large swathes of air space

and allowing unhindered operations on the ground and over the sea? Food for thought!! As against the present trend of seeing air dominance as dominating the medium of air in conventional warfare at the upper end of the spectrum of warfare, a contrarian view suggests a small change that looks at air dominance as not only dominating air and space but also as dominance being imposed on the other two mediums from the air. When you see it this way, you would realise that the coercive effect caused on the ability of an enemy to use the air effectively in a conventional conflict by a pair of F-22s or Su-30s on a fighter sweep mission under close control of AWACS, is the same as that caused by a loitering Predator, a fighter aircraft, or attack helicopters on a group of terrorists or insurgents who want to move from place A to B. Therefore, a broad spectrum definition of air dominance that retains relevance irrespective of the intensity and genre of warfare is: *“The ability of a nation to exert relentless pressure on an adversary from the medium of air and space to achieve strategic objectives/or effects across the spectrum of warfare.”*

Recent conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum of warfare in Kargil, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Gaza and Sri Lanka have shown that air power, if used decisively, has the potential to dominate the path to conflict mitigation, de-escalation or even conflict termination. The Kargil conflict of 1999 is a classic example of air dominance in joint operations in a high altitude conflict that swathed through the lower spectrum of

warfare. Some called it a limited high intensity high altitude conflict between India and Pakistan, while some called it the first high altitude conflict between an established state and a combination of state and non-state adversaries. While air power purists would say that the IAF mainly conducted a classical high altitude interdiction campaign that choked the intruders and allowed the Army to push them back, the bare facts reveal that a combination of intimidating air defence missions and well executed interdiction missions allowed the IAF to dominate, coerce and intimidate the adversary, and acted as a major catalyst that forced his withdrawal. Imagine if the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had interfered with our operations, both in the air and from the air. Would the situation have de-escalated so quickly? The firm answer is no! So it can safely be assumed in this case that air dominance can be decisive in de-escalation or conflict resolution across the spectrum of warfare and not only at the upper end. Two other examples in recent times wherein air power has been used to dominate the adversary in sub-conventional scenarios have been by the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) against the LTTE and by the Israeli Air Force against the Hamas in Gaza.

Shifting focus onto Sri Lanka where the LTTE is holed up in its last bastion for what is going to be certainly its last fight, after it had attacked Katunayake airfield in Colombo and Anuradhapura airfield by bombing them with light aircraft, but inflicting heavy casualties, many analysts had predicted the resurgence of the LTTE. In an article published recently in this journal, it was predicted that if the SLAF attempted to dominate the LTTE from the air, the LTTE would not last beyond end 2008/ early 2009 and that is precisely what is unfolding. In short, a small air force like the SLAF has shown what it takes to dominate from the air against a powerful insurgent non-state adversary. Yes, there has been significant collateral damage and loss of civilian lives — but if the LTTE is wiped out and the government shows magnanimity and restores normalcy soon, the SLAF should take tremendous credit for escalating, only to facilitate rapid de-escalation. However, the employment of air power has had its own

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problems in influencing the outcome of irregular warfare, be it against insurgencies, terrorists or other non-state actors. A classic example in recent times was the inability of the Israelis to dominate the Hezbollah exclusively from the skies. They repeated the strategy against the Hamas with some success because they executed it differently by dovetailing land operations almost simultaneously, as they should have done in Lebanon in 2006. Contrary to existing perceptions that air dominance is a private and exclusive air battle that is fought in isolation between two air forces, and whose effects are not immediately felt on the land/maritime battle,

nothing could be farther from the truth. In today's fast moving battlefield, there is no time for individual campaigns. Instead, the air dominance campaign has to include roles and missions that impact immediately on the land/maritime campaign and it is the seamless integration of all these that would constitute a well orchestrated air dominance campaign.

## **DOCTRINAL CLARITY**

There is a need for air forces like the IAF also to have clarity on the employment of air power in 4G/IW just as the Indian Army has on a similar subject through its recently published doctrine on sub-conventional warfare. Similarly, the Indian Navy too has to clearly articulate its thought process so that gradually, even in the Indian context, a joint model to tackle 4G Warfare/IW emerges in the years to come. Only then will our armed forces be capable of effectively and jointly tackling this genre of warfare that is eating away at the fabric of our robust democracy. So let us look at air dominance in irregular warfare from a different perspective and begin with a definition that could provide a clear direction for the future: *the ability to unleash the entire range of kinetic, non-kinetic and coercive capabilities*

*of air power with the primary objective of protecting the sovereignty of a state and its citizens and nullifying the impact and influence of non-state actors. Some of the key extraneous factors that would dictate the ability of a nation to strive for air dominance in this domain are:*

- Political will to use air power in IW and brushing away misplaced perceptions that air power is essentially escalatory.
- Willingness to accept limited collateral damage in pursuit of larger objectives.
- Availability of a steady stream of synergised and actionable intelligence and a heavy reliance on Human Intelligence (HUMINT) for immediate targeting.

It is also important to establish a link between geography and type of governance in a nation with its ability to use kinetic or offensive air power against non-state actors. Countries like Sri Lanka or Israel which face situations that threaten their existence, would find it much easier to justify the use of offensive air power to their own people and ignore international condemnation, as would near totalitarian regimes like Russia in the fight against Chechen separatism. However, large democracies like India which do not face threats to their very existence, have geographic depth and are confronted by non-state actors like the Naxalites from within their own populace, find it difficult to employ offensive air power readily, though I believe that if the situation deteriorates, air strikes against non-state actor leadership can break the back of an insurgent outfit and must not be ruled out. Similarly, in J&K, where the Indian state is involved in a campaign to win the hearts and minds of the people, use of offensive air power does not find favour and probably rightly so! However, if the proxy war waged by Pakistan gets more intense, the option to use offensive air power against large groups of infiltrating terrorists from across the border, in tandem with the Indian Army and other paramilitary forces, can be a deterrent and thwart any concerted attempt to step up the proxy war primarily by coercion and the 'fear factor' associated with the offensive employment of air power.

### AIR DOMINANCE PLATFORMS AND ROLES IN IW

Let us now briefly brush through the kind of platforms, weapons and systems that would lend themselves easily to the prosecution of air dominance in IW or 4G warfare:

- Fixed wing multi-role fighter assets and attack helicopters with precision capability that can carry out strikes against COGs of non-state actors, like leadership, training camps and weapon storage areas.
- ISR assets to support acquisition, monitoring, tracking and engagement of both static, fleeting and mobile targets.
- Attack/armed helicopters and armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) like the Predator to engage time sensitive and fleeting targets.
- Medium lift transport aircraft and helicopters to support Special Forces and small teams.
- Non-lethal weapons and other weapons like the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) for maximum effect with minimum damage.
- Night fighting devices.
- Compatible and interoperable laser designation systems with high end communication systems that supports data transfer and video streaming, all of which are focussed on targeting.
- From an Indian point of view, the operationalisation of a few abandoned airfields in the high altitude areas of the northern Himalayas like Daulat Beg Oldi and Phukche <sup>4</sup>after almost 50 years is an example of how a deterrent capability lends itself easily to both state and non-state adversaries. On hindsight, had these airfields been active in 1999, the incursions and occupation of the Kargil heights by soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry and other 'irregular' fighters from Pakistan may have been monitored well in time. It is also an indirect way of exercising air dominance.
- "Show of Force" missions and "Eye in the Sky" missions are mainly

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4. From *The Hindu*, April 7, 2009.

flown to exert both kinetic and non-kinetic pressure on a non-state adversary. They could comprise fighter and attack helicopter missions to enforce “no fly zones”, or armed/attack helicopter sorties to minimise incursions via porous borders. The recent incidents of large scale crossings by the Lashkar militants in J&K that led to prolonged encounters could have been assisted by air power, had the option been explored and exercised. Even if the terrorists were holed up in caves, fairly accurate coordinates would have been available for attack from the air.

**What is of concern, however, is the absence of adequate debate on the need for air dominance even at the lower end of the spectrum of warfare.**

## **SUMMARY**

Traditional practitioners of air power may continue to feel that air combat, large formations of ground attack aircraft striking multiple targets simultaneously, corridor formations of medium and heavy lift transport aircraft dropping a division size airborne force remain the *raison d'être* of air dominance. It is probably time to review that mindset and make air dominance relevant across the spectrum and train to accept that 4 vs 2 engagements are relevant, but so are stealthy missions to take out terrorist leadership. Translating this into force structures means that there is no scope, as some may feel, that proliferation of conflict at the lower end of the spectrum of warfare calls for downsizing of conventional force structures. In reality, however, it is a wake-up call to speedily complement conventional force structures with platforms and capabilities that can address 4G conflict. Training and leadership assume added significance in 4G and IW. To be successful, the leadership must learn and train their command, and perceive and react expeditiously with minimum force to neutralise the target, without causing any collateral damage. Suitable

“frames of reference” coupled with the ability to generate hard intelligence in a synergised manner and its real-time exploitation are, as such, key to the success of such operations. Proactive, unpredictable and unconventional tactics are called for to push the non-state actor onto the back foot by seizing the initiative and making him reactive, insecure and unsure. The modern non-state actor is tech-savvy, capable of handling sophisticated weaponry and comfortable while operating independently or in small teams. To tackle such an opponent, there is a need to stay ahead in terms of flexibility, initiative and decision-making of the junior leadership and creative/ out of the box thinking on the part of the senior leadership. Only then can the state stay ahead in 4G/IW.

There is no doubt about the inescapable requirement for air dominance in conventional warfare at the higher end of the spectrum of warfare. What is of concern, however, is the absence of adequate debate on the need for air dominance even at the lower end of the spectrum of warfare. Continued focus on building conventional air power assets for high intensity conflict is essential for democracies and large militaries to protect interests, influence geo-politics and retain certain coercive and deterrent capabilities. However, unless these assets are employed across the spectrum of warfare and more so in the realm of IW or 4 G Warfare, it is going to become increasingly difficult for air forces to cope with the emerging challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Winning the hearts and minds of the common people who are the worst affected by 4G warfare is the only way to a lasting solution in any such conflict. However, in the process of achieving that, a nation-state like India cannot afford to get labelled as a “soft state”. To ensure this, the state has to be more decisive in authorising the use of deterrent force like air power without worrying too much about any of the consequences except that of ‘punitive’ protection for its citizens, *Collectively, we have to move beyond blaming others for wanting to practise terror in India. Instead, we must turn our attention to reforging and sharpening our blunted instruments*



*to fight terror*<sup>5</sup>. Air power is a powerful instrument of the established state and must be used to dominate the non-state actor— there can be no other way in the future.

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5. Harish Khare in *The Hindu*, July 18, 2007.