From the Editor’s Desk

Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s death on July 8th came as a huge shock for Japan, the international community, and especially the Indo-Pacific. A founder of the Indo-Pacific and friend of Delhi, his death has pushed the Quad states to redouble their work in the region. July also witnessed several forums and diplomatic activities in the region. The 51st meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum saw the US and Australia focus on countering China’s moves in the Southern Pacific. The first virtual Israel, India, US and UAE (I2U2) Summit on the western fringes of the Indo-Pacific, focused on clean energy cooperation and food security and brought into focus India’s expanded role in this region. Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s visited Tokyo and Seoul and highlighted his views on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Japan’s 2022 defence white paper was released as a precursor to a new National Security Strategy, set to be released at the year-end.

This month we present to you specially selected opinions and cherry-picks covering all this and more. Do check out our Social Media Corner for some engaging and insightful content, including debates, interviews and podcasts from eminent experts.

Jai Hind

CONTENTS

From the Editor’s Desk
Opinion/ Review/ Expert View
Social Media Corner

PEEP-IN

Who will call the shots in the Indian Ocean?
Read on more about it at :-
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2128621

QUOTE

“The Indo-Pacific region is “at the center” of international strategic competition”.

– Nobuo Kishi, Japan’s Minister of Defence
Shinzo Abe: Remembering the Architect of Indo-Pacific Strategy

Source: Dr Ashok Sharma and Professor John Blaxland, Australian Institute of International Affairs


Heads of state and government from NATO’s member countries and key partners are meeting June 29-30, 2022, to discuss security concerns and the alliance’s new Strategic Concept. (Emmanuel Dunand/AFP via Getty Images)

The assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has shocked the world. But Japan’s longest serving prime minister has left a remarkable imprint both domestically and internationally. After being stricken by both the 1997 East Asian financial crisis and the 2009 global economic slump, Abe guided Japan through a series of fiscal reforms. The distinctive sociological and demographic traits of Japan, however, precluded economic policies and structural reforms from being as successful as he had hoped.

Abe’s legacy in foreign and security policy, however, is particularly striking. For much of the post-war period, Japan had shied away from broad-based strategic thinking and regional leadership roles. But by making important constitutional amendments, Abe incrementally moved Japan away from its post-World War II pacifism and worked towards building a stronger and more internationally-engaged self-defence force. He did this by modernising the force and increasing military spending. This was a move characterised by opponents as sinister, stoking nationalist and militarist sentiments in a revisionist manner that played down past wrongdoings — but it is best understood in light of China’s unsettling assertiveness and fears over a distracted and disrupted United States. Abe’s initiatives were pivotal, particularly on Indo-Pacific security, where he bolstered Japan’s bilateral and multilateral relations with the USA, India, and Australia. Abe was integral in forming the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, conceptualised a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and was a persistent advocate for enhanced trade ties through a Trans-Pacific Partnership.

From being a staunch supporter of Japanese nationalism to being an outspoken internationalist, Abe’s influence could be seen far and wide. Abe played a leading role in shaping the Indo-Pacific concept by broadening the strategic canvas of the Pacific Ocean. The term was popularised by Abe when he addressed the Indian Parliament in 2007, outlining his vision of the “confluence of the two seas” between the Indian and Pacific oceans. This set the path for the inclusion of India in the strategic framing, acknowledging and highlighting the geopolitical significance of India to the grand geostrategic equation of the Indo-Pacific. Successive US administrations followed Abe’s lead. The “free and open Indo-Pacific” idea was promoted by

Perhaps no other leader has shaped the modern strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific as much as Shinzo Abe. He will be missed.

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Japanese officials in Washington in 2017 and in 2018, the US Defense Department changed the name of the region’s senior military command from Pacific Command (PACOM) to Indo-Pacific Command (INDO-PACOM), demonstrating Abe’s influence. US president Joe Biden acknowledged Abe as “a champion of the Alliance between our nations and the friendship between our people.” The idea of the Indo-Pacific conceptualised was the biggest contribution of Abe that will be cherished as a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific is touted as the key to global prosperity in the 21st century.

Even ASEAN, ever wary of causing offence in China, signed up to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific – a clever way of acknowledging Abe’s work while also carefully avoiding a commitment to it being “free and open.”

Widely respected in democratic countries for his forthright positions on China, Abe shaped the Indo-Pacific strategy. He was a key figure in the creation of the Quad, which started as an unofficial coalition following the Tsunami that rocked the Indian Ocean in 2004. The Quadrilateral military drills in 2007 were the first step towards the re-imagination of the strategic landscape as being about the Indo-Pacific. This evolved into the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue which re-emerged after a decade long hiatus. Abe worked on developing strong ties with the Quad nations at the bilateral and multilateral levels. He continued working on strengthening the security ties with the United States, along with a strategic partnership with Australia, but the highlight was building a comprehensive and robust strategic partnership with India – a country which had been on the other side of Cold War geopolitics, more closely aligned with the Soviets than the Americans.

Abe worked assiduously, persuading India, a traditionally wary and circumspect player in world affairs, to join him in backing the Indo-Pacific concept. From the “India Japan Strategic and Global Partnership” in 2006 with India’s Manmohan Singh to the “Special and Strategic Partnership” with Narendra Modi, the relationship between India and Japan has blossomed in the political, strategic, and commercial arenas. Japan was the first nation with which India began a 2+2 (foreign and defence ministries) dialogue. It joined the US-India Malabar naval exercises in 2015, and signed the Japan-India civil nuclear accord in 2016, putting an end to Japanese opposition to India’s status as a nuclear power. On the economic front, Tokyo rose under Abe to become New Delhi’s 12th-largest trading partner, thanks to growing Japanese investments in India. Both of India’s most recent prime ministers, Modi and Singh were his close friends.

When the United States lost its appetite for multilateral trade initiatives, Abe sought to fill the gap, energetically resuscitating the moribund Trans Pacific Partnership to
bolster regional trade ties while leaving an opening for the United States to resume its mantle of economic leadership, through the Comprehensive Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

On bilateral ties with Australia, Abe was unparalleled, having visited five times, and overseen an unprecedented deepening of ties. Building on the 1957 commerce agreement with Australia signed when his father was Prime Minister, Abe invested in deepening and broadening trade, investment, and security ties ranging from the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2007, a Special Strategic Partnership in 2014 (covering law enforcement, border security counter terrorism, disarmament, peace operations, and humanitarian relief operations) and the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement of 2015.

Abe made every effort to ensure that like-minded democratic countries cooperate in a coordinated way against a much more assertive and disruptive China. Japan’s international posture today can be directly linked to Abe’s pivotal leadership. He will be cherished on both ends of the Indo-Pacific.

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Russia is Gaining an Indo-Pacific Foothold Through Myanmar

**Source:** Mohamed Zeeshan, The Diplomat


Earlier this month, the leader of Myanmar’s ruling military junta, Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, went to Russia in order to expand his regime’s defense and energy cooperation with Moscow. The relationship is most definitely lopsided and Moscow has not been willing to publicly embrace Min Aung Hlaing’s regime just yet. During his visit last week, the general was not granted a meeting with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, and Russia downplayed the visit as a “private” one.

Yet, since the coup last February, Russia has been using its military might to expand its influence in Myanmar by sponsoring the junta’s operations. Moscow has supplied drones, fighter jets, and armored vehicles to the military regime, according to one United Nations expert. Russia has also thwarted statements at the U.N. Security Council aimed at Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis. The two governments are now united by their fight against Western sanctions and find themselves with expanding common ground.

Russia’s support is vital to the Myanmar junta, which is fighting a war of attrition against...
sundry rebels in the country’s complex ethnic landscape. So far, it has killed more than 2,000 civilians, according to U.N. officials. Yet, in the face of guerrilla warfare from multiple quarters, the military has struggled to establish its control outside provincial centers.

A steady stream of weapons from Moscow is key to the junta’s plans, and some experts believe that it has transferred raw materials to Russia in exchange, so as to circumvent sanctions. On his latest visit, Min Aung Hlaing even sought support in establishing nuclear energy to revive his war-ravaged economy.

For Russia, Myanmar’s geographical location is a strategic boon. Nestled between India and China, with a coastline facing the Bay of Bengal, Myanmar has access to both the Indian Ocean and the maritime trade routes leading into the South China Sea.

The Myanmar junta’s relative isolation post the coup also makes it a soft target for Moscow. Since the coup, the military government has largely relied on China. Under the democratically elected government headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar had whittled down the scope of various Chinese projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). After the military takeover, the junta revived and expedited several of those projects.

Yet, the military remains wary of putting all its eggs in Beijing’s basket. Unlike Russia, which has maintained military ties only with the junta, China has armed and engaged with rebel militias as well. For the junta, a diversification of ties by moving closer to Moscow is a welcome prospect – and Russia has begun responding favorably.

Meanwhile, opposition fighters have been disappointed by the lack of international support for their cause, despite sanctions and lofty rhetoric from the West. The opposition People’s Defense Forces and other rebel militias were recently successful in recruiting about 100,000 fighters. Yet, only about 40 percent of them are said to have even small arms. In the absence of much support from the West, resistance groups have been forced to rely on public donations.

America’s goodwill amongst Myanmar’s rebel forces is compounded by its contrasting attitude toward Ukraine. Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion in February, the U.S. has poured in over $7.3 billion in military assistance, including – more recently – long-range missiles and artillery that are helping annihilate Russian targets in southern Ukraine.

By comparison, many analysts believe that a fraction of that support will be sufficient to take down the junta in Myanmar. “A supply of 50–100 Stinger-like missiles and a few thousand military-grade M4 automatic rifles would be enough for them to overthrow the military junta,” wrote one analyst, Michael Martin, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Yet, so far, the U.S. has been reluctant to enter the fray.

Washington’s absence has left Russia with the strategic space to consolidate its own allies and proxies. In the immediate aftermath of the Ukraine invasion, the Myanmar military junta
was among Putin’s most vocal supporters. “Russia has worked to consolidate its sovereignty,” a spokesperson for the regime had said at the time. “I think this is the right thing to do.”

If the junta is able to prevail in Myanmar with Russia’s support, it would strengthen Putin’s hand in a region where he already enjoys some goodwill. Across the rest of the Indo-Pacific, countries such as India and Indonesia have maintained close ties with Moscow, despite Western sanctions.

If the Biden administration is serious about achieving its objectives in the Indo-Pacific, it would need to counter Russia’s stealthy expansion of power in Myanmar more purposefully. A good starting point would be to engage more proactively with the opposition and help meet its needs.

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The I2U2 Summit: Geoeconomic Cooperation in a Geopolitically Complicated West Asia

Source: Kabir Taneja, ORF

The I2U2 group of countries, ‘I2’ standing for India and Israel and ‘U2’ representing the United States (US) and United Arab Emirates (UAE), held their first summit level virtual meet on 14 July, during US President Joe Biden’s visit to Israel. The summit-level talks come as a welcome push since the meeting of I2U2 foreign ministers in October 2021 was followed by a lull despite many analysts christening this new setup as the ‘Middle East Quad’ (or ‘West Asia Quad’).

All four member countries have highlighted six main areas of cooperation that have been selected to launch this engagement into its next stage. With geoeconomics being the central tenant, cooperative projects in the fields of water, food security, health, transportation, and space cooperation have been identified as the first set of pilots, operating under larger global umbrellas of issues such as international economic stability, climate change, volatile energy, and food markets that have disproportionately affected the Global

The I2U2 grouping could be a game-changer in the region as it provides a platform for all the member states to outline new areas of cooperation.
South, compared to the more developed parts of the world. The Quad is the correct format to take fast decisions, Israel’s Prime Minister Yair Lapid said, perhaps indirectly questioning the feasibility of larger groups such as the United Nations (UN) or the G20 to deliver quickly and concretely in a more complicated world.

**The Geoeconomics of it All**

Undoubtedly, the scene-setter for the I2U2 was the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, which brought Israel and a group of Arab Gulf states led by the UAE into official partnership and recognition. The aim of the grouping is clearly to build more efficient cooperation in spheres where both regions can aid each other’s economic security. Israel today has the opportunity of using the financial prowess of centres such as Dubai to market its technology-driven offerings, something which the country is known for. And the first beneficiaries of the same have been the Gulf states themselves, with defence technologies offered by Israel quickly finding interest in the region with states such as Bahrain reportedly looking at Israeli drones and anti-drone systems to counter the threat from Iran. However, Israel, the UAE to a certain extent, and some other Gulf states rely heavily on imports to supply themselves with their daily requirements.

Recent disturbances to international supply chains caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s war against Ukraine and more targeted plans to diversify global manufacturing capacities away from China have given significantly more weight to ‘minilaterals’ such as I2U2. One of the outcomes of the summit, that of the UAE investing US$ 2 billion to develop hi-tech integrated food parks across India, will not only bring a big technological boost to Indian agriculture through a potential UAE-Israel state and private sector cooperation, but also give critical food security capacity to Israel, the UAE, and their regional partners, offering a level of insulation from larger and more complicated international commodities trade frameworks. In return, India should also look for a greater say via the UAE and (indirectly) the US, with Abu Dhabi now often seen as the most influential Arab capital, in cartel-like ecosystems such as OPEC and OPEC+. Food security for the Gulf by design would go hand-in-hand with energy security for India.

**Strategic Opportunities Amongst Challenges**

While the prospects of the I2U2 remain strong for the future, New Delhi will also appreciate the fact that strategically, India is the odd one out when it comes to the regional geopolitics of the Middle East. The first I2U2 summit has taken place during what many see as a very volatile visit of Biden to the region. Many Gulf players today are seeking a new strategic architecture with the US that would offer binding protection if any military conflict with Iran was to ensue. Biden, on the other hand, is having to maintain a balance between remaining a vital player in the region, but also not getting military entangled. The recent, messy American withdrawal from Afghanistan has only heightened anxieties in the Gulf of what American support without agreed guarantees would entail in the future. And to hedge their bets and diversify strategic
plays, they are also willing to give space to the likes of Russia and China in the Middle East, much to Washington’s dismay.

While Lapid in his comments at the summit eluded to the ‘Quad’ as a good format, the US made direct comparisons to the original Quad in the Indo-Pacific, where the US, India, Japan, and Australia partner in a grouping that is effectively designed to curtail China’s influence in Asia. US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s direct conflation between the original Quad and the development of the I2U2 as a ‘West Asian Quad’ may not position well two very diverse and strategically different areas for New Delhi. India being caught in a US-sponsored and backed Israel-Arab security deal would complicate the country’s known and appreciated ‘strategic autonomy’ in the Middle East as a state that chooses not to take sides. While an overall expired concept, non-alignment still resonates when it comes to India’s West Asia policy. The Abraham Accords, since their signing, have undoubtedly stabilised the region to a certain extent, but have also created two major blocks, one being Iran, and the other that is now seen as anti-Iran. This is despite sideline diplomacy, such as Saudi’s independent talks with Iran hosted by Baghdad, the UAE’s continuous cooperation with Tehran on certain issues and so on remaining constant. These concerns are not visible only from New Delhi’s vantage point but have also been raised in Europe, with scholars advising European capitals to not follow Washington’s lead by supporting a Gulf-Israeli defence pact and continue to work towards a regional de-

For India, it leverages its good relations with Israel, the Gulf, and the US alike to build economic exchanges that are mutually beneficial with next to no downsides on the horizon.

Conclusion

The I2U2, both on paper and in practice, makes a lot of sense. For India, it leverages its good relations with Israel, the Gulf, and the US alike to build economic exchanges that are mutually beneficial with next to no downsides on the horizon. However, geoeconomics and economic linkages cannot be seen as separate from geopolitics, and Middle East’s geopolitics remains volatile despite the Abraham Accords, with the Iran crisis looking to get even more complicated with chances of a JCPOA 2.0 remaining bleak. While none of these should dissuade India from aggressively developing economic linkages with a now ‘normalised’ Arab–Israel region, concern lingers that the Abraham Accords themselves are doing far too much heavy geopolitical lifting far too briskly, something that New Delhi, as the odd-one-out, should remain on top of.
China-Japan Ties Twisted and Tested by Indo-Pacific Framework

Source: Rumi Aoyama, Asia Time


Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and US President Joe Biden meet on May 23, 2022. Photo: Wikimedia Commons

The Indo-Pacific Framework for Economic Prosperity was launched in May 2022 during Joe Biden’s first visit to Asia as president. Of the 13 participants, Japan is the only country to announce it will join all four pillars of the IPEF.

Why is Japan so determined to support this US initiative? Will this proactive move damage the fragile bilateral relationship between Japan and China — or will the newly launched initiative disrupt ongoing regional economic integration?

Japan-China bilateral trade reached a 10-year high of US$391.4 billion in 2021 and more than 30,000 Japanese companies currently operate in China. Yet Japan appears to be enthusiastically embracing Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy — a move that irritates China.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reinforced the Fumio Kishida administration’s China policy, and rising public support for a solid deterrence policy suggests the current trajectory of Tokyo’s foreign policy is likely to continue.

It is widely recognized in Japan that most Asia Pacific countries think the framework — a trade agreement without the promise of US market access — is insufficiently attractive to have an immediate impact on regional trade.

But mainstream voices from within the Japanese government and business community argue that Japan should actively engage with the IPEF in the hope it will serve as a stepping stone for the United States to return to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The IPEF will also strengthen the US–Japan economic partnership.

Japan swiftly joined the US-led alliance that imposed punitive sanctions on Russia in February 2022. Tokyo’s decision was attributed to its security concerns about China — namely to ensure Washington and NATO’s support for Japan in the face of military pressure similar to that experienced by Ukraine.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call to many pacifist Japanese that war could well happen overnight. Public support for a strong Japan-US alliance and a domestic military buildup is now on the rise.

This sentiment is even present in Okinawa, where opposition to US bases is among the highest in Japan. More than 93% of Okinawans view China as a national security threat and a growing number of Okinawans (69% in a May 2022 survey) believe that US military bases in Okinawa are necessary.

With domestic support for US engagement
solidifying in Japan, the IPEF will likely take root in the Indo-Pacific. But it will have a limited impact on Sino–Japanese relations and regional geo-economic trends.

In the short term, the relationship between Japan and China will not deteriorate sharply, even if Japan has made minimal effort to stabilize Japan-China relations. Prior to Biden’s visit to Tokyo, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi organized a video conference with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi. The official statements following the online meeting were relatively confrontational, with both sides asserting their own diplomatic positions.

It is Beijing’s Japan policy that has maintained and will continue to maintain stable bilateral relations. While raising its tone when criticizing Tokyo’s China policy, Beijing has made relatively rational demands on Japan. Rather than asking Japan to significantly change its foreign policy, China urges Japan to better balance its relations with the United States and China and to develop bilateral trade.

Contrary to widespread fears that the Indo-Pacific Framework will lead to the decoupling of Asian economies, economic regionalism will continue to gain momentum in the Asia Pacific.

While the IPEF is a trade framework to advance Washington’s economic leadership, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is championed by both Japan and China. The launch of the IPEF has since prompted China to devote more diplomatic resources to RCEP.

While the IPEF may only have a limited effect on removing supply chains from China, China’s zero-Covid policy and deep economic woes have significantly eroded business confidence.

A Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry survey reports that 14% of Japanese companies operating in Shanghai are seeking to “reduce or postpone” future investments in China.

This sentiment is relatively moderate compared with the results of a European Union Chamber of Commerce survey indicating that the “China Plus One” policy long pursued by Japanese companies — to avoid solely investing in China by diversifying into other countries — is catching on with the Europeans.

It is widely believed that the success of the Indo-Pacific Framework depends on ASEAN countries — but in reality, it depends on China, China’s economy and its foreign policy. Japan’s support for the IPEF will help it gain traction in the Indo-Pacific, but it will not loom large over long-established China-Japan relations.

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Japan's Defence White Paper Sounds Alarm Over China-Russia Ties

Nikkei Asia


July 2022

Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Feb. 4. The two countries are increasingly deepening military cooperation. © Reuters

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has shaken the international order to its core, in Asia and elsewhere across the globe. Japan's recently released annual defense white paper makes clear the government's alarm over Moscow's use of force to unilaterally change the status quo, and urges a strengthening of the nation's defense capabilities as quickly as possible.

Surrounded by China, Russia and North Korea, Japan faces an increasingly dire security environment, and the July 22 white paper presents a largely accurate assessment of the situation. The government will begin full discussions about boosting defense spending and other related issues in preparation for a revision to the National Security Strategy at the end of the year. We hope the government fully explains the need for these changes to the public and that officials will consider the most effective means of implementation.

Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi states at the beginning of the paper that the international community now faces its "biggest challenge since World War II." Russia's invasion of Ukraine is one factor in this assessment, but Moscow is also worryingly stepping up its military activities in East Asia.

The report pays particular attention to the deepening military cooperation between Russia and China, noting that this trend "warrants concern and must continue to be closely watched." In October 2021, naval vessels from Russia and China performed an unusual exercise, practically circling the Japanese archipelago. In May this year, bombers from both militaries conducted joint long-range flights around Japan.

Although the U.S. is officially focused on competition with China, it has no choice but to devote effort and resources to supporting Ukraine for the time being. Japan needs to play a more significant role in this context.

The possibility cannot be ruled out that China and Russia may simultaneously engage in unexpected provocative actions. The government must be prepared for such a situation.

In Japan's recent upper house election, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party called for an increase in defense spending, but did not specify how the additional funds would be allocated. If more spending will be required of Japan's already strained public finances, the government and ruling coalition should work to gain the public's understanding by laying out a plan early on.
The white paper expresses the same "strong security concerns" about China as in last year's report. The paper notes that the military balance with Taiwan is tilted in Beijing's favor, and the imbalance is growing more severe.

Experts increasingly share the view that a contingency involving Taiwan would also impact Japan. A Nikkei poll found that more than 90% of respondents said Japan should be prepared for such a scenario, either under current law or through amended law.

The report again describes North Korea, which has conducted repeated missile launches, as a "grave and imminent threat." Expanding joint military training with the U.S. and other friendly nations is an effective way to prepare for contingencies involving either Taiwan or the Korean Peninsula. Policymakers should also examine Japan's current legal framework to look for any gaps that would undermine national security.

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Cherry-Picks of the Month


CAPS Experts In Focus


4. G7 Response to China’s BRI - [https://capsindia.org/g7-response-to-chinas-bri/](https://capsindia.org/g7-response-to-chinas-bri/)

5. How Japan’s Rare Earth Industry Flourished under Shinzo Abe - [https://capsindia.org/how-japans-rare-earth-industry-flourished-under-shinzo-abe/](https://capsindia.org/how-japans-rare-earth-industry-flourished-under-shinzo-abe/)
Debates/Panel Discussions

1. Shinzo Abe’s vision and legacy, Asia Society Policy Institute - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v8O-Q8qs08I

2. Col. (Retd) Grant Newsham: The legacy of Shinzo Abe and the future of the Indo-Pacific - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kzMBOsQUREg

Interview/View Points


Podcasts

1. Convergent and Divergent Views of the Indo-Pacific - https://www.clubhouse.com/room/mWVrXkbB

The Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS) is an independent, non-profit think tank that undertakes and promotes policy-related research, study and discussion on defence and military issues, trends and developments in air power and space for civil and military purposes, as also related issues of national security. The Centre is headed by Air Marshal Anil Chopra, PVSM AVSM VM VSM (Retd).

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