




# CENTRE FOR AIR POWER STUDIES (CAPS)

Forum for National Security Studies (FNSS)

## INDO-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER



A Monthly Newsletter on Security and Strategic Issues on Indo-Pacific Region from  
Centre for Air Power Studies

### From the Editor's Desk

*While April has seen a flurry of diplomatic activity for the Indo-Pacific region and India in particular. From the India-France Ex Varuna to the conclusion of the India-Australia trade agreement, India-US summits, and the visits of the British, EU and Russian political leaders – India's centrality in global and regional politics has never been more evident. With Britain in particular, India stands ready to launch collaborations on fighter jet engine technology and transfer of other critical defence technology. At the same time, both AUKUS and Quad are swiftly evolving, with AUKUS turning focus to hypersonic missiles and the Quad with the inclusion of South Korea as a observer in its May summit.*

*This month, we present to you specially selected opinions and cherry-picks – including several expert commentaries from the Raisina Dialogue 2022 – covering all this and more. Do check out our Social Media corner for some insightful content, including an interview with CAPS' Air Commodore Savinderpal Singh on Russian air power in its Ukraine campaign and a commentary on the importance of US collaboration for India's rare earth reserves.*

*Jai Hind*

Vol 1, No 12, 07 May 2022

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### PEEP-IN

*AUKUS, a strategic submarine pact, turns to missiles*

Read on more about it at :-

<https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/04/09/aucus-a-strategic-submarine-pact-turns-to-missiles>

### QUOTE

*"The quest for self-sufficiency or Atmanirbhar Bharat for India doesn't mean isolation but creating capacities that can help you and help others."*

– Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan  
Shringla at the Raisina Dialogue

## Opinions/Review/Expert View

## As Boris Johnson Races to Match EU Trade and Offers, India is in a Win-Win Position

Source: Seshadri Chari, *The Print*

<https://theprint.in/opinion/as-boris-johnson-races-to-match-eu-trade-and-offers-india-is-in-a-win-win-position/926174/> 22 Apr 2022.



A file picture of PM Narendra Modi with British PM Boris Johnson, on the sidelines of the G7 Summit, in Biarritz, France in 2019 | PIB

Never before have the corridors of power in New Delhi seen such a long list of foreign visitors in such a short time queuing up to do business with India. The country's handling of the Covid pandemic, economic recovery process, and the strong and independent stand on geopolitical events in the region and elsewhere could be some of the reasons for this sudden attraction. United Kingdom Prime Minister Boris Johnson himself had to cancel two earlier dates due to the pandemic. Having arrived in India on 21 April, he will surely find the former 'East India Company' colony a new place.

Although threats from 'autocratic states' and India's stand on the Russia-Ukraine crisis appeared to be uppermost on Boris Johnson's agenda initially, it is now clear that trade and Indo-Pacific cooperation are top priorities for

**Although threats from 'autocratic states' and Russia-Ukraine crisis appeared topmost on Boris Johnson's agenda, it is now clear that trade and Indo-Pacific are main priorities.**

the PM. His office had earlier suggested that the visit assumes importance, as the two countries will deepen relationships on issues pertaining to 'strategic defence, diplomatic, and economic partnership'.

Deep down in the British psyche, there was always a nagging idea that it wasn't 'Great' as long as it was tied to the European Union (EU) despite not dissolving its pound sterling into the euro cauldron. The mood in the country to urgently quit the EU was sensed by Johnson when he was the Foreign Minister and quit Theresa May's cabinet on the Brexit issue and went on to become Prime Minister. The need to chart a new and independent path after quitting the EU, especially on security, trade and diplomacy, was articulated in the 2021 policy paper by the UK government.

### Going global

Seventy-five years is a long time for the UK to consider going global after the 'liquidation of Her Majesty's governments' across Africa, Asia, and the Far East. This should explain the resolve to set 2030 as the target to deeply engage 'in the Indo-Pacific as the European partner with the broadest, most integrated presence in support of mutually-beneficial trade, shared security, and values'. The Indo-Pacific has transformed from the Asia Pacific into a vibrant region

with many more stakeholders than the number it boasted about under British colonialism. The India-centric emerging contours of the Indo-Pacific appear to be a natural destination for the UK if it wants to join the Going Global bandwagon and do what it did centuries ago

for existence and trade. Most of the colonial geography of Britain, and the rest of the European powers as well, have now come under the economic influence of the ‘autocratic State’, a fitting euphemism for China.

It remains to be seen if the democratic coalition’s new approach towards a free and open Indo-Pacific gets enriched by Britain’s changed attitude towards the region. The Quad has been trying to stand up to the challenges in the maritime and continental domain, especially posed by an assertive and, at times aggressive, ‘not-so-peaceful’ rise of China. India has been at the receiving end of this threat both on its northern and western borders, thanks to the ‘partition plan’ of Boris Johnson’s predecessors.

Will the changed global approach of the UK include measures to correct its historical wrongs? “It is the long-standing position of the UK government that the crisis in Kashmir is fundamentally a matter for India and Pakistan to resolve. And it is not – alas, since we were there at the very beginning – it is not for us as the UK to prescribe a solution in that dispute,” Boris Johnson had said while replying to the debate on the abrogation of Article 370 in the British Parliament in 2019.

The deeper security and trade initiatives can include the acceptance of the fact that Britain was at the root of the problem. This may give it a clearer vision to deal with the future course of actions that New Delhi may initiate.

But, as of now, the British Prime Minister has to attend to rebalancing ties with India and the EU. While the Comprehensive Economic

Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between India and the UAE will come into effect in May this year, New Delhi will restart negotiations with the 27-member EU panel on the long-pending comprehensive free trade agreement called broad-based Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA), which has been stalled since 2013. It is likely to boost the present level of merchandise exports, which stand at nearly 57 billion US dollars.

Boris Johnson’s country has to match these trade figures in the coming years, as it is going to be the UK that will compete with the 27 members of the EU, of which it is longer a member. In a way, New Delhi stands to gain both ways with a free trade agreement with two major economic power blocks.

### Trouble at home

Meanwhile, Boris Johnson’s visit also coincides with domestic issues in the UK like the police fine against him for hosting an unauthorised birthday party in June 2020, where the number of guests exceeded Covid protocols and social distancing was not maintained. The UK Opposition has also raised its objection to the government’s decision to relocate refugees to Rwanda, which has a dubious human rights record. The UK-Rwanda agreement, announced by British Home Minister Priti Patel, has already drawn flak from the conservative Opposition and some international agencies. But Britain’s biggest problem is accommodating, housing, feeding, and employing these refugees at a time when its own economy is unable to support such large-

**The Quad has been trying to stand up to the challenges in the maritime and continental domain, especially posed by an assertive and, at times aggressive, ‘not-so-peaceful’ rise of China.**

heartedness.

The last time Johnson faced criticism, then as the Foreign Secretary, was for the Rohingya refugee issue when he did not punish Myanmar sufficiently. But then, many of the refugee problems in South Asia and elsewhere could be traced to the British colonial past. For the UK, 'going global' will be a challenge in the changed circumstances, and India will truly be a useful and equal partner.

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## The Season Of Caucuses: QUAD, AUKUS And The Exclusive-Inclusive Duality Of Indo-Pacific Asia

Source: Rory Medcalf, ORF

<https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/season-of-caucuses/> 12 April, 2022.

The primary contest for the future of the Indo-Pacific region is simple: It is about preventing Chinese hegemony while avoiding catastrophic conflict. After all, the Indo-Pacific concept has become a useful organising principle for a wide range of nations seeking to manage and balance Chinese power. However, there is now a secondary contest for the Indo-Pacific—or more accurately a contest over the idea of the Indo-Pacific—in terms of what constitutes the most effective set of regional policy responses to the China challenge. The contours of this new diplomatic terrain were starkly laid out in 2021 in contrasting visions by a range of generally like-minded nations and their groupings.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United

Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) are strong manifestations of balancing strategies in the Indo-Pacific. They are also complementary: If AUKUS can deliver a stronger Australia, then Australia will become a more capable partner in the Quad. However, the challenge now for their member states is to reconcile these exclusive balancing arrangements with the more inclusive approach advocated by Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU). This will require Australia, in particular, to be more effective at articulating why AUKUS serves the interests of many partners, or at least why it does not undermine them. Canberra can make a sound case that AUKUS is, at heart, about improving national deterrent capability, not building a new alliance. At the same time, EU nations will need to openly acknowledge why balancing and deterrence postures may be increasingly necessary in a world where China–Russia collaboration threatens stability at both ends of Eurasia.

## AUKUS and After: Submarine Turbulence and Deep Ocean Currents

The diplomatic storm of the Australian-British-American technology deal called AUKUS has become a familiar story. It involved Australia's sudden abandonment of the programme with France's Naval Group to build a fleet of advanced diesel-electric submarines. Instead, in September 2021, Australia announced an extraordinary agreement with the US and the UK to acquire nuclear-powered vessels, either the US Virginia-class or the UK Astute-class SSN.

**Indo-Pacific concept has become a useful organising principle for a wide range of nations seeking to manage and balance Chinese power.**

The French government cried betrayal and deception over the termination of a contract that reflected a wider strategic partnership. Australia insisted that it was simply pursuing the best military capability to protect its national interests in response to the growing threats from China. The mistrust will be slow to subside. But deeper ocean currents were revealed. For another character in this drama was something called the “Indo-Pacific”. A few years earlier, this word was barely heard in international affairs; now it has become a powerful diplomatic mantra—a term with many useful meanings, including a code for what to do about a powerful and assertive China.

“The future of the Indo-Pacific will impact all our futures,” said Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison at the AUKUS launch. His British counterpart explained the new three-nation partnership as, “working hand in glove to preserve security and stability in the Indo-Pacific.” True to the American tradition of grand foreign policy rhetoric, President Biden declared that, “the future of each of our nations—and indeed the world—depends on a free and open Indo-Pacific enduring and flourishing in the decades ahead.”

Also in September 2021, the leaders of the so-called Quad countries—the US, Australia, India and Japan—convened in Washington for their first in-person meeting of this important new strategic grouping, widely seen as a diplomatic balance to China. With a less confronting agenda than AUKUS, the Quad is more focused on a “public goods agenda” spanning vaccines, technology, environment and infrastructure. The member countries committed to “a region that is a bedrock of our shared security and prosperity—a free and

open Indo-Pacific, which is also inclusive and resilient.” This programme has continued into 2022, with Quad leaders convening again on short notice in March to maintain momentum on the public goods agenda, while also managing differences over responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The leaders reiterated that the primary focus of the Quad should remain the Indo-Pacific.

### A Family Feud Over the Indo-Pacific Idea

Canberra’s diplomatic activism has once effectively propagated the Indo-Pacific as a unifying idea. Now, Australia has become the centre of a family feud in which different democracies are preaching their own versions of the creed. France defined its outcry over the sunken submarines deal, not in the crude business

**Australia insisted that it was simply pursuing the best military capability to protect its national interests in response to the growing threats from China.**

terms of the global arms trade, but as a regretful “lack of consistency” in efforts to uphold shared interests and values in la région indo-pacifique. After all, on the very

same day as the AUKUS bombshell, the EU—long accused of ignoring the tense geopolitical realities of Asia—had released its own ‘Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’.

The European approach was high sounding, but its plea for multilateral diplomacy, inclusiveness and non-confrontation sidestepped the hard question of what should be done if China had other ideas, especially with its escalating coercion of Taiwan. By October 2021, armed tensions were escalating across the Taiwan Strait, with Chinese bombers making sinister daily air shows in skies it contested with the self-ruling island. Taiwanese President, Tsai Ing-wen, declared that “the course of the Indo-Pacific, the world’s fastest-growing region,

will in many ways shape the course of the 21st century.” That included the increasingly real possibility of catastrophic war.

The Indo-Pacific, then, is more than a place: It is an idea and a wave sweeping global diplomacy. In the past few years, many powers and international groupings have invoked this term to define how they are rising up to the China challenge: The US, Japan, India, Australia, Indonesia, ASEAN, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the EU, Britain, Taiwan and more.

An Indo-Pacific future is rapidly arriving. In early 2021, the new US administration of President Joe Biden hit the ground running with its own evolution of the Indo-Pacific idea: An expansive map of what it described as ‘competitive coexistence’ with China. Such a policy was meant to be underpinned by the strengthened engagement of diverse allies and partners. Soon this was manifested in President Biden’s first international summit—the inaugural (if virtual) meeting of leaders of the Quad—followed by an in-person gathering within months. Such Indo-Pacific solidarity was then underscored in a firm American line against China in a diplomatic face-off in Anchorage; and extended a few months later in the Cornwall summit of the G7 and its new democratic partners, Australia, India, South Korea and South Africa. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation subsequently cast its eye far east, warning that China posed “systemic challenges”. No longer an academic obscurity, the term “Indo-Pacific” is now standard language far and wide. This signifies one thing: The question

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of what needs to be done to blunt China’s bid to dominate the globally-vital Indo-Pacific region—in security, economics, technology and values—has now become a first-order question in global diplomacy.

### **Reconciling Inclusive with Exclusive: Towards an Adaptable Strategy**

The Indo-Pacific answer amounts to a practical reimagining of the world map to suit the problem and the times. It reframes an Asia-centric region to reflect growing connectivity and contest across the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, driven in substantial part by China’s expanding interests and influence. This vision is useful to many nations because it explains and encourages the balancing and dilution of Chinese power through an array of new partnerships across collapsed geographic boundaries. We, thus, have a metaphor for collective action; a code for a pivotal region where China can be prominent but not dominant.

In a global discourse often dominated by Beijing’s transgressions and triumphalism, or simplistic narratives of US-China bipolarity, the Indo-Pacific idea offers a useful alternative. It is about steadiness and solidarity among many nations. It is about incorporating a more powerful China into a regional order where the rights of others are respected, and counter-balancing that power when those rights are not. And that is the point: It should be possible to reconcile the competing exclusive (US, Japan, AUKUS, Quad) and inclusive (EU, ASEAN, India) visions of the Indo-Pacific.

The key here is China's behaviour: The strategy of others should be adaptable enough to pivot between inclusive and exclusive policy agendas, and to maintain elements of both simultaneously, depending on whether China is choosing to focus more on coexistence or coercion. I would contend that this dynamism has informed Australian policy for some years, even if that is not always apparent, or if its fruits are yet to be compelling. For instance, while placing the Quad and AUKUS together at the centre of foreign policy—as evidenced in the platforms of both major parties in the Australian 2022 federal election campaign—Canberra has quietly strengthened relations with its non-aligned neighbours in Southeast Asia. In 2021, Australia became the first country to finalise a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with ASEAN. The AUKUS agreement had prompted brief expressions of concern in Indonesia and Malaysia, but received a better reception in Singapore and the Philippines, and does not seem to have alienated Australia-ASEAN relations overall. It is also worth noting that any concerns that AUKUS will somehow undermine the Quad were short-lived, more the stuff of excited media speculation than any serious policy thinking in either New Delhi or Tokyo.

A core part of the Indo-Pacific idea is the agency of middle players—not China or the US—in shaping the regional order. In fact, the spread of the Indo-Pacific concept was a quiet achievement from years of activist diplomacy by these powers, notably Australia and Japan. The turmoil of 2020 and 2021, with deepening concern about China as a threat,

has had two divergent effects on the choices being made by nations. This captures a tension at the heart of the Indo-Pacific idea. On the one hand, it is about inclusion, multipolarity, risk-management and the choices of many nations across a shared space. But on the other hand, as China-centric rivalries worsen, the pressures will grow to emphasise strategic balancing and deterrent power. This tension—between one Indo-Pacific of diplomacy and inclusion and another of military balancing and US-China struggle—is what has been revealed and accentuated in the AUKUS crisis.

Other nations and groupings will need to develop their own sophisticated ways of navigating both these Indo-Pacifics—the inclusive and the exclusive. For instance, the Indo-Pacific democracies that

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have felt China's pressure—such as Australia, Japan, India, the Philippines and Taiwan—may welcome the EU's renewed interest in the region. However, there is a risk that the European focus on multilateral diplomacy, inclusiveness and non-confrontation sidesteps the hard question of what to do if China has more coercive and

uncompromising ideas. Moreover, China's support for Russia, ahead of and during the Ukraine invasion, suggests that the EU countries will not permanently be able to overlook the question of whether China poses a systemic challenge globally rather than just a regional threat to resident powers in the Indo-Pacific.

### What Next for the Quad?

Likewise, India and other Quad members will need to keep refining their expectations of this institution. After all, not only has the Quad been characterised as an exclusive balancing alignment,

but also has the potential to be the core of more inclusive arrangements in terms of its ‘public goods’ agenda. The shift towards a broad ‘public goods’ agenda is smart. It has helped ensure the Quad’s acceptance by many other nations and institutions, including ASEAN and the EU, as an enduring and stabilising part of global diplomatic architecture. This has blunted much of China’s criticism that the Quad is supposedly some quasi-alliance bent on containment and a confrontational, exclusive approach to security.

The Quad has made great progress in recent years: The two summit meetings in 2021 (and a shorter leaders’ virtual discussion in March 2022) affirm its priority place in the strategic policy settings of all four member states. At the same time, the establishment of AUKUS has become the new lightning rod for China’s diplomatic frustration. As of March 2022, China is seeking to define the Quad, AUKUS, Five Eyes and various bilateral US alliances as part of an allegedly coordinated ‘5432’ strategy. This is an example of China’s desperate recognition that it can no longer mount a credible diplomatic attack on the Quad per se.

A challenge now for the Quad is to focus on living up to the promise of delivering tangible outcomes and benefits to the regional community, such as through vaccine delivery in Southeast Asia and improvements to technology standards and governance. Other issues and opportunities ahead for the Quad include:

Preventing or managing fissures over Ukraine: It makes sense for the Quad countries to air and

address differences robustly through their trusted dialogue with one another. India’s dependence on Russia poses long-term risks for India’s interests in balancing China. How seriously can Delhi rely on a self-weakened Moscow that, in turn, becomes increasingly reliant on Beijing? Quad partners need to help India diversify its sources of military technology and energy. At the same time, the focus of the Quad on the Indo-Pacific needs to be restated and reinforced.

Adapting to the opportunities of coordinating with other nations and groupings: Without necessarily expanding on an already busy agenda, Quad capitals would be well advised to identify early opportunities for ‘Quad Plus’ cooperation

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on specific functional issues such as critical technologies, vaccines, climate, disaster relief or infrastructure investment, perhaps with Britain, France, other European partners, South Korea (where a new government provides a real opening), individual Southeast Asian partners, Canada and New Zealand.

Anticipating future contingencies: The Quad is not a treaty alliance, and its early success will be jeopardised if alliance-like expectations are placed on it. Although the Quad capitals are building a significant degree of trust and like-mindedness with one another, this will not immediately translate into concerted policy action. The Quad governments would do well to invest in helping each other build shared understandings of the security risks their nations—and the region—could face in this decade of disruption. Shared anticipation of potential strategic shocks is the first step in building towards policy coordination, or in tempering expectations. For instance, Quad



nations would benefit from frank and confidential dialogue, perhaps in a 1.5 track format, about plausible strategic shocks in the region—such as a Chinese assault on Taiwan—and their implications for national interests and policy options.

## Conclusion

The Quad has defied the doubters and is here to stay. Indeed, some internal strains actually reinforce the value of a flexible arrangement like the Quad to play a quiet bridge-building role between these key Indo-Pacific democracies. Those issues include not only divergence about how to respond to the Russian aggression but also, for instance, varying levels of risk appetite for overtly opposing China and differentiated patterns of applying democratic values to internet governance. To the extent that the Quad can be an island of trusted dialogue within a turbulent regional and global system, it can also set an example for other coalitions to counter coercion and build stability.

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## India–Australia Relations on the Upswing

Source: R.P. Singh, IDSA

<https://idsa.in/idsacomments/india-australia-relations-rp-singh-260422> 26 Apr 2022

The Second India–Australia Summit, held on 21 March 2022, took stock of various new initiatives and mechanisms agreed under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), inked in June 2020. The relationship has been further bolstered by the signing of the India–Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (IndAus ECTA) on 2 April 2022 between the two Trade Ministers, in the presence of the respective Prime Ministers. The agreement is a major milestone that promises to propel bilateral trade to new heights and achieve ambitious targets for Indian and Australian economies.

India–Australia relations have indeed transitioned from a difficult past to a promising future. Till the year 2000, there was considerable cynicism between the two countries and lack of cooperation in most sectors, primarily owing to contrasting views on the commonwealth, India's independent foreign policy and Cold War dynamics. When India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, Australia imposed tough economic sanctions, resulting in further deterioration of relations. Economic and trade cooperation as well as people-to-people links were also limited.

However, since 2000, the two countries began to forge an increasingly cooperative partnership, essentially driven by the changing regional

landscape in Asia and China's aggressive behaviour, as also improving India–US relations, as signified by the nuclear deal. Bilateral relations were further bolstered by Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Australia in 2014 and recent partnerships forged as part of the Quad meetings and other mini-laterals.

### Virtual Summit

At the Virtual Summit on 21 March 2022, all areas of cooperation were discussed between the two leaders, and the key strategic and economic outcomes were highlighted in the joint statement. Regarding Indo-Pacific region, the two leaders expressed their shared commitment to free, open and rules-based order, supported by a robust regional architecture, and ASEAN centrality.

On the Ukraine crisis, they expressed concern over the conflict and the resultant humanitarian crisis, as also emphasised on the importance of dialogue and diplomacy based on the UN charter, international law, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, to resolve the crisis. The leaders called for immediate cessation of violence against the civilian population in Myanmar, release of detained leaders there and unhindered humanitarian access. The two leaders committed to humanitarian assistance, adherence to counter-terrorism commitments and human rights in Afghanistan. Concerning South China Sea, both sides underlined the importance of freedom of navigation and over flight, consistent with international laws, particularly UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). It was announced that India will participate in the Indo-Pacific Endeavour Exercise 2022, which aims

**India's independent foreign policy and Cold War dynamics. When India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, Australia imposed tough economic sanctions, resulting in further deterioration of relations.**

to promote security and stability in Australia's near region through bilateral and multilateral engagement, training and capacity building.

On the economic front, Australia–India Infrastructure Forum was launched to enable Australian firms to explore India's vast infrastructure opportunities. A new Consulate-General in Bengaluru was announced to help plug Australian businesses into India's digital economy and innovation ecosystem. The Progress on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) was reviewed, with both sides committed to a full CECA by the end of the year. The two countries shared their commitment to cooperate on such aspects as critical minerals, and emphasised the need for resilient and sustainable supply chains for their transportation. An MoU was signed between Australia's Critical Minerals Facilitation Office and Khanij Bidesh Ltd for joint cooperation on critical minerals. Further, Australia and India pledged to cooperate on research, production and commercialisation of clean technologies, critical minerals and energy.

Among other new declarations are the India–Australia Centre of Excellence for Critical and Emerging Technology Policy, to be set up in Bengaluru, and establishment of Gen Rawat India–Australia Young Defence Officers' Exchange Programme. Australia committed the largest single investment in the bilateral relationship with India of about US\$ 280 million across skills, diplomacy, clean technology, critical minerals and space exploration. Indian diaspora in Australia is more than 6 lakh people and about 1 lakh students, totalling about 3 per cent of the

Australian population.

## Convergences

Recent years have seen a significant transformation of the India–Australia strategic relationship. With CSP signed in June 2020, an array of institutional mechanisms have been initiated to promote bilateral cooperation, including Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation, Arrangement on Mutual Logistics Support, Framework arrangement for Cyber & Cyber Enabled Critical Tech Cooperation and MoU on Mining and Processing of Critical and Strategic Minerals. The inaugural 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue was held in September 2021 and the two Foreign Ministers have been meeting regularly. The two nations have a robust defence partnership. Besides dialogues, training and exchanges, they conduct regular joint military exercises, as also anti-piracy coordination and white shipping information sharing. Bilateral military exercises that have been conducted include AUSINDEX 2021, PITCH BLACK 2018 and AUSTRAHIND 2018. Australia has consistently supported India’s NSG membership, and permanent seat in the UN Security Council. India and Australia signed the civil nuclear agreement in 2014 and Australia made the first uranium shipment to India in 2017. However, trade in uranium since then has been lacklustre owing to issues regarding safeguards, and Australian domestic politics.

On multilateral issues, both countries are members of the Quad, along with Japan and the United States, and cooperate on various positive agendas relating to the Indo-Pacific. India and

Australia have similar concerns vis-à-vis China’s coercive behaviour. Australia has pushed back on China’s aggressive trade barriers, and has called for independent investigation of COVID-19 origins. India, on its part, has given a strong response to China’s unilateral attempts to alter status quo on the Ladakh border.

India and Australia cooperate closely at ASEAN forums viz. East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting, as also at G20, which India is going to host next year. The two countries have a robust issue-based trilateral mechanisms with Japan (since 2015), Indonesia (2017) and France (2020).

**India and Australia signed the civil nuclear agreement in 2014 and Australia made the first uranium shipment to India in 2017.**

Some multilateral initiatives where India has taken lead and the two countries cooperate are Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI), Coalition of Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), and Infrastructure for Resilient Island States (IRIS) and International Solar Alliance (ISA). In the Indian Ocean, both countries engage with partners in forums at Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS); as also at many multilateral exercises, such as Malabar and now Talisman Sabre and Indo-Pacific Endeavour.

India and Australia have a shared vision on the Indo-Pacific. India’s approach to the region was articulated by PM Modi in 2018 through the vision of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All). To implement the vision of SAGAR, the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) was launched in 2019. India has also strengthened its outreach with Pacific island countries, through FIPIC (Forum for India–Pacific Island Cooperation). Australia’s strategic view on Indo-Pacific is spelt out in 2020 Defence Strategic Update.

Australia's strategic objectives as defined in this document include –the shaping of strategic environment in the region, deterring actions that are against Australian interests and responding with credible military force, if required. South Pacific region is Australia's primary area of influence and its deep engagement in the region is defined by the Pacific Step-up initiative, which was first announced at the Pacific Island Forum Leaders' Meeting in September 2016 as a 'step-change' in its engagement with the region.

### Divergences

While India and Australia cooperate on most areas, analysts observe that there are many issues of divergences also. Australia has looked at strategic and security issues through the lens of its US alliance, which has now got further strengthened with AUKUS deal, whereas India follows an independent foreign policy in international relations and tries to balance its strategic calculations. The two nations have differing views on Myanmar, for instance. For India, developments in Myanmar are a matter of strategic concern, due to its proximity to the country's northeast region and militants operating from across the border. Australia, on its part, has strongly condemned the military coup and detainment of senior leaders. Australia's response to the Ukraine crisis is aligned with its allies in West, while Indian response is based on its national interests and historic ties with Russia. Australia, just as India, Japan and many others, has realised the importance of self-

reliance in defence manufacturing and resilient supply chains. Australia has increased its defence budget and is acquiring advanced weapon systems, including nuclear-propelled submarines and hypersonic missiles under AUKUS deal.

### The Promise of IndAus ECTA

Recognising that a free trade agreement between the two countries will usher in economic growth and build trust and respect, the two nations signed the historic IndAus ECTA on 2 April 2022. With ECTA in place, the trade is likely to increase from the current estimates of US\$ 27 billion to about US\$ 45–50 billion over the next five years, and is expected to create over 10 lakh additional jobs. The deal will eliminate tariffs on more than 85 per cent

**Joint defence manufacturing has a tremendous potential to be explored, leveraging Aatmanirbhar Bharat initiative. Furthermore, broader long-term reciprocal access arrangements, similar to foundational agreements with US, can be looked at to emphasise real-time maritime domain awareness and information sharing, besides interoperability and operational coordination.**

of Australian goods entering India and almost all Indian exports to Australia. Indian companies will get supply of energy and raw material, while Australia will get better access to the rapidly growing Indian market. Labour-intensive sectors in India like textiles, pharmaceuticals, etc., will create new jobs and Indian students and software professionals will benefit from the liberalised visa regime. In

addition, the agreement will assist Indian finished product exports in petroleum, cosmetics, linen clothing, jewellery and furniture.

### Way Forward

Being two major powers with shared interests, India and Australia can play a significant role in creating a strong and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. The Quad


partnership must be leveraged and widened in its relevance and influence, by enhancing security and economic cooperation among the member nations. India needs to engage more proactively with ASEAN nations and give required assistance, including in the defence field, like in the case of the supply of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to Philippines. India and Australia need to take a leadership role in maritime security affairs in the two oceans, and have deeper engagements with the Pacific and Indian Ocean island countries. Joint defence manufacturing has a tremendous potential to be explored, leveraging Aatmanirbhar Bharat initiative. Furthermore, broader long-term reciprocal access arrangements, similar to foundational agreements with US, can be looked at to emphasise real-time maritime domain awareness and information sharing, besides interoperability and operational coordination. Close cooperation in critical emerging technologies will be a win-win for both countries, for example in fields of Artificial Intelligence, semiconductors, drones, 6G, blockchain, etc. While the ECTA has been inked, CECA should be concluded at the earliest. Some other focus areas can be enhanced trade in uranium under the rubric of civil nuclear cooperation and joint infrastructure connectivity projects..

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## Oceanic Choices: India, Japan, and the Dragon's Fire: How does the QUAD Work?

Source: Satoru Nagao, ORF

<https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/how-does-the-quad-work/> 28 Apr 2022



An important feature of Japan's current strategic policy is its concept of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) in the Indo-Pacific. Japan was a pioneer in creating the concept of both the QUAD and the Indo-Pacific area. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's speech to the Indian parliament in 2007—entitled “Confluence of Two Seas”—introduced the idea (although he did not use the word “QUAD” specifically).

Why does Japan need the QUAD? Since the 2000s, the security situation around Japan has changed, especially since China has escalated its activities in the entire Indo-Pacific area. As a result, the QUAD has an important role to play in the resolution of this issue. This article will focus on three things: What are the features of China's territorial expansion? How should the QUAD respond? And finally, what problems should the QUAD be anticipating?

### What are the Features of China's Territorial Expansion?

#### Japan and India Share the Same Problem

The QUAD countries, including Japan and India, are experiencing the same problem: A steady increase in Chinese presence and activity near

their borders. For example, in the sea around the Senkaku Islands of Japan, China has employed its coast guards and increased its activities. In 2011, the number of Chinese vessels identified within the contiguous zone in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands in Japan was only 12. But the number increased to 428 in 2012; 819 in 2013; 729 in 2014; 707 in 2015; 752 in 2016; 696 in 2017; and 615 in 2018. By 2019, the number had reached 1097.


In the case of the Indo-China border, Beijing has also stepped up its activities. In 2011, India recorded 213 incursions in the Indo-China border area, but in the following years, the numbers were larger: 426 in 2012; 411 in 2013; 460 in 2014; 428 in 2015; 296 in 2016; 473 in 2017; 404 in 2018; and 663 in 2019. Based on the number of Chinese incursions in the Indo-China border area and Chinese activities in the sea around the Senkaku Islands, it becomes apparent that China has increased its assertiveness in 2012 and 2019 in both regions (see Figure 1).

### Three Important Similarities of China's Territorial Expansion

China's territorial expansion has three features. The first feature of note is China's repeated disregard for current international law when laying claim to new territory. In the East China Sea, China did not claim the Senkaku Islands before 1971, but its attitude has since changed. The Senkaku Islands are in a strategic location to pressure Taiwan and have potential oil reserves. In the case of the Indo-China border, the Tibetan exile government has stated that these areas belong to India. China has ignored current international law and expanded its territorial claim.

The second feature of China's territorial expansion is timing. Beijing has exploited the situation whenever it finds a power vacuum. For example, China occupied half of the Paracel Islands just after France withdrew in the 1950s, and occupied the other half in 1974. This was one year after the United States withdrew from South Vietnam. In the 1980s, China expanded its activities in the Spratly Islands and occupied six features there in 1988, just after the Soviet Union decreased its military presence in Vietnam.

Figure 1: Comparison of China's activities in two regions



And in 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef, three years after the US troops withdrew from the Philippines. These activities indicate that China tends to expand its territorial reach when military balances change and power vacuums are detected. Over the past decade, the military balance has been changing. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Expenditure Database, from 2011-20, China increased its military expenditure by 76 percent. During the same period, India increased its military expenditure by 34 percent, Australia by 33 percent, and Japan by only 2.4 percent.

The United States decreased its expenditure by 10 percent. China has tried to expand its territorial claims not only in the South China Sea, but also in the East China Sea, Taiwan, the Indo-China border, and the Indian Ocean because it sees a power vacuum in these areas.

A third feature of China's territorial expansion is non-military control. China has used foreign infrastructure projects—known as the Belt and Road Initiative—to expand its sphere of influence. Countries with significant Chinese investment and debt are hesitant to criticise China, even when it flouts international rules. China has also been using “vaccine diplomacy” for COVID-19 to foster goodwill among recipient countries. Thus, for China, non-military methods like infrastructure projects, supply chain dependence, and vaccines serve to expand its influence and power. Even on developed countries like Japan and Australia, China uses this method of economic control. For example, when Australia insisted on an international investigation to identify the

origin of COVID-19, China delayed processing imports like wine and lobster from Australia. Dependence on the Chinese market is a powerful weapon for Beijing to expand its influence, and ultimately expand its territories.

### How should the QUAD Respond?

#### Respecting Rules-Based Order

First, the QUAD must continue to respect and insist upon a rules-based order grounded in current international law. The joint statements of both QUAD summits in March and September

2021 mention that a free, open, rules-based order will “meet the challenges to the rules-based maritime order, including in the East and South China Seas.” These words carry great significance because China has tried to change the status quo by force and continually challenges international norms.

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#### Maintaining Military Balance

Second, the QUAD countries need to fill perceived power vacuums by maintaining a military balance. To do this, they need to increase their defence budgets, which is not an easy task. Therefore, reorganising the security system itself is important. For a long time, a “hub and spoke” system has maintained order in the Indo-Pacific. In this system, the hub is the US and the many spokes are US allies such as Japan, Australia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific. A feature of the current system is that it heavily depends on the US. For example, even though Japan and Australia are both US allies, there is no Japan-Australia


alliance. However, China’s recent provocations indicate that the current system has not worked to dissuade its expansion. As mentioned above, between 2011-20, China increased its military expenditure 76 percent, and the US decreased its expenditure by 10 percent. Even if the US military expenditure were three times bigger than China’s, the current “hub and spoke” system would still not be enough.

As a result, a new network-based security system is emerging. American allies and partners cooperate with each other and share security burdens with the US and among themselves. Many bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral, or other multilateral cooperation arrangements—such as US-Japan-India, Japan-India-Australia, Australia-UK-US, India-Australia-Indonesia, India-Australia-France, US-India-Israel-UAE—are creating a network of security cooperation. In this case, the QUAD is one example of countries cooperating with each other and sharing the regional security burden.

If the QUAD countries coordinate well, they can force China to defend multiple fronts at once and, thereby, dissuade China’s territorial expansion. In such a scenario, China would need to simultaneously make defence expenditures against the US and Japan on the Pacific side, as well as against India on the India-China border side. This sort of cooperation would provide a way to maintain a military balance even if China’s military expenditure were rising at a rapid pace.

In this case, offensive capability is the key. For a long time, no countries except the US, Japan, Australia, and India possessed enough capability to attack China. However, if the US, Japan, and India all possess long-range strike capabilities, their combined capability forces China to defend multiple fronts. Even if China decides to expand its territories in the Indo-China border, it will still need to expend a certain amount of its budget and military force to defend itself against a potential attack from the US and Japan. Currently, Japan, India, and Australia are all planning to possess 1000-2000 km long-range strike capabilities, such

Figure 2: “Hub and spoke” and network-based security systems





as cruise missiles, and F-35 jets with glide bombs and cruise missiles. Indeed, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and South Korea are also increasing their strike arsenal with surface-to-surface missiles. In the case of the Philippines, Manila decided to import BrahMos cruise missiles from India. These moves could be key in dissuading China from its current path of expansion.

In September 2021, Australia, the UK, and the US announced that they had formed AUKUS, a trilateral security arrangement in the Indo-Pacific. In this alliance, the US and the UK will support Australia to acquire and maintain eight nuclear submarines. If Australia possess nuclear submarines with long-range strike capabilities, Australian naval forces can operate in a far wider area in the Indo-Pacific, and potentially counter China's threat in that area.

### **Integrate military and non-military policy as one overall strategy**

Third, the QUAD needs to integrate non-military efforts into its overall strategy. These will be a very important part of any counter-China strategy, because China's threat is bound up with the strength of its budget. It can change the status quo by force when its military power is stronger than others, and so maintaining a military balance is important. However, because of its strong economy and ample budget, China's military modernisation has outpaced that of other countries. That is why non-military efforts are needed to reduce China's economic advantage.

In the case of foreign infrastructure projects, the situation is the same. Because of its

favourable economic situation, China can invest heavily in these projects and create huge debts and obligations for recipient countries. These countries then tend to follow China's lead in international organisations such as the World Trade Organization. Therefore, reducing China's ample budget and its influence is an important priority.

Other issues are similar: Because China is rich, it can deliver COVID-19 vaccines to expand its influence; it can dominate rare earth mines in the world and affect supply chains for critical technology; and it has been able to dominate solar panel production and expand its presence in that sector as strict new rules regarding climate change are imposed.

Therefore, the QUAD countries need to integrate their economic efforts and reduce their reliance on China. Decoupling and risk-diversifying of supply chains and markets are necessary. Japan, for its part, has already begun to do so—it has relocated its factories from China to Southeast Asia and South Asia and the number of Japanese citizens living in China has decreased from 150,399 in 2012 to 111,769 in 2020. At the same time, the number of Japanese living in the US has increased from 410,973 in 2012 to 426,354 in 2020. In addition, Japan earmarked US\$2.2 billion of its 2020 economic stimulus package to help local manufacturers shift production out of China.

**China would need to simultaneously make defence expenditures against the US and Japan on the Pacific side, as well as against India on the India-China border side.**

## What Problems should the QUAD be Anticipating?


### Russia is Foremost

Currently, the most important obstacle the QUAD must overcome is relations with Russia. When Russia invaded Ukraine, Japan's very clear stance was that it would support Ukraine for three reasons. First, Russia could not credibly justify its military operation to the United Nations (UN). This means that it is using unilateral action to change the status quo by force. If the international community, including Japan, allows Russia to win the war, China will follow Russia's example by using the same type of invasion against Taiwan, India, and possibly others. This is not acceptable for Japan. Second, if Russia wins the war against Ukraine, the US will need to prioritise Russian deterrence in Europe. The US could not withdraw its military forces from Europe and redeploy them to the Indo-Pacific to deter China. Japan is aware that it would face a serious situation if it had to deter Russia and China at the same time. Third, Japan shares a border with Russia and has fought a war with Russia in the past. In recent years, Russia has repeatedly provoked Japan. For

example, in 2020, Russian military planes tried to enter Japan's territorial airspace 258 times, setting off repeated "scrambles" of Japan's Air Self Defense Force fighter jets. In 2021, five Chinese warships and five Russian warships jointly circled Japan. These incursions are evidence that Russia is a threat to Japan. The US and Australia share the same interests with Japan vis-a-vis Russia.

However, for India, Russia is important. India's military equipment depends on supplies of repair parts and ammunition from Russia. Despite India's weapons being high-end, sensitive machines, its soldiers need to use them in tough conditions, and having access to repair parts is vital. Additionally, Russia backs India in its fight against Pakistan's support of terrorist camps within its borders. There is a possibility that the international community will ask India to stop its military operation in Pakistan, but Russia will vote in the UN Security Council in favour of India. In addition, because India depended on the Soviet Union during the Cold War, their human-to-human connection is still deep and influential. Therefore, the stance of Japan-US-Australia and the stance of India are completely different when

Figure 3: Share of arms suppliers for India



it comes to Russia—posing a threat to the QUAD cohesion.

### Will India Need Russia?

Will this situation continue in the future? Indeed, the situation is already changing. Figure 3 shows the share of arms suppliers for India. Arms imported from the US, the UK, France, and Israel are blue and arms imported from the USSR or Russia are shown in red. Before 1962, most arms suppliers were blue countries. But since 1962, the USSR or Russia have been the main arms suppliers for India. However, India has recently imported more weapons from the US, the UK, France, and Israel than Russia. Until now, Russia has been the main arms supplier for India to maintain its current equipment, but that is changing.


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**China would need to simultaneously make defence expenditures against the US and Japan on the Pacific side, as well as against India on the India-China border side.**

## Biden's Indo-Pacific Framework: 'Cloud Cuckoo Land'

Source: Claude Barfield, Inside Sources

<https://insidesources.com/bidens-indo-pacific-framework-cloud-cuckoo-land/> 29 Apr 2022



The Aristophanes lives. Delusive optimism, unmoored to reality and lampooned in the Greek playwright's "The Birds" at this point seems to be an apt metaphor for the Biden administration's highly anticipated Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). As now configured, trade experts in both the US and Asia have described the IPEF variously. At best, the Prime Minister of Singapore views it as a "baby step," but more commonly, Asian and American trade experts characterize the framework as "weak tea," consisting of "all of the things the US considers important" but little for Indo-Pacific nations in return for their membership obligations. Specifically, the US will press Indo-Pacific nations to introduce or upgrade economic and social reforms like labor rights, climate change, and data flows, among others—all while refusing to grant additional market access to the American economy.

## Geopolitical Background

In reality, the US has been “overshadowed” by China in recent years throughout the Indo-Pacific, particularly in Southeast Asia. As the Biden administration attempts to recover America’s leadership role in the region, the US finds itself outside of the two major regional trade agreements: the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). While less comprehensive than the 11-member CPTPP, the 15-nation RCEP, which includes ASEAN countries plus Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, includes provisions that provide meaningful inducements for intra-RCEP trade. (Almost 50 percent of exports from RCEP nations go to other RCEP members, and China ranks as the largest trade partner for almost all of them.)

### The IPEF: What We Know

The IPEF will be a complicated, not to say Rube Goldberg-esque, structure. As now envisioned (these details could continue evolving right down to the official kickoff), the IPEF will consist of four substantive pillars: infrastructure and green technology, supply chain resiliency, tax and anti-corruption, and trade rules and standards. The US Trade Representative (USTR) and Commerce Department will divide the lead responsibilities for the initiative with the Departments of Defense, State, and Agriculture participating in interagency deliberations.

Administration officials have indicated that

the framework will be organized as two concentric circles. There will be an outer, less ambitious orbit of nations and an inner, more ambitious group of countries who will be expected to agree to deeper commitments. The IPEF will take the form of an executive agreement, not a trade agreement ratified by Congress. Thus, it could be subject to change by succeeding administrations.

**The Prime Minister of Singapore views it as a “baby step,” but more commonly, Asian and American trade experts characterize the framework as “weak tea,” consisting of “all of the things the US considers important” but little for Indo-Pacific nations in return for their membership obligations.**

The trade module, headed by the USTR, will include the digital economy, labor rights, environment, elements of competition and regulatory policy, agriculture, and transparency, with “inclusiveness” and reducing inequality as cross-cutting

themes. At the same time, the administration has been adamant that no market access obligations will be included in the IPEF.

No final decisions have been made on just which Indo-Pacific nations will be invited to join the framework, but administration officials have held extensive discussions with Australia, India (quite recently), Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam. Over the past several weeks, the administration has been scrambling to persuade a number of additional Indo-Pacific nations to join the process.

### Major Flaws in Biden’s IPEF Strategy: Trade Agreements Versus Executive Agreements

The decision not to push for formal enforceable trade pacts with IPEF members has been roundly criticized by the US business community and members of Congress from both parties. At a recent Senate Finance Committee hearing, the

negative reaction was bipartisan. The committee’s ranking member Sen. Mike Crapo (R-ID) queried: “Why would you take the carrot of market access off the table?” And Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA) stated in frustration: “I’m for labor rights. I’m for capacity building. But why can’t we be for opening market access right now and getting rid of tariffs?” These reactions echoed throughout the hearing—and at a comparable House Ways and Means Committee hearing.

Both ideological and political judgments explain the administration’s firm opposition to more formal trade obligations in the IPEF. First, starting with her confirmation hearings, USTR Katherine Tai has expressed deep skepticism regarding market-access trade goals. In recent days, she has argued that we must rethink the traditional dichotomy of “free trade equals good; protectionism equals bad.” In effect, she and other Biden administration officials accept the major claims of the progressive and labor-union wing of the Democratic party that argue past US trade agreements—or, in her words, the “offshoring and outsourcing of American jobs and opportunity”—have both been detrimental to the US and have led to greater inequality. In place of the outdated “20th century” market-access priority, the Biden administration is putting forward a new “innovative” model that privileges high labor, environmental, and social justice standards “to counteract those

forces that have tended to bleed out our industries to other regions.” (Although here is not the place for this debate, it suffices to state that Tai’s progressive view of trade is inaccurate. While trade liberalization does “not lift all boats,” there is overwhelming economic evidence that freer trade policies result in greater economic growth and higher living standards.)

Tai and other administration leaders have also tied themselves in knots over the enforceable rules versus inclusive participation in the IPEF.

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Deputy USTR Sarah Bianchi and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo have stoutly claimed that binding high-stand rules will define the framework, despite the weak obligations of an executive agreement. Recently, Tai disparaged binding provisions, arguing that in the past, “what looked like ironclad commitments on paper” didn’t actually deliver.

“Engagement, not dispute settlement, [is] key to durable trade policy,” she maintained.

“Engagement” through an executive agreement may have its virtues, but it is no substitute for legally binding trade rules that transcend individual US administrations. Indo-Pacific nations are quite aware of the US’ recent trade history, notably former President Donald Trump’s decision to pull the US out of Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. Asking Indo-Pacific nations to adhere to the most stringent labor, climate, anti-corruption, and digital trade rules while offering no market access—instead, only giving

**Indo-Pacific nations are quite aware of the US’ recent trade history, notably former President Donald Trump’s decision to pull the US out of Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations.**

vague promises of development financing for participation in the IPEF—is no recipe for a revival of US economic leadership in Asia.

One final political point: While the Biden administration has not raised the following point as a defense of mere “engagement,” it is true that moving to a legally enforceable IPEF arrangement would entail facing the difficult challenge of seeking a grant of renewed presidential authority (Trade Promotion Authority) to negotiate future trade agreements. Such a move could well entail several years of complex domestic political negotiations. But, in the end, this admittedly fraught course might be the most realistic path for what the administration calls innovative “21st-century” trade policy.

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## Social Media Corner

### Cherry-Picks of the Month

1. Defence tech transfer, fighter jet collaboration — UK PM’s India visit packed with deliverables - <https://theprint.in/diplomacy/defence-tech-transfer-fighter-jet-collaboration-uk-pms-india-visit-packed-with-deliverables/926976/>
2. India and the Philippines: Towards A Comprehensive Strategic Partnership - <https://idsa.in/idsacomments/india-and-the-philippines-asahu-010422>
3. Creating Waves in the Indo-Pacific: Reverberations from Russia’s War in Ukraine - <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/creating-waves-in-the-indo-pacific/>
4. Japan might not become the second Ukraine, but concerns of aggression very real - <https://theprint.in/opinion/japan-might-not-become-the-second-ukraine-but-concerns-of-aggression-very-real/934564/>
5. US Credibility in ASEAN in the Shadow of the Ukraine Conflict - <https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/us-credibility-in-asean-in-the-shadow-of-the-ukraine-conflict/>
6. China’s Rise and the Implications for the Indo-Pacific - <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chinas-rise-and-the-implications-for-the-indo-pacific/>
7. South Korea’s New President Steps Into a Geopolitical Minefield - <https://www.newsweek.com/south-koreas-new-president-steps-geopolitical-minefield-opinion-1701883>
8. Reclaiming Development: Pathways for Public Development Finance in the Indo-Pacific - <https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/ORF-Mihirs-Indo-Pacific.pdf>

### CAPS Experts In Focus

1. Ukraine: Russian Use of Limited Air Power Stalls its Ground Campaign - with Air Commodore Savinderpal Singh - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KaFnacnt8Yg>
2. India is a rich source of rare earths, but still imports. US collaboration can help change that - <https://theprint.in/opinion/india-rich-source-of-rare-earth-but-still-imports-us-can-help/931113/>

1. The Raisina AMA – with S Jaishankar - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DRPVXFSoeG4>
2. Raisina Fireside: Can the Atlantic Order Unite in the Indo-Pacific? – with Adm. Tony Radakin (Chief of the Defence Staff, UK) - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oXRXCcR03KA>
3. The Stream: How can Sri Lanka overcome its economic emergency? – with Al Jazeera - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DRPVXFSoeG4>

### **Debates/Panel Discussions**

1. Chasing the Monsoon: Life@75 – Raisina Dialogue panel with S. Jaishankar, João Gomes Cravinho, Stephen Harper, Jeff M. Smith and Velina Tchakarova - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2dXqVwbuJc>
2. What Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Means for the Indo-Pacific: A Bipartisan Congressional Dialogue – with Rep. Ami Bera (D-CA) and Rep. Steve Chabot (R-OH) - <https://www.usip.org/events/what-russias-invasion-ukraine-means-indo-pacific>
3. Geopolitics Beyond Borders #5: QUAD-AUKUS & the Rise of the Indo-Pacific – roundtable discussion by South Asia Centre LSE with Frédéric Grare, Yuka Koshino, Harsh V Pant and Peter Watkins - [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SUkH\\_d9ciGA](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SUkH_d9ciGA)
4. Why France Wants To Be an Indo-Pacific Country: Europe's Presence in Asia and the French Elections – with Asia Society - [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_szghlZ4QnE](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_szghlZ4QnE)
5. Conundrum of an Island: Sri Lanka's Geopolitical Challenges – Book discussion with Gulbin Sultana, Smruti S. Pattanaik, Vinitha Revi and N. Sathiya Moorthy - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ldOo6LjwSbM>

### **Podcasts**

1. National Security Podcast: Indo-Pacific diplomacy and the war on Ukraine – with Tanvi Madan, Benjamin Herscovitch and Rory Medcalf - <https://www.policyforum.net/national-security-podcast-indo-pacific-diplomacy-and-the-war-on-ukraine/>
2. New “Knight” on the Board: The Impact of South Korea's Presidential Election – with Michael J. Green and Victor Cha - <https://www.csis.org/node/64955>
3. The Future of Warfare - <https://carnegieendowment.org/the-world-unpacked>

4. National Security Podcast: The European Union's Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific – with His Excellency Dr Michael Pulch, His Excellency Jean-Pierre Thébault and Rory Medcalf - <https://www.policyforum.net/resource/the-european-unions-strategy-for-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific/>
5. China and India share a contested border and an uncomfortable neutrality in the Ukraine War—but not much else – with Kaiser Kuo and Manjari Chatterjee Miller - <https://supchina.com/podcast/china-and-india-share-a-contested-border-and-an-uncomfortable-neutrality-in-the-ukraine-war-but-not-much-else/>



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