

PIVOTING THE PACIFIC: TWO-LEVEL GAMES AND US MILITARY PRESENCE IN JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES

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INTRODUCTION

The importance of the high seas as a means of commuting and transport was first advocated by American naval historian Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. He asserted that the “rise and fall of empires” was a product of ensuring mastery over the seas which guaranteed victory during war-time and prosperity during peace-time. His *mantra* for building a naval fleet was first ensuring a productive market. “Production, shipping and colonies” were three basic things he emphasised on, also known as the “trinity”¹. In order to secure maritime trade and shipping routes, he suggested the setting up of colonies and military bases.

This emphasis on seabasing and power projection was what substantiated American military preponderance on the high seas from the 19th century onwards. However, the transformation of technology, economic conditions and security environment through the World Wars and Cold War impacted the global force posture of the United States. Initially, military bases were

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1. Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783* (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

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set as part of the imperialist enterprise, and later, served as bulwarks against the Soviet threat during the Cold War. The United States, since the end of the Cold War, has had to tailor its force posture dramatically to the region-specific issues, threats and stakes involved, while being sensitive towards local concerns and demands.

In 2011, during his address to the Australian Parliament, US President Barack Obama announced the Rebalance to Asia or the “Pivot Policy”. One of the central tenets was the repositioning of 60 percent of US naval assets

from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific. It was ordered to predominantly contribute to the security of the Asia-Pacific, ensure freedom of navigation, and additionally, as a strategic response to China’s swift economic and military rise that was worrisome to its neighbours. The Chinese have disputed claims with the Southeast Asian nation-states over the South China Sea and with Japan in the East China Sea. The United States remains a “treaty ally” of Japan wherein under Article V of the bilateral security treaty signed in 1960, the United States would come to the rescue of Japan if it came under attack. The United States had a military base in the Philippines which was later discontinued. However, the Philippines allows rotation of American troops and is pondering over hosting the Americans again as security against a rising China. It is under these conditions that this paper would analyse the base negotiations with the Philippines and Japan.

This paper seeks to understand the host nation’s negotiation strategies in terms of accepting US foreign military presence, using Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory. A two-fold analysis is involved here: one, at the level of base negotiations, and the other, the implications of the outcome of the negotiations in the light of America’s pivot policy.

The structure of the paper is as follows: a theoretical foundation of the two-level games thesis by Putnam will be provided, followed by a brief exposition of the significance of a military base. The research would

then focus on base openings in Japan and the Philippines and ultimately apply the theory to base closure to compare the stark differences between the two states in terms of international negotiations and domestic ratifications, followed by a few conclusive remarks.

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF MILITARY BASES

The Cold War was an era of a calculated play of strategic assets and military posturing along with a blackbox style of decision-making. The stationing of US missiles in Turkey and Soviet weapons in Cuba proved to be the bone of contention between the two superpowers that contextualised the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The necessity of possessing a military base is vital to posture and signal to adversaries, to secure one's territory and national interests, to station troops, aircraft, ships, missiles to secure the host country, and to provide for other non-military activities like oil refuelling, conducting scientific research, etc.

Diplomacy is a process of strategic interaction in which actors simultaneously try to take account of, and, if possible, influence, the expected reactions of other actors, both at home and abroad.² The United States' base diplomacy with the East Asian states (Japan and the Philippines) was earlier a strategy of seize and conquer (the Philippines) and defeat and occupy (Japan). The outset of the Cold War brought forth intense debates in America about national interests and national security against a vicious Communist aggressor, the former Soviet Union. As the ideological fault lines divided nation-states, even setting up of military bases became a by-product of this bipolar alignment of the world. The world was divided into camps, as both superpowers formed a network of alliances and military bases to sustain their military, political, diplomatic and economic preponderance.

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2. Robert Putnam, "Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics", in *Studies in International Political Economy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 15.

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The history of basing and 'basing diplomacy' has evolved through times of colonisation and through the periods of wars between nations. Basing networks in a relative sense was mostly a function of the scope of rival empires.³ This quote highlights the dawn of *Pax Britannica*, the idea of the sun never setting on the British Empire and its bedazzled colonies as its crowned possessions. Africa, the Indian Ocean Region and other parts of the world were divided between rivalling empires to secure trade, commercial expansion, fulfil energy requirements during peace-time and

war. The consequent unravelling of *Pax Americana* as a superpower can also be attributed to the advantage it possessed in terms of leasing basing networks from Britain.

The opening of military bases was justified by safeguarding of ideological fault lines (during the Cold War), pronouncing common commercial interests, providing security to host nations, and also creating dependency in terms of providing arms and money in exchange for setting up of basing facilities⁴. This led to the strengthening of allies and alliance networks.

Basing diplomacy refers to the diplomatic tools used to open and secure military bases, in this case in foreign territories. Takafumi Ohtomo theorises the process of establishing bases (of the United States) in a five-fold simple and systematic approach.⁵ Table 1 below signifies the various strategies adopted by the United States to formulate a basing network.

3. Robert E. Harkavy, *Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence* (Oxford University Press: United States, 1989) p. 3.

4. Ibid., p. 5.

5. Takafumi Ohtomo, "Understanding U.S. Overseas Military Presence after World War II", *Journal of International and Advanced Japanese Studies*, vol. 4, March 2012, pp. 17–29.

Table 1

Outright conquest	Defeat and occupy	Hand down	Forceful removal of original inhabitants	Payment (quid pro quo approach)
Post the Spanish-American War of 1898, sinking of a US ship, US attacked and set bases.	After a war is fought.	In 1940, the US and UK signed a “destroyers for bases” agreement. The UK’s bases were leased to the US for 99, years.	Coercive measures were used to remove inhabitants who were forced to relocate in neighbouring territories.	There is a monetary or military compensation to set up a base. Arms/ money in exchange of security.
Guam, Puerto Rico, Philippines.	Japan and Germany.	Bermuda, Bahamas, Antigua, Diego Garcia, etc.	Diego Garcia used to combat the Taliban post 9/11. The indigenous population moved to Mauritius and Seychelles (also South Korea and Japan).	Philippines and Spain. Russia’s base in Ukraine.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION: TWO-LEVEL GAMES AND INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

The foreign policy machinery of each state is tailored to secure its national interests, optimise it by manoeuvring through international negotiations and avail the best or most suited offers. Prior to globalisation, the debates and decisions taken at an international level did manifest at the domestic levels. Simultaneously, domestic pressures and constraints compel or condition nation-states to ‘act the way they do’ at an international level. There is

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a mutual manifestation of the international in the domestic, and of the domestic at the international. Post globalisation, this interaction has strengthened, and has sometimes resulted in spillover effects.

Robert Putnam sought to explicate this interaction between the two levels (domestic and international) and, thus, analyse it as a mutual variable impacting negotiations and diplomacy. The theoretical novelty of this approach lay in its attempt to transcend solely realist or liberal explanations of states' foreign policy actions.⁶ He elucidates the "two-level game" metaphor, where actions on one level "reverberate" the actions on the other. One could visualise this as a two-level game of chess. Except that the number of actors involved can be more than simply two. The state in a two-level metaphor is functioning as a 'gate-keeper' between the international and domestic levels.⁷

The chief negotiator represents the "Janus-faced" executive that negotiates at both levels, Level I being the international level and Level II, the domestic.⁸ This theory is best used to understand and analyse international negotiations. The negotiated outcomes of an agreement refer to:

- Success and failure in terms of reaching an agreement which can be a "deliberately coordinated" policy on both levels that results in policy ratification, implementation, or continuation.
- Distribution of gains and losses: a cost-benefit analysis of gains at the international and domestic levels as well as depending on the policy preferences by the domestic constituents and statesmen.

6. Michal Trnák, "Two-Level Games and Base Politics: Understanding the Formulation of Czech and Polish Foreign Policy Responses to U.S. Military Base Deployment Proposal" (Washington DC: John Hopkins University, 2007-08), p. 4

7. Anouar Boukhars, "A Two-Level Game Analysis of the Complexities of Interstate Rivalry in the Maghreb," *Columbia International Affairs Online*, 2001, <http://www.ciaonet.org/access/boa02/>. Accessed on October 13, 2013].

8. Ibid.

The “win set” is defined as “the set of all possible Level I (international) agreements that would ‘win’—that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents”⁹.

The success and failure of a negotiating and bargaining strategy depends on the outcomes. And Putnam distinguishes diverse strategies for negotiations at Level I and Level II. The strategies adopted at both levels are interdependent as the negotiator would have to influence, convince and persuade (1) opponents at Level I; (2) domestic constituents at Level II; as well as (3) implement his/her own preferences.

BASE OPENINGS, BASE CLOSURE AND TWO-LEVEL GAMES

In order to comprehend the complexities of the negotiations for base closure, one must briefly understand the context under which the bases were opened in the first place. The author seeks to briefly deliberate upon the negotiations by the Philippines and Japan with the United States using the two-level game metaphor. Japan and the Philippines are the two lynchpins of American base networks in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. The withdrawal of the US troops from the Philippines was seen under the light of the domestic pressure and legislative action taken. This is in contrast to Japan, where domestic pressure didn’t translate into policy outcomes of ousting the Americans. While their base negotiations are different, it is an interesting case to compare the two nations that may be shaping the strategic landscape of the Asia-Pacific, and may be pivoting America’s ‘pivot’ policy.

PHILIPPINES

Level I: International Actors, Incentives, and Bargaining Strategies

There are several declassified documents that reveal the “crony capitalism”¹⁰ and the perverse priorities of the Filipino elite during the bargaining with

9. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games”, *International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 3 (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1988), pp. 427-460.

10. The phrase is borrowed from the title of the book by David C. Kang, *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

the United States. During the Depression-era in America, the officials passed the HHC Act (Hare-Hawes Cutting Act) in 1933 that allowed for Philippine's independence after a ten-year Commonwealth period. The Act was rejected by the Philippines Senate as it allowed American military presence within two years of independence. Freedom was only a fleeting possibility. The Level I negotiations kicked off with the then Senate President Manuel Quenoz who travelled to Washington for a renegotiable deal.

As Putnam's theory elucidates, the smaller the win set on Level II (here the failure to negotiate with Senate members, led to rejection of the Act) results in a likelihood of bargaining advantage with Level I members. Thus, the American side presented an alternate Bill titled the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934 (also known as the Philippine Independence Law). Also, the state executive acted autonomously without the consent of the people of the Philippines and was subsequently able to manipulate the clauses of the Act according to its prerogatives¹¹. This Act was not specific on US military presence in Manila, but did mention the retention of the naval facilities until further negotiations (within two years of independence) between the two nations. The Act was ratified by the domestic constituents.

But due to some unforeseeable events, (the Japanese invasion into the Philippines, control over Singapore) the United States had to occupy the military bases. Negotiations began in 1945 when a new Senate President, Sergio Osmeña, came to power. He pledged allegiance to the United States, and leveraged the base negotiations in exchange for monetary gains. Hence, the base was established not out of security for the Filipinos but for the American interests to counter Japanese imperialism and as a bulwark against expansion of the Soviets who themselves had set up a base Cam Ranh Bay, in Vietnam. On March 26, 1947, the Senate approved the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) by a vote of 18 in favour and none opposed. The United States could secure a trade Act with the host nation that protected

11. The Philippines base agreement provided for military aid and compensation to the host nation. They even signed a Trade Act, allowing for all the sugar crops, to be exported, by harming the rice fields. The farmers meanwhile availed only beggarly wages.

their investors, withheld the right to alter the Philippines currency as well as allowed for criminal jurisdiction in the Philippines.¹²

As stated earlier, the bases in the Philippines were of little advantage to the host nation's security; instead, they served the interests of the Americans. The question of base closure arose when the MBA (amended in 1979 that reduced the occupation period from 99 years to 45) was nearing its expiry date in September 1991. The Philippines Senate had to vote for or against US military presence.

During these developments, Philippines President Marcos was sent into exile in 1984 for practising corrupt policies. The people's power revolution came about in 1985, wherein the civil society demanded a democratically elected leader and, thus, the US backed Corazon Aquino came into power in 1986. Added to the tensions was the volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo that compelled the authorities to close the base for a while. Hence, the setting up of democracy, the paradoxical increase in leftist opposition, and the then lukewarm Cold War comprised the context under which the base negotiations took off.

In 1988, the MBA renegotiations led by Philippines Foreign Secretary Manglapus had the United States pay a larger sum as aid to the population¹³. This fuelled the aggression of the angry population who felt their president had "sold them out"

Negotiations at Level I (international) appeared to be a deal, between a pro-US president and the steadfast Filipino counterpart that were driven by economic incentives, security umbrella, etc. The Americans were aware of the domestic brewing in the Philippines, and knew that the negotiations could swing both ways. And, hence, American Defence Secretary Dick Cheney in 1989 declared, "We won't have any other choice...we won't stay where we're not wanted, and if they want us out, we're--we're gone."¹⁴ The

12. A number of amendments were made to the Military Bases Agreement, in 1979, 1983, 1988, etc.

13. Conrad B. Davis, "Subic Bay Naval Complex-Are There any Alternatives", Study Project, United States Army War College (Pennsylvania: USAWC, March 1992), p.9.

14. Jim Mann, Melissa Haley, "Philippines Vote Perils U.S. Bases: Far East: Preliminary Action by Senate in Manila Would Close Strategic Subic Bay Naval Base. The U.S. says it Won't Offer More Money and is Ready to Leave", *Los Angeles Times*, September 10, 1991.

recalcitrance displayed by the Americans signifies their unwillingness to go the extra mile. While the Philippines was mired in heated domestic debates, its president had assured the Americans that the deal would pull through.

Level II: Domestic Pressures, Coalitions and Institutions

The Partido Nacionalista (Nationalist Party) that was set up in 1907, consisted of revolutionaries and intellectuals from the Philippine-US War.¹⁵ The most notable nationalists were Claro Recto, Jose Laurel and Lorenzo Tanada. Recto called for independence and then Marcos purged them from politics. Philippine Left groups evolved to become the strongest opposition to Marcos.¹⁶ The onset of democratic governance in the Philippines turned the tables for the protests.

The strength of the Communist insurgents had increased dramatically in the last six years of the Marcos regime. In 1980, the American Defence Department estimates placed the New People's Army (NPA), the military arm of the Communist Party, at 24,430 full-time fighters supported by a mass political base of around 1,740,00 insurgents.¹⁷ Another coalition called the Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition (NFPC) was formed in the light of the US forces stationing nuclear material on the military bases. In February 1983, the Anti-Base Coalition was formed. The network of these groups was countered by Corazon Aquino's coalition which consisted of members of the Roman Catholic Church as well as the residents of central Luzon Island who are economically dependent on the bases and, hence, want the Americans to stay¹⁸.

Domestic strategies employed by the anti-base coalition groups, as noted by Andrew Yeo, were very well deliberated upon. They penetrated the Senate, the powerful elite, and managed to strengthen allegiances. Hence, they were more concerned with establishing a strong and credible

15. Andrew Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-U.S Base Protests* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) p. 41.

16. The details on the domestic protests and uprisings are availed from Ibid.

17. Leszek Buszynski, "The Philippines, Asean and the Future of the American Bases", *The World Today*, vol. 44, no.5 (London: May 1988, Royal Institute of International Affairs), p. 82.

18. "Senate of the Philippines", Government of Philippines, URL: <https://www.senate.gov.ph/about/history.asp>. Accessed on November 20, 2015.

network with the Senate members who would participate in the voting than in influencing the masses. Yeo described the “weak security consensus” of the Level I negotiators as directly dependent on the crafted planning of these pressure groups.

JAPAN

Level I: International Actors, Incentives, and Bargaining Strategies

The US military base in Japan is situated in the Okinawa prefecture in the Ryuku Islands. The political controversy surrounding the base is complicated by the history of these islands that have been peripheral to the mainland Japanese affairs.

Imperial Japan had actually annexed the Ryuku Islands in the 19th century and later provided for cultural assimilation. The significance of the islands grew during the Pacific War since the arrival of the American forces. Hence, Okinawa had been under foreign occupation by the Imperial Japanese and Americans until 1945.

In 1960, after the Security Treaty was signed between Japan and America, economic assistance as well as a security umbrella was provided by the Americans to the Japanese. The rapid egression of the Japanese markets led the Americans to request in 1976-78 that Japan pay for the maintenance of the facilities. The Americans chose a flexible interpretation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Article 24, by which they could carry the burden of costs under certain conditions¹⁹. This economic assistance paid by the host nation (as part of sharing the burden) was called Host Nation Support (HNS) or *Omoiyari Yosan* by the Japanese²⁰. Similar to the case of the Philippines, the Americans were known to have altered the currency in Okinawa (as different from mainland Japan) and, hence, swerved the economy to their benefit, damaging the locals’ entrepreneurial capabilities.²¹

19. Yeo, n.15, P. 270

20. In Japanese, it is referred to *Omoiyari Yosan* (Sympathy Budget) as suggested by Minister of Defence Agency, Shin Kanemaru.

21. Kozue Akibayashi and Suzuyo Takazato, “Okinawa: Women’s Struggle for Demilitarization”, in Catherine Lutz, ed., *The Bases of Empire: the Global Struggle against US Military Posts* (London: Pluto Press, 2009), pp. 243-270.

Okinawa has been entitled as the “lynchpin” of the American military base network or as Douglas McArthur called it, the “Keystone of the Pacific”. The strategic importance of Okinawa can be attributed to its proximity to China, South Korea North Korea and Taiwan, that, according to many scholars, keeps the security dynamics stable in East Asia. The bilateral hub and spoke alliance system in Japan is operational through the deployment of troops here. The base is the gateway into the Pacific and, hence, is of significant value to the Americans.

The host nation (Japan) pays for the installation and maintenance of the base and also wages of the Japanese people employed by the base. This is an added burden shared by the Japanese in lieu of renouncing the “sovereign right to use force” as per their constitutional limitations. Japan is sheltered under the United States’ security umbrella that serves the purpose of national defence for the country. Okinawa’s history, torn between foreign invasions, occupations, strife and revolts, is fuelled by the foreign military presence. There are waves of protests in the prefecture that seldom reverberate in the corridors of the Diet. This paper will focus on the 1996-97 base negotiations between America and Japan as well as the 2004 referendum that left the window of opportunity open for the local Okinawans.

The 1996 base negotiations were triggered because of the rape of a school girl in Okinawa in 1995 by three American Servicemen. This issue spiralled into a huge uproar in the prefecture. As mentioned above, when applying the two-level game theory to the military base agreement with Japan, one must be aware of the multiple levels involved. As Andrew Yeo points out, there are three levels: Tokyo-Washington negotiations; within Tokyo, there are negotiations; in addition to which there are negotiations between Okinawa and Tokyo. Hence, in this case, the Governor of Okinawa, Ota Masahide, led the mass movement against the US bases in Japan and refused to sign the lease papers to renew the agreement regarding allotting of land to set up military facilities. Masahide was elected in November 1990 on a platform of opposition to the Japan-US Security Treaty and a commitment to secure the return of lands currently occupied by the US bases to their rightful

owners.²² The protests demanded that both governments negotiate on the military base burden that Japan shared. A referendum was announced, and the US and Japan agreed to set up a Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO).

The SACO promised to reduce the burden in the Futenma Air station, planned to return several other facilities, sought to amend the Status of Forces Agreement, and initiate noise reduction levels²³. The plans were a sham as both governments neither sought to implement these changes nor eliminate the bases. It was a policy of appeasement, just to contain the domestic protests.

External factors like the drafting of the "East Asia Strategy Report" in 1995 contributed to fuelling the flames of the protests as these reports sought to affirm the US-Japan security alliance post Cold War, including the maintenance of the military bases.²⁴ The Group of Twenty (G-20) Summit was held at Naha city and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit was held in Osaka that year. US President Clinton failed to show up at Osaka due to some domestic budget cuts.

In December 1996, the final report by SACO was released: it sought to establish a heliport centre at Nago city and also allowed for relocation of US troops within Okinawa. Another domestic referendum was held in 1997 in the northeastern city of Nago, where anti-US base protests had resurfaced. Eighty percent of those eligible voted in the non-binding Nago referendum, 54 percent of them opposing, and it is said that because of the persuasion of the Japanese government, Tetsuya Higa, then the mayor of Nago, announced the acceptance of the plan and, subsequently, resigned.²⁵

Level II: Domestic Pressures, Coalitions and Institutions

Civil society is strong in Japan with a plethora of trade unions, coalitions and other groups. The issue of stationing foreign military bases in the

22. Ibid., p. 4

23. "The Japan-U.S Special Action Committee Interim Report", April 15, 1996, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/seco.html>

24. See: <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=380>

25. Akibayashi and Takazato, n. 21, pp.243-270.

country which might appear to be the concern of the entire country is actually restricted only to the prefecture of the military base in Okinawa. Hence, there is a diffused level of civic awakening and a dim possibility of availing a large win set in this case.²⁶

Evaluating the Japanese case in terms of segregating two independent mutually exclusive levels is impossible. Here, in the domestic level, the author would like to emphasise on why the multiple referendum conducted in Okinawa is of political significance. In the case of Okinawa, “the nonbinding prefectural referendum was a direct challenge to the central government’s authority in a policy area that is politically and constitutionally recognized as being within its administrative jurisdiction, namely, national defense and bilateral treaty obligations”.²⁷

Two events, the rape incident and leasing of private lands to set up the military bases, sparked off a series of protests in the prefecture. Several people rose to form a movement, called the Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV) that argued for human rights and demilitarisation of the region. They conducted non-violent protests in Naha, collected signatures and even visited the Foreign Ministry, demanding base closure. This particular movement was successful in establishing international linkages, as Kozue Akibayashi and Suzuyo Takazato note, in the Buklod Centre of the Philippines and Du Rae Bang of Korea, that have supported the victims and survivors of military violence. The East Asia–US–Puerto Rico Women’s Network Against Militarism, which comprises women from Okinawa, mainland Japan, Korea, the Philippines, the United States, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii, held its first international meeting in Naha, Okinawa, in 1997.²⁸ There were other associations in Okinawa that dealt with the issues of land leasing to the US. Ridge notes the presence of the Okinawa Prefectural People’s Rally (*Okinawa Kenmin Sokekai Taikai*), sponsored by 18 key Okinawan labour and citizens organisations and attended by many

26. The analysis of the domestic constituents in Japan is based on the researcher’s reading of Lutz, n.21.

27. Robert D. Eldridge, “The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on U.S. Base Reductions: One Question, Several Answers”, *Asian Survey*, vol. 37, no. 10 (Berkeley: University of California Press, Oct. 1997), p. 881.

28. Akibayashi and Takazato, n.21.

people. He also mentions the *Okinawa Ken Gunyo Tochito Jinushikai Rengokai* (Okinawa Federation of Landowners of Land Used for Military Purposes) that was against the United States.

Table 2

Dimensions	Japan	Philippines
Military Base Agreement (signature)	These military bases were legitimated by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, signed and put into effect in 1960.	Mutual Defence Treaty signed between the US and Philippines in 1951. The Military Bases Agreement signed in 1947.
Ratification and lease dates	1960 onwards.	1988 Amendment to Military Bases Agreement, renewal expired in 1991.
Base Locations	Kadena Air Base of the US Air Force, Futenma Air Station of the US Marine Corps (in Ginowan City),	Clarke Base, Subic Bay, Mactin Air Base/ Benito Euben Air Base.
Significance during Cold War	Communist threats from China and (presently nuclear) North Korea.	To fight the Japanese, Indian Ocean trade, secure Southeast Asian countries.
Economic, technological incentives	Japan pays the Host Nation Support (<i>Omouiri Yoson</i>)	Philippines received compensation from the Americans (amount varies)

NEGOTIATIONS AND OUTCOMES

Japan

Win Set Size: The Japanese side possessed a small win set, and the US-Japanese (Level I) proposals/ policy alternatives did not gain a majority amongst the Level II domestic constituents. The Japanese negotiators on

It was more expensive to ratify, as the prospects of stationing the US troops in Okinawa was perceived to be crucial. The economic incentives, compensations and security umbrella provided to the Japanese were non-tradable items for bringing about peace in Okinawa.

Level I wanted to maintain status quo in order to secure their interests in contrast to the widespread civil unrest in Okinawa prefecture. Hence, the two-level game states that the lower the costs of a non- agreement (maintaining status quo), the smaller are the win sets. It was more expensive to ratify, as the prospects of stationing the US troops in Okinawa was perceived to be crucial. The economic incentives, compensations and security umbrella provided to the Japanese were non-tradable items for bringing about peace in Okinawa.

Ratification and Negotiations: The ratification in this case was not necessarily constitutional, as Putnam has declared, as it was not a parliamentary one. Despite the protests against the base construction prior to, and after which, the two referenda were taken, the results of the referenda were never taken into account. The ratification process was a basic 'endorsement' of sorts. In this case, the steps taken at Level I to modify the SOFA through SACO were pushed forth without first consulting the options on Level II. Negotiations and bargaining at the international and domestic levels sometimes comprise a simultaneous process and sometimes are first initiated domestically to gather the public opinion and are, thus, modified to maximise the gains at Level I. Here, after the first report of SACO was drafted and circulated, on September 8, 1996, the referendum was held and 53 percent of the 910,000 registered voters favoured the base reduction and revision of SOFA.²⁹ Hence, the initial proposal of removal of bases was forgotten, as people now negotiated for 'reduction' of force and not 'elimination'. This is alternatively known as synergetic linkages, where "policy options offered at Level I, change preferences of any domestic constituents".

29. Ibid.

The multi-level process of negotiations is complex because of the heterogeneous nature of the domestic constituents. In Japan, there are myriad anti-base coalitions, and protests led by women and environmentalists, with even the political class propagating different propositions in terms of either base reductions, base eliminations, de-securitising Asia, etc. Hence the distribution of the gains availed at Level I to the Level II constituents affects the size of the win sets. As Robert Putnam observes, the Level I agreement bears unevenly on them. One is aware of the “transnational alignments”, of the domestic protest group, OWAAMA, that went to Washington and addressed the issue of military presence in Japan and its impact on women. Many other anti-US base groups went to the Philippines and established networks, arguing for de-securitising of the region as a whole, because base realignments, along with the losses, are disseminated from one place to another.

Many other anti-US base groups went to the Philippines and established networks, arguing for de-securitising of the region as a whole, because base realignments, along with the losses, are disseminated from one place to another.

The Japanese propensity for seeking the broadest possible domestic consensus before acting constricts the Japanese win sets, as contrasted with majoritarian political cultures³⁰.

Negotiator: Thomas Schelling once noted, “The power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to make concessions and meet demands...This strategy results in establishing an immovable position that goes beyond the ability of the other to concede and, thereby provoking the likelihood of stalemate....³¹” This is applicable to the Japanese politicians who negotiated with the United States. The Japanese politician Ishihara Nobuteru (the former secretary-general of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party), stated that the question of the Henoko base transfer is of little importance to the larger vision that is the United States-Japan security agreement and that the base construction

30. Putnam, n.2, p. 449.

31. Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 19-28.

should continue regardless of any protest by the Okinawans.³²

Philippines

Win set: In the case of the Philippines, successful ratification resulted in a larger win set for Level II. The negotiations didn't break down between the two parties because of the size of the win sets, as the policy preferences were open at both Level I and Level II and the negotiator, despite being averse to the outcome of the ratification, still managed to uphold the credibility of the negotiations, unlike in the Japanese case.

Negotiations: The negotiations between the US and the Philippines are very much in contrast to the USA-Japan negotiations. For one, the Americans weren't as concerned with the costs/benefits of Subic Bay as they were of Okinawa. Hence, the distribution of gains was much higher in the Philippines case at Level II. The domestic constituents were much less divided, hence, homogenous in the case of the Philippines. Here, there were more or less two camps, one for, one against, the American bases. The debate on a 'no agreement' (meaning policy continuation) was the one significant disagreement among Level II constituents. To explicate this more lucidly, the people of the Philippines were only concerned that the present policy would continue, and, hence, that remained the agenda behind the protests. In the case of Japan, the outburst of multiple concessions and multiple demands was manipulated well by the political leadership that could manipulate the win set.

Also, in the Philippines the ratification process was thoroughly constitutional. The base agreement renewal was put to vote and out of 23 votes, 12 were against and 11 were for. Hence, they secured a win set. An important point of deduction is that international pressures here could not translate into swinging of opinions in the Philippines Senate. The pressure groups entrenched the political class and, hence, were able to secure a majority by one vote, that had a massive ripple effect on the country's security policies, economy, etc. The costs and

32. Kevin M. Evringham, "The United States Military Realignment on Okinawa", *Master Thesis*, Paper 275, (Connecticut, 2012), see: http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/gs_theses/275, p. 36.

benefits of the proposed agreement were more concentrated in this case (because of a homogenous constituency) and, hence, they could divert their interests in a streamlined fashion. In Okinawa and Naha, the protests were concentrated in one prefecture in Japan, within which only a few groups that were severely affected, protested. And there was a difference of opinion amongst those groups as well. Hence, while a majority voted in a referendum conducted in the city, the nationwide beliefs were different.

ANALYSIS

The layered process of negotiations in the Philippines and Japan witnessed a difference in policy outcomes that impacted their national security (host nations) and affected the broader US military strategy. The two cases are significantly different in two aspects: (1) The US-Philippines base negotiations were initiated at Level I (top-to-bottom approach), where the leader then had to lay out policy preferences to the domestic constituents. In the case of Japan, it was the exact opposite, where protests for base closure were voiced from Level II, from where the local audience, the governor, had to pass on the concerns to the leader who would then notify Level I actors. Hence, as the information passed from bottom-to-top, the policy preferences got altered and subdued.

(2) The monetary benefits were *directly* reaped by the Philippines. The United States as per the agreement was required to pay in cash to the government, along with providing security to the state. Again, the Japanese case was in contrast to this, as Japan bore the burden of the US presence in exchange for the extended deterrent and security umbrella. However, the government avails the monetary benefits of the US military presence *indirectly*, because of employment provided to many Okinawans.

CHALLENGES TO PIVOTING THE PACIFIC

The United States appears to be militarily and economically anchored in the Asia-Pacific. There have been remarks stating that “it is the goal of the US military to be able to run the planet from Guam and Diego Garcia by

2015, even if the entire Eastern Hemisphere has evicted US forces from other bases there.”³³

Thus, history has proved the importance of military bases which in today's context are as vital as maintaining strong economic ties. For the US Administration to sustain its power in the world and in the Asia-Pacific, it needs the support of its allies. America's allies need a confirmation too in times of crises. Japan's concerns over the North Korean ballistic missiles capabilities and China's rapid technological advancements, provided the impetus to the Japanese leaders to involve the United States in the region. National security interest in this case has been prioritised over domestic concerns. This is primarily because Japan's security policy is structured within the institution of the US-Japan security alliance. The military base or forward posture is a strong pillar of the alliance and of Japan's security policy. Thus, the military base in Japan serves domestic as well as regional interests.

In 2014, the Philippines signed the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the United States, affirming the Mutual Defence Treaty signed in 1951.³⁴ The EDCA allowed for rotation of American military troops, in addition to American access to designated areas and facilities in the Philippines. It was after China seized Scarborough Shoal located in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea (or West Philippines Sea) that the Philippines emphasised on security. In 2015, it reopened the former American military base at Subic Bay to set up facilities and installations.

In another twist of events, the satellite imagery of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) revealed China's military prowess in its creation of artificial islands over existing low-rock formations in the South China Sea; China's claiming them as its own territories and extending

33. Andrew S. Erickson, Walter C. Ladwig III and Justin D. Mikolay, "Diego Garcia and the United States' Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy", *Asian Security*, vol. 6, no. 3 (Taylor & Francis: Washington, 2010), p. 227.

34. "Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement Between the Philippines and the United States", Government of Philippines, URL: <http://www.gov.ph/2014/04/29/document-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/>. Accessed on November 20, 2015.

its maritime claims, is attributed to be a flawed legal argument based on coercion. The United States, in its Department of Defence Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy 2015, brandishes these installations as Military Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) modernisation, essentially because they are used as measures to strengthen legal claims and simultaneously further strategic interests. It has sparked international fears over militarisation of these islands by the deployment air force and naval capabilities.

Vietnam (Spratly Islands), Malaysia (Swallow Reef), Taiwan (Itu Aba) and Philippines (Tithu Reef) have constructed airstrips on the respective islands in the past. But the scale, speed and severity with which the Chinese are modernising, is worrisome for all the small countries in the region. China has the largest airstrip of all the claimants in the Fiery Cross Reef, of about 3,000 m, along with the potential to deploy fighter squadrons.

The Republic of the Philippines, meanwhile, has submitted its territorial and maritime claims to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, while China chose not to participate or follow suit. In this potential security flashpoint the United States appears to be in a Catch-22 situation as it wants to be present in the region to reassure its allies and appear as a credible power, but it is also wary of provoking the Chinese too much by escalating tensions or getting entangled in any conflict in this region.

Thus, it is only when the host nations agree to situating foreign presence during peace-time can diplomacy, power projection and security policies be implemented. Hence, Robert Putnam's two-level game theory is valid in establishing linkages between international crises and domestic happenings.