

THE UMBRELLA POLITICS

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When a state stays under the security umbrella of another state, the latter takes the responsibility of providing security to the former, either explicitly or implicitly. The ideological power struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War had resulted in blocs to gain political leverage and strategic advantage in regions of their interests. Military and political influence are two vital factors which determine a state's power potential. Extended deterrence is referred to as "an attempt by a defender to discourage a challenger from attacking its protégé".¹ There have been several arguments propounding that extended deterrence works, as can be understood from the following sentence: "*There hasn't been a superpower war since 1945 in spite of the Soviet Union's expansionist ambitions, so deterrence must work*".²

During the Cold War, the East and West considered nuclear weapons to have "superseded all other types of weapons, and commitments to allies had been made exactly on this supposition".³ Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler have argued that a true security dilemma has two aspects: a "dilemma of

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1. Steve Chan, "Extended Deterrence and the Logic of Selection", in *China, The US, and The Power-Transition Theory: A Critique* (New York: Routledge, 2008).
2. As Quoted by Richard Ned Lebow, "Extended Deterrence: Fact or Fiction?", in Eric H. Arnett, ed., *New Technologies for Security & Arms Control: Threats & Promise* (Washington: AAAS Publication No.98-36S, 1989).
3. Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Studies and the Problem of Power", in Thomas G. Mahnken, Joseph A. Maiolo, eds., *Strategic Studies: A Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

interpretation” which arises from uncertainty over the motives, intentions and capabilities of other states; and the “dilemma of response” which arises from uncertainties over the appropriate response. This further complicates international politics as choices made in this regard determine “whether actors are drawn into a spiral of strategic competition and arms racing, jeopardising rather than enhancing their security”.⁴

This paper aims to take a look at the umbrellas that exist in today’s forum of world politics and the *raison d’être* behind them. For a broader understanding, the paper is divided into four sections: the first section explains why states offer a security umbrella, the second deals with why states accept to be under a security umbrella, the third deals with why some countries choose not to be under a security umbrella, and the fourth section with the limitations of a security umbrella.

SECTION I

WHY STATES CHOOSE TO OFFER A SECURITY UMBRELLA

States with autonomous production of weapons are more powerful than states without this capability. Powerful states like Russia and the United States provided a security umbrella in order to maintain the security colonialism. States balance power in two ways: either by mobilising their domestic resources to develop military power or by forming temporary alliances with other states which have similar interests.⁵ In the early 19th century, Britain provided a naval umbrella in the Gulf region for Pax Britannica dominance. A security umbrella was usually used by the United States to provide nuclear security to countries like Japan, South Korea, Turkey, a large part of Europe, Canada and Australia for Pax Americana dominance. A defensive umbrella for US allies in the Gulf indicates that the US is “trying to create a more self-sustaining security architecture that requires outside involvement

4. As put forward by William Walker, “Sculpting an Order out of Disorder: Nuclear Weapons and Cold War”, in *A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2012).

5. Lt. Col. Rolf A. Siegel, “America’s Grand Strategy Choices”, *Strategy Research Project*, US Army War College, April 10, 2000. (Unclassified).

only *in extremis*".⁶ With the integration of Japan and Germany in the US security and economic arrangements, the Americans tried to maintain peace with these enemy states through a policy of "double containment". The Soviet Union, on the other hand, never had an explicit security umbrella over its allies. Barry Buzan explains the "superpower overlay" which was particularly strong in Northeast Asia where "indigenous security dynamics were effectively suppressed throughout the Cold War".⁷ In 1957, after the launch of the Sputnik by the Soviets, Eisenhower offered Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) to the European countries. For

the United States, stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in the European states was necessary since the European conventional build-up was still at its nascent stage. The Soviets, on the other hand, considered Central and Eastern Europe to be more important and, hence, decided to deploy satellite alliances with these countries "to provide a buffer" against a perceived American expansion and also to prevent a German "revanchist design" in Europe.⁸ The Nye Report of 1995 clarified the United States' long-term commitment in the region. For the United States, it was important to maintain a tangible strategic "footprint" in the region to check the Chinese and keep an eye on the North Koreans. Washington chose to hedge its security bets which would combine "engagement, binding, and balancing mechanisms".⁹ Since 1945, the Russians have made their presence felt strongly with their

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6. Peter Juul, "Clinton's Defence Umbrella", *The Guardian*, July 24, 2009, <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/jul/23/clinton-iran-defence-umbrella-gulf>>

7. Barry Buzan, "The Post Cold War Asia-Pacific Security Order: Conflict or Cooperation?" in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, eds., *Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

8. As expressed by Andrew O' Neil in "Northeast Asia's Security Order", in *Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia: The Quest for Security* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

9. Evan S. Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability", in Li Ming Jiang, ed., *China's International Relations In Asia: Critical Issues in Modern Politics*, Vol I (New York: Routledge, 2010).

security umbrella in Tajikistan and, at present, theirs is the “second largest military contingent” outside Russian territory.¹⁰ The ten-year lease signed between Russia and Tajikistan in 2004, enables Russia to get “exclusive use of three military bases and joint use of an air base free of charge” and also deploy Russian troops in the territory of Tajikistan.¹¹

When the United States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949, Lawrence Kaplan had identified it as a “radical transformation in American foreign policy”. Many analysts felt the United States was going against the policy of political isolationism which it had followed prior to 1941. The United States applied Winston Churchill’s strategy of taking the harder course, joining with the “less strong powers” and thereby defeating and frustrating the “continental military tyrant” in its own grand strategy.¹² The 1950 National Security Council articulated America’s grand strategy as one framed to “foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish”.¹³

During the Cold War, the two superpowers were aware that a strategic victory for one was a strategic failure for the other. The weakening of Japan at the end of World War II, and the resource exhaustion of France and Britain, forcing them to retreat from Asia soon after World War II were some of the factors that led the United States to start playing a big role in the Asia-Pacific region. In contrast, the Gross National Product (GNP) of the United States increased from \$209.4 billion in 1939 to 355.2 in 1945.¹⁴ In 1950, the United States held 49.8 percent of the world’s monetary gold, reserve currencies, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) reserves.¹⁵ The Soviet nuclear umbrella was never an officially declared one but was implied

10. Farangis Najibullah, “Tajikistan Under the Russian Security Umbrella”, <http://www.rferl.org/content/under_the_russian_security_umbrella/24320140.html>

11. Ibid.

12. Piece quoted from citation by Eric A. Miller, “Threats, Dependence, and Alignment Patterns”, in *To Balance or to Balance: Alignment Theory and the Commonwealth of Independent States* (England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2006).

13. “American Hegemony Without an Enemy,” <<http://www.u.arizona.edu/~volgy/LayneSchwarzAmericanHegemony.html>>

14. Geir Lundestad, “Cooperation Established: ‘Empire’ by Invitation, 1945-1950: America’s Position of Strength”, in *The United States and Western Europe Since 1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

15. Ibid.

under the security pacts. Under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, it included Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The United States, on the other hand, followed the hub and spokes system whereby it tried to build several alliance mechanisms after the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951. It is described as a model in which there is a cartwheel in which the hub (the United States) stands and can move with the help of strong spokes like Japan, South Korea, Turkey and other alliances. As North Korea continues with its ambitions of possessing nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence has further strengthened in South Korea. China perceived the presence of the US defensive umbrella in Japan as a check on Japan's strategic ambitions.

The US defence strategy aims to achieve four key goals for the development of US forces' capabilities, their development and use. They have "paid special attention in assuring allies and friends of the US' steadfastness of purpose and its capability to fulfil its security commitment; dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten US interests or those of our allies and friends; deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and imposing severe penalties for aggression on an adversary's military capability and supporting infrastructure; and, decisively defeating an adversary if deterrence fails".¹⁶ The defensive umbrella had proved to be fruitful for the United States in the case of Taiwan as in the quest for military assistance to counter the Chinese threats, Taiwan even underwent a transformation from a corrupt dictatorship to a democracy. However, it could be rightly said that in Taiwan, the United States basically follows *dual* deterrence or *pivotal* deterrence and not *extended* deterrence. This means that the US tries to discourage China from launching any armed attack against Taiwan while, at the same time, it discourages any attempt by Taiwan to declare *de jure* independence.

The tussle between democracy and non-democracy continues since the end of World War II. With an Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism and the quest to become the world's government, containment of the Communist

16. Doctrine of Joint Nuclear Operations, *Joint Publication 3-12*, March 15, 2005.

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bloc remained a major agenda of the United States’ grand strategy. Andrew O’ Neil highlights Asia’s Cold War dynamics based on three independent levels: the impact of the US-Soviet global rivalry in shaping the security frameworks and strategic dynamics of inter-state relations in the region; the regional-level rivalries involving Asia’s indigenous great powers, particularly China; and “the competition, conflict and cooperation among the local powers at the sub-regional level...overlaid by the rivalries among the major powers”.¹⁷ Nuclear weapons have always been an important tool in the foreign policy of Washington. In 1949, the nuclear umbrella was provided to NATO by the US to “protect against the perceived military threats of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries”.¹⁸ For the United States, Asia was in its list of regions of strategic importance only when the dragon became a Communist state and the Americans feared Communist expansionism in Asia. The United States believed that an unchecked China would “enforce claims over resources and territory” which are disputed at present by the “weaker neighbours”.¹⁹ It was assumed that the security umbrella would enable Washington to enhance its strategic reassurance. In the 1960s, Lyndon Johnson offered support to states that felt threatened by the nuclear blackmailing of the “Communist Chinese aggression”. Since the end of the Cold War, the Chinese have been cautiously pursuing a strategy of expanding their own power and influence and, at the same time, trying to undermine and diminish the power and influence of the United States. The United States had always played the game of *real politik* well against both the Soviet Union during the Cold War and against China post Cold War. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States uses the security dilemma model

17. O’ Neil, n.8.

18. David Krieger and Steven Starr, “A Nuclear Nightmare in the Making: NATO, Missile Defense and Russian Insecurity”, *Nuclear Age Peace Foundation*, January 3, 2012.

19. Views expressed by Aaron L. Friedman, “A Contest for Supremacy” in *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and The Struggle for Mastery in Asia* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2011).

to contain the Chinese. In 1961, a Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Friendship and Cooperation was signed which committed the USSR to the defence of North Korea. This cordial relationship was maintained even during the Sino-Soviet split when North Korea maintained good relations with both the countries.²⁰ At present, both the United States and China are trying to shadow box each other for influence and status in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States has particularly been befuddled about China's revisionist tendencies and believes that China's rise could bring about instability in the Asia-Pacific region

Post Korean War, the United States had remained committed to South Korea's security and, in return, the South Korean government purchased US military goods. In 1980, Korea signed a memorandum of understanding with the United States government to purchase the F/A-18s, and in 1991, decided to procure the F-16s.²¹ Provision of the security umbrella to Australia under the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Treaty since 1981 had provided the United States a stopover for US Air Force (USAF) B-52 bombers at Darwin in the Northern Territory when they fly out from Guam to patrol the Indian Ocean. South Korea was the largest recipient of US exports of major conventional weapons for 2005-09. The United States delivered 40 F-15K combat aircraft and advanced air-to-air missiles and air-to-surface missiles to South Korea.²² Under the implicit nuclear umbrella of the United States, Israel procured several fighter aircraft like the F-151 Thunder²³, F-4E 2000 Phantom and F-161 Sufa²⁴. Japan would be receiving the F-35s from the United States. South Korea, Japan and Taiwan have received aircraft like the F-16 Fighting Falcons, F-15 Eagles, and F-4 Phantoms. It has

20. Greg Austin and Alexey D. Muraviev, "Strategic Policy in the Asia Pacific", *The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia* (New York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000).

21. Kongdan O. H., "US-Korea Aerospace Collaboration and the Korean Fighter Project", *International Military Aerospace Collaboration: Case Studies in Domestic and Intergovernmental Politics*.

22. Paul Holtom, Mark Bromley, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, "International Arms Transfers", *SIPRI 2010*.

23. David S. Sorenson, "Israel, the United States, and the F-151 "Thunder", Program, *International Military Aerospace Collaboration*.

24. John Steinbach, "The Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program", The Emirate Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 2009. <http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policy/israeli-nuclear-policy/steinbach_israeli_program.pdf>

been suspected that Iran too could provide a nuclear umbrella to fellow Muslim countries as a cover for “terrorism and subversion”.²⁵ By this move, Iran could make it clear that it was ready to launch an attack on non-Muslim states like Southeastern Europe, Israel and Russia. Iran’s decision of an alliance with the Islamic countries for a missile umbrella could also imply that Iran could threaten those Islamic countries that support the West. There have also been reports of Iran starting to build a joint missile base in Venezuela which would enable Iranian missiles to reach the territory of the United States. Iran had planned to station the Shahab-3, Scud-B and Scud-C category missiles in the region. This could enable Iran to carry on with the S-300 missile deal with Russia, using Venezuela as the proxy state to buy the missile, as Russia is bound by sanctions against Iran.²⁶

The United States considers that the concept of providing a nuclear umbrella to allies assures them of nuclear security and serves as a tool for non-proliferation by preventing them from trying develop and field their own nuclear weapons. The United States offered a security umbrella to Israel to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons, even though some could debate that Israel already possesses indigenous nuclear weapons. There have been several arguments which pointed out that in case the United States stopped providing a nuclear umbrella to states, many states like Germany and Japan could become nuclear weapon states. The decision to deploy four Aegis ships in Rota, Spain, is due to the fact that Rota is on the southwestern Atlantic coast of Spain, about 65 miles away from the Strait of Gibraltar, which leads to the Mediterranean Sea. This would be critical to the security of the region.

In the Gilpatrick Committee Report, it was asserted that a Japanese decision to build nuclear weapons would probably produce a chain reaction of similar decisions by other countries. ²⁷ In 1958, the United States had deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea. However, by 1992, under the

25. C.Hart, “The Marriage of Terrorism and Nuclear Capability”, *American Thinker*, February 24, 2010.

26. Anna Mahjar-Barducci, “Iran Placing Medium Range Missiles in Venezuela: Can Reach the US”, *Gatestone Institute*, December 8, 2010.

27. Roswell L.Gilpatrick, Chairman, “A Report to the President by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation”, National Security Archive, Washington, DC, January 21, 1965.

direction of George Bush, the nuclear weapons were removed from the state. There were unconfirmed reports that South Korea was pursuing its own nuclear weapon programme. In the 1960 and 1970s, when the conventional military balance started tilting towards North Korea, Seoul did think of a nuclear arsenal to neutralise Pyongyang's conventional military strength. However, in 1975, South Korea was coerced by the United States to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The security umbrella over Taiwan enabled the United States to cut off the French-Taiwan nuclear deal too. The United States' decision to offer a nuclear umbrella to the Middle East states is to deter Iran and also to prevent other Islamic states in the region from becoming nuclear states.

Weaker states often bandwagon with powerful states having the same enemy in order to increase the strategic costs to the enemy state.

SECTION II

WHY STATES CHOOSE TO ACCEPT A SECURITY UMBRELLA

Military stability is a desired aim for most states as no state would want to be defeated militarily and be subjected to political submission by military means. While some states prefer to indigenously militarise, others often prefer to stay under a security umbrella in order to save the expense of military modernisation and also to remain safe and secure against any threat of aggression from rival or rogue states. States which do not have the power to deter other states, could use the security umbrella to their convenience to deter those states and thereby bring in regional stability. Weaker states often bandwagon with powerful states having the same enemy in order to increase the strategic costs to the enemy state. As Kenneth Waltz puts it, "on the weaker side" alignment is "appreciated and safer, provided, of course, that the coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking".²⁸ For example, a missile defence umbrella in Turkey will raise the cost for Iran and Russia to develop

28. As quoted in Threats, Dependence, and Alignment Patterns.

counter-measures to overwhelm the ballistic missile defence. Many analysts feel Japan's Yoshida doctrine allowed Japan to be a "free rider" whereby it could exist under the shadow of American security, thereby preventing resources to be drained out to raise a standing military. While the Chinese economy remained in the underdeveloped category, Japan's remarkable economic growth determined by the *Phoenix* factor after the holocaust was regarded in Northeast Asia as the "regional exemplar of the developmental state".²⁹ It could also be said that because Japan had little pressure of military expenditures, it could continue its United Nations diplomacy efficiently. Tokyo's contribution to UN expenditures increased from 11.4 percent in 1989 to 19.5 percent in 2004.³⁰ Japan possesses one of the most modern conventional military forces in the world. After the Korean War, South Korea also received foreign aid which prevented the economy from falling apart. It has been reported that Turkey has an estimated 90 B-61 bunker busting bombs of the United States hosted in its own territory which are claimed to be far more than what Turkey can produce indigenously.

As Stephen Walt argues, states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone.³¹ Gramsci describes hegemony as "a relation, not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership. It is the organisation of consent."³² A major reason for Japan to be under the tutelage of the American forces was the Sino-Japanese tension which had prevented detente since time immemorial. China, on the other hand, chose to build a close alliance with the Soviets unlike the Japanese policy of a dependent security alliance with the United States. The Yoshida doctrine accepted the "conditional independence" and "sovereignty" of Tokyo in exchange of the American "strategic shield".³³ Japan's neighbours could encourage the nuclear umbrella as some feel that

29. O' Neil, n. 8.

30. Rex Li, "A Regional Partner or a Threatening Other? Chinese Discourse of Japan's Changing Security Role in East Asia", in Christopher M. Dent, ed., *China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia*.

31. O' Neil, n. 8.

32. Cornelia Beyer quotes Antonio Gramsci's definition of hegemony in "Hegemonic Governance", University of Hull, <<http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/Beyer-Hegemonic%20Governance%20Turin.pdf>>

33. Japan: Occupation and Recovery.

in case the US-Japan treaty ever fails, Japan could rearm itself.

When Washington offered IRBMs to Europe, Turkey and Italy accepted them. Turkey accepted them to deter the Soviets while Italy accepted them to strengthen its relationship with the US and achieve a power status. Allied elites, especially in Northeast Asia, accepted US leadership based on the “legitimate ideology of extended nuclear deterrence, institutional integration and unique American nuclear forces that underpinned the alliances”.³⁴ A possible reason for Japan’s acceptance of the nuclear umbrella could be that Japan had learnt from the mistakes it had committed in the Pearl Harbour episode, and would not dare to challenge the United States in the future. Japan could argue the case for a nuclear umbrella under defensive military capabilities. In case Japan becomes a nuclear weapon state, it could lose the United States as an ally and could be isolated in the East Asian region, given that the country does not have trustworthy allies in the region. The “Taepo Dong shock” in which a North Korean missile flew above Japan, landing in the Pacific Ocean, made Japan pretty apprehensive and led to a missile defence alliance with the United States. The fear of North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons also strengthened Japan’s decision to build a missile defence alliance with the United States. Right after the Korean War, South Korea was under the nuclear umbrella of the USA in order to deter the Chinese. In 1958, nuclear weapons were deployed in South Korea, and till 1991, South Korea was under the nuclear umbrella of the USA. However, with North Korea testing its nuclear weapons, the USA and South Korea issued a joint communiqué whereby the USA agreed to provide help to the South Koreans for ‘extended deterrence’ under a nuclear umbrella.³⁵ The ‘direct military threat’ from North Korea had worried the South Koreans.

Japan could argue the case for a nuclear umbrella under defensive military capabilities.

34. As cited by Peter Hayes in “Extended Nuclear Deterrence, Global Abolition, and Korea”, *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* < <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Peter-Hayes/3268> >

35. Note: In 2009, President Obama reaffirmed to provide security to South Korea through extended deterrence and under this extended deterrence, providing the nuclear umbrella was on the agenda of Washington.

The North Korean military doctrine is based on the belief that decisive victory can be achieved only by offensive means. The nuclear umbrella could also help in building cordial relations between South Korea and Japan. Both perceive North Korea as a serious threat to their territory. Hence, both countries, sharing similar political values and a capitalist economy, have the potential of being allies. Saudi Arabia has also been threatened by Iran's ambitious nuclear programme. At present, Saudi Arabia is believed to be under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. Even the UAE desired to be under the missile defence umbrella of the United States and was interested in the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system. The security umbrella deal between Venezuela and Iran permits Venezuela to use the missile facilities in case of "national needs".³⁶

During the Cold War, when Germany was divided, any military attack by the East Germans on the West German border could have provoked a nuclear retaliation from the United States. One could rightly say that the United States allowed Germany to carry on with civilian nuclear research and development because of it being under the American nuclear umbrella. However, following *ostpolitik* and the unification of Germany, both East and West Germany came under the security umbrella of the United States. The uranium imports for Japan could be used judiciously only for the purpose of nuclear energy without facing the consequences of sanctions on the import of nuclear energy. The United States encouraged Japan to establish its own self-defence forces with technological and financial assistance from the United States which would include Japan's defence industrial base and also aerospace. There was, hence, a *gaiatsu* (political pressure) for rearmament. In 1955, the indigenisation of the Japanese aerospace industry began with the licensed production of the F-86 (60 percent of domestic production). However, in 1956, Japan produced the T-1 trainer which was 100 percent domestic with a licensed engine. By the 1960s, the aerospace industry started to flourish and most Japanese felt that autonomous defence capabilities comprised a better option than being in an alliance.³⁷

36. As quoted in Mahjar- Barducci, n.26.

37. Michael Jonathan Green, "US-Japan Co-development of the FSX", *International Military Aerospace Collaboration: Case Studies in Domestic and Intergovernmental Politics*.

For Japan, the idea of staying under the nuclear umbrella could be the best option as that would prevent Japan from withdrawing from the NPT, thereby damaging its own international reputation. At the end of World War II, Japan hoped for Soviet mediation to obtain more favourable surrender terms which were dashed by Moscow's decision to enter the war, thereby violating its neutrality treaty with Japan.³⁸ In a way, one could say, the military alliance with the United States spared Japan from being divided among the victors, unlike Germany, thereby enabling Tokyo to regain its sovereignty.³⁹ This dependent security alliance further incited resentment and worry amongst the Chinese. This could be the reason why the Chinese laid more stress on improved diplomatic relations with Japan in the Bandung Conference in 1955. One cannot deny that the economic bilateral ties between Beijing and Tokyo had been strengthening. The security umbrella also allowed Japan to "compensate for its legitimacy deficit" by projecting itself as *small Japan* and *peace loving state* and also enabled Japan to follow "tip-toe diplomacy".⁴⁰ Japan takes the nuclear umbrella as an opportunity to maintain cordial relations with the United States and, at the same time, it also enables Japan to have nuclear weapons in its territory. After being labelled a "free rider" and a practitioner of "check book diplomacy", it began to emerge as a robust US ally during the 2001-06 tenure under Junichiro Koizumi.⁴¹ Japan recognised Korea's independence and also renounced claims on Taiwan. South Korea, on the other hand, knows it has little influence over North Korea's nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programme and the main interlocutors are the United States, China, Japan, and Russia.⁴² Even though Australia faces no real external threats, the rise of China, India and Japan has kept the Australians worried about

38. Alice Lyman Miller and Richard Wich, "Japan: Occupation and Recovery", in *Becoming Asia: Change and Continuity in Asian International Relations Since World War II* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

39. Ibid.

40. Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan's Policy Towards China: Domestic Structural Change, Globalization, History and Nationalism", in Christopher M. Dent, ed., *China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia* (UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2008).

41. Geoffrey Kemp, "Pakistan, Japan, And South Korea: Middle East Connections", in *The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia's Growing Presence in the Middle East* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).

42. R.S.N. Singh, *South Korea*.

the strategic role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. However, even though the Australians are thinking of an indigenous nuclear weapon system, it is unlikely to happen as that would mean withdrawing from the NPT. Many have felt that such a decision will lead to international isolation, but that is unlikely as Australia could be supported by China and Russia for strategic reasons.

SECTION III

WHY STATES CHOOSE NOT TO BE UNDER A SECURITY UMBRELLA

NATO members like France and the United Kingdom had their indigenous nuclear programme. In the post World War phase, due to diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the United States, one could assume that Britain would have stayed under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. But it did not choose to do so. Instead, it behaved the same way the arch rival of the United States, the Soviet Union, behaved by going in for an ambitious indigenous nuclear weapon programme. Prime Minister Clement Atlee saw nuclear weapons as a means to end any further wars as he believed that only a "bold course" could "save civilization".⁴³ George Bernard Shaw had once stated "Britain is faced either with the end of this country or no more war..the choice between survival and extinction".⁴⁴ It could be this fear of extinction that probably influenced Britain to not stay under any umbrella and to pursue its own nuclear weapon programme. Britain was particularly disappointed with the formation of NATO.⁴⁵ France refused to stay under the United States' nuclear umbrella. Charles de Gaulle had built the *force de frappe* to restore the prestige of France by building indigenous nuclear weapons. France also feared that the US nuclear umbrella might not be applied to France if the Soviets attacked Europe. De Gaulle's main motive was to pose a serious challenge to the US defined Atlanticism, where Germany

43. In Hot Pursuit: British and Soviet Nuclear Policy.

44. Quoted in Lawrence S. Wittner, "A New Sense of Fear: Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand", *One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through 1953* (California: Stanford University Press, 1993), p.86

45. Ibid., p.87

became the main battleground for the US-French rivalry. However, during the later phases, France and Great Britain were assisted by the United States in sensitive nuclear technology for developing nuclear weapons.⁴⁶ When the United States offered IRBMs to NATO allies in 1957, following the launch of the Sputnik by Moscow, countries like Denmark and Norway not only refused to station such weapons on their territory but also opposed stationing them on any part of the European territory. There has been a belief that even India was under the nuclear umbrella. However, as Jasjit Singh clarifies, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 under Clause 9 was a mere political signal to convey the political deterrent to countries like the US or China. In 1991, India sent a clear signal to Moscow that it did not require Clause 9 of the treaty, and was ready to sign a fresh treaty without the clause because probably by then, India had already built the bomb.⁴⁷ Even though Turkey has been under the nuclear umbrella of the United States since the Cold War era, there have been concerns that it is now trying for an indigenous nuclear weapon programme. This could be due to Turkey's threat perceptions from Iran, Syria and Israel and also due to suspicion over the security umbrella of the United States. In 2009, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Erdogan ruled out the idea of hosting US missile defence systems against Iran as he felt it would make Turkey "susceptible to a possible missile attack from Iran and also Syria, Iran's ally".⁴⁸ The decision to host advanced radar systems could jeopardise relations between Tehran and Ankara, especially at a time when Turkey is trying to improve its relations with Iraq, Iran, Russia and Greece.⁴⁹ The Iran threat could coerce the Saudi Arabians to develop their indigenous nuclear weapons.⁵⁰ China's military expansion has also been a threat for both Japan and the United States and, as a result, the defence relations between Japan and the United States have strengthened over the years. However, Japan's threat perceptions have led many to believe that Japan could eventually

46. As Cited by Matthew Kroeing, "Explaining Nuclear Assistance", in *Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (United States of America: Cornell University Press, 2010).

47. As clarified by Jasjit Singh. The clarification has been put down with his permission.

48. Debalina Chatterjee, "Missile Defence in Turkey", *USI Journal*, January-March, 2012.

49. Ibid.

50. Yoel Guzansky, "Saudi Arabia Nuclear Hedging", *Atlantic Council*, December 13, 2011, <[http://www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1323850540.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1323850540.pdf)>

North Korea insists on self-reliance, thereby rejecting any scope for dependency, and laying stress on nuclear arms.

start developing its own nuclear weapons. According to Victor Cha, withdrawal of the nuclear umbrella from East Asia by the United States could result in North Korea acting more proactively by becoming more provocative. It could consider it an admission of defeat by the United States and its allies and, hence, could rely less on conventional capabilities and treat any escalation as a “use or lose incentive”. The threat from these artillery systems has been so strong that

South Korea had not been appreciative of a ballistic missile defence as it felt that this threat cannot be negated by such defences.

Sometimes, states do not want to be under a security umbrella even if they are weak in all respects. North Korea insists on self-reliance, thereby rejecting any scope for dependency, and laying stress on nuclear arms.⁵¹ The mission of the nuclear forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is to “deter and repel aggression and attack against the country and the nation until the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the world is realized”.⁵² North Korea maintains a policy of not using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or threatening them with nuclear weapons as long as they do not become a threat to its security “in conspiracy with nuclear weapon states”.⁵³ The United States and Japan appear reluctant to convert the Six-Party Talks into a regional security dialogue mechanism, as they fear that doing so could confirm China’s standing at the centre of the talks.⁵⁴ The United States believes that nuclear weapon capability in the possession of an unpredictable country like North Korea is a dangerous tool which would threaten regional security. North Korea, on the other hand, has resented the US move of calling it the “axis of evil”, and the delay in the setting up of a light water reactor led to North Korea retreating from its obligations under

51. Gilbert Rozman, “Navigating Between the United States and North Korea”, in *Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught Between North Korea and the United States* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

52. China and North Korean Borderlands, Relations, History,< <http://sinonk.com/tag/cold-war/>>

53. Ibid.

54. Rozman, n.51.

the 1994 Accord. Hence, it claims that its uranium programme is legitimate.⁵⁵ In May 2003, North Korea had nullified the 1992 pact with South Korea for denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and by October 2003, North Korea declared that it was using “plutonium separated from the 8,000 fuel rods to fabricate nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterrence”.⁵⁶ States which realised the importance of hard power, and feared having to remain under the security umbrella of a strong state, pursued their indigenous missile development programme (such as India’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme) or proliferated missile technology from other countries (Pakistan proliferated missile technology from China like the M-9 and M-11, and from North Korea.). When Pakistan was on the verge of becoming a nuclear weapon state, China had clearly declared that it did not have a policy of providing nuclear umbrellas to other countries.⁵⁷

States like Israel, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina and India have defence industrial sectors which have unique symbolic importance as indicators of modernisation and are a dominating factor in setting overall scientific and technical priorities. The ability to produce weapons would bolster the morale of these countries and enable them to display their technical prowess.⁵⁸ The 2005 Defence White Paper of South Korea had laid stress on becoming more self-reliant.

Turkey is reported to be one of the most capable countries in the Middle East with the capacity of building the bomb. If threat perceptions increase, Turkey could become a nuclear weapon state with possible help from Russia or China or even Pakistan. Japan’s “large-scale plutonium recycling program” is creating suspicion that Japan might possess enough fissile material to produce nuclear weapons.⁵⁹

55. R.S.N.Singh, *North Korea, Asian Strategy and Military Perspective* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 2005).

56. Frederick N. Mattis, “Problematic States”, *Banning Weapons of Mass Destruction*, (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2009).

57. Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Chinese Delegation Seems to Deny Pakistan a Nuclear Umbrella”, *The New York Times*, May 21, 1998.

58. Janne E. Nolan, “Proliferation: The Case of Ballistic Missiles”, Eric H. Arnett, ed., *New Technologies for Security and Arms Control: Threat & Promise* (Washington DC: AAAS Publications, 1989).

59. Robyn Lim, “No More American Umbrella?: Nuclear Temptation in Japan”, *The New York Times*, April 15, 2002.

In 2009, Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak had rejected the nuclear umbrella offered by the United States.

China does not support the idea of extended deterrence and, hence, is opposed to the idea of a nuclear umbrella provided by nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states.⁶⁰ On the other hand, China indulges in nuclear and missile proliferation. For example, when Pakistan wanted to become a nuclear weapon state, it looked for a Chinese nuclear umbrella, but that did not succeed.

Instead, Pakistan had to indulge in nuclear proliferation with other states and missile proliferation with North Korea and China. North Korea, on the other hand, received technology from Pakistan and Iran to build solid propelled ballistic missiles.

In 2009, Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak, had rejected the nuclear umbrella offered by the United States. According to him, such an umbrella "would imply accepting foreign troops and experts"⁶¹ on Egypt's territory which was not acceptable to the Egyptians. It would also make the region nuclearised which could have a domino effect and lead other states to develop nuclear weapons, and, hence, jeopardise peace and stability in the region. When talks were on about a missile defence shield in Turkey by NATO, Iran had adopted the necessary measures such as long range missiles in the air.⁶² Russia perceived missile defence as being against it and started to improve its ballistic missile capabilities. In 2007, the existing Pac-2 systems in Kuwait and Qatar were replaced with the more advanced Pac-3s. Such systems were feared to create an obstacle for a Missile Free Zone in the Middle East as Iran could work towards improving its missile programmes so that its delivery systems could not be intercepted by the Patriots.

60. Yao Yunzhu, "Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence", *Strategic Insights*, vol. IV, issue 9, September 2005.

61. Fareed Mahdy, "Egypt Rejects U.S. Nuclear Umbrella", <<http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48156>>

62. "Iran Missiles Under Protective Umbrella", *PRESS TV*, September 25, 2011.

SECTION IV

LIMITATIONS OF AN UMBRELLA

In the 1960s, Germany was exposed to nuclear blackmail by the Soviets, and, at the same time, there were apprehensions about the American nuclear umbrella as the Germans felt that it was weakening or on the verge of being withdrawn.⁶³ South Korea has been apprehensive to support the theatre missile defence programme of the United States

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 raised questions about whether extended deterrence was preventive or provocative. The United States arms build-up and missile deployment in Turkey and in the rest of the European countries and “assertions of strategic security” had increased Soviet strategic insecurities.⁶⁴

Japan’s Defence Minister Fumio Kyuma has stated that deterrence would strengthen only when the US explicitly states: “If you drop one nuclear bomb on Japan, the US will retaliate by dropping ten on you”.⁶⁵ China, on the other hand, feels that Japan is taking advantage of the US-Japan ties to “impede the reunification of China and Taiwan” and also provide military support to the US in case there is a conflict over the issue of Taiwan.⁶⁶ The United States’ security assistance to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act pledges the United States to maintain military capabilities to ensure peace in the Western Pacific, but it does not require the United States to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf in the event of an attack from Mainland China.⁶⁷

Under the European Security and Defensive Policy, Europe would be under the US’ defence umbrella to strengthen the US-European security alliance. Turkey wanted to be a part of the European Union defence and security mechanism, but since it was not a part of the European Union, its bid was rejected. However, one could argue that the efficacy of the nuclear

63. As put forward by Wolfgang Kreiger, “The Germans and the Nuclear Question”, *Fifth Alois Memorial Lecture*, 1995.

64. Richard Ned Lebow, “Extended Deterrence: Military Fact or Political Fiction?”, in Eric. H. Arnett, ed., n.58.

65. Quoted in “Concepts”, *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century* (RAND Corporation, 2012).

66. Li, n.30.

67. Matthew Kroeig, “Israel’s Nuclear Program: French Assistance and US Resistance”, *Exporting the Bomb* (Cornell University Press, 2010).

Few Europeans believed that the United States would risk going into a nuclear war if European security was at threat.

umbrella was lost once the Soviets gained the nuclear weapons too in 1949. Few Europeans believed that the United States would risk going into a nuclear war if European security was at threat. North Korea had objected to the nuclear umbrella over South Korea provided by the United States then as it thought that it would make the Korean Peninsula more susceptible to a nuclear war. This also made Japan suspicious of the United States. The umbrella in both South Korea

and Japan could lead to the two countries actually building nuclear weapons due to conflicts, thereby making the Northeast Area peninsula a nuclearised area. Both Japan and South Korea are involved in the Takeshima Dogdo Island conflict and, hence, these countries becoming nuclear weapon states could lead to a severe catastrophe. The Korean People's Army in North Korea has adopted a forward deployed offensive posture and placed its weapons like the long range artillery systems in the Demilitarised Zone; it has also started to develop nuclear weapons in order to reduce its vulnerability to a possible American nuclear attack. In such a case, North Korea would attack Seoul with conventional weapons, thereby causing massive destruction in the Korean Peninsula. During the Cold War, the United States had a wide variety of nuclear weapons stationed in Seoul ranging from surface-to-air missiles to 8-inch howitzer artillery shells. At some point, there were around 950 nuclear warheads stationed at the southern half of the peninsula.⁶⁸ North Korea has made it very clear that denuclearisation of North Korea would be possible only when the United States' nuclear threat is removed and there is no nuclear umbrella area in South Korea. Sometimes, states prefer to remove the nuclear weapons of the umbrella state and, at the same time, expect the umbrella security to be given to them. This becomes a complicated situation, as seen in the German case. The Germans of late had demanded the removal of American nuclear weapons stationed in their territory. At the same time, Germany expects to be under the security

68. Chuck Krauss, "Nuclear Vacuum Zone: Extended Nuclear Deterrence, China and North Korea", April 23, 2012, <<http://sinonk.com/2012/04/23/nuclear-vacuum-zone-extended-nuclear-deterrence-china-and-north-korea/>>

umbrella. NATO members consider the move by Germany of wanting to stay under the nuclear umbrella and, at the same time, trying to transfer the responsibility of maintaining the nuclear weapons to other states, as “irresponsible”.⁶⁹ In the recent past, there has been a series of failed US-Israel anti-missile tests which raised questions on the US goal of providing an “umbrella” to defend its allies against an Iranian nuclear attack. This also increased Israel’s concerns over a possible nuclear attack by Iran against which there would be no viable defence, thereby making the Israelis more worried. Even during the Gulf War—Operation Desert Storm in 1991—the US deployed the Patriot anti-missile systems in Israel, and Saudi Arabia could not intercept Iraqi ballistic missiles. Moreover, Israel faces threats from rockets launched from the Gaza Strip by terrorist organisations like the Hezbollah and Hamas, which would not give it enough time to deploy any adequate defence. There is no guarantee that under a security umbrella, the weaker states would not indulge in developing nuclear weapons. While Japan has not deployed nuclear weapons and remains under the umbrella of the US, there have been reports that the country has used its “electrical utility companies as a cover to allow the country to amass enough nuclear weapons materials to build a nuclear arsenal larger than that of China, India and Pakistan combined”.⁷⁰

It must be noted that South Korea maintains good relations with China and Russia in spite of the US security umbrella. In fact, what is noteworthy is that during the fall of the Soviets, Moscow rejected the ideology of North Korea, and instead, sought South Korean capital goods, technology and credit. In spite of the US nuclear umbrella, Turkey has acquired weapons from China like the WS-1 302mm multi-launch rocket systems, or TR-3000 rockets. In 2010, China also conducted a joint military exercise with Turkey in Anatolia.⁷¹ Turkey is desperately trying to modernise its military and China

69. Judey Dempsey, “Germany Is Chastised for Stance on Nuclear Arms”, *The New York Times*, February 8, 2010.

70. Joseph Trento, “United States Circumvented Laws to Help Japan Accumulate Tons of Plutonium”, *DC Bureau*, April 9, 2012.

71. For more on this, see Debalina Chatterjee, “The Sino-Turkey Defence Relations”, *Revue Defense Nationale*, November 2011.

could be the “best option” for “cheap and efficient defence equipment”.⁷²

There is also no guarantee that the state which is under the security umbrella would be provided with the weaponry systems that it wants. For instance, in spite of being under the defence umbrella of the United States, Japan did not receive the F-22 Raptor aircraft from it due to the ban on its export by the US Congress. Umbrellas become complicated in a multipolar world as there are too many powers “to permit any of them to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and adversaries and too few to keep the effects of defection low”.⁷³ The main problem of extended deterrence in East Asia is the “ineffective nature of extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia, ...an ineffective policy is woven into the fabric of East Asian security management”.⁷⁴ US allies like Australia realise that the US nuclear ‘umbrella’ is getting smaller, but it is “certainly not contracting abruptly”. Many analysts are of the view that the umbrella is still broad enough to cover the allies’ strategic concerns and interests. The only issue with the US umbrella is the problem of convincing allies that their national interests would be as important to the United States as its own.⁷⁵ For example, at present given Japan’s interest in an indigenous nuclear weapon system, it would be a challenge for the United States to convince the Japanese. In 2002, Ozawa Ichiro, a Japanese politician had mentioned that Japan could become a nuclear weapon state if it felt threatened by Beijing’s bullying. The Japanese are aware that the Chinese “could build missiles faster” than the United States could “build their missile defenses to protect Japan and American bases” in Japan.⁷⁶ The Japanese are also apprehensive of the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system as they fear that it would jeopardise Tokyo’s relations with China and Russia and could isolate Japan in Northeast Asia.⁷⁷

72. Ibid.

73. Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons”.

74. Kevin Kallmyer, “North Korea and the US Nuclear Umbrella: US Posture, Changes, Allies and Consultations, *Centre For Strategic and International Studies*, September 10, 2010.

75. Rod Lyon, “The US Nuclear Posture Review: What’s New, What’s Not”, *Australian Strategy Policy Institute*, April 8, 2010.

76. Robyn Lim, “No More American Umbrella?: Nuclear Temptation in Japan”, *The New York Times*, April 15, 2002.

77. Peter Van Ness, “Hegemony, Not Anarchy: Why China and Japan are Not Balancing US Unipolar Power”, *Working Paper*, 2001/2004.

States like China have a policy of not providing a nuclear umbrella to other states. However, this does not stop them from providing nuclear technical assistance. China has had a history of assisting Iran in developing nuclear technology. China trained Iran in building a “primary research facility and also agreed to provide Iran with sub-critical zero-yield nuclear reactors” but under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.⁷⁸ However, after being charged by the United States, China stopped providing assistance.

There is no guarantee that just because a state has provided a security umbrella to a state, it would not assist that state with nuclear or missile technology. There have been reports that the United States has also provided sensitive information on nuclear technology to Israel, thereby encouraging it to develop its own nuclear weapon programme.

It has been stated that a nuclear umbrella provided by the United States violates the NPT wherein Article 1 commits the five nuclear weapon states not to transfer nuclear weapons and technology to non-nuclear weapon states and Article II commits the non-nuclear weapon states to refrain from receiving them.⁷⁹ There have been arguments that the American overseas military presence should be withdrawn since it provides security to the US allies that they should provide for themselves. It also ensures America’s involvement in other states’ conflicts in areas of less than vital interest, potentially threatens the balance of power in those regions, and drains US resources, thereby reducing America’s economic competitive advantage. However, the major concern of states today is whether the United States’ nuclear umbrella would be credible with its declining capability. Hence, this apprehension could lead not only America’s foes but also its friends to indulge in nuclear proliferation. It has also been feared that the missile defence umbrella in the European countries to counter ballistic missile threats from Tehran and Pyongyang could be

78. Geoffrey Kemp, “China’s Return to The Greater Middle East”, in *The East Moves West: India, China and Asia’s Growing Presence in Middle East* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).

79. “The Nuclear Umbrella States”, *ILPI Nuclear Weapons Project*, 2012. Note: The United States had confirmed that since the US forces control these weapons, it was not a breach of the NPT.

US extended deterrence could become substantially less credible as the strategic balance shifts in Asia over the coming decades, especially if the US strategic primacy gradually approaches its expiry.

destabilising and could result in preventing the world from moving towards disarmament. US extended deterrence could become substantially less credible as the strategic balance shifts in Asia over the coming decades, especially if the US' strategic primacy gradually approaches its expiry or as other powers enhance the credibility of their own nuclear deterrents.⁸⁰ The umbrella concept of the United States also has its limitations in that the weaker states have not been adaptable to the American model and also the Americans are facing stiff competition from the rising powers.⁸¹ It must be understood that too much dependency could lead to loss

of sovereign control over foreign policy. An independent capability of producing weapons protects the weaker states from losing sovereign control by "empowering them within the alliance, while simultaneously providing a hedge against possible abandonment".⁸² The very existence of nuclear weapons is a direct threat to humanitarian law and, for that matter, any state whether pursuing an independent nuclear weapon programme or under a nuclear umbrella, becomes a direct challenge to humanitarian law. It also becomes a challenge to international law as a whole. The Rarotonga Treaty of 1985 calls for a South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone whereby New Zealand is not under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. However, Australia is under the nuclear umbrella in spite of signing the treaty.

80. Views expressed by Raoul E. Heinrichs, "Australia's Nuclear Dilemma: Dependence, Deterrence or Denial", *Security Challenges*, vol.4, No.1, (Autumn 2008).

81. Robert Singh, "The United States: The Eagle Untamed", in *Multipolarity in the 21st Century: A New World Order*.

82. Michael Jonathan Green, "US-Japan Co-development of the FSX", in Pia Christina Wood, David S. Sorenson, eds., *International Military Aerospace Collaboration: Case Studies in Domestic and Intergovernmental Politics* (England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2000).

Does the Umbrella Actually Provide Stability?

If nuclear weapons and their delivery systems provide the best deterrence, then a nuclear umbrella could be said to have a stabilising effect. Even if a state does not develop its own nuclear weapons, the fact that there is a powerful state to provide them, could deter an enemy state from attacking. There could be a dilemma over whether the powerful state intends to come to the rescue of the umbrella state when it needs military help. However, the fact that there is the presence of a powerful state in the umbrella state also creates a dilemma of 'what if they do?'. This could prevent states from entering into a conflict as there would be fear of retaliation from the other side. Hence, even if China possesses nuclear weapons, the fact that there is a nuclear umbrella over Japan does make China uncomfortable. In a world without nuclear weapons, there would surely be 'virtual' nuclear arsenals existing. This means that a robust nuclear infrastructure would exist, which would involve both the civil and military, and can give the countries the capacity to build or reconstitute their nuclear weapons in case a threat arises. Hence, the United States would need to reassure its allies that in case of zero nuclear weapons in the world, the reconstitution of US nuclear forces can take place in a "timely way".⁸³ From a neo-realist perspective, with the prevalence of the Hobbesian system, states would never be completely confident about the willingness of a foreign state to come to their aid in an emergency, unless it serves the state's own strategic interests.

83. James E. Goodby, "A World Without Nuclear Weapons: Fantasy or Necessary?", *SIPRI YEARBOOK 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). The above analysis was given by James E. Goodby in this article.