

A BRIEF LOOK INTO FORMATION OF JAPAN'S DEFENCE POLICY

PRERNA GANDHI

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

— Chapter II, Article 9 of Japanese Constitution

INTRODUCTION

From a bipolar world during the Cold War when Japan comfortably gave up its diplomatic influence by sheltering underneath the US security umbrella and focussing on building up its lost wealth and prosperity after the horrendous defeat in World War II, to the unipolar world post the Cold War wherein the US became the centre of influence, and a rapidly growing China threatened to outrun Japan and counter US power by its massive size, Japan underwent continuous 'security identity' crises that shaped and modified its 'identity' as a state, the threats that it perceived could undermine that 'identity' and the aspirations it had in the arena of regional and international security affairs. The concept of 'national identity' is intangible in international relations studies for understanding

Ms **Perna Gandhi** is a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.

These security treaties that entitle the United States to station military bases in Japan and extend nuclear deterrence to Japan, have been pivotal not only to Japan's post-war strategic culture but also to the strategic-military balance of power in the region.

a nation's choices, preferences and actions as they are governed not only by material considerations but also by ideational ones of what it assumes to be its inner values and role as a state, both domestically and in the international scenario. 'Security identity', a sub-feature to the larger concept of national identity is defined as the larger-held principles reflecting the role and threat perception that determine a state's policy in the domain of security affairs as these principles, entrenched in the policy-making institutions, inform about the actions and decisions of that state. For Japan, these

principles have been in a constant flux as events post World War II have been far-reaching in the changing international power dynamics.

To understand the pace of change for Japan, one has to only see that in the span of the last 72 years, the very country that accused it of being a military aggressor and agitator for World War II and dropped two atomic bombs on it, is today, its closest ally, has its second largest overseas military base in Japan and now accuses it of not fulfilling its military obligations wholeheartedly. It has been 68 years since the end of World War II, and Japan has come a long way from its days as an Axis power to becoming a peaceful nation, remaining the world's second largest economy till 2010 for 42 years after overtaking West Germany in 1960, yet historical legacies and war memories render hostility to Japan even today. Japan legally has no army; its military forces are referred to as Self-Defence Forces or *Jieitai* (自衛隊). It renounced its right to belligerency with the adoption of the 'Peace Constitution' in 1947; and the Security Treaty of 1951 and Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960 with the United States have been the underpinning of its territorial and external military security till date. These security treaties that entitle the United States to station military bases in Japan and extend nuclear deterrence to Japan, have been pivotal not only to Japan's post-war strategic culture but also to the strategic-military balance of power in the region. The US-Japan alliance is crucial to deterring

the threats of major conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, off Japan, and in the Taiwan Strait¹.

THE CHINA ANGLE TO THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE

China with its double digit figures of both growth and defence budgets has been the focus of much of the (international relations) studies in recent times. It would have been easier if one could characterise China as a new kid on the power block but for the fact that the world's third largest country, in terms of area size, and the world's most populous country is no new power. In fact, it is used to enjoying great power and holding notions of Sinocentrism or being the centre of civilisation for much of its history and referring to itself as the Middle Kingdom. But if we look more in depth at its strategic culture, it was always a little inclined to aggressive expansionist policies (Feng 2007). China's rulers and ministers believed that the vastly superior Chinese civilisation founded upon 'virtue' and reinforced by its lavish material achievements would overwhelm the hostile tendencies of the uncultured. Frequent gifts of the embellishment of civilised life, coupled with music and women would distract and enervate even the most war-like people. If they could not be overawed into submission or bribed into compliance, "using barbarian against barbarian" was followed (Sawyer 1993). Ironically, even with insufficient transparency and information, much clout has been given to China. Is China a realist, mercantilist or revisionist power and "what exactly is China up to" have been questions of much debate and speculation in foreign policy and international relations studies.

China's growing assertiveness, bordering on aggression, in international strategic relations since the 2000s has more often than not found itself clashing with US presence and hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. With its rapid economic and military growth, China finds itself at a crossroads as it can no longer rely on the Communist or Maoist ideology to hold itself together. Hence, nationalism serves as a better binding factor, and rather than working to create a strong national identity from within, it is much easier to do it from outside-in by demarcating the outside national enemy for everyone to unite against. Hence, as in China's case, stir up hostilities with a nation and

1 "US Force Posture Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment", Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2012, at <http://csis.org/publication/pacom-force-posture-review>.

With its rapid economic and military growth, China finds itself at a crossroads as it can no longer rely on the Communist or Maoist ideology to hold itself together.

you get a nation with an overzealous sense of patriotism. The USA and China can be said to be a classic case of frenemies. While the United States and China inevitably engage in a competition of influence to some extent, Beijing's counter-containment strategies (such as A2AD or Area Access-Area Denial) used as tactical strategies in response to its perception of US engagements in the Asia-Pacific region, are deemed as a repeat of the Cold War "containment". Distinguishing between legitimate and manufactured concerns

requires careful attention and continuous strategic dialogue between both countries². Both countries are well aware of Armageddon scenarios in case of full-blown conflicts in this century and both know the space they have for peaceful diplomatic manoeuvre, therefore, it is expected by the international community that they will know what to forgive and what to forget.

Probably the post-modern People's Republic of China (PRC) is still in the process of defining its role and ambitions as a state and sees equal or more threat to its 'national identity' as compared with the international perception as a 'threat' to undermine regional and global power dynamics. Yet, being an old neighbour of Japan, with a long memory of historical relations, it exerts much influence on Japan's strategic-military policies. However, Japan's *alliance with the US and its position as an economic power have been the major deciding themes in its strategic-military policy decisions. For the United States, Japan has been the core of its access and influence in the Asia-Pacific region.* Japan has more often than not been criticised of "free-riding" on this alliance; it wasn't until 1978 that Japan picked up budget sharing for the maintenance of US forces in Japan. Recent initiatives post the 2000s indicate a marked change from Japan's passivity as a partner in the alliance, as indicated by the Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Special Measures Law passed in 2003 and its 2004 despatch of ground troops for the first time since World War II, to a country in which fighting was still going on to assert that it was a responsive ally and willing to make its share of the contribution.³

2. Ibid.

3. Takeshi Yuzawa, *Japan's Security Policy and the Asean Regional Forum: The Search for Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific* (Routledge, 2007).

SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLAND CONFLICT

The long standing conflict between Japan and China over islands in the East China Sea known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan and the Diaoyu Islands in China, has been deteriorating since 2010. In August 2012, the Japanese government's purchase of three of the disputed islands from a private landowner in order to preempt their sale to Tokyo's nationalist Governor Shintaro Ishihara, sparked massive Chinese protests and a marked drop in Sino-Japanese trade. This led to military escalation in the East China Sea by both countries, leading to the scrambling of fighter jets and locking of radars, followed by an undue display of naval warships which further precipitated suspicion rather than calming the conflict. The island's conflict in the East China Sea goes beyond mere questions of territorial sovereignty over three uninhabitable islands and five rocks (which, in total, amount to only 2.7 square miles in the East China Sea); clashing Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and continental shelves based on the inconclusive UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS)⁴, fisheries, shipping routes and logistics, uncertainty of the exact scope and scale of resources in the East China Sea after the last exploration in 1968 and a desire to perpetuate the conflict as a nationalist agenda building up on historical wounds and memories by both countries⁵.

China's increasing demand for energy has prompted intense interest in resource extraction from the continental shelf that runs under the East China Sea. The hotly disputed oil and gas fields in the East China Sea named Chunxiao, Duanqiao and Tianwaitian by China, and Shirakaba, Kusunoki and Kashi by Japan, overlap the median line, which Beijing refuses to recognise as the EEZ demarcation boundary⁶. Also the strategic shipping routes for China in the YSEB (Yellow Sea Economic Basin) catering to 57 percent of China's trade, north of the East China Sea, lead

4. As defined in Part VI, Article 76 of UNCLOS III, "The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil...to the outer edge of the continental margin or to a distance of 200 nautical miles" from the nation's coast (UN 1982).

5. Amelia Moura, "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Dispute in the East China Sea", June 7, 2013, at <http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/expeditions/2013/06/07/the-senkakudiaoyu-island-dispute-in-the-east-china-sea/>.

6. Brahma Chellaney, *Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan* (Harper Collins Publishers, 2006)

to more reasons for the Chinese controlling interests in the islands⁷. For Japan, its stake to those islands assumes even more strategic importance beyond the oil and the fish, as they form its first line of defence and are a mere 410 km or 220 nautical miles (nm) away from Okinawa which holds critical importance for both Japan and the US. The United States is bound by the US-Japan Security Treaty to protect “the territories under the Administration of Japan” and has asserted that Japan administers the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands). Yet, though Japan is assured of US help through the treaty, its anxiety remains over Washington's commitment to defend Japanese territory if there is a risk of going to war with China. Shinzo Abe has taken a firm stance on the island dispute. But he has also pushed for a high-level dialogue with China to help improve ties. Beijing has so far refused to hold such talks.

2010 NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY GUIDELINES

Unlike most countries which regularly update their security strategy and defence plans, Japan's National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) have been updated three times since their initial conception in 1976: in 1995, 2004, and, most recently, in 2010. The increasing frequency of NDPG revision indicates that Japan is constantly evaluating its minimalist security policy to adapt it to the changing needs of the international security environment. The 2010 NDPG published under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government, introduced a major shift in the country's strategic concept from “basic defence force” to “dynamic defence capability” in response to the rapid transformation of the security environment. It is evident that Japan wants to pick up a more assertive role in both regional and global defence matters but under the aegis of the US-Japan alliance so as not to create distrust among the international community⁸.

NDPG 2010's acquisition programmes specifically target areas that promote the growth of dynamic defence capabilities within the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDF). These include capabilities to ensure security of

7. “The Yellow Sea Economic Basin - A Sea of Stars”, Investment and Pensions Asia, 2009 at http://www.ipe.com/asia/the-yellow-sea-economic-basin-a-sea-of-stars_30583.php?categoryid=5689#.UkKbn9JWb34.

8. “Special Feature”, Ministry of Defence, *Japan Defense Focus*, no. 4, at <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no04/special.html>.

the sea and air space around Japan, respond to attacks against island areas, counter cyber attacks, defend against attacks by special forces, provide for ballistic missile development capability, respond to complex contingencies throughout the region, and provide consequence management and humanitarian assistance to large-scale and special disasters. Focus areas for future development include joint operations, international peace cooperation activities, intelligence, science and technology, research and development, and medical capability⁹. The most pressing issues for Japan from the context of international perception at the moment seem to be redefining the right of collective self-defence, whether or not to amend the Constitution and changing the three non-nuclear principles, especially of Japan developing nuclear deterrence capability¹⁰.

ARTICLE 9 AND THE RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE

Change in Article 9 of the Constitution has been a strong agenda of Prime Minister (PM) Abe since his election. Yet there is strong political opposition, as evidenced by the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP's) own ally New Komeito being staunchly opposed. "If the LDP shifts toward the direction where the public is wary (such as revising Article 9), we will side with public sentiment and control the LDP" even though the LDP has far more Diet members, President Yamaguchi of New Komeito said in an interview with *The Japan Times*¹¹. Article 9 of the Constitution is seen as the first target by Abe, as easing the procedure for an amendment is critical for the Japanese Constitution that has never been amended since its implementation. The LDP has drawn up a proposal to lower the required parliamentary margin of approval for constitutional revisions to a simple majority in each House¹². Article 9 reads in full:

-
9. Douglas John MacIntyre, "Emerging from Behind the US Shield: Japan's Strategy of Dynamic Deterrence and Defense Forces", *JFQ, Issue 65*, 2nd Quarter, at <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/jfq-65/jfq-65.pdf>.
 10. "Japan's Defense Policy: The View from Washington DC", Brookings Policy Paper, 2012. at <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/08/13-japan-kageura>.
 11. "New Komeito Chief Vows to Counter Abe if he Tries to Change Article 9", *Japan Times*, June 29, 2013, at <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/06/29/national/new-komeito-chief-vows-to-counter-abe-if-he-tries-to-change-article-9/>.
 12. "Behind Moves to Revise Article 9", *Nippon News*, July 11, 2013, at <http://www.nippon.com/en/genre/politics/100042/>.

Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.

Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution.

Revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has attracted much attention from the international media. The two-decade-long recession and China surpassing Japan in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) terms (2010) has led to lowered morale for the Japanese public and left space for the Japanese politicians to once again pick up the agenda of sovereignty and national defence. Clause 1 of the Constitution raises the issue of identity and legality of the SDF forces and their deployment in national as well as international war-like scenarios. Clause 2 raises issues of possessing sufficient weapons and nuclear deterrence. Change in Article 9 is more than likely to damage Japan's reputation as a peaceful state. Though its interpretation sufficiently favours both the SDF and the US-Japan alliance, it is the definition of the extent of collective self-defence that becomes the problem. Not exercising the right of collective self-defence obstructs both Japan's diplomatic leverage in strategic-military affairs, regionally as well as globally, and also creates imbalance in the US-Japan Treaty as rather than defence sharing, it puts all the burden on the United States, with Japan taking no accountability in the alliance .

NUCLEAR STAND

There is probably no country that shows greater dislike for nuclear armaments than Japan, having suffered the trauma of nuclear attacks twice, with opinion polls consistently revealing that public opinion is overwhelmingly opposed to nuclearisation. Japan has been active in encouraging and strengthening multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament regimes since the early 1990s and has submitted disarmament resolutions to the United Nations General Assembly every year since 1994. Japan's nuclear and non-proliferation policy comprises four main pillars: the Atomic Energy Basic

Law of 1955 restricting Japan's nuclear energy use exclusively to peaceful purposes; the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" of not possessing, producing or introducing nuclear weapons on Japanese soil; compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and reliance on the US nuclear umbrella for external security.¹³ However, Japan's role as a spokesperson for nuclear disarmament is a complicated one between its contradictory positions of nuclear abstinence and ensuring the credibility of the US extended nuclear deterrence. In 2010, Japan acknowledged a Cold War secret pact with the United States, concluded in 1969, that US ships carrying nuclear weapons could stop at Japanese ports as it was not tantamount to passage of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil and nuclear weapons could be stationed in Okinawa in times of emergency. "The No Confirm-No Denial" policy deterred questions for the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) without creating tensions in the region and implicating Japan.¹⁴

Issues of national identity and sovereignty have plagued Japan time and again, with debate ongoing among the nationalists, pragmatists and pacifists. The United States' commitment to deterrence has been a concern in Japanese politics, though the Obama Administration has once again put the focus on the Asia-Pacific region as integral to its strategic interests¹⁵. Before concluding the NPT, to appease the United States in 1970, in return for control of Japanese jurisdiction in Okinawa, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato conducted a secret non-governmental study in 1968 (with a second part of the study conducted in 1970) to investigate the possible economic, technical and diplomatic aspects involved in nuclearisation. The study concluded that the costs of nuclearisation far outweighed the benefits (the study came to light in 1994). Though the impact of the 1968/1970 study on the Japanese defence policy remains debatable, nonetheless, similar attitudes persist even today that nuclear weapons would provide few benefits to Japan and may show a breakdown of the US-Japan alliance, weakening the security of the region, and may even start a dangerous arms race in East Asia should

13. "Japan's Policies on the Control of Arms Exports", Ministry of Foreign Affairs at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/>.

14. "Secret Pacts Existed; Denials 'Dishonest': Deals Reached on Nuclear Arms Entry, Okinawa Reversion: Panel", *Japan Times*, May 10, 2010, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2010/03/10/national/secret-pacts-existed-denials-dishonest/#.UePDxtJgf_Y.

15. "US Force Posture Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment", Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2012 at <http://csis.org/publication/pacom-force-posture-review>.

It is expected that once the reprocessing plant moves beyond the testing phase to become commercially operational, it will separate and stockpile up to 8 metric tonnes of plutonium annually. This amount is sufficient to produce 1,000 nuclear weapons.

Japan walk down that path¹⁶.

Though strategic studies depend a lot on official positions and statements, any good analyst would know that there is a lot of reading between the lines. The construction of the Rokkasho spent fuel recycling complex in Aomori Prefecture has been subject to strong controversy. It is expected that once the reprocessing plant moves beyond the testing phase to become commercially operational, it will separate and stockpile up to 8 metric tonnes of plutonium annually. This amount is sufficient to produce 1,000 nuclear weapons.

The Rokkasho reprocessing plant was originally scheduled to become operational in November 2008, however, complications during test operations caused the Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. to postpone the date further, in its 19th postponement, to October 2013¹⁷.

SELF-DEFENCE FORCES 'LEGITIMACY' CRISIS

The SDF, since the time of their inception in 1954, had faced crises on its purpose and boundaries. The Peace Treaty of 1951 stated that "Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of *individual or collective self-defense* referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements." The US and Japan Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (MSA Agreement) signed on March 8, 1954, obliged Japan to strengthen its defence capacities. Article VIII of the agreement read, "The Government of Japan . . . will make . . . the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world, take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defense capacities, and take appropriate steps to ensure the effective utilization of any assistance provided by the Government of the United States of

16. "Country Profiles, Japan", Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 2013, at <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/japan/nuclear/>.

17. Ibid.

America¹⁸.” When the Bill for the SDF was introduced into the House of Representatives, there was much concern that government interpretation of Article 9 ultimately would allow the unlimited increase in self-defence capability under the name of self-defence and that after the MSA Agreement became effective, Japan would have obligations under the right of collective defence and would be obliged to dispatch the SDF overseas. Hence, when the House of Councillors passed the SDF Law, it also passed the Resolution on Ban of Despatch of SDF to Abroad.

Yoshida Shigeru, one of the most powerful figures in post-war Japan and prime minister from 1946-47 and then 1948-1954, influenced much of post-war Japan’s strategic-military policy and promulgated the “Yoshida doctrine” built on three pillars of ‘*seikei-bunri*’ or economics first policy, Japan’s adherence to the Peace Constitution and reliance on the US for security. The Basic Policy on National Defence or BNPD 1957, Japan’s first post-war official document on its strategic-military role in national and regional security, defined Japan’s role as: to resist direct and indirect aggression against Japan’s national security pending the arrival of assistance from the US/UN forces. This approach was reinforced in the second official document on Japan’s defence policy NDPO (National Defence Policy Outline) that, for the first time, defined the mission and force structure for the SDF in 1976. Yoshida’s landmark quote, “If you like shade, find yourself a big tree” was to remain a defining theme in Japan’s post-war strategic-military culture until the 1970s when it was challenged by multiple international events such as Nixon visiting China in 1972, the oil crisis, withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam in 1975, increased trade friction with the US and continuous US pressure after the Nixon-Sato communiqué in 1969 to take up greater military responsibilities¹⁹.

Post-war Japan had assumed that the international security environment was a given which could not be affected by Japan but the breakdown of détente and intensification of the Cold War in the late 1970s led to a new comprehensive security concept that security went beyond military issues and Japan could also influence the international environment. For fear of US military withdrawal from Asia, the Guidelines for Defence Cooperation

18. “Law Library of Congress, Article 9”, at <http://www.loc.gov/law/help/JapanArticle9.pdf>

19. M Blaker, “Evaluating Japan’s Diplomatic Performance”, in GL Curtis, ed., *Japan’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change* (M.E . Sharpe, 1993)

Japan's first post-war official document on its strategic-military role in national and regional security, defined Japan's role as: to resist direct and indirect aggression against Japan's national security pending the arrival of assistance from the US/UN forces.

were signed in 1978 when Japan started contributing 10 percent to the maintenance of US forces in Japan. It also expanded its ODA (Official Defence Assistance) policy in the 1980s to countries deemed as "strategically important" by the United States²⁰. Further changes came along under Nakasone's term as prime minister as he removed the ban on Japan's export of dual military technology to the US. Under him, Japan also agreed to cooperate with the US in its Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and entered into joint production of the advanced fighter aircraft

FSX. He also broke the one percent ceiling on defence expenditure (though it amounted to only 1.013 percent) to strengthen military capability in areas such as anti-submarine weapons²¹. Nakayama Taro's (foreign minister at the time of the Gulf War) quote, "Peace has its price, and we have to pay it" was a radical departure from Yoshida and laid down the tone for the 1990s, marked by the Gulf War, North Korean nuclear and missile crises, Taiwan Strait crisis, increased threat perception from China and a landmark revision of the 1978 guidelines after almost 20 years, resulting in the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliance that provided the mandate for Japanese military involvement in situations that not only involved a direct attack on Japan but also in military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region²².

The Gulf War in the beginning of the 1990s' decade raised serious concern over the issue of collective self-defence, as Japan, though it had initially declined US/ UN requests for participation in the war on the grounds that it did not want to get involved in a Middle Eastern crisis but later contributed about \$13 billion to the war effort, was excluded from Kuwait's congratulatory message to US/UN forces. Fear of alienating the US and isolation in the global community provoked Japan to seriously question

20. Akitoshi Miyashita, *Limits to Power: Asymmetric Dependence and Japanese Foreign Aid Policy* (Lexington Books, 2003).

21. Bhubhindar Singh, *Japan's Security Identity: From a Peace State to an International State* (Routledge, 2013).

22. Ibid.

its pacifist policy. While the UN was used to shield its minimalist security policy in the 1950s, Japan in the 1990s relied on the UN again to overcome domestic constraints so as to carve out a responsible role in international security affairs²³. With the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL) in 1992 that allowed Japan to send not just civilian personnel but even the SDF, Japan has cooperated in 8 peace-keeping operations such as in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, the Golan Heights and Timor-Leste, in 5 international humanitarian relief operations such as for Rwandan refugees and Timorese and Iraqi displaced persons, and in 5 international election monitoring activities such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Timor-Leste.²⁴

Under the notion of collective defence, Japan's participation in the UN Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO) and its anti-piracy measures in Somalia by guarding commercial ships with military escorts has won it much international acclaim and praise but siding with its ally in wars in the Middle East has received serious criticism and raised questions on the "self-defence" nature of the SDF. Owing to the Gulf War debacle, after the 2001 terrorist strike on US soil, Japan was quick to show solidarity and passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in September 2001, following which the SDF was deployed to assist the US led international Coalition through rear end and logistics support. Former Prime Minister Koizumi justified the decision to send the SDF to Iraq with the following three points: to send the SDF to Iraq is to help the Iraqi people and support international cooperation; the SDF would be offering humanitarian assistance and would not be using force; it is important for Japan's international relations with the US²⁵. Further, in the Diplomatic Bluebook 2004, the Japanese government stressed that instability in Iraq would have a direct impact on Japan due to its extensive reliance of almost 90 percent on Middle Eastern oil and, hence, it was necessary that Japan make efforts towards ensuring peace and stability in this region.²⁶ Japan withdrew from Iraq in 2006.

23. Ibid.

24. "Japan's Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005 at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pamph2005.html>

25. Noriko Hashimoto, "Is the Overseas Deployment of Japan's Self-Defense Force (SDF) Illegal? Rethinking the Japanese Contribution to International Peace and Security", February 10, 2009, at http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=586.

26. "Diplomatic Bluebook", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/>

A nation has full rights to maintain its sovereignty with honour and pride, and Japan having been a responsible state in the world community after its World War II debacle, should be allowed to decide for itself. Yet the immense international interest in Japan's pacifism is motivated by its own interests in ensuring global peace and regional security. Japan has been a model of economic development with numerous lessons of growth for developing economies. It is one of the few countries to possess economic power and high standards of living without having an extensive military structure. It also disproves the theorem that military Research and Development (R&D) forms the basis of technological development of a country. Hence, Japan serves as an ideal for countries undergoing military and diplomatic crises that non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament may serve their purpose better than engaging in conflicts over nationalistic issues. Even the United States exploited this image of its ally as evidenced by its assigning disarmament and reconstruction work to the Japanese contingent in Iraq.

ISOLATION OF DEFENCE INDUSTRY

Japan's defence industry has been kept in quasi-isolation by its own government with a ban on arms exports in keeping with "The Three Principles" of non-export to Communist bloc countries, countries subject to "arms" exports embargo under the United Nations Security Council's resolutions, and countries involved or likely to be involved in international conflicts since the declaration of the principles at the Diet session in 1967. In February 1976, the Government of Japan announced the collateral policy guideline at the Diet session that the "arms" exports to other areas not included in the Three Principles will be also restrained in conformity with Japan's position as a peace-loving nation.²⁷ However, despite the isolation, the domestic defence industry has transformed into a dominant player in design and manufacture of defence components. Post 1952, when the aircraft production and development ban was lifted, 14 projects to produce US military aircraft under licence have been undertaken in Japan. With each production, the Japanese components of the aircraft have increased, from 60 percent in

27. "Japan's Policies on the Control of Arms Exports", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/>.

the F-86 to 85 percent in the F-104. Even the latest F-2 does not realise full autonomy, but the indigenously produced Mitsubishi ATD-X Shinshin stealth aircraft scheduled for test flights in 2012 may be the realisation of Japan's dreams after almost six decades of technology transfer from the world's most advanced aerospace industry.²⁸ The Greater Nagoya Industrial Cluster, housing many of Japan's biggest defence companies, with its sub-clusters of automotive, aerospace, information technology, biotechnology, ceramics and environmental technology and premier universities and research institutes generates one percent of the world's GDP.²⁹

In late 2011, the ban on weapons export was lifted after decades of a self-imposed embargo. A report entitled "Towards Formulation of a Strategy for Survival," released by the Ministry of Defence's Defence Production and Technology Base Research Committee after a six-month study, notes that Japan is suffering from what is often called the "Galapagos syndrome" of isolation from global markets after half a century of ban on weapons exports. The report mentions that conglomerates such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Electric, IHI, NEC, Toshiba and Fujitsu, for whom defence production is a fraction of their global business, should consider alliances or mergers of business units to improve efficiencies, stop overlaps, and pool production and R&D resources. The issue at urgency is that Japan, with its numerous legislative constraints, must ensure that the domestic defence industry remains dynamic as its collapse in the face of international competition may lead Japan to lose much-needed autonomy in defence production or at least breakout capability for autonomy and, thus, strategic leverage on the US, and any independence left in the destiny of its own security policy.²⁹ However, by creating civil-military clusters conducive to technology transfers and emphasising on the development of dual use technologies while hugging its security ally close, Japan has produced advanced platforms such as the FS-X/ F-2 fighter, the Aegis equipped

28 Jenny Lu, "Technology Transfer and the F-2 Fighter: How the Japanese Defense Industry Defied the Odds", 2013, at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/.../techedge/.../55-63__Technology%20Transfer%...%E2%80%8E

29. "Japan Strives To Overcome Defense Industrial Base 'Crisis'", *Defense News*, June 24, 2012 at <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120624/DEFREG03/306240003/Japan-Strives-Overcome-Defense-Industrial-Base-8216-Crisis-8217->.

destroyer and the four Mitsubishi intelligence-gathering satellites.³⁰

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA- JAPAN RELATIONS

Relations between India and Japan are without much historical baggage for Japan and enjoy positivity. Cultural exchanges between India and Japan began early in the 6th century with the introduction of Buddhism to Japan from India. As a result of the link of Buddhism between India and Japan, monks and scholars often embarked on voyages between the two nations. At the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, one of the dissenting judgments in favour of Japan was made by Indian Justice Radhabinod Pal. The principled judgment of Justice Radhabinod Pal is remembered even today in Japan. In 1949, Prime Minister Nehru responded to a letter from school children in Tokyo, and sent an elephant named 'Indira' after his daughter to the Ueno Zoo as a gift³¹. Many in Japan also remember India's refusal to attend the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951 for the reason that India was concerned about the limitation on Japanese sovereignty and national independence. After the restoration of Japanese sovereignty, Japan and India signed a separate peace treaty and established diplomatic relations on April 28, 1952, in which India waived all reparation claims against Japan. From being the first recipient of Japan's first Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 1958, to becoming one of the largest recipients of Japanese ODA, India has received approximately ¥3,600 billion (US\$36 billion) over the past few years³². Japan sees its ODA for India as one of the important tools to strengthen Japan-India relations set forth by the "Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership", and sustainable growth of India is paramount in ensuring that of Asia, including of Japan³³. Also, the agreement in 2004, during Kawaguchi's visit to India for the formation of the G-4 by Japan, India, Germany and Brazil to acquire permanent seats

30. Jenny Lu, "Technology Transfer and the F-2 Fighter: How the Japanese Defense Industry Defied the Odds" at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/.../techedge/.../55-63__Technology%20Transfer%...%E2%80%8E.

31. Symposium on Japan and India: Challenges and Responsibilities as Partners in the 21st Century in Asia, March 16, 2005, Keynote address by Yoshiro Mori, former PM of Japan.

32. Rohit Sinha and Geethanjali Nataraj, "Japanese ODA Stimulates Indian Infrastructure Development", EastAsiaForum, 2013 at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/06/18/japanese-oda-stimulates-indian-infrastructure-development/>.

33. "Overview of Japan's ODA to India", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/sw_asia/india_o.pdf.

in the UN Security Council, has been a significant gesture of the growing friendship between the two countries.

Relations between the two nations became constrained by the Cold War politics as Japan sided with the US, and India headed the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). There was a brief low in 1998 as a result of Pokhran-II. Japan imposed sanctions on India following the test, which included the suspension of all political exchanges and the cutting off of economic assistance. These sanctions were lifted three years later. Asia's two largest democracies—second and third largest economies respectively—Japan and India have developed close relations since 2000 as India grew closer to the United States with Clinton's historic visit in 2000 (after a lull of 22 years since the last visit by US President Carter in 1978), followed by a visit by President Bush in 2006 and later President Obama in 2010. From the 1998 debacle, to a decade later, the two now refer to each other as "Strategic Global Partners" as per their 2006 Strategic Global Partnership, and have concluded a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation along with a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (2010) that liberalised bilateral economic activity. Since 2006, India and Japan have held annual prime ministerial level talks—a privilege afforded by each to no other state and, in Japan's case, not even the United States (Panda 2012). Trade between Japan and India had never been impressive. Japan's exports to India in the fiscal year ending March 2013 were worth \$8.25 billion. Imports were worth \$5.7 billion.³⁴

As stated in the Japanese Annual White Paper on Defence (2012), the level of cooperation between military branches has advanced the most in the naval area, no surprise considering one is a peninsula and another an island nation, with the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) taking part in the Indo-US Malabar Exercises in 2007 and 2009, and the Indian Navy and JMSDF carrying out their first-ever bilateral combined training exercises off Sagami Bay in Japan in June 2012. Also, the JMSDF and the Indian Navy, in activities in the Gulf of Aden off Somalia, have exchanged schedules for the escort of civilian vessels to ensure the safety and security of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) that is basic to the economic

34. HS Prabhakar, "Thrust to India-Japan Relations", June 5 2013, available at <http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Thrust-to-India-Japan-relations/2013/06/05/article1620208.ece>

Indian bilateral trade with Japan for 2012-13 worth \$14 billion is dwarfed by Japan-China trade (\$68 billion) and India-China trade (\$66 billion). Despite China being the largest trade partner for both India and Japan, China stands at a crossroads with both India and Japan.

development of both countries. The Japan Ground Self-Defence Force (JGSDF) has also worked with the Indian Army, forming a logistics battalion in the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights. The Japan Air Self-Defence Force (JASDF) is also reinforcing its relationship with its Indian counterpart, with the JASDF chief of staff having paid a visit to India in November 2012, on the heels of the 2010 visit to Japan by the Indian Air Force (IAF) chief of staff. In October 2012, the second vice-ministerial "2+2" meeting was held after a hiatus of two years, in which the two sides

discussed maritime and outer space security, and agreed to hold a Indo-Japanese Cyber Dialogue.

Indian bilateral trade with Japan for 2012-13 worth \$14 billion is dwarfed by Japan-China trade (\$68 billion) and India-China trade (\$66 billion).³⁵ Despite China being the largest trade partner for both India and Japan, China stands at a crossroads with both India and Japan. 2013 itself has seen Japan facing off China in the East China Sea and India facing Chinese incursions in Ladakh. Relations between China and Japan continue to be wracked by war memories and territorial disputes that inhibit close diplomatic relations. India's border disputes with China in Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin, in addition to Delhi's hosting of the Dalai Lama, create friction in its relationship with China.³⁶ As China rises with its aggressive behaviour in pursuit of both economic and diplomatic power, observers of Asian affairs turn to India and Japan as potential sources of stability in the region. A strategic partnership between Asia's largest and richest democracies creates a formidable defence, lending structural security to the region. India and Japan share similar liberal-democratic values and are both closer to Washington than they are to Beijing. The positive effect of trilateral cooperation among the US, India, and Japan will bolster regional multilateralism through institutions

35. Ibid.

36. Ankit Panda, "India and Japan Come Together", October 1, 2012, at <http://thediplomat.com/indian-decade/2012/10/01/india-and-japan-come-together/>.

such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and the still in talks Trans-Pacific Partnership.³⁷

Under pressure from the Bush Administration, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, including the US, Britain, France, Germany and Japan, had decided to allow exports of nuclear power technologies and equipment to India. In turn, India pledged a unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. The Indian call for insertion of a clause in a Japan-India nuclear pact to ensure it would not hamper India's nuclear weapons

As China rises with its aggressive behaviour in pursuit of both economic and diplomatic power, observers of Asian affairs turn to India and Japan as potential sources of stability in the region.

programme, besides the right to reprocess spent nuclear fuel from Japanese generation equipment continue to be points of difference. India and Japan have agreed to accelerate talks to conclude a pact to facilitate Japanese firms to export nuclear power generation technologies and equipment to India. Such a pact is problematic because India is not a party to the NPT. India plans to build about 20 nuclear power plants to increase the share of nuclear power in supply from the current 4 to 25 percent by 2050. The worth of India's nuclear power market is estimated at \$150 billion.³⁸

Relations between Japan and India are progressive and hold scope for stronger ties, as evidenced by Japan's image of India. According to a 2013 BBC World Service Poll, 42 percent of the Japanese people view India positively, with only 4 percent expressing a negative view.³⁹ With liberal economic policies and friendly US-India ties, Japan now views India as more than just a populous, poverty-ridden South Asian nation besieged by territorial issues with Pakistan; rather, as one whose alliance is critical to counter a growing China and will be a deciding factor in the East China Sea. India has a strategic geographic position that is significant in maritime

37. Ibid.

38. "PM Leaves for Japan, Says Trip to give New Meaning to India's 'Look East' Policy", *Indian Express*, 2013, at <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/pm-leaves-for-japan-says-trip-to-give-new-meaning-to-indias-look-east-policy/1121191/>.

39. "Views of China and India Slide in Global Poll, While UK's Ratings Climb", *Globescan, BBC*, at <http://www.globescan.com/commentary-and-analysis/press-releases/press-releases-2013/277-views-of-china-and-india-slide-while-uks-ratings-climb.html>.

traffic, connecting the Asia-Pacific region with the Middle East and Europe and, hence, it is important from the viewpoint of maritime security. Japanese Minister Koichiro Gomba has reiterated the geopolitical significance of India as it lies on the SLOCs linking West Asia with Japan. Japan plans to step up the maritime security in the region to maintain the security of the SLOCs and facilitate unhindered trade by the sea routes. Japan is looking at India to expand cooperation in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden as well.⁴⁰ In a recent June 2013 visit, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described Japan as a “key regional and global partner for India and maintained that there is a growing congruence in the interests of both countries⁴¹. India is at the centre of Prime Minister Abe’s security thinking, as articulated by his new security diamond consisting of India, Japan, Australia and the United States — a reincarnation of his failed first-term quadrilateral security framework.⁴²

40. “India and Japan Join Hands to Increase Maritime Security in Asia Pacific”, *DefenseNow*, available at <http://www.defencenow.com/news/658/indian-and-japan-join-hands-to-increase-maritime-security-in-asia-pacific.html>

41. “PM Leaves for Japan, Says Trip to Give New Meaning to India’s ‘Look East’ Policy”, *Indian Express*, 2013, at <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/pm-leaves-for-japan-says-trip-to-give-new-meaning-to-indias-look-east-policy/1121191/>

42. Purnendra Jain, “Japan–India Summit Boosts Bilateral Ties”, *EastAsiaForum*, 2013, at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/06/06/japan-india-summit-boosts-bilateral-ties/>