

INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE PLANNING

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When we talk of planning, it necessarily has to be related to the future and supposedly it necessarily also has to be related to something that is expected to happen in the future or something that one would want to make happen in the future. But, unfortunately, what is going to happen in the future is a factor quite unknown and uncertain and the entire planning can go awry if what one expects to happen does not happen. So, obviously, the very first important step in the process of planning would be to try and predict the future as accurately as one can because one's planning will be as good or as bad as one's prediction.

When it comes to defence planning or what is more appropriately referred to as security planning, we find that the emerging world scenario is quite like a kaleidoscope of constantly changing patterns with different kinds of threats emerging. And we also find that the nature of these security threats and various concerns demands a full spectrum capability from low intensity conflict to high technology conventional war and that too against the backdrop of a nuclear, biological and chemical environment. Prediction, thus, becomes a very complex and difficult process and there are far too many chances of the prediction going wrong. Whoever could predict the collapse of the erstwhile

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USSR? As a matter of fact, in the 1989 assessment made of the USSR by the US, they concluded that it is a very strong power. Similarly, no one could predict that the two Germanys would unite the way they did. Prediction, even short-term, leave aside long-term, is also quite a difficult proposition. The US couldn't predict correctly the course that the Iraq War would take. They thought that they would walk in and comfortably walk out but their predictions were entirely wrong.

The impact of globalisation, increasing economic interdependence and militarisation of space will also have a profound impact on the battlefield milieu. The ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) demands increased battlefield transparency, much greater situational awareness and a variety of precision guided munitions. Technology driven Information Warfare (IW) would be another dimension. In our security assessment, therefore, ideally speaking, we must take cognisance of the potential threat in the region and develop a strategic posture, whereby we have the ability to influence the developments conducive to our national interests – in other words, controlling or shaping the future to some extent rather than waiting for something to happen and then reacting – a bit of a far flung dream for us but nevertheless achievable and, therefore, worth trying.

As quoted in many articles and presentations, India is strategically located vis-à-vis both continental Asia as well as the Indian Ocean Region. It has a landmass of 3.3 million sq km and varying topography, including high mountains, deserts, thick jungles and vast plains. The northeastern frontier also comprises steep, high ranges and dense tropical forests. To the south, there are ranges close to the sea, inland plateaus interspersed with river valleys, coastal plains, and far flung island territories such as Lakshadweep to the west and Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the east. On three sides, from Gujarat to West Bengal, it is bordered by the Arabian Sea, the Indian

Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. India is, thus, a maritime as well as continental entity with a coastline of 7,600 km and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of over 2 million sq km. This geographical and topographical diversity, especially on its borders, also poses unique challenges to our armed forces. India's land frontiers extend across more than 15,500 km, sharing borders with seven neighbours, namely, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, China, Bhutan and Nepal.

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Few countries face the range of security challenges, concerns and threats that India faces in its neighbourhood ranging from terrorism and low intensity conflict to nuclear weapons and missiles. India's location at the centre of an arc of terrorism between North Africa and Southeast Asia, its close proximity to a key source of nuclear proliferation and the continuing acts of terrorism from across its western border require India to maintain a high level of vigilance and defence preparedness. The nature of new threats has also reinforced the need for international cooperation to combat terrorism and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). In this respect, India could play a major role in the global response against such forces.

The present decade has witnessed significant developments on the international scene. Global relations involving various countries have undergone remarkable changes and fresh alignments have occurred necessitated by the national interests of the players. These relate to preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty (which is a military function) and other fields driven by economic, technical and geo-political considerations. To safeguard these interests, an optimum level military capacity is a must apart from a diplomatic thrust.

The situation in almost all the countries bordering us is quite precarious. The situation along the western border of Pakistan is not likely to improve in the near future. Afghanistan is in a state of turmoil and will perhaps remain so for a long time. Despite the statements made by Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani after the recent meeting in Egypt on July 16, 2009, with Prime Minister

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Manmohan Singh, where they met prior to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit, Pakistan will continue to abet and promote terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) as this is a low cost option and enables Pakistan to pursue its strategy of India's containment.

China poses a long-term threat to us. It is undoubtedly aiming to take on the mantle of the Asian leader and has been steadily strengthening its economic and military capability. It has resolved its boundary disputes with all barring India. This dispute is likely to be kept alive while it modernises. By 2020, it is likely to be in a position to assert itself and move towards its perceived national interests. It is felt that the development of the logistics network in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is well beyond the requirements of the settled population. It will facilitate a quick enhanced military build-up against India, should the need so arise. We need to continue to monitor development of military infrastructure by China in the India-China border areas and its military modernisation, including in the maritime sector. Even though China has overtly opposed the weaponisation of space, it is moving towards that direction by its proposed formation of a Space Force and development of anti-satellite weapons. This could well pose a threat and be a cause of serious concern to the development of our space programme.

Bangladesh does not pose any threat in conventional military terms to India. The threat from Bangladesh is mainly non-military at present. The main threat is from illegal cross-border infiltration, anti-India activities and support to Indian insurgent groups. The rise of 'Islamic Fundamentalism' and 'Islamisation of the State' is a serious challenge. The volatile situation in Bangladesh and instability in the region has the potential to overflow across the borders into India and we need to watch against that.

There is no direct threat from Sri Lanka to India. However, in its anxiety to overcome the might of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Sri Lanka government has hurt the feelings of Indian Tamils. The future of Tamils in Sri Lanka is presently uncertain. We need to keep a close watch on

the further developments in this state as also in our Tamil dominated areas.

Nepal *per-se* does not pose any direct military threat. Nevertheless, the spillover of Maoist insurgency into India and coordinated activities with the left wing extremists is already having a certain effect on the internal security situation in North Bengal, Bihar, UP and Uttaranchal.

Owing to its geo-strategic location, Myanmar is an important neighbour for India. It does not pose a military threat to us and traditionally relations between India and Myanmar have been cordial. However, increasing Chinese influence is not in Indian interests. A Pakistan-Myanmar-China trilateral nexus in Myanmar and in the Indian Ocean Region does not augur well for India. India must make concrete efforts to establish and maintain defence cooperation ties with Myanmar.

Developments in Afghanistan have a direct bearing on peace and security in our region. The Taliban and other like-minded fundamentalist groups continue to pose a challenge to the Afghan government and comprise a cause of concern for India.

Further west of the region, the US-led war against Iraq, its interference in Afghanistan and now in Pakistan continues to feed Islamic radicalism, aggravating fault-lines based on religion and concern in relation to the security of the 3.5 million strong Indian community resident in the Gulf states.

The internal situation in India is also getting increasingly unstable. The left wing extremists have expanded their areas of influence from states neighbouring Nepal into the interior of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh. Left wing extremists now possess a considerable number of sophisticated weapons looted primarily from the security forces and have inflicted considerable damage on their apparatus. All in all, the prediction of the future is getting more and more difficult and complex, and so is the making of long-term plans.

This dynamic and fast changing nature of the global, regional and domestic security environment necessitates a constant review of our war waging capability.

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This dynamic and fast changing nature of the global, regional and domestic security environment necessitates a constant review of our war waging capability. The process of Integrated Perspective Planning is supposed to do just that. It is supposed to review the gap between the capabilities required to maintain a qualitative and quantitative combat edge over our adversaries and our present capabilities. It is then supposed to identify the force structure and capabilities required to fill this gap. Post Kargil War, having realised the importance of synergy, the issue of jointness among the three Services in perspective planning has assumed great importance.

In our armed forces, no long-term perspective planning in any coordinated manner was done earlier. Each Service made its plan in isolation without consulting the other Services and processed it separately with the MoD. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) too didn't bother to do any kind of integration. This drawback was highlighted in many high level committees and conferences but nothing concrete was ever done about this aspect.

The other drawback was that the plans made by the individual Services were not capability-based. They were replacement or number-based, meaning that if "X" number of aircraft were likely to get phased out during the existing plan, then the same number of replacements were planned for induction.

The next drawback was that the Services were asked to restrict their plan to an expenditure of roughly 8 per cent more than what they were allotted in the previous plan. Thus, the budget controlled the making of plans rather than the envisaged threats or capabilities building doing so. The allotment of the defence budget to the three Services was also done based on a fixed ratio of roughly 45, 23 and 18 per cent to the Army, Air Force and Navy respectively and the remaining going to other organisations. No prioritisation was done between the capability requirements of the three Services and the budget adjusted accordingly.

Thanks are due to Musharraf for his Kargil adventure. He perhaps did not realise the good he was doing to the Indian armed forces. It was post Kargil that the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) was formed. The KRC findings were tabled in the Parliament in early 2000. Following the submission of the KRC report, the Prime Minister set up a Group of Ministers (GoM), popularly known as the Arun Singh Committee, to go into the various aspects of this badly fought war by us. This Group realised that no integrated approach existed among the three Services and recommended that this folly needed to be corrected forthwith. Besides many other recommendations, they also recommended creation of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) and appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). HQ IDS was, thus, created on October 1, 2001.

The Arun Singh Committee also emphasised that there is an urgent need to integrate the process of planning for achieving greater synergy in both perspective planning as also in its implementation. And this is precisely what HQ IDS does.

IDS mainly consists of four branches which look after Operations (Ops), Doctrine Organisation and Training (DOT), Intelligence (Int) and Policy Planning and Force Development (PP&FD). It is the PP&FD Branch that mainly looks after the planning process. The major duties of the PP&FD Branch are as follows:

- Policy and Planning of Force Structure Development.
- Budget Analysis and Monitoring.
- Acquisition, Procurement and Technology Management.
- Formulate the Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) and Five-Year Defence Plans.
- Propose *intra-se* and *inter-se* prioritisation of schemes of Five-Year Plans of the three Services.
- Coordinate strategic and security perspectives.
- Analyse critical deficiencies in force capabilities and assess impact on national military objectives.

In order to produce a meaningful comprehensive integrated Perspective Plan, there are a few things that need to be understood. To start with, we must understand what we mean by comprehensive security. The nation must first of all decide and know what it wants in the future and only then can any kind of planning be done. Those in power must clearly spell out the national objectives. Based on these objectives, the nation must then work out its National Security Policy. The United States, for instance, for good or bad, had the objective of shaping the Middle East and instilling democracy there. They then worked out the relevant security policy, strategy and plan to achieve that objective. Some other weaker nations may want to remain in a closed environment. Some may want to influence just their neighbourhood.

These security objectives of the nation will have to depend on the existing and futuristic strategic environment and, more importantly, on the strength of the nation. The strength of the nation will determine the power it can exert to achieve the security objectives. This strength of the nation which can be called the Comprehensive National Power (CNP), will, in turn, depend on the economic, military, politico-diplomatic and technological strength.

This national power is divided into intangible factors and tangible factors. The intangible factors are the will and mental strength of our political masters and at the fighting level, the determination and bodily capabilities of the individuals and groups that comprise the military forces, the most important one being the spiritual strength of the forces. In other words, these factors include Quality of Command and Control, State of Discipline, Troop Morale, Fighting Spirit, Quality of Training, *Esprit de Corps*, Spirit of Teamwork, etc which cannot be easily quantified. The tangible factors are Strength of Military Personnel, Quantity and Quality of Material, Quantities of various Weapons, Destructive Power, Tactical Mobility and other physical strengths. Take Israel, for instance. In its case, factors like attitude of the government and people, morale, discipline are plus factors and enhance its CNP. In our case, it is perhaps not as positive.

In our context, economy and democracy are the two major driving factors, which are guiding our inter-state relationships. Within these parameters,

military power is a natural and an important part of national power for ensuring that the interests of the people are protected, strengthened and also projected. It is a known fact that a nation will prosper if there is peace and there can be peace only if the nation is militarily strong.


The strength of national power determines the ambitions that a nation can harbour. Today, India may not be in a state for global power projection and intervention, however, we can, and we definitely need to, think beyond our borders for power projection, at least in the regional frame, and attempt to shape our periphery not with hegemonistic intentions but to ensure our national security in the future.

The next thing to understand before starting any planning process is the structure and functioning of our higher defence organisations. Post Kargil War, having realised the importance of jointness and integration to achieve better synergy, and on the recommendations of the KRC and subsequently the GoM, the higher defence organisation was restructured to cater for future wars, maintain parliamentary control over the military, strengthen the advisory apparatus to the government on professional military matters, and strengthen the budgetary process. However, it was ensured that changes in the working system were to be minimal. The other two important recommendations of the KRC of integrating the MoD with Service HQ in the true spirit and of appointing a CDS remain unfulfilled. The organisational chart for the higher defence organisation post Kargil at the national level is depicted in Chart 1

Right on top we have the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security). The Chairman is the Prime Minister and the other members are the Home Minister, Defence Minister, Minister of External Affairs, Finance Minister and Vice Chairman Planning Commission. Cabinet Secretary, National Security Advisor (NSA) and any or all the Chiefs may be invited for specific issues.

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Chart 1
Higher Defence Organisation



The CCS is linked to the National Security Council (NSC) and the Raksha Mantri (RM). The NSC is also chaired by the PM, with more or less the same members. The NSC has under it the NSA, Strategic Policy Group and the National Security Advisory Board. The Strategic Policy Group consists of the three Chiefs and the various Secretaries Finance, Defence, Home, Foreign, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), Intelligence Bureau (IB), etc. The National Security Advisory Board consists of eminent personalities like former bureaucrats, Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), eminent scientists, academicians, retired Foreign Service people, etc.

At the operational level, the Raksha Mantri interacts with the Defence Secretary, Secretary Defence Production, DG Acquisition, Secretary Defence Finance and Secretary Defence R&D [a Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) man], Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and on certain occasions also with the three Chiefs. Under Chairman COSC we have the - Strategic Force Command (SFC), A&NC – Andaman and Nicobar Command and HQ IDS.

The creation of HQIDS, which principally works as the staff for the Chairman COSC, has been a very important step towards the process of integration.

At present, the Chairman COSC provides the link between the political leadership and the armed forces for the execution of all military tasks. HQ IDS primarily acts as his advisory staff. In order to accomplish its tasks while remaining within this existing system, IDS has to interact with many organisations like Service HQ, DRDO, MoD, MEA, MHA, DoS, ANC, DIPAC, SFC, etc.

Considering that we started working towards integration only a few years ago, we have achieved a great deal in a short time. This has primarily been because the government is seized of the problem post Kargil and is now more conducive and amenable to accepting changes suggested by the armed forces. A major step towards this has been the formulation of a new approach to the Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), which has been approved.

The process of formulating an LTIPP for the armed forces is a complex one and has to be collaborative since there would be a number of agencies such as CCS, NSA, MoD, MEA, MHA, MoF, Intelligence agencies, HQ IDS, Services HQ, DRDO, Defence Industry including various Public and Private Sectors, etc, contributing towards the final product. The ideal procedure laying down the modalities for the formulation of the LTIPP which has been approved by the Raksha Mantri is as follows:

Stage 1 (Articulation of a National Security Strategy). The starting point for the process of formulating an LTIPP has to be the articulation of a National Security Strategy. This would need to be a broad based document that deals with the government's overall national security objectives and interests. The National Security Strategy would be as articulated by the CCS, assisted by the NSA. This would deal with every facet of security like border, energy, economy, internal disturbances, etc.

Stage 2 (Formulation of Defence Planning Guidelines). Though the starting point for identifying future capability needs is the CCS approved National

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Security Strategy, this would often be too broad based and would only provide a general guidance. Hence, we will have to narrow it down to only those aspects of the strategy that have a direct bearing on the roles/activities that the armed forces may be called upon to perform. This document would be the Defence Planning Guidelines. Defence Planning Guidelines, articulated by the Department of Defence (DoD) in the MoD and

approved by the Raksha Mantri, would articulate the types of contingencies that the armed forces may be called upon to respond to in a 15 years time horizon. The likely contingencies would have to be enumerated in their priority. The Defence Planning Guidelines would also need to lay down the likely availability of funds for defence for the same time span.

Stage 3 (Formulation of a Defence Capability Strategy). Thereafter, formulation of the Defence Capability Strategy would be a function of HQ IDS under the CDS/Chairman COSC. The strategy would identify defence capabilities required for each type of contingency enumerated in the Defence Planning Guidelines. Thereafter, with the help of Service HQ, it would assess the existing capabilities; establish the gaps in capabilities, and prioritise the filling up of these gaps. The Defence Capability Strategy would show how defence intends to provide a flexible mix of capabilities in consonance with the government's priorities.

Stage 4 (Preparation of a Defence Capability Plan). The Defence Capability Plan, also prepared by HQ IDS, would have a horizon of 15 years and would list the capabilities required with associated time-frames. This would also include the various options for achieving the capabilities envisaged, whether to develop them indigenously or look abroad, and the broad nature of each project. This, along with the likely availability of funds as indicated in the Defence Planning Guidelines, would facilitate the formulation of a meaningful and achievable LTIPP.

Stage 5 (Preparation of LTIPP). The LTIPP would flow out of the Defence Capability Plan and would essentially list out the programmes and projects

required to be taken up to achieve the capabilities listed in the Defence Capability Plan. The process of preparation and implementation of this involves:

- Preparation of the respective Long-Term Perspective Plan (LTPP) by the Army, Navy and Air Force.
- Receipt, scrutiny and analysis of the LTPP of the three Services and preparation of the LTIPP by HQ IDS. This would involve study of force levels, force structures, force accretions and inter-Service prioritisation.
- Presentation to the COSC and approval of the LTIPP by the COSC.
- Circulation of the LTIPP to each of the Secretaries of the DoD, prior to its presentation to the Defence Planning Council.
- Presentation of the salient aspects of the individual Service LTPP and the LTIPP to the Defence Planning Council headed by the RM.
- Approval of the CCS to the LTIPP with specific reference to force structures, force levels and the equipment profile of the three Services.
- Finally, acquisitions effected based on the Five-Year Acquisition Plans and the Annual Acquisition Plans which would flow from the LTIPP.

All this is a complex process and involves identifying the capability needs of the armed forces, establishing *inter-se* priorities, examining options for meeting these capabilities, managing the projects / programmes that flow out of the plan and providing life-time support. This involves high levels of accountability and by its nature would be rigorous, time consuming and resource intensive.

To summarise so far, four main documents need to be produced for making a meaningful LTIPP – National Security Strategy articulated by the NSA and approved by the CCS, Defence Planning Guidelines by the MoD and approved by the RM, Defence Capability Strategy produced by IDS and approved by the Chairman COSC and Defence Secretary, and Defence Capability Plan also produced by IDS along with Service HQ.

Let us try and see how this planning and acquisition process functions by taking an example. Let us, for instance, presume that one of the objectives set by the government is to substantially increase the import and export of trade

and energy requirements through the medium of the sea, but the geo-political situation that is likely to develop in the future may not permit this. Based on this national objective, the CCS with the help of the NSA would define a comprehensive National Security Strategy which will have to be acted upon simultaneously by the MEA, MHA, DoD and others. This could be called Step 1 i.e. formulation of the National Security Strategy.

Step 2 would be making of the Defence Planning Guidelines, articulated by the Department of Defence in the MoD and approved by the Raksha Mantri, which may state that the geo-political situation that is likely to develop in future may not permit this and one of the contingencies that may arise is blockade of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC). We will, therefore, need to have adequate control over the SLOC right from Strait of Hormuz in the west to Strait of Malacca in the east and we should be able to tackle any such blockade. The government feels that it will have the necessary economic power to achieve this objective and extra funds as required would be made available at the beginning of each Five-Year Plan.

Step 3 would be the formulation of the Defence Capability Strategy by the IDS along with Service HQ. The strategy would identify defence capabilities required for ensuring that a blockade does not take place like in-flight refuelling capability, capability to airlift "X" battalions with their associated equipment, all weather day and night capable long range interceptors with air-to-air refuelling capability, "X" number of ships capable of carrying so-and-so class of helicopters, so-and-so class of ships, and so on. IDS along with Service HQ would therefore, assess the existing capabilities available with the Services as also with public and private sectors, establish the gaps in capabilities and prioritise the filling up of these gaps.

Step 4 would be preparation of a Defence Capability Plan with the help of the Service HQ, DRDO, public and private sector industries ,etc. The plan would have a horizon of 15 years and would list the exact capabilities and projects required, with associated time-frames and the force structure required. This would also include the various options for achieving the capabilities envisaged, namely, indigenous or imported.

Step 5, the last step, would be preparation of the LTIPP based on the LTPPs of the three Services which each Service would have made keeping the guidelines and the capability plans in mind and finally seeking approval from various agencies.

As mentioned earlier, till a few years ago, the three Services were making their LTPPs entirely on their own without consulting each other and these LTPPs were being sent separately and directly to the MoD for clearance. Based on these LTPPs, each Service then made its Five-Year and Annual Acquisition Plans. But the first big change that came about around 2006 was that the LTPPs were sent to IDS for scrutiny, integration and creation of a LTIPP. While creating this LTIPP, IDS attempted to integrate the LTPPs of the three Services and prioritise

Service projections in order to build an optimised joint force structure based on the RM's Operational Directive. An attempt was also made to keep the development and modernisation of the three Services balanced.

The main rationale behind the preparation of the LTIPP was to realise the required "Joint Military Capabilities" to counter the envisaged external and internal threats and to fulfill the national military objectives. But while making the LTIPP, it was noticed that there were certain major constraints in doing so. Firstly, it was noticed that our combat capability vis-à-vis the adversaries has reduced over a period of time and so the main focus had to be on building up of deficiencies. For example, the number of Air Force fighter squadrons had reduced considerably from its approved strength due to phasing out of the MiG-21 and MiG-23 fleets and non-induction of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) due to delays involved in its production. The same was the story with the Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) of the Army.

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Secondly, it was seen that we are still in the initial stages of formulating a joint military doctrine. Planning of Joint Operations has been done on a small scale to cater for limited out of area contingencies and disaster management. However, formalised structures for large scale joint planning and execution have not as yet been created. Along with the restructuring of the higher defence organisation, command, theatre and field level organisations also need to be restructured.

In view of the above, classic joint force structuring and inter-Service prioritisation was not feasible. What was possible was enhanced joint planning and a focus on areas of commonality with a view

to progress towards complete integration in a phased manner. The focus on commonality was to be in design, development, production or acquisition and usage through interoperability and integration. Some important areas of commonalities identified in the three Services' LTPPs were:

- Command, Control, Communication, Computing, Interoperability, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4I2SR).
- Integrated Air Command and Control Systems (IACCS), Air Defence (AD) weapons and sensor systems.
- Surface-to-surface missiles for both tactical and strategic roles.
- The military satellite programme under the Department of Space with the Air Force as the lead Service, which, apart from providing imagery and navigation facilities, will allow the three Services to employ and use Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs), and Electronic Warfare (EW) systems.
- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
- Light and medium lift helicopters.
- EW philosophy and equipment.
- Special Forces.
- Integrated Logistics.

The Indian armed forces with their multi-front obligations covering the aerospace, maritime and continental dimensions, need to keep pace with the uncertain and dynamic security environment. Conflicts have come closer home with the growing global dependency on the Middle East for energy and the consolidation of global terrorism in the region, with its hub centred in our neighbourhood. This turbulent situation is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Geo-political compulsions and the fact that India would become a reckonable economic power in the next two decades, dictate that the Indian armed forces should graduate being “border-centric forces” to “expeditionary forces” having regional power status.

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Over a period of time, due to financial constraints and an inadequate technological and infrastructural base in the country, our armed forces have been unable to keep pace with the galloping technological advancements. To safeguard national interests, our armed forces need to be optimally structured, equipped and weaponised, and capable of operating effectively in a joint Services environment covering the entire spectrum of conflict in our extended neighbourhood.

In order to achieve this, Integrated Perspective Planning needs to be carried out after an objective study of the envisaged global, regional and internal environment as also the appreciated threats and their likely implications on India. The consequent deductions would lead us to our minimum inescapable capabilities that must be met.

Integrated Perspective Planning should focus on building capabilities rather than filling numerical deficiencies arising out of phase-outs; consolidate our defence potential in order to deter and dissuade our immediate neighbours; and build up forces to be in a position to exercise influence in the regional context in furtherance of national strategic interests commensurate with our national power and our standing in the world.