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The prophets of air power emphasised the importance of ‘command of the air’ as one of the vital ingredients for success in war. Today, and for the future, it has translated into the inevitable requirement of aerospace dominance. This necessarily brings us to the doorstep of advances in science and technology that either make firepower exponentially lethal or hopelessly powerless. This happens to be in the realm of the electromagnetic spectrum. While studying the changes in the nature of warfare, it is also important to understand the relative strength of other dynamic factors that influence relations between nations. It then becomes obvious to state that an understanding of the strategic culture of nations is in the best interest of those in pursuit of knowledge in international affairs.

Several mega trends and global issues have been surrounded by revolutions that have surfaced from developments not only in the Arab world but also in several other developing nations. Conflict has been defining newer contours and though large scale war may be remote, it is pertinent to note the commonalities that surround the factors which provide the paths to such uprisings.

Recent events in our neighbourhood and other parts of the world not too far away from the borders of India highlight the need to constantly relate such indications to our national security and its several linkages. As we complete half of the present year, we can see another year coming to an end, with no culmination of the widespread conflicts. It becomes important, therefore, that we keep pursuing our studies towards a better understanding of, and necessarily resolve, some of the issues that can probably deliver peace dividends.
It has been encouraging to note the zeal of some enthusiastic contributors to the journal and I will be happy to receive more articles on wide ranging issues of national interest.
ELECTROMAGNETIC WEAPONS AND AIR POWER

INDRANI TALUKDAR

The ongoing evolution in technology has led to the opening of a new horizon not only for the non-military world but also for the military. With time, warfare has undergone a huge overhaul, especially with the evolution of air power. Technological enhancement has led humankind towards more insecurity, hence, to the evolution, and enhancement, of defence equipment. Today, battles are no longer restricted to the conventional and symmetric types. In this changing environment, air power has been able to keep up with this transformation through its new generations of aircraft equipped with sophisticated weaponry. This article will look into the dynamics that air power will be able to create in future warfare. Missiles, especially cruise missiles fitted on aircraft, have enhanced the power of air forces in fighting both symmetric, conventional and asymmetric, non-conventional warfare. Missiles with electromagnetic pulses fitted on aircraft will further enhance the role of air power in the future.

War has been omnipresent since the beginning of civilisation. The battle for the survival of the fittest and the aspiration to overpower others led to wars, that necessitated the invention of defence capabilities and defence forces. Therefore, with the passage of time and our new technology-driven age, the level of weapon systems

Ms Indrani Talukdar is a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.

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has risen to an unprecedented one which has increased the scope of war in different forms. Varied means of firepower, weapons and transportation supporting warfare have evolved with time. These expansions in firepower have encouraged the materialisation of new and emerging technologies which are being harnessed towards innovative and most effective methods of war-fighting.\(^1\) In this spectrum of war, air power’s role has been significant.

**AIR POWER**

War was essentially two-dimensional till the advent of air power in this century.\(^2\) The evolution of combat air power in the real sense where its power could be understood fully was in World War II (although it was used in 1911 during the war between Italy and the Ottoman Empire). During this war, aircraft were used as a strategic contraption to overpower the will of an adversary. This came in the form of strategic bombing as reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence gathering had been going on from the time when kites, balloons and airships were invented and used. Even during World War I, aircraft were used mainly for the purpose of Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) but with time and experience, military strategists could see the damage these air machines could inflict upon an enemy, leading to further experimentation. In fact, advances in technology hold out the promise of an expanding and increasingly effective role of air power, enhancing its “dominance” factor in current and future wars. The advent of air power and the rapid advances in technology in this technology-intensive combat capability have added a new dimension to surprise in war-fighting: that of technological surprise.\(^3\) This sophisticated synergy between air power and evolving technologies has encouraged the achievability of concepts like command of the air, air superiority and air dominance.

With time, the concept of strategic air power came into being through the lethal impact from the third dimension, especially during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Since Gulf War I in 1991, however, this concept has been stretched to include not just heavy bombers but bomb droppers of all types—from stealthy F-117 fighters to

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2. Ibid., p.122.
pilotless cruise missiles. It redefined the planning and execution of strategic air power once and for all. During the 1990s, strategic air power capabilities grew and evolved. More fighters became precision fighter-bombers. The Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), which were guided by the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite signals rather than by a laser beam or an infrared emanation, conquered weather because they could attack precisely through rain, fog, and clouds. Improved ISR capability in both manned and unmanned vehicles increased the output of real-time targeting information. The debut of the stealthy B-2 with JDAMs in Operation Allied Force in 1999 and the dominance of precision weapons in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-led campaign hinted at what was to come.4

The principal strategic and operational value of air power is its ability to destroy targets that are well beyond the front line of enemy forces. This idea of “deep attack” is critically important because it means that aircraft or missiles can be used for the purpose of destroying the power grids, command and control facilities, social and economic infrastructure, and logistics systems that constitute the foundation of modern societies. Ever since the origin of powered flight, the notion of cruise missiles has competed with manned aircraft for the conduct of deep-strike attacks.5 Critics might point out that with the invention of the cruise missile and its impact, the notion of lethality which was reserved earlier for aircraft, would get shifted to the former. But the obituary of air power cannot be written yet. One is not underestimating the power of missiles, especially cruise and ballistic missiles, but even with the development of varied types of missiles, the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre proved the power of aircraft in bringing down the world’s superpower. It was a civilian airliner that did the job. Hence, attack from the third dimension would remain critical.

The progress in the development of aircraft from the 1st Generation Aircraft (GA) to the latest which are the 5th GA and the potential 6th GA would definitely enhance air power. The 1st GA had jet propulsion like the HE-162, F-80 which got upgraded to the 2nd GA with swept wings; range-only radar and infrared missiles (like the MiG-15, F-86K). With more experimentation, 3rd GA were introduced which had supersonic speed, pulse radar and technology to be able to shoot at targets beyond visual range—the F-104, F-6, F-105, F-4. The 4th GA came up with the pulse-doppler radar, high manoeuvrability, look-down shoot-down missiles like the F-15, F-16, Mirage 2000, MiG-29. Scientists upgraded this 4th GA with 4+ and 4++ which had high agility, sensor fusion, reduced signatures, Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA), or some “active” (waveform cancelling) stealth and some supercruise respectively (SU-30, F-2000, Rafale, F-18E, F-15SG, MiG-35). The 5GA are equipped with AESA, active stealth with all-aspect stealth with internal weapons, extreme agility, full-sensor fusion, integrated avionics and some or full supercruise (F-22, J-20, PA FAK, F-35). The latest are the potential 6th GA whose features are extreme stealth, efficient in all flight regimes (subsonic to multi-Mach), possible “morphing” capability, smart skins, highly networked, extremely sensitive sensors, optionally manned and directed energy weapons. This transition in the expansion of aircraft has given an edge to countries with advanced air power to think beyond the conventional or kinetic lines of engagement.

FIFTH/FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE
Warfare has evolved with time. Warfare could be defined in five categories. These are: first generation warfare, second generation warfare, third generation warfare, fourth generation warfare and fifth generation warfare. Modern warfare in the 21st century has evolved as the result of political, economic, social, and technological changes that have occurred over time in societies. The rise of nation-states in the modern era brought the development of 1st Generation (formation) Warfare (1GW). Each generation represents a dialectically

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qualitative shift in the methods of waging war.\textsuperscript{7} The 1GW was driven by ideas which were of linear tactics of column and line.\textsuperscript{8}

By the time of the US Civil War, the advent of advanced transportation and communication systems, combined with heavier mobile firepower, signified the emergence of a new model—2\textsuperscript{nd} Generation Warfare (2GW).\textsuperscript{9} Whereas 3\textsuperscript{rd} Generation Warfare (3GW) was highlighted by modern manoeuvre warfare between states, 4\textsuperscript{th} Generation Warfare (4GW) reflected a post Cold War era, dominated by non-linear operations between state and non-state actors. The plethora of intra-state conflicts during the 1990s gave rise to the terms “low intensity conflict” and “limited warfare”. In the last decade, terms such as “asymmetric warfare” have emerged to describe the rise of transnational threats such as terrorism. More recently, terms such as “irregular warfare”,\textsuperscript{10} “complex irregular warfare” and “hybrid wars”\textsuperscript{11} have not only surfaced but have become the new face of warfare.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken warfare into the 5\textsuperscript{th} Generation Warfare (5GW). This generation of warfare has involved individuals attacking individuals. To fight this latest generation of warfare, countries like the US and China have been equipping themselves with the latest weaponry systems. For example, the US uses the drone attacks through Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles


\textsuperscript{10} Irregular warfare includes counter-terrorism, insurgency support, counter-insurgency, shaping and deterring, and a number of other non-conventional war-fighting techniques. In this warfare, operations typically use conventional military forces against an unconventionally formed, but complex, adaptive adversary, with a structure that reflects the manifold sources of their origin—be it nationalism, ideology, ethnic tensions or religious fanaticism, etc. The US armed forces have defined irregular warfare as a violent struggle between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population (s). This warfare favours indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will. “The Reality of Air Power and Irregular Warfare: What’s in a Name? Irregular Warfare and ‘Counterinsurgency’”, \textit{Pathfinder}, Air Power Development Centre Bulletin, issue 120, September 2009.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
(UCAVs), third generation aircraft with Airborne Early Warning and Communication Systems (AEWCS) fitted, fourth generation aircraft and fifth generation aircraft fitted with precision guided systems like laser guided bombs which help in accuracy; and these sophisticated weaponry systems would be a few to tackle the adversaries in this generation warfare. War is no longer restricted to state versus state but has taken various forms.

The evolution in weaponry systems has changed the traditional notion of battle of only being kinetic to being non-kinetic as well. The definition of kinetic actions includes those that involve physical and material means like bombs, bullets, rockets and other munitions. Meanwhile, non-kinetic actions are logical, electromagnetic, or behavioural, such as computer network attacks on an enemy’s systems or psychological operations aimed at an enemy’s troops. While non-kinetic actions have a physical component, the effects they impose are indirect—functional, systemic, psychological or behavioural.

**ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)**

With warfare spreading to the non-kinetic spectrum, a medium like the electromagnetic pulse is been proving to be effective. The EMP effect was first observed during the early testing of high altitude airburst nuclear weapons. The effect was characterised by the production of a very short (hundreds of nanoseconds) but intense electromagnetic pulses, which propagated away from their source with ever diminishing intensity, governed by the theory of electromagnetism. Hence, the EMP is in effect an electromagnetic shock wave. This pulse of energy produces a


13. For example, during the Kargil War 1999, the Mirage and Jaguar fitted with laser guided bombs helped in dragging out the Pakistani adversaries. In conversation with Air Mshl P.V. Athawale (Retd.), PVSM, AVSM, VSM, Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies on July 10, 2012.

powerful electromagnetic field, particularly within the vicinity of the weapon burst. The field can be sufficiently strong to produce shortlived transient voltages of thousands of kilo volts on exposed electrical conductors such as wires, or conductive tracks on printed circuit boards, where exposed. It is this aspect of the EMP effect which is of military significance, as it can result in irreversible damage to a wide range of electrical and electronic equipment, particularly computers and radio or radar receivers. Subject to the electromagnetic hardness of the electronics, a measure of the equipment’s resilience to this effect, and the intensity of the field produced by the weapon, the equipment can be irreversibly damaged or, in effect, electrically destroyed. The damage inflicted might require complete replacement of the equipment, or at least substantial portions thereof.\(^\text{15}\)

With the expansion of warfare into the fourth dimension through the electromagnetic spectrum, future war would likely depend upon the use of electromagnetic devices. Classical paradigms of military power, strategies of direct and indirect approach, tactics of manoeuvre; or the age-old alternating equation signifying the relative strength of offence or defence, have all come under the all-pervading influence of this fourth dimension.\(^\text{16}\) In fact, the combat capability of this dimension, merged with the potentiality of air power, has proved to be a lethal combination in the past and will also be in the future. Hence, in this changing form of warfare, in terms of regular and irregular (kinetic and non-kinetic) warfare, the place of air power stands indisputable.

Major roles like counter-air remain vital in irregular warfare. In this scenario of warfare, the combination of air power and special forces has become the preferred precision attack mechanism. Even in this kind of warfare, airborne ISR has been critical in finding, fixing, tracking and monitoring a concealed, mobile adversary which might operate in small groups as well.\(^\text{17}\) Therefore, the quality of air mobility which air power possesses gives it an edge over other tactics


\(^{16}\) Singh, n.1, p.122.

\(^{17}\) n.11.
of warfare. The ability of air mobility\textsuperscript{18} to prosecute an adversary with precision, speed and discrimination has become the preferred attack mechanism\textsuperscript{19} in this kind of special warfare. Therefore, in the 5GW, the vital role of air power cannot be underestimated. It would be air power along with intelligence which would help the leadership to tackle this new generation of warfare. Joint operations with air power in the lead would be the solution towards defeating the adversary in hybrid warfare and 5GW.

Air power’s capability with the non-kinetic medium was exhibited during the Operation Desert Storm air campaign. During the campaign, it was demonstrated how the application of air power was the most practical means of crushing an opponent’s information processing and transmission nodes, and the need to physically destroy these with guided munitions absorbed a substantial proportion of available air assets in the early phase of the air campaign. Air power has proved to be a most effective means of inhibiting the functions of an opponent’s vital information processing infrastructure. This is because air power allows concurrent or parallel engagement of a large number of targets over geographically significant areas.\textsuperscript{20}

Recently, a newer version of the electromagnetic technology was updated in the US. It promises to change the face of warfare, giving air power more authority in projecting its dominance in all three dimensions. A recent news report has mentioned about this latest technology which comprises the use of electromagnetic pulses through missiles to target buildings which can permanently shut down a country’s electronics without harming people. The US aircraft manufacturer Boeing has claimed to have successfully tested the weapon on a one-hour flight during which it knocked out the computers of an entire military compound in the Utah desert. According to Boeing, the test was highly successful as the camera

\textsuperscript{18.} Air mobility is a unique capability of air power, one that is used by governments to meet a number of challenges. An air force needs to have air mobility, spread sufficiently between large, medium and small airlift capabilities to be considered balanced. Air mobility is a term that encompasses general airlift, aeromedical evacuation, search, air-to-air refueling, as well as specialist capabilities such as airborne operations and Special Forces insertion and extraction. “Facets of Air Power: A Balanced Air Power”, \textit{Pathfinder, Air Power Development Centre Bulletin, issue 167, November 2011}).

\textsuperscript{19.} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{20.} Kopp, n.15.
recording was disabled. Codenamed the Counter-Electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP), it is the first time that a missile with electromagnetic pulse capability has been tested. Although an artist’s impression and not the real clip was shown for security reasons, the video showed a stealth aircraft which deploys a missile that emitted radio waves from its undercarriage. This deployment led to the knocking out of the computer system inside the building of the tested compound, without any casualties. Further, it was reported that the missile is equipped with an electromagnetic pulse cannon, which uses a super-powerful microwave oven to generate a concentrated beam of energy which causes voltage surges in electronic equipment, rendering it useless before surge protectors have the chance to react. Therefore, if this technology is launched in the mainstream, this would mark “a new era in modern warfare”. This experimentation was carried out with the aim to render an enemy’s electronic and data systems useless even before the first troops or aircraft arrive.²¹ Although the development of electromagnetic waves is not new, their use in missiles through air power has been tested for the first time to shut down the electronics of a nation without any human casualties. Hence, one can stretch the horizon of highly non-kinetic warfare in the future.

CONCLUSION
The national will power of major countries like the US and China has led to enhancements in defence technology. Strong will power always leads to innovations.²² These countries have realised the power of influencing an adversary with the edge of their technology in the entire defence sector, especially in the aviation section. The combination of the air and land battle concept or the air and sea battle concept would dominate the future battlefield though the non-kinetic form would also be strongly prevalent. In fact, the development in weapon systems is enabling these countries to tackle both symmetric and asymmetric warfare. A lot of innovative thought process and

For example, it is assumed that the missile could penetrate the bunkers and caves believed to be hiding Iran’s alleged nuclear facilities. Ibid.
²² Advertisement punch-line for Citizen watches.
evolution to converge fixed-wing air power with missiles like cruise missiles, air-to-air missiles, etc has been done, making the third dimension contraption omnipresent.

Army Gen William Mitchell had described a cruise missile as “a weapon of tremendous value and terrific force to air power,” and proposed that these weapons be used in his famous bombing tests against battleships to prove the efficacy of attacks from aircraft. The Army General had predicted the power of cruise missiles for air power, but it is a two-way process. With the latest development of the electromagnetic missiles and the technologically enhanced cruise missiles, the lethality can be proved and complemented by air power. Though cruise missiles had already been used to attack the centres of gravity like communication facilities and air defence sites, yet with the electromagnetic weapon, the impact will be more powerful. Hence, looking into the latest invention by the US, it can be assumed that with proliferation of cruise missiles, in both developed and developing countries, the superpower has understood the need to go a notch higher than the rest for its national security interest. In fact, if this technology becomes successful in the battle scenario, then, even the most lethal surface-based air defence network to deny, for example, the US air power’s ability to fly through its enemy’s air space, would be weakened.

But a word of caution is also attached to this latest technology. Although the use of missiles with electromagnetic pulse would be destructive, the Boeing experts have also warned that the technology could be used to bring Western cities to their knees if it falls into the wrong hands. The developments in hybrid wars with non-state actors and the widespread mushrooming of these entities might pose a threat to countries like the US, Europe, etc. However, the elimination of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden by the US Navy Seals where air power’s influence was visible, can be reassuring. Prevention is better than cure; therefore, countries progressing in this technology would also have situational awareness of these unconventional activities along with the conventional ones.

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25. n.21.
SINO-US RAPPROCHEMENT: NEW TRENDS

SANA HASHMI

China, the so-called potential superpower, and the US, the sole superpower, have always attracted the majority of attention in the international system. Their bilateral relations, which are multifaceted, have the prospect to alter the course of world politics. It is beyond the shadow of a doubt that the 21st century or what scholars refer to as the *Asian Century* is, to some extent, being impinged on by their relations. A deepening Sino-US entente could bring with it increased possibilities for sustained worldwide economic growth, the peaceful resolution of outstanding regional disputes, and the successful management of pressing global problems, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, it has become a universal fact that in spite of their respective efforts at maintaining cordial relations, their relations are majorly dominated by the competition for power in Asia and, for that matter, in the whole world. In the contemporary times, on the one hand, the US is endeavouring to

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Ms Sana Hashmi is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.

1. The term *Asian Century* was coined during the meeting of the then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, and China’s paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, in 1988, who were of the opinion that the 21st century will be dominated by India and China and other powers of Asia, with diminished dominance of the US which will give rise to the new international order.

protect its hegemony as the sole superpower in the world; while, on the other hand, China is striving to establish its foothold as a regional hegemon which makes it the biggest threat to the US ascendency. And just as the Americans wonder whether China’s rise is good for US interests or represents a looming threat, Chinese policy-makers puzzle over whether the US intends to use its power to help China or hurt it.³ The US has continued to hedge against China’s rise by maintaining Taiwan as a strategic distraction, aiding the growth of Japan’s military and modernising its naval forces, while pressuring China on human rights.⁴ Their relations are marred by mutual apprehensions on both sides. David Shambaugh has famously explained the nature of Sino-US relations by stating that given the global importance of these relations, this is a marriage where divorce is not an option.⁵ Their bilateral relations are largely shaped by a mix of competition and cooperation. Nevertheless, much of the scholarly work has concentrated on the competition between these two giant countries and, to a large extent, the scope of cooperation has been overlooked. The benefits of engagements are likely to be greater than its costs, stressing the advantages of encouraging Beijing to pursue a path consonant with the US strategic interests, and offering a nuanced mix of “carrots and sticks”.⁶ The purpose of this paper is not to negate the high level competition or expound the fact that there is no clash of interests; instead, it tries to assay the echelon of Sino-US engagement and highlights that there is enough scope for cooperation. As rightly pointed out by former Deputy Secretary of State, Robert B. Zoellick “Cooperation as stakeholders will not mean the absence of differences; we will have disputes that we need to manage. But that management can take place within a larger framework where the parties recognise a shared interest in sustaining political, economic, and security

⁴. Ibid.
systems that provide common benefits.”

The Chinese leadership has, time and again, reiterated that Beijing does not perceive the US as a competitor or adversary and lays emphasis on building vigorous relations since the establishment of their formal diplomatic relations in 1979. This is apparent from the statement of China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping on the occasion of the visit of the National Security Adviser under the George W. Bush Administration, Gen. Brent Scowroft, during the Malta Summit in 1989. He stated, “China cannot be a threat to the US, and the US should not consider China as a threatening rival. We have never done anything to harm the US; China and America should not fight with each other”. Since the post-Cold War period, the Chinese made it apparent that the US is central to China’s foreign policy behaviour which was evident from China’s phasing out its nuclear cooperation with Iran, joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and assisting the US in the Six-Party talks dealing with North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme.

While it is true that Washington holds an important place in Beijing’s foreign policy, it is equally true that Washington views Beijing as a significant partner. To substantiate this, it is most apt to quote the statement of former US President, William J. Clinton, who proposed the concept of “Strategic Partnership with China”, on the occasion of conferring Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to China in 1993, “China occupies an important place in our nation’s foreign policy. It is the world’s most populous state, its fastest growing major economy, and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Its future will do much to shape the future of Asia, our security and trade relations in the Pacific, and a host of global issues, from the environment to weapons proliferation. In short, our relationship with China is of very great importance”.

Even Former US Secretary of State Colin Powell commented that the United States

8. Quoted in Ali, n. 6, p. 3.
and China are enjoying their best relations since Nixon’s first visit to China in 1972. Recently, in 2011, Hu Jintao’s visit to the US proved promising in intensifying their bilateral relations and once again reaffirmed their commitment to building a constructive, cooperative, and comprehensive China-US relationship for the 21st century, which serves the interests of the American and Chinese peoples and of the global community.

Interestingly, US President Barack Obama is undeniably more receptive to the US relations with China in comparison to his predecessors. He proposed the catchphrase “strategic reassurance” during his first Administration which aimed at welcoming China’s rise and, in return, China has to reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of the security and well-being of others.

A vulnerable global environment has made both the countries mutually dependent. Needless to say that it is their mutual interests which lead them towards greater cooperation. This relatively accommodating attitude is reflected in several trends, such as seeking China’s cooperation in fighting global terrorism, coping with climate change issues and thwarting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The US-China bilateral relations include a wide gamut of issues ranging from trade and investment to addressing environmental issues and maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific which makes them interdependent on each other and paves the path for cooperation. However, this paper only tries to explain their level of cooperation and dependency vis-à-vis their economic interests and their presence in the Asia-Pacific.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS
Gone are the days when international relations were used to

determine the alliance systems and power projection. It won’t be erroneous to say that with the end of the Cold War and advent of globalisation, most of the relations in the international system are guided by economic concerns and the Sino-US bilateral relations are no exception to this phenomenon. It has been argued that to be a superpower, being economically sound is the foremost prerequisite. The US has already achieved the status of a superpower a long time back and China is on the verge of becoming one. To a larger extent, it is not wrong to articulate that in the current period of global financial uncertainties, both countries give preference to their economic interests over national interests. Economic exchanges between the US and China have increased dramatically since the onset of market reforms in the 1970s and further accelerated with China’s entry into the WTO, and from 1978 to the end of the 20th century, the value of trade between the two countries grew by more than two orders of magnitude, from US $ 1 billion to almost US $ 120 billion annually. In 2011, the US-China goods and services trade figure reached US $ 539 billion. However, the trade deficit with China and negative balance of payment remains a thorn in the flesh for the US.

It is no surprise that within a span of a few years, China’s economy has developed significantly and it has been speculated that China’s economy will surpass that of the US in 2025 to become the world’s largest economy, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of around US $ 31 trillion. Moreover, America has a big reason to worry as there could be a fiscal squeeze in 2013. In the contemporary time, China owns US $ 1.8 trillion worth of US treasuries and China can cripple the US economy by moving the maturities of these securities from 90 to 60 days or threaten to sell these assets at lower rates.

19. In conversation with Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli, Professor, Chinese Studies, East Asia Centre, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, on March 5, 2013.
However, a point to be noted is that if the US economy collapses, it will have an adverse effect on almost all the economies of the world, including the Chinese economy. Hence, it is important for China to have flourishing economic relations with the US.

In the present scenario where China has emerged as an economic giant, the US finds it more feasible to cooperate with China to deal with the financial crisis, given that both countries are each other’s second largest trading partner. The US is the third largest source of foreign direct investment in China while China is the largest foreign creditor of the US; China is the world’s largest exporting nation and the US the largest importer.20

The Strategic and Economic Dialogue, established in 2009, is an impeccable paragon of their escalating cooperation in the economic field. Their participation and cooperation in international economic forums such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and G-20 is a milestone in their economic relations. Though these two institutions are multilateral in nature, China and the US are the most important players in the institutions. In fact, Hillary Clinton in the San Francisco Declaration at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministerial Kickoff remarked, “We all have differences in our individual approaches to economic policymaking, but I also know that we share the belief that markets, trade, and investment are vital to our prosperity”.21 Both countries are well aware that in the present condition of tentative economic circumstances, competition won’t do much good to them and cooperation is the only way for their economies to remain stable and prosperous.

**ASIA-PACIFIC DILEMMA**

Undeniably, both countries are apprehensive of each other’s intentions and, in a way, are trying to counter each other’s influence in the regions of utmost importance, particularly the Asia-Pacific. For instance, the US’ rejuvenated interest in the Asia-Pacific with its entry into the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2011 and bringing the matter of the South China Sea on the platform is lucid evidence of the US goals of countervailing China’s huge dominance in the Asia-

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20. n. 5.

Knowing that China is the only country that has the potential to threaten the US position in the world, the US is endeavouring to strengthen its relations with the countries of Asia, particularly India, through its *Rebalancing in Asia* strategy. While, on the one hand, China accepts the US presence in the Asia-Pacific for peace, stability and overall prosperity, on the other hand, it consistently opposes the US intervention in the South China Sea dispute and Taiwan which it refers to as internal matters, and also its military manoeuvres in the region. China claims that the Obama Administration is forging closer defence ties with countries near China, including India, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore; repositioning troops, planes and ships; and stepping up aid in the South Pacific to offset attention from Beijing. Nevertheless, China and the US have adopted two-pronged strategies with regard to each other. On the one hand, they are strengthening their relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific and circuitously countering each other in order to establish their foothold in the region, while, at the same time, they are cautious of the consequences of their respective moves in the region and are focusing more on improving their bilateral relations through engagement. Despite the power-struggle in the Asia-Pacific, both the countries are moving towards regional cooperation. During the 4th Consultation on Asia-Pacific Affairs in late 2012, the then US Assistant Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell reiterated that the Asia-Pacific consultation mechanism between the two countries is very useful and pledged to continue using the platform to maintain close contacts and coordination on major issues in the region. A similar stance has been reiterated by Mark Lippert, current Assistant Secretary of Defence for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, by stating that “the US *Rebalancing Strategy* under Obama Administration II is not aimed at containing China; in fact, it is a mere endeavor to revitalize and mature its partnerships

throughout the region and updating them to meet the security challenges of the twenty-first century, and strong bilateral relations with China is an important part of the strategy.”  

Both China and the US need each other in the region. China is already being perceived as a threat by most of the countries of the Asia-Pacific and has strained relations with many of them due to the sovereignty and territorial issues. China very much needs the US recognition and friendship to alienate fears vis-à-vis its so-called rise. Since China’s influence in the region is enormous, the US’ recent rejuvenated interest in the Asia-Pacific, to some extent, requires engaging and balancing China. A point to be noted is that though they are vigilant about China’s assertive and expansionist policies, the countries of the region admire and welcome US presence. However, it is worth mentioning that not only are Beijing and Washington apprehensive about their rivalry in the region, but the countries of the region are equally uneasy and don’t wish to be affected by the China-US power struggle. Hence, their cooperation is needed for ensuring peace and the overall growth of the two countries and of the region as well.

**CONCLUSION**

Both countries underwent a leadership transition around the same time in November 2012, indicating that their transition was one of the most important events of the year. Now it is up to US President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping whether the relationship gets a constructive or a downbeat turn. As has been said and demonstrated in the past, the rise and existence of two or more major powers simultaneously can never be frictionless, hence, their relations are bound to be dominated by a power struggle and competition in all spheres. While there are no two viewpoints on the fact that competition is the most crucial factor in their relations, the possibility of escalated cooperation and its scope cannot be downplayed. Distrust and disagreements between the US and China on issues like Taiwan, the South China Sea and human right abuses in Tibet still prevail and will continue for an indefinite period of time. However, there is ample evidence to suggest that they are certainly

trying to offset the differences with a number of high-level official meetings and institutional engagements. Nevertheless, with the coming of Taiwan President, Ma Ying Jeou, to power, China-Taiwan relations are moving towards an accommodating stance, which, in turn, would elevate trust between China and the US.

In view of the fact that interdependence is the foremost feature of the multipolar world, it goes without saying that the US needs China to preserve its supremacy in the new world order and China relies on the US to project its benign image and to achieve its objectives of becoming a superpower without damaging its theories of peaceful development and policies of good neighbourliness. Moreover, as China is the largest importer of oil, its energy needs entail stable Sino-US relations given that the US Navy has commendable reach to the sea lines of communication. It is certainly propitious for both countries to focus more on strengthening their bilateral relations through cooperation and avoid clashes as far as possible given that cordial relations will be favourable not only for them but for the stability of the whole world since no country wants to be in a position of being confronted with a Sino-US conflict. The new leadership in China and the policy changes in the US make the situation more hopeful and predict the new trends of harmonious and cooperative relations with regard to addressing jointly the economic crises, climate change issues, terrorism, North Korea’s nuclear weapon programme and, for that matter, a less competitive environment in the Asia-Pacific. The new pattern suggests that both countries are willing to amend their policies to cater to the needs of each other and are certainly shifting their priorities to economic issues from military issues.

Since cooperation or engagement overshadows the competition between these two major powers, it is in the best interest of the US to foster Robert B. Zoellick’s proposed concept of “responsible stakeholder” vis-à-vis China in 2005, particularly when China is most afraid of being labelled as a ‘threat’ to its neighbouring countries. The road towards healthy engagement between China and the US would not be an easy one. Cordial relations and the removal of the stalemate in their ties would require modification in policies from both sides. Certain issues like trade imbalance, the Taiwan crisis and competition
for energy need to be addressed. Given the complex nature of Sino-US relations and the factors affecting them, it is difficult to predict the future relations of these two countries. However, the Sino-US relations trajectory suggests that no matter what, they don’t want to confront each other, especially when both are aware that they are militarily well-equipped and economic interdependence is the key to survival. Furthermore, it is a prerequisite for both China and the US to have a stable and favourable system for their rise and existence. If China and the US can assure each other that they are not a threat to each other and welcome their co-participation in the international arena, they can manage and exist simultaneously without confronting each other.
PAKISTAN’S NASR MISSILE

DEBALINA CHATTERJEE

TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION
Pakistan’s 60-km range solid fuelled ballistic missile, the Nasr, also known as the Hatf-9, was developed in 2011, giving Pakistan the capability of developing battlefield range ballistic missiles along with its medium range and long range ones. It is a surface-to-surface missile developed by the National Development Complex. With an in-flight manoeuvre capability, the missile can carry nuclear warheads too and is highly accurate.¹ The battlefield range ballistic missile is reported to be capable to “defeat all known anti-tactical missile defence systems”.² Four missiles can be fired from salvos and, hence, it is called a multi-tube ballistic missile, and can carry a sub-kiloton tactical nuclear warhead. The system is probably a four-tube adaptation of a Chinese designed multi-rocket launcher, possibly the A-100 type. It can be mounted on an 8-wheeler truck and is capable of carrying four 2- feet-long ballistic missiles. It is reported to be a 300 mm ballistic missile. Even though the missile has a range of only 60 km, its range could be probably extended further. The 2013 test was witnessed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen Khalid Shameem Wynne, Director General Strategic Plans Division (SPD) Lt Gen Khalid Ahmed Kidwai (Retd), Chairman National Ms Debalina Chaterjee is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.


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Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) Muhammad Irfan Burney, Commander Army Strategic Forces Command Lt Gen Tariq Nadeem Gilani, senior officers from the armed forces and scientists and engineers of strategic organisations.

The Nasr is important for Pakistan in the following ways:

- **Boost to its Artillery**: Pakistan is modernising its artillery at a slow but steady pace. Though quantitatively behind India, Pakistan’s artillery is undergoing a qualitative modernisation process. The Nasr ballistic missiles would give an impetus to Pakistan’s self-propelled artillery. Since it is multi-tube, it would give the Pakistan Army concentrated high volume firepower. The missile can be carried by a highly mobile Transport Erector Launcher (TEL), thereby enhancing its ‘shoot and scoot tactics’ and avoiding counter-fire and enhancing survivability options. Launched from a multi-tube launcher, it could result in greater target damage and take the enemy by surprise. The Nasr would, thus, provide Pakistan ‘bigger bang for the buck’.

- **Technological Prowess**: According to Shirin Mazari, the Nasr is a signal of the ability to acquire tactical missile capability and miniaturisation technology. Pakistan’s desire for plutonium enriched nuclear weapons was to enable its process of miniaturisation of nuclear weapons which is otherwise difficult by uranium enriched nuclear weapons. Hence, there was a plan to set up four nuclear reactors to produce plutonium. The miniaturisation technology in the missile would allow Pakistan to also work on nuclear warheads for its air launched cruise missile, the Raad, and ground launched cruise missile, the Babur, and it could also be miniaturised for its sea-launched submarine capability in order to move on to a second strike capability. Pakistan could use the capability of the Nasr missile to dodge any missile defence into its long range missile system too. According to SIPRI 2011 reports, though Pakistan’s current nuclear arsenal is believed to use Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), there is evidence that Pakistan is

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5. Shirin Mazari is the Chief Executive Officer of Strategic Technology Resources.
moving towards “an arsenal based on plutonium”. Pakistan’s shift from uranium enriched to plutonium enriched weapons is slowly enabling it to increase the number of nuclear weapons and it could cross both Britain and France before long. With the Nasr tactical missile, Pakistan now becomes the only Sunni Muslim country in the world to possess nuclear capable sophisticated ballistic missiles of varied ranges.

- **Deterrence and Stability**: The Nasr would not be used as a military weapon since the missile would enable Pakistan to continue with its sub-conventional warfare under the nuclear umbrella. Hence, it would be used as a deterrent against India. Taking the genie out of the bottle is a big mitigating factor which no decision-maker would want to risk in the battlefield. It must be noted that Pakistan’s objective is to ensure “deterrence stability by calculating a minimum deterrence posture that is related to the increasing capabilities of its adversary, namely India.”

Pakistan considers development of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons as “consolidating Pakistan’s deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum”. The Nasr would be a ‘use it or lose it’ weapon for Pakistan. Hence, Pakistan is likely to resort to a first use of the Nasr. This could deter India from launching even a conventional offensive. Shirin Mazari believes that India’s “dream of a limited war against Pakistan had been laid to rest”. According to Ali Ahmed, the Nasr aims to invite the attention of the world to South Asia being a nuclear flashpoint which could “energise the international community towards crisis de-escalation and conflict termination.” Pakistani military planners believe that the Nasr missile system will “close a nuclear deterrence gap” which was opened up by the Cold Start doctrine.

the Nasr missile has been able to restore the “strategic balance by closing the gap at the operational and tactical levels” which had, hence, contributed towards “preserving peace in South Asia”.¹¹ In peace-time, nuclear weapons are not mated with their delivery systems, hence, the Nasr is less likely to be launched accidentally. It is also least likely to be operationally deployed. Over the years, Pakistani leaders have been drawn toward the policy of “flexible response,” including the consideration of battlefield nuclear strikes.¹²

- **Self-Deterrence**: The Nasr is also going to be self-deterring for Pakistan since any kind of nuclear detonation by the Nasr would have a fallout not only in India but also in Pakistan too. Some of Pakistan’s cities are very close to the border and, hence, the fallout of these battlefield nuclear weapons would also extend to the Pakistani cities. Hence, counter-force targeting by Pakistan could lead to destruction of its own counter-value forces.

- **Defeat India’s Cold Start Doctrine**: One could go back to the Cold War days and recall the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO’s) indulgence in tactical nuclear weapons in order to negate the Soviet Union’s conventional superiority over them. Tactical nuclear weapons would serve both as a line of defence and as a deterrent, as was seen during the Cold War when the NATO tactical nuclear weapons were visualised to do the same job against Soviet conventional forces. Development of the Nasr is a testimony to the fact that Pakistan views India’s Cold Start doctrine with “concern”. Pakistan’s need for a prompt military response to a conventional attack from India’s side called for nuclear deterrence even at the battlefield level. According to Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, India’s “recent doctrinal transformation, upsurge in its anti-missile program, and gigantic investment in the conventional missile weaponries have obliged Islamabad to reciprocate by manufacturing and testing a credible-cum-

¹¹. As quoted by Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Compulsions”, *The News*, November 6, 2012.

transparent new weapon, the Nasr missile”.\(^\text{13}\) The Nasr would allow Pakistan to negate India’s Cold Start doctrine by launching nuclear offensives, given its ‘offensive defence’ strategy. It is Pakistan’s effort to lower the nuclear threshold between India and Pakistan. The Nasr would be a step towards lowering India’s conventional capabilities prowess, thereby negating the very essence of the Cold Start doctrine.

- **Bleeding India Through Thousand Cuts:** It is a known fact that nuclear weapons serve a political purpose. Since India would be deterred to even launch a conventional offensive against Pakistan, it would be easier for Pakistan to continue with its effective strategy of proxy wars on Indian soil as an effective tool of foreign policy.\(^\text{14}\) Pakistan could “forward deploy the Nasr missile surreptitiously at vulnerable points along its border with India, ahead of executing any covert operations against India”.\(^\text{15}\)

- **Counter-Force Targeting:** The missile is a “first use counter-force weapon”.\(^\text{16}\) The Nasr would give Pakistan the advantage of destroying the counter-force targets of India and not aim at the counter-value targets. This could further save Pakistan’s own counter-value targets since India could choose to respond by counter-force targeting only. Hence, the Nasr could alter the targeting strategies of both states from counter-value to counter-force targeting. The Quranic concept of warfare which is followed by the Pakistan Army, pays importance to targets, which when struck, would deprive the enemy of his weapons or combat strength in case it is not possible to aim at his vulnerable points.\(^\text{17}\)


14. Pakistan has always played its nuclear weapons card well against India in order to deter India from launching conventional warfare, thereby negating its conventional superiority and, at the same time, promoting and funding sub-conventional warfare.


16. Ibid.

LIMITATIONS

The simultaneous launch of more than one missile is only possible if “an advanced level of technological efficacy was developed”.\(^\text{18}\) It is quite obvious that the missile has been developed with China’s assistance. However, the nuclear capability of the missile is dubious.\(^\text{19}\) Even though plutonium warheads could be fitted in lighter weapons, the “implosion assembly with a diameter of under 12 inches would be a real feat”. Brig Gurmeet Kanwal also raises doubts on Pakistan’s ability to fit miniaturised nuclear warheads on a 300 mm ballistic missile.\(^\text{20}\)

Though press reports claim that the missile is “highly accurate”, there has not been any release of information of the missile’s Circular Error Probable (CEP) data and, hence, it is too early for India to judge the missile’s accuracy without knowing the guidance systems being used and the CEP.

The National Command Authority with the Strategic Plans Division will be responsible for all nuclear related activities. Tactical nuclear weapons will also be under stringent control since Pakistan fears the influence of the Taliban in its own territory. Pakistan’s centralised control of nuclear weapons is to prevent the unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. In 2009, even Obama had given the assurance that he was “confident” that the nuclear arsenal is “secure” since he believes that the Pakistan Army realises the hazards of the weapons falling into hands of terrorist organisations.\(^\text{21}\) After Washington’s efforts of unleashing all kinds of propaganda against Pakistan’s nuclear programme, Pakistan has made the effort to develop a foolproof command and control system.\(^\text{22}\) However, nuclear weapons are for deterrence purposes and if used for a “quick response,” could lead to grievous threats. Even though the National Command Authority is expected to control the Nasr, there could be a chance of

\(^{18}\) Ibid.

\(^{19}\) The following concern was also expressed by Brahma Chellaney in an interview with Times Now.

\(^{20}\) Brig Gurmeet Kanwal raises these doubts in an email exchange. It is published with his permission.


miscalculation since the missile is likely to be deployed in the forward areas of the battlefield and when that happens, the command and control system of the Nasr would become decentralised.

It is possible that limited conflicts could become nuclear in nature, especially with Pakistan having a “first use policy” and an “offensive defence” doctrine. Pakistan is also a revisionist state and, hence, may not think twice before using the deadly weapon.

CONCLUSION

There could be a possible proliferation of this missile to North Korea and also to Turkey. North Korea has already been taking assistance from Iran and Pakistan in developing solid propelled ballistic missiles in the past. Turkey too is looking beyond the United States and NATO. It hosts a number of US tactical nuclear bombs at present and could also aspire to develop its own nuclear technology.

While most scholars are drawing a line between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, there is actually no distinction between them. A strategic weapon could also do the job at the tactical level. The response to the Nasr from India’s side, irrespective of it being a tactical nuclear weapon, should be an Agni-I nuclear tipped-ballistic missile, that is, tactical use of strategic weapon systems.

Pakistan considers the missile as a game changer for Pakistan, especially given its conventional inferiority against India. It must be noted that this missile is no game changer. The first reason being that if nuclear weapons were to be used by Pakistan at a tactical level, it could be done even with the other categories of the Hatf ballistic missiles.

According to Rodney Jones, Pakistan does not need another layer of nuclear deterrence to counter the Cold Start doctrine. This is because Pakistan’s conventional defences alone are completely capable of “repelling or flaying the quick but shallow penetrations the Cold Start envisages”.23 Pakistan’s conventional modernisation, especially of its artillery, is leading to a qualitative modernisation and, hence, there is indeed no need for the nuclear-tipped Nasr to enhance conventional deterrence any further. Pakistan’s Multi-Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) especially are sophisticated and long range ones are.

being acquired from China like the A-100 category and the WS-1. Pakistan’s conventional warheads could easily destroy tanks and fast moving targets like it has done in the past. Hence, Pakistan does not need to use the nuclear weapons for this purpose.

For the Nasr to be a true deterrent, Pakistan would need a credible Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), since any kind of nuclear attack on India, even if it is unable to reach the territory, would invite punitive retaliation from India’s side which cannot be prevented by Pakistan unless it has a credible BMD.

The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) regime must be implemented on Pakistan to prevent it from building tactical nuclear weapons. Pakistan has, of late, been expanding its output of fissile material which can enable it to develop another 100 nuclear warheads with ease. The heavy water reactors have reportedly enabled Pakistan to produce weapon grade plutonium for decades. Plutonium enriched nuclear weapons will also require more fissile material than uranium enriched ones. Hence, a cut in fissile material could shatter Pakistan’s miniaturisation process.24

This missile, fired from the MLRS will be able to target the Indian Army’s artillery and missile batteries. However, there is a need for air power support for any MLRS, whether nuclear or conventionally armed, to provide deep fires for initial entry support. Even if India is able to destroy Pakistan’s Nasr in the initial stages of the war, in case the missile is nuclear-tipped, the fallout from the missile would be dangerous even if India uses conventional warheads to destroy the missile. While one could ponder as to why there is a need for such tactical missiles on Pakistan’s side, apart from the Cold Start issue, it must be kept in mind that Pakistan does not believe in India’s no first use doctrine.

The Iron Dome is expected to be an effective shield against the Nasr, however, its credibility is not yet known. The fact that Israel has successfully intercepted solid propelled missiles fired on its territory

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24. Note: According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 8 kg of plutonium and 25 kg of highly enriched uranium are “significant quantities” to develop nuclear weapons. Plutonium enriched nuclear weapons take less time and sophistication to develop. Plutonium production and reprocessing require a small production reactor and reprocessing facility which could be hidden more easily than a uranium enriched one.
could provide some sort of respite against the solid fuelled Nasr. However, the fact that a number of missiles can be fired from salvos would make interception difficult. Moreover, according to Mansoor Ahmed of Qaid-e-Azam University, Manoeuvrable Reentry Vehicles (MARVs) could be developed for the Nasr which could further negate India’s ballistic missile defence systems.

Installing modern sensors and radiation monitors for portal monitoring can prevent the Nasr from falling into the hands of terrorist organisations. Since the nuclear weapons in Pakistan are in a semi-knocked down or completely knocked down state, there is less chance of these falling into the hands of terrorist organisations.

Among all the reasons for Pakistan’s need for this tactical weapon, the most logical one for the development of the Nasr is for bleeding India through a thousand cuts. The Cold Start doctrine calls for the joint use of mechanised forces, tanks, artillery of the Indian Army. The Indian Army’s tanks would most likely contain explosives when they are ready for a strike. Hence, if Pakistan has to destroy these tanks, it could simply fire a rocket with less explosive force and achieve a kill. A high explosive anti-tank round can destroy tanks with its high velocity partial stream of hot metal which can penetrate solid armour because of its heat and pressure. The same process can be applied for mechanised infantry where the heat produced even with conventional explosives on the Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) would force the infantrymen to evacuate the damaged APCs. It is a known fact that tanks and APCs work best in desert areas, hence, if APCs are destroyed, Pakistan could easily target the Indian Army’s infantry. Since the Indian Army also has Multi-Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRLs) like the Pinaka and Smerch, and the extended range Prahaar, these would also have the shoot and scoot ability which could enhance their survivability against nuclear and conventional weapons. Hence, gambling against artillery, especially self-propelled, on Pakistan’s side, especially with its Nasr, could be folly. Being a surface-to-surface missile, the missile is not effective as an air defence and, hence, cannot take on Indian Air Force aircraft. In mountain warfare, 155mm towed howitzers could cause havoc.

25. Note: It is difficult to intercept solid fuelled ballistic missiles.
and destruction even with conventional warheads since they are best suited for mountain warfare. Hence, the Nasr is being used as a psychological weapon to keep testing and trying New Delhi’s patience against the Pakistan-funded proxy wars in India.
CONCEPTUALISING STRATEGIC CULTURE: A PERSPECTIVE

PRATEEK KAPIL

There are two types of strategic decision-making: strategic policy and strategic behaviour. Policy is concerned with long-term scenarios like strategic doctrines, for example, national security strategy, and behaviour deals with short-term strategic decisions such as day-to-day policy, issue-specific and case-specific responses. The term strategic culture is different and how you define it is extremely critical to the consequences it will have on the two concepts above. There are different definitions of the term and the mere definitions have had a polarising effect on the exponents.

The existing strategic cultural models are either extremely broad wherein they suggest that all aspects of a state’s strategic behaviour will always be consistent with the state’s strategic culture. The standard criticism of these models is that they cannot account for behavioural anomalies and that they assume too much continuity in strategic policy. The other models assume that strategic culture is a dependent variable like all other variables in the strategic context and can change continuously owing to the environment. These, however, become merely descriptive and fail to separate the effects of strategic culture, and any conclusions that these models draw are inherently transitory in nature and, thus, the strategist is never sure of the predictive value or the final applicability of his analysis. The main

Shri Prateek Kapil is a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.

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research problem, therefore, quite obviously is how to agree on the initial template to theorise about strategic culture. It is also important to note that when strategic culture is defined too broadly to explain everything about a state’s strategic policy and behaviour, it may end up explaining very little and will be of very little significance. For example, when we say that the US’ strategic\footnote{Alan Bloomfield, “Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate”, \emph{Contemporary Security Policy}, vol.33, no.3, December 2012, pp.437–46 11ISSN 1352-3260 print/1743-8764 online http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2012.727679 # 2012 Taylor & Francis} culture was largely isolationist in the pre-War era, we need to bear in mind that America regularly engaged in the so-called banana wars in the Latin American states and an extremely bloody civil war on the American continent.

The Johnston-Gray debate is the most prominent and the most polarised debate in the strategic culture literature.

Alistair Ian Johnston,\footnote{Alistair Ian Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture”, \emph{International Security}, vol. 19, no. 4, Spring 1995, pp. 32-64.} in his now famous essay “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” argued that Colin Gray’s definition and other first generation models (which we will get to later in the text) were “underdetermined” which he explained as containing not enough information for successful prediction of strategy. He observed that these models regard strategic culture as an all pervasive independent variable which contains the patterns of strategy, and causes of outcomes. He disagreed with this analysis and insisted that strategic culture itself is a dependent variable and is itself an outcome.

Alternatively, Johnston offered a positivist conceptualisation of strategic culture by treating it like an ideational explanatory variable that causes strategic behaviour rather than subsuming strategic behaviour in its own definition which, he argues, analysts like Colin Gray do. In his model, he wanted to measure the causal effect of a state’s strategic culture in relation to the contributions made by other variables like geography or relative power or leadership to strategic outcomes. He further articulated that if we define strategic culture this way, it is possible to explain anomalies in the normal pattern of the strategy of a state because any deviation would be caused because strategic culture, itself a dependent variable, will be influenced by the force of other dependent variables.
Johnston defines strategic culture as a limited, ranked set of grand-strategic preferences that is consistent across the objects of analysis [statements, texts, White Papers, National Security Strategy (NSS) documents, epics, etc.] and persistent across time. This ranking is not, therefore, necessarily responsive to changes in non-cultural variables such as technology, threat or organisation. If preference rankings are not consistent across objects of analysis, then a single strategic culture cannot be said to exist at that point in time.

The criticisms of Johnston’s model proceed in to. While he criticises the first generation models as difficult to operationalise, the same could be said of his own model. Scholars argue that while we can quantitatively measure material variables, we can define the range and accuracy of weapons, geography, etc. we cannot measure ideational variables like strategic culture if we regard them as dependent variables like Johnston does because ideas cannot be assigned weight like material variables can. This led Colin Gray to argue that Johnston’s analysis was an intellectual wasteland. He theorised that strategic culture should be regarded as an independent variable that defines the broad context of strategy rather than just another dependent strategic variable. His definition of strategic culture was as follows: “...comprising the persisting (but not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions and habits of the mind and preferred methods of operation (so behavioural patterns) that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience”. He concluded that culture should be conceptualised as “something out there or that which surrounds” an actor, meaning that it is part of the strategic environment of a state or entity or actor and it always pushes the latter in preference of some directions more than the others. For Gray, strategic culture shapes both the context and the strategy of any actor. He then articulated the seven dimensions of strategy in his book Modern Strategy. These are seven independent variables: Geography, Technology, Economy, Logistics, Politics, Ethics and Strategic Doctrines.

The critique of Colin Gray’s model is that it is tautological and results in self-fulfilling prophecies and, therefore, it is impossible.

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3. Ibid.
to theorise it, falsify it and, thus, analyse it. Gray openly admitted this and went so far as to suggest that “a critic would be correct in observing that if a strategic culture is everywhere, it is, in a practical researchable sense, nowhere, and then he defended his position by stating that the unity of cultural influence and policy action denies the existence of the boundaries needed for the study of cause and effect because all strategy is executed by humans who themselves are cultural agents. He said that his approach was to regard strategic culture as an interpretive variable which describes the interplay for various variables. Gray leaves no room for any external variables which can influence a nation’s strategy. He thinks that strategic culture is pervasive and continuous. Johnston can explain the anomaly because he regards strategic culture only as a strategic variable but his model also suffers from similar operational problems. The culturalists, as they are called, are split in the debate, but are slightly more in favour of Colin Gray’s assessment.

Alan Bloomfield gives an example of a hypothetical thought experiment which might tilt the scales slightly in favour of Gray. To illustrate why interpretivism would seem to have an edge over positivism in strategic cultural analysis, consider in more detail the possible implications of adopting an overtly positivistic formulation, broken down and applied to the real world decision-making contexts. One way to operationalise a model with strategic culture as a discrete, measurable, independent variable (Johnston’s approach of positivism) would be to imagine decision-makers sitting around a table deliberating on how to respond to a strategic crisis. When considering the evidence before them, they would assign relative weights to the material variables (geography, relative power, technology, etc.) relevant to the situation at hand. We could then imagine the decision-makers consciously doing the same for the strategic culture variables: they would, in effect, be measuring the strength of their collective strategic-cultural preferences. They would then assess whether the combined weight of some of the material variables overrode the weight of their strategic-cultural preferences, or whether other variables lent support to their strategic-cultural predispositions. If one approaches the same problem from an interpretivist position (Johnston’s approach), those decision-makers are assigning relative
weights to the material variables and then they consciously weigh them up against one another. But the implications of the weight they assign to each material variable depend on how those variables are interpreted in the relevant social context. He concludes by saying that strategic culture in this formulation is, therefore, not operationalised alongside the other variables, like Johnston postulates, but strategic culture as a broad context instead would give meaning to the material variables under consideration, as Gray describes.

As a conclusion to this influential debate, from Gray we take the notion that culture provides context: that it guides and shapes interpretation; and from Johnston we take the goal of building falsifiable theory which can be tested.

INDIA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE
It is safe to say that the discourse on India’s strategic culture has moved on from the days of Mr. George Tanham’s now famous article which professed the lack of strategic thinking in India. Various Indian scholars, both in India and abroad, have spent the last decade trying to decode and analyse India’s strategic culture, albeit with mixed results. Various statements from the establishment and the strategic community have hinted at the patterns, and, at the very least, the existence, of a strategic culture in India.

The most articulate attempt on the issue was made by the National Security Advisor (NSA) in the K Subrahmanyam memorial lecture which he delivered at the India International Centre, at the start of 2011. He stressed, “Frankly speaking, for a civilisation and state like India not to have a strategic culture is impossible. It is like someone claiming to be apolitical, which itself is a political choice. Many others see in India a strategic culture that is ‘more distinct and coherent than that of most contemporary nation states’, according to Rodney W. Jones.”

According to him, the most comprehensive (but incomprehensible) definition of the term is as follows: strategic culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions and modes of behaviour, derived from common experience and accepted narratives (both oral and written).

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4 NSA Mr. Shiv Shankar Menon, “K. Subrahmanyam and India’s Strategic Culture”, Air Power Journal (Centre for Air Power Studies), vol. 7, no. 1, spring 2012, pp. 1-12.
5 Ibid.

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that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives. Or, to put it more intelligibly, without the academic jargon, strategic culture is an identifiable set of basic assumptions about the nature of international and military issues. This would involve both a central strategic paradigm (about the role of war in human affairs, the efficacy of force, the nature of the adversary, and so on), and a grand strategy or secondary assumptions about operational policy that flow from the assumptions.

He has cited the continuum that exists in the indigenous strategic literature of India right from ancient period (Kautilya) to the modern Indian political thought (Nehru-Gandhi). He has endorsed the descriptions of India’s contemporary strategic culture given by Kanti Bajpai who has pointed out differences between “Nehruvians”, neo-liberals and hyper-realists, postulating what is common to all three streams of Indian strategic thought, and described how they might differ on the best means but not on India’s external goals. To summarise Bajpai, all three streams agree on the centrality of the sovereign state in international relations and recognise no higher authority; see interests, power and violence as the staples of international relations that states cannot ignore; and think that power comprises both military and economic capabilities at a minimum. Beyond this, they differ on the best strategy and means to be adopted.

For “Nehruvians”, the natural state of anarchy can be mitigated by understandings between states, and making preparations for war, and a balance of power, central to security and foreign policy, is both ruinous and futile. For neo-liberals, mutual gain is a conditioning factor for the natural state of anarchy between states, particularly as they become interdependent. They, therefore, see economic power as a vital goal for states, to be achieved by free markets at home and free trade abroad. The hyper-realists are, however, pessimistic and do not believe in transformation, only endless cycles of inter-state threat, counter-threat, rivalry and conflict, where the risk of war is only managed by the threat and use of violence. For them, the surest way to peace and stability is the accumulation of military power and the willingness to use force.
According to me, however, the Nehruvian pillars of strategic autonomy and multilateralism persist in India’s strategic thinking, with neo-liberalism gaining ground with the growth and integration of the economy. However, the slow reforms process and the stalemate on the reforms of international organisations like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank have proved to be major roadblocks to the neo-liberal line of thinking. The hyper-realists, on the other hand, have been marginalised to crisis situations. Therefore, in toto, the Nehruvian caution and strategic autonomy have come to be the central features of Indian strategy even though neo-liberalism is visible in day-to-day policy. It has to be noted that the common thread across these lines of thought and, consequently, one tenet of India’s strategic culture is the consensus on the international system being anarchic in nature. There is also a consensus on the nuclear option unless an international institutionalised framework for complete disarmament is formulated.

In a lot of ways, having a grand strategy helps us in making an assessment about whether a nation has any strategic culture. As a corollary, not having a grand strategy leads to further existential questions about strategic culture. Even Johnston postulated that strategic culture is a ranked set of grand strategic preferences and patterns existing over the history and future of a nation. For example, the British insistence on naval dominance and the Australian debate between continental or forward defence point to certain strategic cultures and their proponents. Although the concepts of grand strategy and strategic culture are not interchangeable, they do have a connection to each other. You cannot have a grand strategy without a strategic culture and having a grand strategy enlightens the debate, the history, the continuity or the aversion to particular strategic cultures in a strategic community. Containment as a grand strategy informed American strategic culture at so many levels. Having made this point, there is a need for a much more rigorous analysis of the link between the two.

Ever since the now famous George Tanham study declared the lack of strategic culture in India, the concept and its component issues have provoked a focussed debate in the Indian strategic
Community over the last decade or so. The complexity of the concept ensured the various contrarian interpretations of the concept. The inter-disciplinary approach is crucial to fruitful debate on the topic. There is a historicity to the research itself and the contributions of various scholars to the strategic culture literature since the 1970s. Like most International Relations (IR) concepts, American scholars had monopolised the debate with major writings coming from Jack Snyder, Alistair Ian Johnston and Colin Gray. In India, the writings of Indian scholars like Amitabh Mattoo and Kanti Bajpai dealt with the concept. Air Cmde Jasjit Singh insisted there was a need to study India’s rich civilisational literature, historical experiences and even contradictory political beliefs and systems. At the same time, there is a need to study the grand strategy and strategic culture of major powers like China, Pakistan, Russia, Japan and Iran.

K. SUBRAHMANYAM AND INDIA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE

As regards a strategic culture in India, Mr. K. Subrahmanyam’s writings\(^6\) have proved an important starting point. The NSA had labelled his approach as realist plus. Subrahmanyam argued that the inclusion of values in the realist discourse is unique to Indian strategic culture—secularism, pluralism, democracy and quasi-federalism are imperative to enhance India’s power in the international system. This is consistent with the Foreign Secretary’s view that India’s grand strategy is that of complete national transformation followed by international power projection. India is alone, along with the USA in an earlier age, in seeking to industrialise and accumulate power as a democracy. All the other major nations of the world industrialised and gathered power before they became democratic. For Subrahmanyam it was, and it remains, a matter of India’s self-interest to help to build a democratic, pluralistic and secular world order.

It can be argued that Subrahmanyam’s realist plus approach is a pseudonym for classical realism which proponents like Kissinger have insisted has always paid attention to values simultaneously with balance of power and national interest. They argue that strategy is not just about outdoing an adversary who is trying to do the same to you although it does not follow a linear logic and is often counter-

\(^6\) Ibid.
intuitive, depending on the moves and calculation of your adversary. Classical realists, however, believe that cooperation can be achieved in non-zero-sum situations, even when others are motivated by self-interest and not benevolence. Strategy is the art of creating outcomes that further your national interest and values, and includes putting yourself in others’ shoes so as to predict and influence what they do. K.Subrahmanyam was one of the first Indians to further such a line of ‘strategic thinking’ on issues and policy.

In my interpretation, the main features of India’s grand strategy,\footnote{K. Subrahmanyam, “India’s Grand Strategy”, \textit{The Indian Express}, Delhi Edition, February 3, 2012, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-s-grand-strategy/907157} according to him are:

- Knowledge, not weapons, will be the currency of power in this century.
- The Constituent Assembly’s oath in 1947 implied that India would promote world peace for the welfare of mankind, including its own population, and it would assume its rightful global position by developing itself to the standards of the industrialised world. This was the strategic goal.
- Non-alignment, while a strategy, is often mistaken for ideology.
- India’s grand strategy is intertwined with governance and development problems.
- Liberal democracy, with a free market economy and a focus on the reforms process.
- Value and balance of power- based alliance: Subrahmanyam looked to combine a strong commitment to the basic values (of secularism, democracy and pluralism), with his realist pursuit of national interest. He was an advocate of value-based relationships: with the US and others on democracy, with Russia on secularism, and with Europe on liberalism. He often argued that there was no real contradiction between the promotion of democracy and the pursuit of India’s interests in our neighbourhood.

This falls in line with the pragmatic-idealist strategic culture that resurfaces often in Indian strategic thinking.
The ‘guns vs. butter’ argument was natural in a country where government and individuals were poor and hunger was rampant. Supraliminally was one of the few after Sardar Patel to argue that economic development needed a sound defence as a prerequisite. He also went on to argue that the economic spinoffs from defence spending were not inconsiderable in terms of growth and technological independence. He had a vision which was rare for that time of what defence as a sector could mean to the national economy, driving technological modernisation and growth by providing non-inflationary consumption. The one thread that ran through all of his writings was the need to increase India’s real strategic autonomy. By this, he never meant cutting ourselves off from the world.

CONCLUSION
The theoretical view in India is in line with Colin Gray’s argument wherein strategic culture is looked at as the interpretive variable which affects all other material, external and ideational variables in any decision-making of strategic policy or behaviour. India’s practitioners have regarded that strategic culture has “something out there to be tapped into”. Therefore, adjectives like Nehruvian, Gandhian, Ashokan etc. are often treated as continuous strains of thought which can be invoked for strategy. Johnston might criticise such an approach because it may not be able to explain breaks (successful or otherwise) in Indian decision-making, for example, the 1971 War, the exercise of the nuclear option. He may criticise the approach on the grounds of whether enough academic rigour has been exercised to identify these continuous patterns of a particular strategic culture. According to him, if “strategic culture” is said to be the product of nearly all relevant explanatory variables, then there is little conceptual space for a non-strategic culture explanation of strategic choice. This makes valid tests of a strategic culture-based model of choice extremely difficult. He says that strategic culture can often be used as just an instrument: for, conscious manipulation to justify the competence of decision-makers deflects criticism, suppresses dissent and limits access to the decision process, and he fears that strategic culture

8. Ibid.
is often very different from operational strategy. However, the same criticisms can also be regarded as hyperbolic in democratic accountable societies but they are potent criticisms to say the least.

But to move on from the Johnston-Gray framework, Alan Bloomberg calls for the existence of strategic sub-cultures. He states that any state can have overlapping or contradictory sub-cultures. Prima facie it’s a middle path but this approach has some standing. This line of thinking derives from the sociological idea put forward by Ann Swindler in 1986 that we should treat culture like a toolbox which contains various strategies of action and lines of thinking. It is a repertoire that we can tap into. Therefore, Bloomberg deriving from this, suggests that there do exist, strategic sub-cultures in nation-states. He cites the example of Beatrice Heuser who said that there are various “belief clusters” in Pakistan—one fiercely anti-Indian, anti-colonial and nationalistic, another pro-Western and liberal, and a third which is radical Islamist. Accepting that there are two or more sub-cultures within a strategic culture can help explain breaks in strategy and if we can understand the strategic debates in a country we can ascertain which strategic sub-culture is dominant and predict when a change is likely to come. However, this model also suffers from Gray’s model. It leads to tautologies and the model is not falsifiable. Johnston’s criticism of Gray holds true in Bloomberg’s model as well.

A strategist, therefore, wonders whether strategic cultural analysis is a viable and practical approach. In my opinion, it is. That is because beyond the important criteria of building a falsifiable and consistent theory, strategic culture has immense discursive utilities in outlining and enlightening the debate on strategy. It provides a framework albeit with caveats which provides a useful starting point to a fairly dependable predictive model on strategy. It broadens the tools, concepts and debates and prevents narrow calculations of operational strategy which might suffer from the ebbs and flows of day-to-day policies. It goes beyond treating the state as a black box and provokes us to study it from inside. Strategic culture is important because it operates at the level of Grand Strategy which is crucial to the long-term thinking of a nation and the international system.
ENVIRONMENT CHANGE: 
THE NEW ARENA OF DEFENCE COOPERATION

MANOJ KUMAR

The perception of the common man is that the defence forces are one of the biggest polluters and have scant regard for existentialism associated with the entire discourse on environment change. Nothing could be farther from the truth; the defence forces are as much affected by the threat to human security as the social institutions which they seek to protect. In addition, the traditional notion of security implying securing only the borders of the state is fast disappearing as newer threats to humankind are emerging, which neither respect boundaries nor follow the direct relation of cause-and-effect. Environment change is one such threat.

The threat of environment change has not been studied by the defence establishment due to factors that have their roots in how the governments have tended to view the debate from the narrow prism of social progress and economic implications. This has kept the defence forces largely out of the picture, so much so, that most of them have not even checked their preparations to meet any eventual fallout of the changing climate. These military institutions would face eventual consequences of climate change as would any other organisation in the country. This mindset is also caused by a fallacy that environment change is a problem of the distant future and not one that would have immediate implications on national security and stability.

Group Captain Manoj Kumar is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.
change (rather climate change) is an issue for future generations, judging that all the erstwhile publications emanating under the aegis of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had placed the timelines close to 2050 and beyond. This viewpoint is now changing as more and more sudden climatic events are being faced with a frequency and intensity not earlier predicted and even now, not precisely understood; be it the extreme heat and cold waves of the US and in the European Union (EU) or the totally fickle monsoons in India, the science remains a little hazy. Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions are increasing and are very likely to continue to increase over the next few decades since there is hardly any worthwhile global agreement to control them. This will bring about changes in wind, precipitation and temperature patterns. Globally, it is very likely that there will be an increase in extremes, in heat-waves and in heavy precipitation and tropical cyclone intensity. Precipitation is projected to generally increase in high latitudes and decrease in sub-tropical regions.

The environment change impacts would not differentiate between a developed or an undeveloped country, a well-prepared or an unprepared institution within a country (albeit the adaptive capability would differ), and between an organisation that pollutes and one that doesn’t. In the same vein, when the world grapples with the adverse consequences of climate change on our environment, the affected communities would exhort all and sundry (irrespective of the differentiation mentioned above) to continue mitigation activities, to the extent possible. So when India and other developing countries of Southern Asia would be called to undertake carbon mitigation activities, post 2020 (this is being optimistic and hoping that humanity wakes up and agrees to a post Kyoto Protocol II world order), it is unimaginable that their military institutions would be kept out of the control regimes. This did not happen when the Montreal Protocol for phasing out Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) was signed in 1987 and ratified later by almost all countries, and it won’t happen now. The military institutions of the developed countries (whether part of Kyoto Protocol mitigation target regime or not) had to work within the ambit of the local/international emission control regime and were not given any concession just because they are the cornerstones of national security.
With the requirement of managing another variable in operational planning, military institutions in many countries would now scramble to prepare themselves for the contingencies emanating from environmental changes as well as their control regimes. When the existing procedures are being modified/upgraded to meet these challenges, it would be appropriate to learn from the institutions that have already taken a lead in the field. The distinctiveness of military operations as compared to any non-military organisation makes a strong case for this cooperation to manifest primarily between the defence organisations. This paper would endeavour to study ‘why and how’ the subject of environment change needs to be placed high on the agenda of inter-state defence cooperation. The scope of subjects that can be discussed within the ambit of environment change is very large. Therefore, the broad concept of conducting defence cooperation on the subject would also be covered. This is a complex subject for the countries of Southern Asia, primarily because of the sensitivities involved with anything that has to do with the military. It would, thus, be apt to showcase the potential of environmental subjects in being able to break traditional mistrust barriers; and, in a few cases, build new ones, if the process is not handled sensitively.

WIDENING THE AGENDA
Defence cooperation normally exists between two friendly countries. It is also inbuilt in the relation-normalising exercise that nations undertake to showcase to the world at large that they are mature states that have the ability to rise above the squabbles of the past. In that sense, defence cooperation is more of a posture that nations adopt to convey a variety of meanings. The ambit of defence cooperation includes the conduct of joint military exercises, exchanging military personnel for training in the respective training institutes, military-to-military dialogues, exchange visits of defence personnel, and inviting defence personnel for conferences/workshops, etc. With the involvement of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the entire exercise of defence cooperation is an important cog in the conduct of a country’s external relations. It is also used to further friendly bilateral relations.

The subject of environment change has never been a part of the defence cooperation agenda that India has drawn up till now. While
the learning value for the Indian defence establishment is immense, one should not forget that this benign subject offers scope for a meeting of the minds even in respect of countries that are mutually suspicious in our neighbourhood. Additionally, India’s Look East policy can be given a suitable boost with ‘environment change’ being made a part of the dialogue with militaries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Even in the cases of countries where defence cooperation is not actively considered, a dialogue on a non-controversial subject like environment change is possible. This would present a window for an interaction that can benefit us by being able to project, and discuss, friendly ideas. This subject, thus, should be actively considered in the defence cooperation agenda and a pool of specialists who work on the subject within the militaries needs to be created. Bringing out a White Paper on the subject would be a start that would invite participation from other countries, even as a part of Track-II diplomacy.

STUDY OF ENVIRONMENT CHANGE: REGIONS OF INTEREST
Climate change is transforming the conventional roles of security actors. With the polar ice melting, there would be an increase in sea level, causing stress on land resources. Similarly, other resources like water and food would become inadequate due to the rise in global temperatures, thus, exacerbating the already existing paucity. In such a scenario, the defence organisation would have to contend with many related issues. Firstly, it would have to deal with internal and external tensions related to lack of the vital resources mentioned above. This paucity would be more and more acute in the developing nations of Southern Asia as the ability of a nation to adapt to changing weather patterns is directly proportional to its development status. Water tensions due to the melting of ice in the Tibetan plateau, coupled with increase in desertification and a rising population is unique to Southern Asia. All these factors would add to already existing international faultlines in the region. As a threat multiplier, environment change has the potential to exacerbate (if not directly generate) destabilising conditions that could reshape the regional security environment.

Secondly, the effect of environment change and the resource crunch on military installations would pose a challenge. The ability
of the military to adapt to these changes would depend upon its acceptance of the problem in the present and then working towards finding customised solutions to the same. These are long-term strategies and a case study on the subject that would be described in the subsequent paragraphs, would focus on how the situation is crying out for intervention. Thirdly, as the consequences of environment change would cause more and more sudden climatic events, the defence organisations would have to increasingly showcase their readiness in dealing with the situation, materially and mentally. Climate change will affect all facets—where, when, why and how the military operates as is visible in the studies undertaken by a few militaries around the globe.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

The Indian military will face increasing political pressure to not only respond to climate change disasters, but also to climate change mitigation. Clean energy specifications may increasingly become part of the new acquisition process. The projected impact of climate change on the regional and domestic scenarios means that the Indian military will face new stresses on its force structure, personnel training and the border security roles, which it has traditionally undertaken. Defence is currently not the lead department charged with dealing with climate change; nor will it be in the future. It is not required that the military be made the lead agency but there is definitely a need to make it a stakeholder at least. However, even without it, the military will have to learn to form partnerships and collaborate with other military agencies and even the industry to respond to the security impacts of climate change, which are almost always likely to be indirect. These would not wait for the military to be officially made a stakeholder in the climate change debate. The cause of environment change may lie in one region/country but its effect may be felt at a different place altogether. Therein lies the dilemma – when the military in this part of the world is facing so many direct threats to national security, managing the indirect ones may mean stretching the resources thin. To this line of thinking one can only recommend that the enormity of the scale of the environmental challenge would
require the defence institutions to be ready, and ‘forewarned is forearmed’.

Climate-induced population displacement, resource (land, water and natural resources crunch) wars and the further weakening of fragile states in the neighbourhood are some of the potential consequences of a changing climate that the Indian military would have to face. The social institutions would have to face the consequences too. It is possible that dissatisfaction with government actions to mitigate climate change, while so far limited to the urban educated population, could contribute to domestic and regional instability. In a democracy, popular movements have forced the government’s hand on more than one occasion, and this could be just one more of the same. The ‘Chipko’ movement of the 1970s and the 1980s is a case in point.

CONCURRENT DISASTERS
As a government department, and a very visible one at that, the defence organisation will need to plan more for its role in domestic disaster response missions. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in India has its own set of procedures to tackle contingencies – man-made or natural. The defence organisation, though utilised to tackle all major natural crisis, has not been considered a stakeholder in these procedures. This lack of foresight in governance should not allow for a sense of complacency within the military. Going by its own past experience and also learning from what the militaries in other countries are capable of doing during such contingencies, the Indian military has to be ready to deal with natural and man-made disasters.

The Indian military needs to be prepared for the co-occurrence of extreme weather events with other traditional/non-traditional sources of security stress. What will happen when domestic infrastructure is damaged by an extreme climatic event at the same time as another such disaster overseas requires a response? Alternatively, if the co-occurrence of an extreme weather event takes place where the security apparatus is already under stress, for example, in Naxal infested areas in central India, the reaction of the NDMA, paramilitary and Indian military would have to be suitably
dovetailed. The Indian military should start planning for responding to scenarios such as the ones described above as the solutions are not easy to come by, considering the lack of knowledge of the variables that can unfold. Many militaries around the world are already practising these contingencies; to join forces is a good option.

NEW ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS
Environmental restrictions on the operation of military hardware and their installations may well exceed what the Indian defence establishment deemed to be acceptable at the start of capability development planning. Procuring particular items of equipment in compliance with the standards will incur costs. A case in point is the restrictions pursuant to the Montreal Protocol. Phase-out of ODS and putting a stop to their production from January 1, 2010, meant that certain chemicals that were hitherto being used in military hardware, were no longer freely available. Their export and import was greatly affected as even existing virgin ODS were banned from crossing national boundaries; permission is given only for exporting recycled ODS. One such chemical comprises halons that are used as fire suppressants in military hardware like aircraft, armoured vehicles, and ships/submarines. It is common knowledge that military hardware is extremely costly and its phase out/replacement cannot be thought about merely due to unavailability of a small amount of gas, however precarious its usage may be. So the right idea would be to find a replacement for halons. This is easier said than done; these wonder chemicals possess properties of non-corrosion, non-toxicity and great efficacy in volumetric terms. This has ensured that their replacements are not available for many military aviation usages and some other military applications. In such a scenario, the defence forces have to find their own solutions to these restrictions. There is no doubt that it would have been easier for any organisation to be prepared with modified processes to conserve and recycle halons, if they had prior knowledge of the control regimes being imposed. It is obvious that all users of these gases, private or government institutions are, thus, stakeholders when the nation takes such a decision and, therefore, need to be consulted. This lesson would be pertinent when the nation formulates carbon mitigation strategies in the coming years.
If the Indian military is to be called upon to act during a national crisis related to sudden weather events, then it faces an increase in non-combat activities, which would require the procurement of dual-use equipment. These operations are also known as “Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)”. This would become critical as the budget is restricted and expertise for such a procurement process is limited. The laying down of qualitative requirements for the new hardware would also have to take into account new environmental standards, changes in temperature and extremes in weather conditions that will affect the operation of equipment and deployment conditions.

Particularly for the Indian Air Force (IAF), airlift capacity will become increasingly important for missions during the growing number of natural/man-made calamities and a fleet with the potential to function in multiple roles will be essential, thus, necessitating new requirements for capital acquisitions. Adequate numbers of helicopters and fixed-wing assets capable of operating in extreme weather will also be necessary. The Navy would similarly have to up its capabilities for such events with more inductions of dual use assets like a hospital ship, etc.

ENERGY EFFICIENCY
The response to climate change would see sectoral emissions caps being put in place. Although the Indian defence establishment may not be separately pointed out, it would have to abide by the local rules on waste treatment, emissions and energy efficiency. This may see greater pressure to moderate its consumption of energy, reduce its impact on the environment and continue to lead other best-practice standards.1 The amount of energy that the Indian defence establishment consumes is not known at present. This may be the starting block for starting an efficiency programme that could take a leaf from programmes already running on the same lines within and outside the country.

DATA MAPPING
As mentioned above, the process of preparation to face multiple threats of environment change can only start with the gathering of environmental data and intelligence. This will help the Indian military to map potential scenarios and cascading impacts brought about by environment change, and formulate appropriate responses. These scenarios would be based on hard evidence and include studying the impact of environment change policies likely to be formulated by the government. Only with hard data can the military convey to the policy-makers a holistic picture of the impacts that may be seen once a proposed policy is being implemented. As an example, if the country is planning to phase-out HCFCs (Hydrochlorofluoro Carbons) – as part of the Montreal Protocol, the military establishment can only react to the proposed time schedule and costs involved if they have the figures of equipment using the same. It is, therefore, imperative that the defence organisations learn from the experiences of each other, across different countries, by studying the effect of local environmental legislations on military procedures. This can be an easy starting dialogue considering that most of these issues would be in the public domain.

SEA LEVEL RISE IMPACTS: CASE STUDY MUMBAI
It had been mentioned earlier that one of the adverse consequences of global warming would be sea level rise. The destruction, though not related to climate change but nevertheless an adverse consequence of a natural calamity, caused by the tsunami of December 2004, would drive home the issue involved. The Indian Air Force’s base at the Nicobar Island, situated at the southern tip of its coastal borders, suffered damage to property as well as human life. This was a sudden environmental event, not easily predicted and, thus, forewarned. But the same cannot be said to be true for rising sea levels that would affect coastal towns like Mumbai in the coming decades. The naval administrative and other infrastructure situated on the southern tip of Mumbai city is specifically vulnerable, as revealed by the state of the adjacent Marine Drive during high tides. This situation is precarious even now, therefore, the way it will deteriorate in the coming decades, is anybody’s guess. It takes on an ominous hue due to the serious paucity of land in Mumbai, as one moves inland.
Nariman Point is the financial soul of Mumbai and is located in the near vicinity to the naval installations, thus, further reducing the scope of their relocation. With such a serious land crunch, it would be a difficult proposition to plan for relocation and easier to plan for infrastructural safety measures. However, these require serious efforts and consultations with specialists, to learn from what the other institutions, within the country and abroad, are planning, and their response. It’s a long drawn effort that has to start now.

The case study described above is not just a one-off scenario and more such vulnerabilities would be evident once the defence forces take on the task of an environmental audit of their installations. Emerging environmental conditions will have implications for how the defence estate and associated military infrastructure are managed. The value of defence’s coastal infrastructure and vulnerabilities to climate change effects will also have implications for defence budget planning. At present, there is little interest in climate change within the Indian defence establishment or its ministry. This is in contrast to the UK: its MoD has developed a climate change strategy and operational delivery plan that outlines how the British military will meet a fully legislated carbon budget. The UK military had appointed a star-ranked climate change and energy security envoy (now retired and appointed as the nation’s envoy on the subject). The defence organisations in many developed countries have constituted groups that specifically study the vulnerabilities of their infrastructure. Learning from their experience would require cooperation and exchange of ideas/views. It is better than reinventing the wheel. Apart from reducing GHG emissions and increasing operational resilience, one of the major aims of defence cooperation being advocated in this paper will be to ensure that Indian military weapon platforms maintain full interoperability with friendly defence organisations in our areas of interest. This interoperability would not only be in the areas of force application but for humanitarian operations in hazardous situations.

**THE THRUST…**

The issues that can be discussed under the subject are indeed multi-dimensional. These may include the following and many more:
• As a threat multiplier, environment change has the potential to exacerbate destabilising conditions that could reshape the regional security environment.

• The effect of environment change would result in a resource crunch that would pose a challenge, to be managed effectively. The resource crunch would affect the military installations directly and could be a potential game changer.

• Since climate change would cause more and more sudden weather events, the defence organisations would have to increasingly showcase their readiness in dealing with disasters, materially and mentally. The militaries would need to be prepared for the co-occurrence of extreme weather events with other traditional/non-traditional sources of security stresses. These can be jointly gamed.

• New environmental standards come up due to country specific legislations. An exchange of ideas on the impacts of such legislations would improve environmental governance and spread good practices of reducing carbon ‘bootprints’. This is a win-win situation for all stakeholders.

Cooperation by the defence forces on the subject of environment has the potential to create new bonds and strengthen already existing ties. It should be actively considered owing to the benign nature of the subject and the possibilities that it offers in furthering bilateral and regional cooperation. Even in cases wherein a nation is not too keen on military cooperation, the subject of environment change can help to remove the existing taboos.
UNDERSTANDING THE SYRIAN CRISIS: HIGHLIGHTING THE ROLE OF INDIA AND THE NEED FOR PEACE

RHEA ABRAHAM

The current Syrian crisis can be traced to two main events in its history. Firstly, the Lebanese civil war of 1976 which prompted Syria to intervene in the region as guarantee to a larger protection, including its claims on the Golan Heights and support for the rise of Hezbollah against Israel. Secondly, the 1982 Hama massacre that killed 30,000 people1 in the province and led to the banning of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) from operating in the region. The instability factor, thus, caused with the prolonged rule of the Alawites (an offshoot of Shii’sm) during these crucial periods, despite opposition from the majority Sunnis, and involvement in regional wars, created a paradigm shift that pushed the country into a poor and disfunctional state.

Therefore, in the endeavour of finding a solution to the ongoing Syrian crisis in West Asia, a study of the country, its political history and the role of ethnicity become factorial to understanding the rise of unrest in the present circumstances. Also, such an exercise aims to highlight the role of India, in negotiating future peace and stability in the region.

Rhea Abraham is a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.


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THE HISTORY OF SYRIA

Syria’s vast ethnic and religious diversity comes from its geo-strategic position which houses, three monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and includes refugees from various conflicts in the region and a culture exposed to the different empires that crossed into West Asia and Europe, during the early years. Influenced to a large extent by both history and geography, Syria has five major parochial identities based on ethnic and religious lines. It is estimated that two-thirds of Syrians are Arabs and Sunni Muslims. The Alawites, Christians and Kurds comprise around 10 per cent of the total population and are further split into various communities. The Druze, an offshoot of Islam, form around 4 per cent of the population and are concentrated mainly in the province of al-Suwayda, in southwestern Syria. The minority Kurds of Syria are found in the northern region bordering Turkey. In 2012, the Assad regime had negotiated a withdrawal from the Kurdish regions and given autonomy to them. Therefore, in the current crisis, the Kurds of Syria, though apprehensive of the Assad regime, do not necessarily want to support an Islamist regime which, in turn, may not be supportive of their concerns.

The Alawites are found in a majority in the Latakia province, the main port city of Syria. Forming the most powerful community in Syria, they were poor farmers in Syria’s past, who were constantly persecuted by the Sunnis. Their rise, however, took place with the French recruitment of Syrian minorities into the Syrian National Army, establishing a tradition of Alawite military service even after the withdrawal of France from the region. Apprehensive of the Sunnis coming to power and ethnically wiping them out, the Alawites installed their community members in top ranking positions in the government. The wide rift between the communities emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries with political interference by the Ottoman Empire, the British, Russians and French. However in the current

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3. Ibid.
4. Robinson, n. 2.
5. n. 1.
security scenario, the minority communities, accounting for one-fourth of the population, continue to support the Alawites as they fear being suppressed by the majority Sunnis and, thereby, prefer a secular state.7

Under the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, Syria was split into several districts for administration. Modern Syria was a byproduct of agreements signed by the French and British despite opposition for the independence and unity of Syria, which was established as a French mandate in 1920. After World War II, two regions split from Syria to form Lebanon and Hatay, now a province of Turkey. Syria achieved independence after a long struggle, in the year 1946. From the period of 1946-56, Syria, pressurised under nascent freedom, underwent several changes to its Constitutions by 20 different Cabinets.8 In 1948, Syria was part of the Arab-Israeli War and supported Egypt and other Arab countries in their fight against Israel and the claim for statehood for Palestine. Also, during this period, neighbouring Egypt tried to combine its territories with Syria as part of the United Arab Republic (1958-61) which, however, did not fructify. With growing tensions in the region in the subsequent years, the Baath Party seized power in 1956 through a military coup that led to the rise of the Alawites in Syria.

**RULE UNDER THE BAATH PARTY**

The Baath Party, currently in power in Syria, was founded in Damascus, Syria, in 1940, by Michael Aflaq, a Greek orthodox Christian and Salah al-Din Batar, a Sunni Muslim. Though it was mainly involved in recruiting rural students and minorities, the ideology of the party centred on socialist principles and Arab nationalism as a cultural heritage.9 At first, the party denied Syria a national identity, but during President Bashar’s regime, it promised political socialisation through education and the media. The party, prevalent in both Iraq and Syria, though conflicting, was opposed by the majority Sunnis in both Damascus and Hama. However, post the

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7. Ibid.


successful coup in 1963, the membership of the Baath Party increased substantially.

During the French recruitment of Syrians into the Syrian National Army, most of the soldiers and officers were roped in from minority groups, including the Alawites. As such, Sunni Muslims and the wealthy Syrians preferred not to send their sons into the army as it was serving imperial interests. However, during this recruitment, the military personnel, mainly the Alawites, brought in their families into the service, based on sectarian, religious and tribal affiliations. Also, the coup was guaranteed successful because of the prevalent rivalry between Sunni officers in the military which, in turn, empowered the minority groups'.

The 14 members of the Baathist Party and their installation as the National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC) through a coup in 1963 had five Alawites among the leadership, including Hafez al-Assad himself, who took over as President of Syria in 1970 and opened membership to non-Arabs, including the Kurds.

Gen Salah Jadid, who took over as President in 1960, started his rule by aligning with the Soviets against Israel. However, the failure of Syria and its air force in the Six-Day War of 1967 and the subsequent hand-over of the Golan Heights to Israel depopularised the regime, leading to conflict within the party. Defence Minister Hafez al-Assad took over in 1970 through a peaceful military coup and began to reform the legislative and political structure of the country. A national referendum was carried out to install Assad as President for a seven-year term. In March 1973, a new Syrian Constitution was put into effect, with elections taking place, that defined Syria as a secular socialist state with Islam as the majority religion. Also, in the same year, Syria aligned with Egypt in the Yom Kippur War against Israel, which proved disastrous for the Syrian territories.

Over the years, Hafez was also criticised for supporting the civil war in Lebanon in 1976 by sending the Syrian Army troops, who

11. Ibid.
were involved in confrontations with the Palestinian and the leftist militias, former traditional allies of the Syrian Baath Party.\textsuperscript{13} Strong opposition was voiced against this action, followed by political assassinations and attacks on members of the Baath Party leaders and Alawites. In the end, however, Syria sponsored the Taif Agreement that brokered peace in the region. In 1977, Assad, in order to consolidate internal matters, brought in an anti-corruption campaign which, however, backfired as a number of high ranking officials were involved in various money laundering scandals and, thereby, this led to opposition within the party.\textsuperscript{14} In 1979, the Aleppo massacre, reported to be the handiwork of the Syrian MB, killed a large number of Alawite military officers, seeding the way for the promotion of sectarian polarisation in Syria. In retaliation, Syrian President Hafez collaborated with the economically strong Sunni and Christian forces to launch a massacre on Hama, the stronghold of the MB in 1982, forcing the MB to later resort to an underground revolt. However, the fight with the MB lasted for six years, bringing the regime to a temporary collapse.

During the first Gulf War in 1990, Syria joined the US-led Coalition against Iraq, and in October 1991, engaged in direct negotiations with Israel. During the \textit{Intifada} years, the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, Prime Minister of Lebanon, and the consequent blame on Syria, pushed the international community to force the Syrian Army, to withdraw from Lebanon, where it had been deployed since the 1980s. In 2000, Bashar al-Assad took over as successor and amended the Syrian Constitution to reduce the age of the President for his eligibility. During his early years, termed the “Damascus Spring”, Bashar brought in a number of pro-Western reforms and policies that lasted till the US listed Syria as a state in the “axis of evil”, with its support for Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestine, in the open. Though relations improved for a brief period after that, the US renewed its economic sanctions on Syria in 2010 proclaiming Syria’s connection to terrorism and covert nuclear operations as being a threat to the international security environment.

\textsuperscript{13} Van Dam, n. 9
THE PRESENT UPRISING
The third and current uprising, started in March 2011, with low key anti-regime protests in parts of Syria such as Dara’a, bordering Jordan. These demonstrations by a group of teenagers, accused of drawing political graffiti against the regime, sparked the revolution as the ripples of the neighbouring Arab Spring. The killing of these demonstrators by the security forces invoked anger which led to the gradual spread of protests across the country.

In April 2011, the Emergency Law of 1963, which had suspended most constitutional right of the citizens, was formally lifted as a concession to the protesters; however, a simultaneous crackdown on the protests still took place in Daraa. June 2011 brought in bloody clashes between rebels and the security forces, in Jisr Al-Shugar, in the northwestern province of Idlib, changing the pattern of the conflict into an armed protest.15 Despite some political measures, heavy fighting was reported in various provinces of Syria, including Homs, in western Syria.

By June 2012, the conflict became international with the mistaken shooting down of a Turkish fighter jet by the Syrian Army which invoked opposition from Turkey. As a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) member, Turkey could apply Article 5 of the NATO treaty (armed attack against any one member in Europe or North America is an armed attack against all),16 if attacked by Syria during the ongoing crisis. In July 2012, members of the Assad family including Bashar al Assad’s brother-in-law and the Syrian Defence Minister Daoud Rajiha were killed in a suicidal attack. In November and December 2012, the rebels made significant military gains, with the regime having to withdraw from parts of its territory. Also several opposition forces came together to form the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.

By late 2012, various rebel groups controlled villages, small towns and rural areas in the southwest and southeast of Syria, and along the Lebanese and Turkish borders. Certain Kurdish areas in

northern and northeastern Syria were controlled by various parties, including the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which emerged from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in 2003. Therefore, during this period, a number of opposition forces gained momentum in their struggle against the regime and included mainly the Syrian National Council (SNC),\(^\text{17}\) which was formed in October 2011 in Turkey, by exiled activists, including many members of the MB movement, and was mostly dominated by the Sunni Muslims of Syria. The SNC currently serves as a contact point for the international community, but it struggles with internal disunity and lack of efficiency. It advocates an international military intervention, despite opposition from the locals who consider it a tool of foreign power. On the other hand, the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC) is an opposition bloc inside Syria and includes many long-term dissidents. Unlike the SNC, the NCC is willing to negotiate with Assad’s regime, opposes foreign military intervention and is on good terms with Russia.\(^\text{18}\) The Free Syrian Army (FSA) comprises Sunni soldiers who have deserted the army since the uprising in March 2012. They are mostly light-armed and trained at an elementary level, and ready to resort to arms in their fight against the current regime.\(^\text{19}\)

However, despite the unsteady success of the rebels against Assad’s forces, Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Deir al Zor continue to remain under the regime. Also, the rebels have failed to protect the civilians in the liberated areas, and they continue to suffer under the constant bombing and attacks. In response to the conflict, President Bashar al-Assad has introduced some measures to satisfy the protesters,\(^\text{20}\) and called for a national referendum, held in February 2012,\(^\text{21}\) to introduce a new Constitution. Though approved

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17. Hinnebusch, n. 10
21. n. 19.
by a vast majority of the participants, the referendum, nonetheless, lacked support from the citizens amidst the ongoing clashes. In May 2012, under the new Constitution, the first parliamentary election reintroduced other political parties besides the Baath Party. The election was termed as rigged; reports suggested that 51 per cent of eligible voters took part in the election, in which the regime supporters won over 90 per cent seats in the Parliament.\(^{22}\) Also, a majority of the opposition boycotted the election.

**THE ROLE OF INDIA**

Highlighting the role of India in the ongoing crisis, Syria feels that India, like Russia, Iran and China should play a positive role in ending violence in the country. India and Syria have enjoyed historical relations and this has, in turn, strengthened political relations. Both the countries have exchanged visits at the ministerial levels and have collaborated in various fields, including education, culture, literature, agriculture and technology.\(^{23}\) India and Syria have a joint commission on economic exchange and a number of Indian industries have invested in Syria, including in trade of petroleum products. A considerable number of Indian expatriates live in Syria, predominant among them Muslim students pursuing theological studies, who have, however, reduced in number with the ongoing unrest.\(^{24}\)

India, beginning with statements as early as April 2011, has opposed military intervention in Syria and has advocated a negotiated settlement.\(^{25}\) India told the UN that further militarisation of the conflict will make a political settlement difficult, and has stressed on the important role that Syria has historically played in West Asia. India has also stressed that the prolonged instability and unrest in Syria will have serious implications for peace and stability in the wider region.


\(^{24}\) Ibid.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met the Syrian Prime Minister Wael al-Halki on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit in Tehran in August 2012. India has conveyed its message to the Syrian leadership, both bilaterally as well as along with its IBSA (India, Burma, South Africa) partners in August 2011.\(^26\) India has stressed on the role of the international community, to facilitate engagement of the Syrian government with its people. Most importantly, India has highlighted that the League of Arab States should be allowed to play a role through a Syrian-led inclusive political process and the leadership of Syria should be decided only by the Syrian people, in a continuation of India’s Syrian policy. Dr. Bouthaina Shaaban, political and media advisor to President Assad, also visited India in March, 2013 to thank India for its stand on the Syrian conflict.\(^27\)

**CONCLUSION**

Therefore, despite changes in the political framework of Syria, the regime’s forces have been estimated to be growing and continue to crack down on opposition rebel forces. The professional military technology and heavy weapons, including tanks and helicopters that the regime forces possess give them an advantage in the direct military confrontations with the demonstrators. Another group of regime supporters, named the Shabiha (“ghosts” in Arabic), are recruited mostly from Alawite groups, and are feared as extremely brutal but without an official link. Also, despite the uprising having strong roots in traditional centres of resistance,\(^28\) the security forces and secret police have remained loyal to the regime, as any attempt to split from the regime has been met with severe punishment. An official order issued in late 2011 banned all senior government employees, Ambassadors and Ministers from leaving Syria without obtaining special permission from the security services.\(^29\) The regime

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27. Ibid.
has also created an autocratic administration based on loyalty to the regime, whose survival is inextricably bound with that of the state, and the buffer communities that protect the Assad regime from further attacks.

Therefore, in trying to understand the current uprising in Syria, one can trace a number of factors as the root causes for the conflict in the region. The absence of a Syrian national identity from the beginning has led to an Arab nationalism and religious identity, which, in turn, has been promoting sentiments against the Assad regime. Also, the central state authority in Syria has been localised and the prerequisite to maintaining power has been the reliance on regional and tribal ties. While Hafez allowed fellow Alawites to benefit from regime jobs, his son cut out the community from such luxuries and only allowed his immediate family to maintain power in the country. This, in turn, angered the Alawites against Bashar. The regime failed to establish political and socio-economic stability, and, most importantly, undo its sectarian character. The Baathist Party has lacked membership of regionally and tribally related Sunnis. Also, structural reforms could have been brought about if the party was continuously disciplined, with no corruption and an elite composite agenda based on education, economics and democratic reforms.30

Most importantly, the involvement of a number of players in the crisis has led to the militarisation of the uprising. Terrorist attacks have been prominent and include the bombings of public installations such as gas and petrol pipelines, and government buildings. Also sectarian clashes are taking place rapidly. Syria has home-grown jihadists not necessarily entering from the borders, which include the MB, which continues to follow its militant objectives rather than pursue political options like the MB of Egypt. The US invasion of Iraq created a breed of Syrian jihadists who fought against the Americans. In the current scenario, the jihadists who have returned are equipped for modern and urban warfare and can deal with the regime militarily.

Therefore, the current crisis in Syria is considered a zero-sum game and its successful outcome remains questionable to many scholars. It is speculated that if the regime survives, the international

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sanctions may remain, in turn, collapsing the Syrian economy and foreign policy. Syria produces around 0.5 per cent of the world’s total oil production. However, because of the European Union (EU) sanctions imposed on Syria since the beginning of the protests in 2011, oil exports have reduced considerably, from around 400 bpd in 2010 to 320 bpd in 2011, and this has decreased Syria’s revenues by 30 per cent. A regime victory might instigate the opposition to bring up a third war because of the structural problems with greater emigration. However, the minorities in Syria will survive the political transition. On the other hand, if the regime collapses, the Islamist factions may succeed. It will lead to a wider ethnic cleansing and subsequent emigration of minorities, with the return of refugee Muslims from Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey.

In the midst of all this and for an immediate solution, therefore, a political compromise, also to be promoted by countries like India, remains the best option. As is seen in the political functioning of Lebanon, it guarantees a stake in the political system of the country and involves a government that is shared by all sections of Syrian society, regardless of ethnic and religious background.

INTRODUCTION
Any mention of Kazakhstan in a general conversation brings a curious look towards the speaker. Why Kazakhstan – what is so important about that country – is it not a failed state – is it somewhere in the Middle East? However, in a conversation on strategic issues facing the nation, Kazakhstan does find a mention, but not necessarily at the same level of importance that some other nations enjoy. The last 20 odd years have been unique for relations between India and Kazakhstan. In the early 1990s, India discarded the restraints of socialism and embarked on far-reaching economic reforms to set the country on the path of globalisation. During the same period, Kazakhstan emerged from the shadows of being a mere component of the erstwhile Soviet Union into an independent, politically stable, economically strong nation with a global and strategic outlook.

Relations between India and Kazakhstan are ancient and historical and can, at best, be described as cordial. After India gained sovereignty, Pandit Nehru, along with Indira Gandhi, while on a visit to the USSR in 1955, visited Almaty, Kazakhstan’s erstwhile capital city. Diplomatic relations were established in February 1992 when India recognised the independence of

Air Marshal Dhraj Kukreja (Retd) is former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Training Command.

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Kazakhstan after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. India was the first country outside the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) region, visited by President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan after its independence, an indicator of the significance assigned to India in that nation. This visit in 1992 was followed by the visit of the Prime Minister of India, Shri Narsimha Rao, in 1993, which attempted to give an impetus to India-Kazakhstan relations. Subsequently, President Nazarbayev has visited India again in 1996, in 2002 and then in January 2009, when he was invited as the chief guest at India’s Republic Day celebrations. It was during this visit that the Declaration of Strategic Partnership between the two nations was signed and the relations received a further boost. In order to strengthen their diplomatic ties, high level visits between India and Kazakhstan have been exchanged on a regular basis in the interim years. Notwithstanding the frequent bilateral visits, the last being in April 2011, by Dr Manmohan Singh, Kazakhstan still does not, however, seem to appear on the radar of the Indian security establishment as other nations do, giving the impression that India either takes for granted its relations with Kazakhstan or, is waiting for a crisis to initiate repair action.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON KAZAKHSTAN
The modern Kazakhstan is located in the central part of Eurasia, with Russia bordering it to the north and China in the east. It is a landlocked nation and has other CIS nations towards the south and the Caspian Sea in the west. Given the geographic locations of India and Kazakhstan, both states have a mutual interest to maintain a peaceful and stable Central Asia, most notably Afghanistan, the centre-point of regional instability as well as illegal drug routes that extend through the region.
Ethnic Kazakhs, a mix of Turkish and Mongol nomadic tribes who migrated into the region in the 13th century, were rarely united as a single nation. The tribes came under Mongol rule in the 13th century, but continued warring with each other; the territory was conquered by Russia in the 18th century and Kazakhstan became a Soviet Republic in 1936. During the agricultural “Virgin Lands” programme of the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet citizens from other regions were encouraged to help cultivate Kazakhstan’s northern pastures. This influx of immigrants (mostly Russians, but also some other deported nationalities) skewed the original ethnic mixture and enabled non-ethnic Kazakhs to outnumber the natives. Kazakhstan, due to its history and the political processes of the Soviet Union, was a mix of more than a 130 ethnic groups at the time of its independence in 1991. Some non-Muslim ethnic minorities left Kazakhstan in large numbers from the mid-1990s, after the country declared self-rule, through the mid-2000s; a national programme to repatriate about a million plus ethnic Kazakhs back to Kazakhstan has brought them to a majority in their native land, yet, today it continues to have more than 130 ethnic groups and 40 religions, while maintaining inter-ethnic and inter-religious harmony. This dramatic demographic shift has also diluted the earlier religious diversity and made the country more than 70 percent Muslim, but has given it political stability with a multi-party democratic system. Being an important international centre for inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue, it has the unique distinction of hosting the first four Congresses of the Leaders of World and Traditional Religions.
Before independence in 1991, Kazakhstan suffered from two of the world’s largest man-made environmental disasters. Nearly 500 Soviet nuclear tests, conducted over 40 years, at the test site at Semipalatinsk (now renamed as Sempy) rendered large tracts of land contaminated and unusable for years, besides the widespread effect of radiation-induced illnesses that affected millions. The Soviet administration also diverted the waters of two of the largest rivers, the Amu Dariya and the Syr Dariya, for cotton irrigation, rendering the Aral Sea devoid of input, thus, affecting the lives of thousands of people. These inherited disasters have had a profound influence on modern Kazakhstan’s economic and nuclear policies.

Kazakhstan’s economy is larger than those of all the other Central Asian states largely due to the country’s vast natural resources. While marching on the path of development, there remain some socio-economic and security issues, which need resolution and include: developing a cohesive national identity; managing Islamic extremist revival; expanding the development of the country’s vast energy resources and exporting them to world markets; diversifying the economy outside the oil, gas, and mining sectors; enhancing Kazakhstan’s economic competitiveness; developing a multi-party Parliament and advancing political and social reforms; and strengthening relations with neighbouring states and other foreign powers. All these activities, planned and initiated by Kazakhstan, are of importance to India, being common perceptions and mutually advantageous to the two nations.

KAZAKHSTAN’S DIPLOMACY
The country has always given due importance to India in its bilateral dealings and in the international forums. Kazakhstan has been supportive on India’s bid for permanent membership to the UN Security Council. It has also been cooperating with India in the field of counter-terrorism and had condemned the 26/11 attack in Mumbai. It has offered active support to India in various multilateral forums, which include the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and other UN organisations. On its part, India has been a consistent supporter of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the only Central Asian forum where India
is a member; it has also supported the candidacy of Kazakhstan as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2017-18.

On the trade front, there is a vast potential which is unfortunately, not matched by the figures; bilateral trade in 2011 was around US$ 290 million, down from US$ 310 million in 2010! A fresh thrust to trade between the two nations was attempted to be provided by the visit of President Nazarbayev to India in January 2009, wherein many agreements were signed between the two nations; this was followed by another round of accords during Dr Manmohan Singh’s visit in 2011; notwithstanding the many pacts and promises, only six Indian companies are accredited with Kazakhstan and only nine joint ventures are registered [Kazakhstan has about 3,500 Non-Resident Indians (NRIs), including 200 students of medical courses]. There are promising opportunities for trade and collaboration in many spheres, primary among them being those of oil and gas exploration, civil nuclear energy, metals and minerals, agriculture, Information Technology (IT), education and defence.

**STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF KAZAKHSTAN**

Does India realise the strategic importance of Kazakhstan? If one was to ask this question in the ‘corridors of power’, the answer would be an emphatic affirmative; but the actions do not seem to indicate so.

Diplomatic relations between the two nations were established in 1992 and they do seem to have developed and matured over the years. India recognises the unique status of Kazakhstan in Central Asia, it being the second largest country in the former Soviet Republic. Recent regional developments, in and around Central Asia and India’s growing energy needs, have further highlighted the strategic importance of the country vis-a-vis India, to forge long-term relations.

Kazakhstan successfully completed its tenure as Chairman of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010; it organised the first ever CICA-OSCE meeting in Istanbul in June 2010, just before relinquishing its chairmanship, an event much appreciated by the Western nations. It has an active voice in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and SCO, both forums being of importance to India for regional security and economic reasons.
The country is also a contributor towards providing stability and peace in Afghanistan, which is also on India’s security horizon. President Nazarbayev has launched a US$ 50 million educational programme to train 1,000 Afghan nationals in Kazakhstan while also physically participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Kazakhstan is a self-proclaimed nuclear weapon-free nation, having renounced its nuclear arsenal, the fourth largest in the world, that it possessed at the time of independence from the Soviet Union, thus, forfeiting the temptation to become the first Muslim nuclear-weapon nation. It also voluntarily shut down the nuclear testing site at Semipalatinsk, a gesture recognised by the UN General Assembly in December 2009, by declaring August 29 as the International Day against Nuclear Tests. Such decisions defined it as a peaceful state wishing to build normal, lasting and mutually beneficial relations with other nations of the world, while significantly contributing to the strengthening of international security and nuclear non-proliferation.

The country is politically stable and a growing economy in the region. Its international reserves stand at about US$ 60 billion; in 2010 the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased by 7 per cent, industrial production by 10 per cent and growth in manufacturing industries reached 19 per cent. The GDP per capita in 1994, just after it declared independence, was a shade above US$700, increasing to around US$ 12,000 in 2012, coming out successfully from the global economic crisis. These indicators and other strengths underscore the role Kazakhstan is poised to play in the region.

INDIA AND KAZAKHSTAN: THE WAY AHEAD

The last visit of President Nazarbayev during which he witnessed India’s 60th Republic Day celebrations, was a pointer to the increasing importance that India now attaches to its strategic ties with his country, a fact acknowledged by him too. During this visit, Kazakhstan and India signed the Declaration of Strategic Partnership between the two nations, which included important agreements/Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) for cooperation in civil nuclear energy, space research, hydrocarbons and legislation covering an extradition treaty and a protocol on the accession of Kazakhstan to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In
addition, President Nazarbayev also expressed his country’s serious commitment to fight the scourge of global and regional terrorism and religious extremism. India, hence, finds Kazakhstan significant for three main reasons – its strategic location, its vast energy and mineral resources, and its secular and composite social structure.

With huge reserves of uranium and hydrocarbons, uranium deposits constituting about 17 per cent of the world’s total, Kazakhstan is of immense importance to India for its energy security. The nuclear agreement signed with Kazakhstan makes it the fourth country besides the US, France, and Russia that would supply uranium to India for civilian energy purposes; as per an agreement signed in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Kazakhstan has promised to supply to India, more than 2,000 tons of uranium by 2014. However, although the agreement signed with Kazakhstan assures long-term uranium supply, the pricing policy needs to be carefully addressed and continuously monitored by experts in the Indian government. In recent years, uranium prices, like those of oil, have also suffered from erratic market fluctuations. From late 2000 to May 2008, spot prices of uranium fluctuated by 1,840 per cent, from US$7 a pound to US$136. According to Fortune magazine (March 27, 2008), “…worldwide, 34 new reactors are under construction, and 280 are being planned or proposed”; the main reasons for such wide fluctuations being the demand for clean energy as well as the need to diversify the sources of energy due to unstable oil and gas prices in recent years. Considering the increasing numbers of nuclear reactors all over the world, in spite of the Fukushima disaster in Japan, it is widely believed that the current uranium prices would not stabilise in the near future.

Energy collaboration between Kazakhstan and India is not restricted just to nuclear fuel; Kazakhstan has huge hydrocarbon reserves too. It has approximately 40 billion barrels of oil reserves, which could well increase up to 100 billion barrels by 2015. Gas reserves in Kazakhstan comprise approximately three trillion cubic metres and it is expected to increase its annual gas output to roughly 70 billion cubic metres by 2015. With the agreement signed during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit in May 2011, India has achieved a major breakthrough in the Central Asian energy sector and this will help diversify its oil acquisitions.
Considering the potential, the current scale of economic interactions, including trade and investment between the two countries, is, however, not large, a view shared by President Nazarbayev who said that “...Captains of Indian industry should not hesitate or be shy of taking advantage of the positive investment climate in Kazakhstan”. Kazakhstan, remains the largest trading partner for India among the Central Asian Republics (CARs), accounting for more than 70 per cent of total trade between India and the CARs. Kazakhstan provides huge scope for investment for the Indian industry in diverse fields, the main being pharmaceuticals, IT and oil and gas exploration.

Kazakhstan hosts the famous Baikonur Cosmodrome. Despite being a major centre for space research, Kazakhstan was more or less a passive partner of Russia and has continued to remain so. The current agreement signed between India and Kazakhstan is expected to assist the Kazakh space programme in a big way, with Kazakhstan expecting technology transfers from India in the space arena.

Another area where Kazakhstan has shown interest in developing relations with India is the defence sector, particularly boosting its arms exports and aerospace collaboration. Having been a part of the former USSR, Kazakhstan holds some military interest for India. The Indian Navy is currently equipped with hundreds of torpedoes that were produced in Kazakhstan during the Soviet era. Kazakh specialists in this field are expecting to carve out and cultivate their own niche within the Indian naval arms market. The armed forces have not only served to maintain domestic and regional security but also participate on a permanent basis within the framework of international organisations such as the SCO, and NATO in Iraq.

A main obstacle in developing India’s trade relations with Kazakhstan is probably the absence of a direct means of transportation. Researchers like Prof P. Stobdan, a distinguished academician, diplomat, author and national security expert, feel that “...economic growth in the Asian region and emerging opportunities for inter-regional trade are creating demand for viable transport connectivity, land-linking arrangements and important transit services.” At best, this can be achieved by reviving and restoring the legendary Silk Route used by traders in ancient times. Some new routes could also
be considered to directly connect India, China and Central Asia, as suggested by Professor Stobdan.

Modern Kazakhstan, being strategically placed in the central part of Eurasia, can play the leading role in developing such a route as it has good relations with both China and India, without antagonising Russia and the USA. This would further improve the chances of increasing cooperation among South Asia, Central Asia and China, keeping India at the centre. As a part of a Vision Document for 2030, Kazakhstan has been laying emphasis on development of transport infrastructure; it is reviving a ‘New Silk Route’ by setting up a ‘Western Europe-Western China’ transportation corridor; having built the ‘Uzen-Turkmenistan Border’ railroad, it has opened access to the Gulf and Middle East countries; other projects have either been completed or are well underway.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
India’s interests in Central Asia are well-recognised and accepted by the USA and its allies. With the growing convergence between US and Indian interests, there is commonality in their reluctance to see the region fall under the exclusive influence of either Russia or China. the Indian threat perception in the region was negatively impacted due to the reducing Russian influence in the region in the 1990s, immediately after the break-up of the Soviet Union, with a corresponding increase in Chinese influence; however, after the increased US presence since 2001, the negative threat perceptions have stabilised, with India once again, viewing itself as a security provider and a balancing influence due to its growing economic clout.

When Kazakhstan became free in the turbulent days of December 1991, few would have thought that the country would achieve as much as it has in the last 20 years or so. Experts predicted then that Kazakhstan, having inherited the massive socio-economic, environmental, and political problems from its parent Soviet Union, would also follow a similar path and soon collapse and fail as a sovereign nation. Today, however, Kazakhstan has proved the experts wrong and a strong and capable Kazakhstan holds great promise for the future, justifiably proud of its achievements and yet, fully aware that much more needs to be done.
India-Kazakhstan relations, though warm and friendly, are in need of a massive overhaul, regardless of the numerous visits by the heads of state or senior ministers and high level delegations. The policy brief prior to the Prime Minister’s visit in April 2011, took an overly narrow and short-sighted view rather than looking at a broad-based, strategic, long-term relationship.

The abstract geo-political considerations and the excessive rhetorical focus on nuclear energy and hydrocarbons, distracts, the attention of Indian policy-makers and corporates from the vast, untapped potential of deeper ties across the full spectrum of common interests, including technological cooperation in IT, alternative energy, and space sectors; the rhetoric needs to be reframed to reflect the broader potential of the strategic relationship that can be mutually advantageous to both states by continuing to develop intergovernmental links in “soft” diplomacy areas, including cultural and educational exchanges.

Along with the built-in opportunities in a stronger India-Kazakhstan relationship, come the risks which need to be appreciated if the ties between the two nations are to develop appropriately in the coming decades. Immediate prospects for instability appear to be very limited, but the potential risks should not be made a bone of contention in India’s ties with Kazakhstan. While pursuing a strategic relationship, India should also continuously pursue tactical measures to minimise the risks to the relationship; the bilateral dialogues should go beyond the immediate energy concerns of India, by openly heralding the importance of the strategic relationship through visible promotion in other sectors, including defence and regional security. If India lags behind in the initiative, the equations may change and the power competition in Central Asia will make it difficult for it to pursue its interests in the region. It is, hence, imperative for Indian diplomacy to shed its lethargy and harness the country’s growing profile in the region, to its advantage.
The ‘institution’ of the Dalai Lama is now, more than ever, at the centre of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. Most of the somewhat ‘weak’ evidence given by China in its claims over Tibet revolves around the ties between the Mongol Khans (clearly failing to make a distinction between them and China) and Tibet, and the bestowing of titles on the Dalai Lama by successive Manchu Emperors. However, these attempts by China have been unsuccessful so far, as even at present the ‘cult’ of the Dalai Lama only seems to be growing and getting stronger. With a sharp increase in the number of self-immolations (a total of 113, with 95 being fatal) by the Tibetans fighting for independence, and the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet, it is hard to overlook the hold that he has over the people of Tibet. Further, several remarks by China’s top political leadership highlight the tactics that China is trying to employ in order to, what it terms as, “expose” the Dalai Lama’s façade, accusing him of encouraging self-immolations. For example, the newly elected President Xi Jinping is believed to have stressed the need to “fight against the separatist activities by the Dalai Lama group and completely destroy any attempt to undermine

Ms Simrat Kaur Virk is a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.
stability in Tibet and national unity.”¹ Why the role of the Dalai Lama is central to the conflict is because China sees him as one of the biggest hurdles in its way to integrate Tibet into China. This is mainly due to the support that the Dalai Lama finds among the people of Tibet, who have revered the institution for centuries. Is it true, as is widely believed, that the Tibetans themselves might lose their commitment to the Tibetan cause, with the death of the 14th Dalai Lama?

This paper, therefore, seeks to explore how the Dalai Lama has come to be the face of the Tibetan struggle for independence. While doing this, it attempts to trace the historical background of the evolution of the institution, and how the Dalai Lama, now, by virtue of the position he holds in the hearts of the Tibetan people, is playing a vital role in Sino-Tibetan relations. An attempt will also be made to highlight the role that the Dalai Lama played in the straining of Sino-Indian relations. The conclusion will focus on the future prospects for China and Tibet relations, in a scenario when the present Dalai Lama is no more.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Historical interpretation has shaped most of China’s arguments when it comes to the issue of Tibet or the Dalai Lama who now holds an influential position. Also, it is one of the main arguments that China makes in its ownership claims. Therefore, the historical background of how the institution of the Dalai Lama came about is tremendously important.

Although it is claimed that the Mongols ruled China and Tibet separately, most of the evidence given by China in its claims over Tibet, dates back to the time of the Mongol Empire, also known as the Yuan Dynasty. In fact, even the origin of the title of Dalai Lama, as the Chinese news agency, Xinhua states, “was granted by the central agencies of China’s dynasties”² and not created by Tibetan Buddhism. Using the Dalai Lama (often as a pawn), China realised, would add legitimacy to its ploy in the eyes of the people of Tibet.

Goden Khan was the first Mongol to invade Tibet. Tibet was at that time ruled by Songtsen Gampo of the Yarlung Dynasty. Buddhism, first introduced into Tibet by Songtsen Gampo, especially under the Gelugpa sect, which was flourishing at this time. When faced with the dominant Mongols, the Tibetans realised that they were no match for the invading Mongol Armies and needed urgently to protect their territories. Spirituality came to their rescue here, as Goden Khan, who recognised the importance of spirituality, invited Sakya Pandita, the nephew of Songsten Gampo, to his court to become the Imperial Preceptor. This change of heart benefitted the Tibetans the most, since this was the beginning of the long Choe Yon relationship which became the cornerstone of the relations between the Mongols and the Tibetans and something that the Chinese, at a later stage would exploit in their claims of suzerainty. This priest-patron relationship continued to flourish during the 14th century, wherein in return for spiritual guidance, the Emperors would protect the Sakya Lamas. The Lamas were also given several titles by the Mongol and Manchu rulers. This bestowing of titles on the Lamas often forms the basis of the rather weak claim of suzerainty. Many Indian scholars have been felicitated by foreign universities, but this doesn’t necessarily mean that they’ve lost their Indian citizenship! So the Chinese claim seems basically weak.

RISE OF THE DALAI LAMA
The institution of the Dalai Lama came into prominence with the further advent of the Gelugpa or the Yellow Hats sect. As mentioned earlier, it was founded at the end of the 14th century and flourished thereon. It was in the 14th century primarily that the sect rose to eminence and its influence spread to central Tibet. Altan Khan, a descendant of Kublai Khan, was the first to give the title of the Dalai (originally Talei) Lama, meaning the “Ocean of Wisdom” to Sonam Gyatso, who was his Guru. The titles of the First and the Second Dalai Lamas were given retrospectively to Tsong Khapa and Gedun Gyatso respectively after the death of Sonam Gyatso. Further, with the ascent of the Gelugpa sect, the clerical office of the Dalai Lama also rose, and

3. Goden Khan was the grandson of Ghengis Khan.
4. Also known as the Yellow Hat sect of Tibetan Buddhism.
5. See Choe-Yon, Priest-Patron.
he also began to serve as the head of the Tibetan traditional council. It was during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) in China when, in order to keep the military threat from the Mongols at bay, there was a surge in the number of titles that were bestowed on senior Lamas from Tibet. The Chinese perhaps thought that through these titles given to the ‘priests’ they could manipulate the ‘patrons’. Two important questions that arise here are: what was the status of Tibet during the Ming Dynasty, and why was there a need on China’s part to protect itself from the Mongol threat if most of its claim relies on the fact that the Chinese were not separate from the Mongols? Isn’t it true, that for all practical purposes, Tibet was independent during the time of the Ming Dynasty?

It was during the reign of the Fifth Dalai Lama, also known as the Great Fifth that the political structure in Tibet became a little more organised and definite. Under the patronage of Gushri Khan, the Dalai Lama set up a new form of government known as the Kashag, with himself as its head. The Dalai Lama remained the head of the Kashag until 1959 and came to be the spiritual and the temporal head of Tibet. The Kashag is still being maintained by the Central Tibetan Authority (CTA) in Dharamsala (in India) with Lobsang Sangay as its Kalon Tripa or Prime Minister. This was shortly after the Dalai Lama gave up his temporal role and resigned as the leader of the CTA in 2011.

The Thirteenth Dalai Lama, seizing the opportunity provided by a weakened Qing Dynasty in 1912, declared an independent Tibet, while also expelling the last of the Chinese officials stationed at Lhasa. The Chinese, for whom the idea of ‘loss of face’ is prime, were deeply angered by this, and part of the anti-Dalai Lama propaganda can be viewed as an attempt to avenge this ‘humiliation’.

It is true that the Chinese realised, although a little late, that the only way to exert influence over Tibet was through their leader and, therefore, the Dalai Lama. The people of Tibet, as we know, revere the Dalai Lama and look to him not only for guidance on spiritual aspects but also on all other aspects, although he has given up his temporal role. China knew that once it succeeded in controlling the Dalai Lama, there would be an acceptance of the
legitimacy of Chinese rule in the minds of the Tibetan people. So their historical claim on Tibet centred on the history and the origin of the Dalai Lama. Unfortunately, very little attention to the roots of history was paid in India.

**DALAI LAMA: SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS**

It is also worth underlining how the Dalai Lama has influenced China’s bilateral ties with its immediate neighbour and thereby impacted the peace and stability of the entire Asian region. The Dalai Lama became the tipping point of the breakdown in Sino-Indian relations. It was the flight of the Dalai Lama, and him being granted asylum by the Government of India, that led to the ultimate breakdown in Sino-Indian relations. As Natwar Singh states in his book, *My China Diary*, “The day the Dalai Lama walked into India in the end of March 1959, the character and content of Sino-India relations altered drastically. By the time Zhou Enlai came to India in 1960, the point of no return had almost been reached.”

The fact that India has provided a safe haven to the Dalai Lama and thousands of other Tibetans hasn’t gone down well with the Chinese, and continues to be a bone of contention between the two neighbours. Tibet, under the guidance of the Dalai Lama, established the Central Tibet Administration, commonly known as the Tibetan Government In Exile (TGIE), and is said to be the representative of the people of Tibet. This fact irks the Chinese the most, who feel that there is too much interference by India in its internal matters (Tibet being an internal Chinese issue). In fact, one of the primary reasons for the Sino-Indian War in 1962, according to experts, was that China (under the leadership of Mao) wanted to “teach India a lesson.” Despite repeated assurances given by successive Indian Prime Ministers that Tibetan activities will be controlled on Indian soil, there exists a trust deficit between the two countries.

Even China’s reaction to the Dalai Lama being awarded the Nobel Prize was centred on the claim that there had been too much interference by other countries in its ‘internal’ issues. All matters relating to Tibet and the Dalai Lama, they claim, are strictly China’s concern, and no other country should interfere.

THE PANCHEN LAMA
Any discussion about the Dalai Lama is incomplete without highlighting the position and the role of the Panchen Lama. The Panchen Lama is considered to be the second highest ranking Lama after the Dalai Lama, and has in the past served as a replacement to the Dalai Lama during the intervening period between the death of the Dalai Lama and the selection of a new one. As a result of this, the Tibetans consider the Dalai Lama and curiously, also the Panchen Lama to be supreme in spiritual matters. This lack of differentiation has been skilfully used by the Chinese in their anti-Dalai Lama propaganda. The Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama have been at loggerheads even in the past. For example the Ninth Panchen Lama (1883-1937) fled to Mongolia after a dispute with the Dalai Lama over the issue of taxes. This kind of a strained relationship had been used by China to its advantage. In 1950, when Mao invaded Tibet, the Panchen Lama supported China’s claim on Tibet, as a result of which he was appointed Acting Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, a post previously held by the Dalai Lama. More recently, in March 2013, the Panchen Lama was appointed as a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference National Committee, one of the China’s top political advisory bodies. The Eleventh Panchen Lama also came out strongly against the riots that erupted in 2008, stating that the acts “not only harmed the interests of the nation and the people, but also violated the aims of Buddhism.” However, it is important to stress on the fact that the present Panchen Lama has been selected by China, and the status of the Dalai Lama’s choice is unknown. The Panchen Lama, therefore, is manipulated by the Communist regime in China and more often than not, tows their line. Since the Panchen Lama plays an important role in the selection of the next Dalai Lama, this move has been viewed as extremely clever. With the Panchen Lama on their side, the Chinese can influence the next selection. The Panchen Lama, therefore, is seen as a conduit for China in its attempt to win over the confidence of the people of Tibet. The Dalai Lama, however, has

strongly disapproved of the Panchen Lama being used as a puppet in the hands of China.

What is the present status of the Panchen Lama who was selected by the present Dalai Lama? While the Chinese claim that he is safe and leading a normal life, there are slight discrepancies in their details of his exact whereabouts, with some presuming that he is dead.

THE MIDDLE WAY APPROACH
The (present) Fourteenth Dalai Lama has proposed what is called the “Middle Way of Autonomy” to resolve the issue of the independence of Tibet; a solution that he says should be acceptable to Tibet as well as China. The Dalai Lama pioneered efforts all through the early 1950s to rework the Seventeen-Point Agreement, which he claimed was signed under duress. Not achieving much success, he was forced to seek asylum in India. The negotiations for the “Middle Way” are somewhat analogous to those of the above mentioned agreement. The Middle Way approach was adopted by the Dalai Lama, after talks with Deng Xiaoping who told him rather categorically that “except independence, all other issues can be resolved through negotiations”. The Middle Way approach, as proposed by the Dalai Lama, does not seek independence for Tibet which, the Tibetans claim, is a historical fact. Treading a cautious and middle path, it suggests autonomy for the three traditional provinces of Tibet within the framework of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This autonomy should be governed by the independently elected legislature and executive that is elected through a democratic process. In a clear softening of the Dalai Lama’s stand on Tibet, he has agreed that once the above criteria are fulfilled, the Tibetans will not seek separation, and will work within the framework of the PRC. While the central government of the PRC will be responsible for the political aspects of Tibet’s international relations and defence, the people of Tibet will concern themselves with all matters relating to Tibet such as religion and culture, education, economy, environmental protection to name a few. The Chinese, the approach goes on to suggest, should stop all human rights’ violations and the transfer of Chinese nationals to Tibetan areas. The Dalai Lama will be responsible for all negotiations pertaining to the approach with China. To give an example of the
hold that the Dalai Lama has over the Tibetans, nearly 64 percent of the Tibetans were in support of the Middle Way approach and did not feel the need for a referendum. The Dalai Lama’s Middle Way of autonomy has been rejected by groups such as the Tibetan Youth Congress and the Young Tigers, who are willing to consider violence as an approach.

**CONCLUSION: EMERGING SCENARIOS**

There hasn’t been much shift in China’s Tibet policy in recent years. Protests by Tibetan nationals are seen by China as being encouraged by the Dalai Lama and, what they call his “clique”. A report in The Hindu newspaper last year stated that the Chinese will “resolutely crush” any activities that destabilise peace in the Tibetan areas of western China. Jia Qinglin, a senior Politburo member and the highest official in charge of ethnic affairs in China said, “The clique of the Dalai Lama are trying in vain to continuously create incidents in Tibet and Tibetan occupied areas”. Further, he is believed to have said that the Dalai Lama clique’s conspiracy “to make Tibetan areas unstable, needs to be resolutely crushed”. China also claims, as mentioned earlier, that it is the Dalai Lama indeed who encourages self-immolations by the Tibetan agitators. Part of their anti-Dalai Lama propaganda revolves around this. They say that the idea of self-immolations goes against the basic tenets of Buddhism, and by encouraging these, the Dalai Lama isn’t being loyal to Buddhism.

As has been discussed earlier, China and Tibet are now facing two possible scenarios when it comes to the issue of the future, after the Dalai Lama is no more, and its implications on the Tibet agitation. For China: with the death of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, China can possibly use the Panchen Lama, who, as stated earlier, has been propped up by China, to bring about a change among the people of Tibet which will further help in toning down of the Tibetans’ agitation. Also, with the Panchen Lama as a Chinese puppet, China can indirectly have a say in the selection of the next Dalai Lama,

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thereby influencing negotiations between Tibet and China. Secondly, although it seems to be an unlikely scenario, given the “Middle Kingdom Syndrome” and the Chinese obsession with expanding their territory, the Chinese accept the Middle Path approach that has been proposed by the present Dalai Lama. For the Tibetans: the death of the Dalai could hold serious and unfortunate repercussions. Firstly, the agitation, without the Dalai Lama at its helm, could possibly die out, and the fact that Tibet is a part of China, will have to be accepted as a fact accompli. Another picture is that the present agitation, in the absence of a moderate leader, could get out of hand. We have also seen a sharp rise in the number of self-immolations and the fact that the Middle Way approach has been rejected by some Tibetan groups, so there is a possibility of violent clashes resulting in destabilisation in this region.

We can conclude that in China, the Dalai Lama faces a formidable adversary. He must, therefore, push for a peaceful settlement of the dispute through negotiations. The hold that he has over the people of Tibet remains unchallenged; therefore, he ought to ensure that the crisis is resolved in his lifetime. Although he has hinted that his successor will not necessarily be from Tibet, it is important that the next Dalai Lama should push for a peaceful settlement of the dispute; which should have something for the people of Tibet as well as China, and, as a result, be an important catalyst for peace and stability in the region.
MASS EXODUS: A GEO-POLITICAL TREND

The geo-political environment all over the world is in a state of uneasy equilibrium. There was simmering discontent in Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, Egypt and now, Syria. Stoked by the social media, the street demonstrations metamorphosed into ideological and human rights movements in those countries. Like wars, such crusades/movements force people, particularly of foreign origin and ethnicity residing in the disturbed regions to flee the host countries in turmoil. The fleeing population incurs the wrath of one or more forces involved in the dispute. Occasionally, they suffer at the hands of the local population. Natural fears and situational compulsions force the masses to rush to temporary or permanent havens. The flight of people forced by the instinctive need for safety is quite often marked by violence. In fact, very few exoduses in the world history have been accomplished peacefully, without bloodshed. Millions died in the communal clashes as they crossed the borders following the partition of India in 1947; very few lucky ones could be airlifted and escaped the ire of the angry mobs.

Group Captain Ashok K. Chordia is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.
The economic reforms of the last two decades in the country and the increased business and work opportunities abroad have encouraged large numbers of Indians to emigrate. According to some estimates, there are over six million Indian expatriates in the Persian Gulf region alone. They look up to the government to stand by them in their times of need. Regardless of the country, the Indians abroad are entitled to government assistance in times of need and consular protection at all times; it is a sovereign obligation on the part of the government, to protect them. Precarious political stability in some parts of the world, Asia and Africa in particular, portends frequent development of crisis situations leading to an exodus, more often than in the past. There is an ever-lurking need of bailing out expatriates from crisis situations. The numbers to be succoured depend on the nature of the crisis but on all such occasions, time is at a premium and the means determine the ends.

**CHOICE OF MEANS FOR EVACUATION**

Surface means of evacuation, sea means in particular, can evacuate fairly large numbers of people very efficiently. But when time is at a premium, surface means may not be the *ultimate* choice. The following facts illustrate the point. Indian warships were in the Mediterranean region when the need arose to evacuate Indians from the conflict zone in Lebanon (Operation Sukoon, 2006) and were pressed into action immediately. INS Mumbai, one of the warships involved in the evacuation, ferried nearly 1,500 people to Cyprus (about 250 km away) in three shuttles spread over six days.\(^1\) Beyond Cyprus, most of them were airlifted. To address a similar crisis in Libya five years later, the warships of the Indian Navy set course from Mumbai (Operation Safe Homecoming, 2011).\(^2\) They took more than a week to reach the region. Meanwhile, civilian chartered ships, available more readily in the region, evacuated part of the distressed population. In due course, some airports in Libya, which were unavailable initially, also became available. Air India and the Indian Air Force (IAF) also chipped in.

At a cruising speed of 15 knots, a warship of the kinds used for evacuation in Operation Sukoon would take more than four days to cover the distance of nearly 1,500 nautical miles (nm) between Mumbai and Kuwait. An IL-76 aircraft with a capacity to carry 210 passengers\(^3\) and a speed of 750 kilometres per hour (kmph) can commence evacuation within hours of a green signal and can ferry people out of harm’s way more speedily. Surface means of evacuation, despite their higher throughput,\(^4\) are unable to provide the expected succour that the affected population deserves instantly.

There is more to a decision to select means for evacuation than elementary arithmetical calculations of throughput/ tonnage, time, speed, etc. In rare circumstances, evacuation by surface means may be a preferred option. Arguments and justifications notwithstanding, the earned experience emphasises the need of a reliable airlift capability for most contingencies.

**NEED FOR PREPAREDNESS**

As has been the experience, and as the trend suggests, geo-political scenarios deteriorate at a tremendous pace. Events occur and become unmanageable in short spans of time. The available response time seems to be diminishing with each crisis. Airlift may or may not be resorted to in every future situation, but in a majority of cases, it will be the choice for evacuation. Therefore, there is a need for eternal preparedness. Since airlift resources are meagre and are often committed, judicious planning and employment is the way to satisfy the needs.\(^5\) Invention or reinvention of procedures when crisis erupts, serves little purpose. Preparedness, founded on experience and anticipated needs, is sure to stand the coordinators and operators in good stead when the need arises.

The air evacuation of Indian expatriates from Kuwait (1990) was the biggest ever evacuation by air.\(^6\) It was perhaps the “biggest

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3. This prescribed capacity can be increased as the aircraft can airlift a payload of 40 tonnes.
4. Throughput is the product of payload and the distance that payload can be moved in a day. Despite low throughput, airlift has a distinct advantage over sealift – an aircraft can begin delivering cargo much sooner than a ship. Criticality is a major criterion for selection of a means.
5. During the expulsion of Asians from Uganda (1972), India had literally disowned some of its expatriates with British passports apparently, because of lack of capacity to evacuate them.
strategic airlift since World War II”. In critical circumstances, the airlift turned out to be a success in as much as it met the need of the hour. A revisit and reflection on the conduct of that historical airlift will help better preparedness in future.

IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT (1990) NECESSITATES EVACUATION OF EXPATRIATES

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces moved into Kuwait marking the beginning of a long drawn war in the region. Military manoeuvres following the occupation threatened the survival of the foreigners of all nationalities holed up in Kuwait. Evacuation of the expatriates became a high priority for the diplomatic missions of all the countries. Indian embassies/ missions in the region coordinated the air evacuation of the Indians. Air India and the IAF together provided succour to the stranded expatriates. It has been nearly a quarter of a century since the Kuwait airlift. Several small airlifts have been undertaken in this period; more air evacuations in the future cannot be ruled out. A close look at those airlifts suggests that none, including the Kuwait airlift, has been absolutely free of glitches.

Discussed here is the airlift undertaken to evacuate Indians from Kuwait. The main source of information in the open domain is K. P. Fabian’s “ORAL HISTORY” account published in the Indian Foreign Affairs Journal. K. P. Fabian is the former Indian Ambassador to Qatar, Finland and Italy. He was the Head of the Gulf Division of the Ministry of External Affairs during the First Gulf War. He was very closely associated with the air evacuation. His recount published nearly 20 years after the air evacuation, is vivid. It, however, throws no light on the significant role played by the IAF. Air Mshl A. K. Goel (Retd), in an interview to the author, spoke of the IAF’s contribution.

US REALISM AND PREPAREDNESS; INDIAN LACK OF ANTICIPATION AND SLOW RESPONSE

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US had been visualising a possible scenario: Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. At the time when Iraqi
troops were actually entering Kuwait, Gen Norman Schwarzkopf, was monitoring a military simulation exercise with similar settings (Iraqi troops storming into Kuwait) in Florida. Realism in the military exercise, and preparedness on the part of the US armed forces, ensured the arrival of the first contingent of American troops in Saudi Arabia in less than a week of the Iraqi invasion. The Indians had not anticipated an invasion – they were not ready with a response. As a result, a delegation reached Kuwait via Baghdad twelve days after the invasion to arrange repatriation of Indians. In those twelve days, the atmosphere had become increasingly volatile, threatening even the civilian flights in the region. The accrued wisdom of the Ugandan crisis (1972) had not been put to use – the magnitude of airlift required to evacuate people had still not been worked out.

RESPONSE TO THE CALL OF DUTY
Problems cropped up even before commencement of the airlift. It so happened that one set of Air India crew was stranded in Kuwait having flown in on an earlier flight. The Air India pilots and staff “threatened” that unless the crew was got out of Kuwait, they would ground all the flights. According to Fabian, “The threat was indeed serious.” The IAF placed six IL-76 aircraft along with the crew under the operational control of Air India for the evacuation. They operated from Mumbai and effected at least 25 percent of the air evacuation. More importantly, the IAF pilots evacuated Indians from Basra and Kuwait10 – difficult airports to operate from, considering the clouds of war. The Air India pilots operated from Amman, a relatively safer airport. To be able to avail airlift from Amman, the people had to travel by road from Kuwait to Amman via Iraq. They were exposed to the dangers of the war zone for the duration of their road journey.

COMPILATION OF DATA FOR EVACUATION
Absence of data for effecting air evacuation was not new to the Indian planners. Under similar circumstances, during the evacuation of expatriates from Uganda (1972),11 initially people felt that Idi Amin

10. Air Mshl A. K. Goel (Retd), Director Operations (Transport & Helicopter) at Air Headquarters at the time of the airlift, in an interview to the author on January 31, 2013.
11. Niranjan Desai, “Revisiting the 1972 Expulsion of Asians from Uganda”, in Fabian, n. 6, pp. 446-458
would not carry out his threat of expulsion of Asians. Thereafter, compilation of data was hamstrung by the rather primitive communication systems. Therefore, the planning and execution of the evacuation was somewhat slow. Meanwhile, those who rushed to the border by rail/road to cross over into Kenya were harassed by the authorities and robbed by the locals. Little was learnt from that experience. The data on the numbers wanting to be evacuated, in this case (Kuwait) too, had not been compiled until the arrival of the Indian delegation. People were hiriedly asked to assemble in a hotel so that evacuation in the first aircraft, an IL-76 aircraft of the IAF carrying the delegation headed by the Foreign Minister, could be worked out. Among those given high priority for evacuation were healthy and wealthy men with recommendations in the form of priority slips signed by the Indian Foreign Minister. One of their qualifications for preference was that they hailed from a certain part of India. Regional representation continued to get weightage. Non-availability of data in the first place, coupled with skewed prioritisation for evacuation was a bone of contention and caused avoidable hold-ups and delays.

**SKEWED PRIORITISATION HAMPERS AIRLIFT**

Absence of statistical data for airlift appears to be a less significant administrative issue. Not really! It had an adverse domino effect on the airlift operation. Lack of data and skewed prioritisation delayed the arrival of people at the airport; the delayed arrival at the airport implied delayed take-off and delayed take-off meant that the pilots would exceed their stipulated duty hours by the time they landed in Bombay. Flying more than the stipulated flying hours is against the laid down aeromedical norms. So the Air India crew expressed their unwillingness to fly. It was a genuine flight safety concern. Rather than ensuring prompt availability of passengers, deliberate false praise was showered on the Air India pilots in the local newspaper. The pilots’ guild/association succumbed to good media coverage – there were no more problems thereafter.

Faced with a similar situation during the Sino-India War (1962) the IAF aircrew had responded very differently. When the transport aircrew were overworked, having been on their feet for nearly 48 hours, young fighter pilots with no experience on the type (IL-
14), took control of the transport aircraft after take-off and flew the machines till landing to give in-flight rest to the fatigued transport pilots.  

**A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT**

Iraq entered Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The evacuation commenced on August 13 and ended on October 11, 1990. In nearly 500 sorties spread over 60 days, Air India and the IAF together airlifted 1,76,000 Indians. As stated earlier, six IL-76 aircraft of the IAF airlifted nearly 25 percent of the evacuees. Simple arithmetical calculations using the above figures suggest that the IAF flew out nearly 750 passengers per day. That number (750) seems insignificant because an IL-76 aircraft can carry 126 paratroopers in the normal mode and 226 passengers when modified with the passenger deck. Considering the payload capacity of the aircraft (40 tonnes), in extreme emergencies when lives are at stake, it may be possible to carry more passengers, in discomfort though (say, 250 per sortie on an average). Thus, even if each of the IL-76s had flown a sortie a day, the daily output should have been 1,500 passengers, double that of the actual output. There are reasons for the apparent gap between capacity and actual output.

**REASONS FOR APPARENT ‘LESS THAN CAPACITY’ OUTPUT**

A closer look at the airlift operation brings out the reasons for the apparent less than the capacity output. Some are listed below:

- As brought out earlier, absence of data on the requirement of airlift and skewed prioritisation caused avoidable administrative difficulties, leading to delays.
- It being a state of war, air space was not available for the asking. There were many countries trying to airlift their people and the air space was crammed.
- An influx of airlift aircraft from many countries led to a clamour for parking bays and support facilities. Kuwait airport under siege offered minimal ground facilities. Keeping the turnaround time low under such conditions was a tall order. It added to the woes of the organisers and passengers alike.

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13. According to Air Cmde Jasjit Singh (Retd), the number was 1,71,824.
• A few corridors in time and space were possible in which air evacuation could take place. Airlifters had to adhere to those corridors to avoid accidental interception by US/ Iraqi aircraft/ missiles – limiting further the number of aircraft that could fly in/ out of the area in the given time.
• The airlift aircraft did not fly a straight path between Kuwait/ Amman and Delhi. They were required to avoid overflying certain regions (like Pakistan) due to political compulsions. Circuitous routes prolonged each sortie. Increased flying time meant consumption of more fuel mandating additional refuelling.
• Refuelling in Basra/ Kuwait/ Amman may not have been an easy option because of the declared hostilities, necessitating at least one en route landing for refuelling, thereby increasing the duration of each sortie and reducing the number of sorties that could be flown in a day.
• Administrative difficulties, lack of basic support systems and prolonged sorties caused crew fatigue. Air India pilots objected to flying more hours than their stipulated duty hours. It goes to the credit of the IAF pilots that this issue was handled in a professional manner. There was no report of an IAF pilot expressing his unwillingness to fly due to fatigue.
• All the above problems were magnified to varying degrees for want of a good communication system. It was the later half of 1990 and unrestricted use of mobile phone communication was still a way off – a facility, which would have made a phenomenal difference.

POINTS TO PONDER
Availability of safe time and space corridors will always constrict the airlift capability in a threatened air space – very little can be done to overcome such hindrances. However, improvement in other areas can enhance efficiency. Some of them are listed below:
• **Situational Awareness:** Realistic analysis of events and developments around the world, and prompt action when the concern grows, can produce a better response and enable prompt commencement of airlift well before the crisis escalates to unmanageable proportions.
• **Administrative Preparedness:** In these days of near real-time communication at all levels, it should be possible to generate data instantly to plan and undertake airlifts. In fact, the embassies/missions abroad must have a ready reckoner of the expatriates. There must be clearly laid down priorities for evacuation and the same must be adhered to with transparency to avoid administrative hold ups/delays.

• **Workable Plans:** Embassies and the expatriates must build a database of options – airfields and alternate airfields that can be used in emergencies. With the induction of the C-130J Super Hercules and C-17 Globemaster III, it may now be possible to carry out airlifts from semi/unprepared airstrips. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and plans must be in place and revised periodically to address emerging compulsions.

• **Minimising Turnaround Time:** This is an area, which has a lot of room for improvement. Work-studies to fine-tune support services and operations can bring down turnaround times drastically. The Over the Hump Airlift (1942-45) and the Berlin Airlift (1948-49) are epitomes of such efforts.

• **Ensuring Crew Comfort:** For reasons of flight safety, aircrew cannot be stressed beyond limits. But it is always possible to ensure that they are least harassed and fatigued. Simple steps in this direction can accrue rich dividends.

• **Matching the Machine Performance:** Modern aircraft have unprecedented endurance and range. Aerial refuelling magnifies the airborne time of an aircraft. A single set of crew cannot possibly match the endurance of an aircraft. *Slip crews* on board an aircraft can increase efficiency substantially.

• **Operation in Threatened Environment:** Military pilots are trained and psychologically prepared to operate in a hostile environment. Civilian pilots are expected to rise to the occasion and accept similar challenges. But because of their upbringing and cognitive past, their response to situations cannot be predicted. This aspect must be borne in mind while planning airlifts.

14. Additional crew on board an aircraft to relieve the main crew in flight and enable uninterrupted operations.
APPROACH TOWARDS FUTURE AIR EVACUATIONS

The approach to future air evacuations must flow from some basics. The first and the most important is that the safety, security and well-being of all Indians abroad, regardless of their status, is the moral obligation of the government. A country that aspires to be a world leader cannot ignore the concerns of its diaspora scattered all over the world. Most sincere efforts must be put in to recover people from wherever and whenever required. A positive response to their distress call is a projection of the diplomatic prowess of the country.

That air evacuation would be a primary choice during a crisis is a given. It may or may not be possible to muster adequate airlift resources to meet each contingency. There are bound to be operational limitations and situational constraints, political or otherwise, which will stymie the efforts. The focus, therefore, must be on preparedness borne out of past experience and anticipated needs.

People will always matter – both the distressed ones, and those providing succour. The best and the worst responses of people will surface in times of crisis. Situations will throw up difficult choices – “to leave people behind to be killed” or “to airlift some extra people with a calculated risk”. The right education of the evacuee and the saviour when the sky is blue, will give the wisdom and the power to move mountains.

What you leave behind is not what is engraved in stone monuments, but what is woven into the lives of others.

— Pericles, Greek Statesman and General

Note: This article reflects the views and conclusions of the author and not necessarily the opinions or policy of the Centre or any other institution.

15. During the Ugandan Crisis, Indians with British passports were literally disowned by both India and Britain. Indian reluctance was surprising in the light of the fact that India had accepted waves of Bangladeshi refugees just a year earlier. The Indian acceptance of Tibetans is also well known.
AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

K.N. TENNYSON

The ANA [Afghan National Army] are a very capable organization; they’ve been fighting and protecting their own people for a very long time,…they are at a stage now that [shows] they are ready to deploy, we are just doing final assessments before they go out there.

— Capt. Raj Chetty,
3 Royal Australian Regiment Task Group.

The ANA is not ready to take over maintenance responsibilities. The ANA’s procedures are significantly different from the ones the Coalition uses. Things move much slower through our system than the Coalition can make things happen.

Col. Hadi,
Afghan Ministry of Defence’s Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Department.

Afghanistan is in a state of transition. The US security forces have begun pulling out of Afghanistan, as a pledge by President

Dr K.N. Tennyson is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.
Barack Obama in his address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan on December 1, 2009.\(^1\) By 2014, President Obama expects “the process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible for their own security.”\(^2\) Following the US, other Coalition partners (Belgium, Britain, Canada, Dutch, and French) too have begun withdrawing their troops from Afghanistan in response to their country’s popular public support for the “war sapped at home.”\(^3\)

Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai, having realised the exigency of the political developments taking place in the region, declared to the international community in July 2010, at an international conference on Afghanistan at Kabul, that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will take charge of their country’s security by 2014 and “urged the international backers to distribute more of their development aid through the government.”\(^4\) The reason why President Karzai requested the international community to utilise the developmental aid through the Afghan government is that most of the American-financed development work in Afghanistan has been outsourced to private companies (contractors), and “a whopping 40 percent of the [development] aid that flowed into Afghanistan” went back to the “donor countries in the form of corporate profits and consultant salaries.”\(^5\) For example, a private military companies like “Black Water does not spend all of its funds on its projects in a specific country like Afghanistan,” wrote Musa Khan Jalalzai, executive editor of the Daily Outlook Afghanistan.\(^6\) This brings us to the conclusion that most of the

projects in Afghanistan were carried out taking into consideration the interests and profits of the external powers and not the welfare and development of the Afghans.

President Karzai has long been critical of private contractors operating in Afghanistan, but, at the same time, the US considered him corrupt, inefficient and incompatible. Since the US felt that the Afghan government lacked the capacity to provide Operation and Maintenance (O&M), in July 2010, the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Middle East District, under the direction of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), awarded “two firm-fixed price contracts to ITT [International Telephone & Telegraph] Exelis System Corporation (a Virginia based publicly traded company) to provide O&M for facilities in northern and southern Afghanistan. The contract covering facilities in the northern provinces is valued at $450 million and the contract covering the southern provinces at $350 million. The services include the O&M of buildings, structures, and utility systems and pest control. The contracts also require Exelis to train ANSF workers on the trade skills required for O&M.”

It is clear that ultimately it is the Afghan people who have to defend their country; therefore, the ANSF must learn to shoulder the responsibility as soon as possible. But many experts and security analysts doubt whether the ANSF would really be able to take on this responsibility to secure their country from internal problems and external threats and bring peace and stability to the country. They are of the opinion that it will be a daunting task for the ANSF to maintain law and order and tackle the resurgence of insurgents in the country, as the ANSF are mired by lack of trained manpower, non-professionalism, ethnicisation, fictionalisation, regionalism, and sectarianisation. However, others, like Capt. Raj Chetty, of the 3 Royal Australian Regiment Task Group believe that if the ANSF, especially the ANA, are imparted “[w]ith more knowledge and better training, the ANA can be protectors of [their country] at an even greater level.” Expressing a similar optimistic note, 2nd Lt. Abdul Samad, Commander of the 2nd Battery, 4th Brigade, 205th Corps,

Afghan National Army, claimed that “the ANA have the ability to take care” of their country’s security.8

**THE US DIMENSION**

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been in Afghanistan for more than a decade now, yet, peace and stability remain a distance dream for the Afghans. The chaotic political condition in Afghanistan continues unabated and does not seem to be coming to an immediate end. What has hurt the Afghans the most is the fact that they not only suffer the brunt of the insurgents’ activities but also the offensive military action of the US armed forces. The US, in pursuance of its objective to defeat and eliminate the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other insurgent groups, has deployed massive air and ground forces, thus, indiscriminately shelling and destroying the lives and property of the Afghans, without taking into consideration the impact of the socio-economic, political, security and humanitarian conditions of the Afghans. The use of high-handed techniques by the US causes large scale colossal damage and casualties to the Afghans, thereby, further exacerbating their insecurity. The large scale civilian casualties have aroused strong resentment among the Afghans, which, in turn, has provided opportunities to the Taliban to exploit the sufferings of the Afghans to strengthen their position. The killing of ISAF troops by the Afghan police and security forces is a clear indication that the Taliban have infiltrated the ranks of the Afghan security forces or that the Afghan security forces are working in close collaboration with the Taliban. Ironically, it is not only the insurgent groups that have raised a voice against the presence of the external armed forces in the country. The voice of dissent was also echoed by the democratically elected President of the country, Hamid Karzai. Today, Afghan’s public, politicians and insurgents alike view the presence of the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces in their country as occupying forces. This disturbing development taking place in Afghanistan leads one to believe that there is a serious flaw in the policy of the US and NATO forces, which inadvertently seems to be hindering their operations.

Therefore, it is imperative for the international armed forces to note that they should adopt a more realistic policy while dealing with the Afghans. The goal of thwarting the militants might does not lie in using military force but in winning the hearts and minds of the locals. And one such way to win over the population is to provide them with a measure of security and strengthen local governance. Without adequate security and strong local self-government, the country will remain chaotic and unstable. It’s not that the US is ignorant of the impact of the use of military force. In fact, in June 2009, Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, former American commander in Afghanistan, openly acknowledged the negative effects of the use of military power (US air strikes) and observed that reducing civilian casualties was essential to the US’ credibility on the war against terrorism, signalling a paradigm shift in US foreign policy. Yet, Afghan civilians continue to suffer from the assault of the external power’s air power (drone attacks), compelling President Karzai to often protest against these callous actions. This does not deny the fact that the numbers of civilian casualties by the Taliban-led insurgents too have increased considerably over the past few months.

THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE IN AFGHANISTAN

Two days after the attacks on the US (September 13, 2001), US Senator John McCain declared on the Senate floor that the US “campaign [against the Taliban and Al Qaeda militants] will be long and difficult, and will not end with the capture or destruction of Osama bin Laden alone.” As predicted by Senator McCain, the war on terror does not seem to be coming to an immediate end. The Taliban have regrouped, reequipped, and have come back to haunt Afghanistan. Today, there is no other greater challenge the Afghans and the people of the region

face than the resurgence of the Taliban and other insurgent groups in Afghanistan. It has stalled peace, stability and socio-economic development in the country.

The UN-mandated ISAF was created to protect the Afghan people and assist the Afghan government “in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces” in accordance with the Bonn Conference of December 5, 2001. At the initial stage of the formation of the new Afghan National Army, Afghan National Guard and Afghan Police Force, Britain, French, Germany and the US took on the responsibility of their recruitment and training. In 2002, India, one of the important regional players, though not part of the ISAF, volunteered to train the Afghan armed forces officers. Since then, small contingents of Afghan armed force officers are being trained in various Indian military officers training academies.

The ISAF mission was initially limited to Kabul and its surrounding areas (northern part of the country). However, with the NATO countries taking over the command of the ISAF in August 2003, its mission was subsequently extended to the entire country. As of October 2012, the ISAF consists of 104,905 troops from 50 nations, which include all the 28 NATO allies and 22 non-NATO partner nations. The ISAF conducts “security and stability operations throughout the country together with the [ANSF] and [is] directly involved in the development of the [ANSF] through mentoring, training and equipping.” The ISAF mission in Afghanistan was further extended by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on September 19, 2007, for another year beyond October 13, 2007, vide Resolution 1776 (2007). The UNSC took the decision “[s]tressing the need for further progress in security sector reform, including further strengthening of the Afghan National Army and Police, disbandment of illegal armed groups, justice

sector reform and counter-narcotics.”

Today, the most serious soft underbelly of Afghanistan lies in the security domain. Therefore, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (the formal decision-making body for Afghanistan and international coordination), having felt that Afghanistan needs a robust security force to contain internal disturbances and external threats after the withdrawal of the ISAF, recommended an increase in the Afghan National Army (ANA) to 195,000 and Afghan National Police (ANP) to 157,000 personnel by October 2012; Afghan Air Force (AAF) personnel to 8,000 and 140 aircraft by 2016; Afghan Local Police (ALP, established in July 2010) to 29,750, and Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) to approximately 30,000 guards by March 2013.

The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), which was set up in November 2009, “bringing together NATO and national training efforts under one umbrella,” carried out the responsibility of recruitment for the ANSF personnel. Currently, 38 countries are contributing to NTN-A. The ANSF are recruited by NTM-A through a scrutiny process, which includes “an eight-step vetting process.” This is done keeping in mind the “complex interaction between recruiting, retention and attrition” and to reduce the high attrition rate of the ANSF “for the long-term viability.” A recently published NATO report, bringing out the high attrition rate of the ANSF wrote, “[F]or every ten ANA soldiers, NTM-A must train twenty-three recruits in order to maintain total overall strength.” However, the attrition of the ANA is not a recent development. Carl Hammer, one of the many Western intelligence officers, volunteers and journalists who visited the Afghan Mujahideen, wrote, in 2002, that the US recruited more than 500 Afghans to the 1st Battalion of the ANA, but there were many dropouts during the

course of their training and only 300 men graduated.\(^{18}\)

**ANSF: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS**

Despite the challenges of retaining the ANSF, NATO, in its official website, claimed, “Both the Afghan police and army are well on track to achieve the goal ahead of schedule.” According to the NATO report, there are 194,466 ANA troops, with 287 ANA units fields against the target of 195,000 by October 2012 and 149,642 ANP officers against the target of 157,000 by October 2012, as of April 2012. It further stated, “[s]ince end-January 2012, the ANSF have lead security responsibility for over 50% of the Afghan population,” thus, reducing the level of ISAF involvement in Afghanistan.\(^{19}\) One could fallaciously presume from the above statements that the state of affairs in Afghanistan is getting streamlined. But the challenges remain. In June 2011, the International Crisis Group brought out a disturbing report which stated, “The Taliban [still] control large swathes of territory stretching from Logar to Laghman,” and “as of May 2011, shadow Governors appointed by the Taliban’s Quetta Shura operate in 35 out of 62 districts in the seven provinces,”\(^{20}\) an indication that a great task lies ahead for the ANSF.

The reason why the ANA is ineffective and unable to take control of the country’s security, according to Musa Khan Jalalzai, is, “International forces neither give any importance to the [ANA] in maintaining peace and stability nor use it as an effective force in tackling insurgency across the country.” On the contrary, the “[l]ocal warlords have long been used to fight insurgency” in the country.” According to Jalalzai, the US’ “Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) gives arms, money and communication equipment to warlords, and hires them on its payroll.” Consequently, “[t]hese warlords, with the help of the CIA, consolidate their political control over different regions of Afghanistan.”\(^{21}\) The outsourcing of the training, and supply of the equipment to the Afghan armed forces is seen as a result of the ineffective role of the ANA.

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19. NATO, n.16.
forces to private military agencies like Black Water, that are least bothered about the well-being of the Afghan security forces or their efficiency, has aggravated the deteriorating security conditions of the Afghans.

The external armed forces consider the Afghans to be weak and incapable. On the other hand, the Afghans do not trust the external armed forces and regard them as invaders of their country. The disturbing political condition of the country is further complicated by the failure of the Afghan government to deliver good governance and bring all sections of the Afghans into a common political platform. Afghan President Hamid Karzai is caught in the political web of distrust. The Afghans see him as a protégé of the US and, thus, question his authority, while the US and other Western countries consider him to be corrupt, inefficient and incompatible.

It is a fact that President Karzai’s administration has been found wanting in many areas and has failed to bring the Afghans onto a common political platform, but the return of the religious extremists in politics will only aggravate the political crisis and hinder economic cooperation and development in the region. There are clear indications that the Afghans are weary of the militants’ activities. The storming of “Zagai and Tora Kopai centres of the local Taliban” by the tribal Lashkar in October 2008 “after the expiry of the deadline given to them for leaving the area” is a clear manifestation of the growing discontent with the Taliban.22 Surprisingly, even the Taliban admit that they will not be able to return to power in Afghanistan. The US should take advantage of the Afghans’ growing weariness with the Taliban and regenerate its resources on developing local capability, because, as Brian Michael Jenkins observes, “It will not be American or NATO forces that ultimately prevail over Al Qaeda and the Taliban, but Afghan forces.”23

ROLE OF REGIONAL POWERS

The complex security problem in Afghanistan is not only the outcome of internal ethnic and sectarian conflicts, lack of good governance, ill-trained armed personnel and reemergence of the Taliban, but also partly because of the dissonant policies of the regional powers. Just focussing on counter-terrorism and training of the ANSF, without a strategic change in the policies of the neighbouring countries will not solve the problems. The international community and the Afghan government should engage with the regional powers and seek their support and cooperation, without which there can never be long-term peace and stability in Afghanistan, because peace and prosperity are linked to a cordial atmosphere among the neighbouring countries. The regional powers’ role in rebuilding Afghanistan is critical, because Afghanistan comprises different ethno-linguistic groups and the varied communities that constitute the Afghans have sizeable populations (kinship) in different neighbouring countries, like the Turkmen in Turkmenistan, Uzbeks in Uzbekistan, and Pashtuns in Pakistan, etc, and these people are more loyal to their ethnic, linguistic, tribal and religious identities, than to the central (Kabul) government.

Afghanistan being strategically located, the regional powers often interfere in the political affairs of the country whenever their strategic and security interests are threatened, thereby, weakening the central (Kabul) government, and, at the same time, sowing the seeds of hatred and antagonism among the Afghans. For example, as most of the Taliban are from the Pashtun community and have ethnic and linguistic affinity with their counterparts in Pakistan, the latter acted as a conduit of the US to the Taliban during the Taliban period and enthusiastically campaigned with the world community to legitimise the Taliban regime. On the other hand, Uzbekistan backed Gen Abdul Rashid Dostum, a former pro-Soviet fighter and the leader of Afghanistan’s minority Uzbek community, while Ahmad Shah Masud (the Lion of Panjshir), an ethnic Tajik, was backed by Iran and Tajikistan, and Ismail Khan (the Lion of Herat), of Tajik origin (member of the Jamaat-e-Islami Afghanistan) was supported by Iran to counter the influence of the Taliban. Even to this day, many of Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries clandestinely support various
Mujahideen leaders for their own national political interest, ignoring peace, stability, unity, and development of the region. Unless these countries cease supporting the varied non-state actors (Mujahideen leaders) operating in Afghanistan, the country will remain chaotic and unstable.

The regional powers need to realise that peace and stability in Afghanistan comprise a prerequisite for peace and stability in the region, because developments in Afghanistan always have profound direct implications on its neighbouring countries’ security. Underlining the geo-strategic importance of Afghanistan on its neighbours’ policy, Hedayat Amin Arsala, former Vice President and senior adviser to the President of Afghanistan wrote, “[T]here is little doubt that Afghanistan’s [geo-strategic] location will [cease] to have a significant influence on the [Asian] country’s future political and economic prospects.”

Therefore, the regional powers need to restructure their policies and adopt a more pragmatic approach to Afghanistan, if they genuinely want to help in rebuilding and stabilising the country, and thereby bring peace and development in the region. In the complex geo-political conditions in Asia, where the internal and external security of the countries of the region is explicitly intermixed, “any worsening of the security situation” in one country “directly spills over” to other countries of the region by “encouraging” the local militants in that country.

CONCLUSION
Even though the countries of the region are competing for influence in Afghanistan, they also share common interests of wanting to isolate the Islamic radical fundamentalist militant groups from taking over the politics of Afghanistan, fearing adverse implications on the socio-economic and political conditions of the people of the region. Since, almost all the external and regional powers do not want the Islamic radical fundamentalist militant groups to once again take control of Afghanistan.


the country’s political structure, the neighbouring countries should help the Afghan government in building strong, competent Afghan security forces to defend their country from anti-national elements. Without strong and competent national security forces, the country will remain weak and unstable, which, in turn, would impede peace, which is a prerequisite to continuing socio-economic development of the country.

The past record of the role of the regional as well as the external powers in Afghanistan is not very encouraging. The role that Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries will play in the future will determine the political conditions of the Afghans. However, one needs to realise that the role of the external powers (the neighbouring countries) is limited, and external powers per-se cannot in any way bring about peace and stability in Afghanistan; they can only create an environment for the Afghan government to improve its capacity to control law and order in the country, win the hearts and minds of the Afghans, and take control of the country.
DECEMBER 13 ATTACK ON INDIAN PARLIAMENT: LOOKING AT ATTRIBUTION THEORY EXPLANATIONS

KANICA RAKHRA

“Attribution theory deals with how the social perceiver uses information to arrive at causal explanations for events. It examines what information is gathered and how it is combined to form a causal judgment” (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). This social perceiver can be an individual or a state. As Alexander Wendt has pointed out in his essay, “The State as a Person in International Theory” (2004), states interact with each other, have histories and memories and take decisions as a unit; and although there might be discussions about what attributes of a person a state can have, a discussion signifies that the concept of a state as a person makes fundamental sense. This essay looks at the state as a ‘person’ or a unit and how the attribution theory helps explain the escalation that took place in the case of India and Pakistan after the attacks on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001.

INTRODUCTION
India and Pakistan have had a chequered history since partition. Their history does act as baggage at certain points in the discussions between the two states and, sometimes, helps the two states build

Ms. Kanica Rakhra is a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.
bridges and engage in dialogue with each other. The states have fought three wars with each other and border disputes continue between the two countries at, at least, three points. Even though the major dispute between the two states is over Kashmir, the problems exist at many deeper levels wherein a basic mistrust of each other refuses to go away from their trajectory. Of the many incidents and clashes between India and Pakistan, this article looks at the December 13 attacks on the Indian Parliament and uses the attribution theory to explain the sequence of events that took place following it, preceding it, and how it led to the India-Pakistan enmity turning into a nuclear standoff that needed international intervention. The article is divided into four parts, wherein the first part looks at the concept of attribution theory and then goes on to look at the concept of the state as a person. In the second part, it explores the said concept by discussing in detail the idea of the state as a person. The third part of the article focusses on the case study of India and Pakistan and how the escalation occurred and later turned into a nuclear standoff. The fourth part of the essay concludes by drawing inferences about the escalation and the aforementioned theory and how a state reacting immediately can have consequences for the relationship between two states.

**ATTRIBUTION THEORY**

Developed by Weiner (1974), the theory explains how events are interpreted and how this leads to the thinking and behaviour, and understanding of events. Attribution theory assumes that people try to determine why people do what they do. A person seeking to understand why another person did something may attribute one or more causes to that behaviour.

Attribution theory is intended to help a person understand the causes of human behaviour, be it their own or someone else’s. The basis of attribution theory is that people want to know the reasons for the actions that they and others take; they want to attribute causes to behaviour they see rather than assuming that these behaviours are random. This allows people to assume some feeling of control over their own behaviours and over situations. Psychologist Fritz Heider (1958) first developed the attribution theory in his 1958
book *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations*. Heider proposed that what people perceived and believed about what they saw dictated how they would act, even if their beliefs about what they perceived were invalid. Heider’s proposed theory of attribution was further developed by psychologist Bernard Weiner and his colleagues in the 1970s and 1980s, and this new theoretical framework has been used primarily in the current attribution research. A final development to the attribution theory was provided by psychologist Harold Kelley, who examined how consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus could be used by individuals to establish the validity of their perceptions.¹ Thus, the theory has gone through a number of refinements and is widely acknowledged as an important aspect of social psychology.

Heider (1958) who contributed to the theory had two main concepts with respect to the attribution theory:

- **Interpersonal Attribution:** When we explain the behaviour of others, we look for enduring *internal attributions*, such as personality traits. For example, we attribute the behaviour of a person to their naivete or reliability or jealousy.

- **Explanatory Attribution:** When we try to explain our own behaviour, we tend to make *external attributions*, such as situational or environmental.²

Attribution theory assumes that people try to determine why people do what they do. A person seeking to understand why another person did something may attribute one or more causes to that behaviour.³ One will even blame victims (of ourselves and of others) for their fate as one seeks to distance oneself from thought of suffering the same plight. There is also a tendency to ascribe less variability to other people than oneself, seeing ourselves as more multifaceted and less predictable than others. This may well be because we can see more of what is inside ourselves.⁴

are affected by emotional and motivational drives as well. It is a
theory that is used by people to understand the psyche of the people
they interact with and thereby rationalise their behaviour based on
those perceptions.

Attribution is a three-step process whereby the first step involves
perception of the action; followed by judgment of the action; and,
finally, leading to attribution of disposition. During the second step of
judgment of action, there are five sliding scales of personal causation:

- Association.
- Causality.
- Justifiability.
- Foreseeability.
- Intentionality.

When one succeeds, one attributes success internally; when a
rival succeeds, one tends to credit external sources (e.g. luck). External
attribution refers to situational factors being given preference over
personality factors. As we seek to explain the reasons and causes for
behaviours, we are prone to falling victim to a number of cognitive
biases and errors. Our perceptions of events are often distorted by our
past experiences, our expectations and our own needs. Some of the
errors are: self-serving bias, wherein the blame for an incident is placed
on external factors; fundamental attribution error, the tendency to put
the blame on others; and actor-observer bias—blaming external forces
for events. But these events have, nonetheless, helped understand the
concept of attribution as a theory and its applicability in foreign affairs.

THE STATE AS A PERSON
State personhood is a useful analogy, metaphor, fiction or short-hand
or something else. That something else, what state-persons really are,
is the behaviour and discourse of the individual human beings who
make them up. To think about the ‘state as a person’ is to attribute
to the state certain properties that we attribute to individuals:
intentions, personalities, rationalities, intentions. Walter Bagehot, the
19th century British constitutional lawyer, argued that personification

5. http://psychology.about.com/od/socialpsychology/a/attribution.htm
6. Alexander Wendt, “The State as a Person in International Theory,” Review of
was useful because it made governments more easily understood and more apt to gain the loyalty of their subjects. Thus, personification of the state is helpful not only to the state and the people representing the state, but also to the people who are represented by it and, in turn, bounded by it.

Scholars disagree about which properties of persons should be ascribed to states, how important state persons are relative to other corporate persons like Multinational Corporations (MNCs) or Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), whether state persons are a good thing, and whether failed states can or should be persons at all. But even though there are problems in the defining of a state and what attributes should or should not be taken, it is clear that some form of personification is needed as it helps in dealing with the other states as entities. Each state as a unit will have divisions but in the end, a collective front in needed for interaction with other states.

Views about states are often intimately bound to views about salient features. Because states are abstract entities, they frequently require physical embodiment in order for ordinary citizens and even state elites to make sense of them. Embodiment can be in the form of national leaders, institutions, symbols or social groups. It is these leaders, institutions and symbols that become the backbone of the state identity and give it legitimacy in the eyes of the people it represents and with the other state units it interacts with. For example, the flag of a state, the national language, and important institutions that become landmarks such as the Burj Khalifa in Dubai.

States are readily described as collective cognition. Although they usually have one person in charge, leaders do not know everything their states know. States are characterised by massive division of labour internally, the structure of which enables their members to operate as a single cognitive system. Some state identities and interests stem primarily from relations to domestic society, others from international society; foreign policy role theorists (e.g. S. Walker, 1987), also, more recently, a number of neo-liberals have emphasised the domestic (and, thus,

8. Wendt, n. 6, pp 289-316.
systematically exogenous) roots of state identities. 10 Both the points stated above clearly refer to the various gaps in literature and in the understanding of the state as a person, but also mention how a state’s identity is sometimes formed in its interactions as a unit with other similar units. The corporate identity of a state generates four basic interests:

- Physical security, including its differentiation from other actors.
- Ontological security, or predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities.
- Recognition as an actor by others, above and beyond survival through brute force.
- Development in the sense of meeting the human aspiration for a better life, for which states are repositories at the collective level. 11

As Wendt puts it, “Relative to the alternatives, a strong argument can be made that they should (be persons) not withstanding its potential costs: states help bring order, and, yes, even justice to the world, and if we want to have states, then it is better to take them as persons rather than something more amorphous, because it will make their effects more politically accountable” (Wendt, 1999). Although there is much to be debated as to whether states become more politically accountable or not, they do tend to make interactions with other states as units more manageable.

INDIA-PAKISTAN ESCALATION

The event being looked into for the understanding of the theory is the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian Parliament by militants allegedly from Pakistan. This brazen attack was preceded by the infamous Agra Summit, wherein both states were unable to come to an understanding on certain terms, thus, making the summit a failure. Certain sections of the media felt that the attack on the Parliament was a result of the failed Agra Summit. 12 While that may or may not

11. Ibid., pp. 384-396.
necessarily be true, the events that followed it were most certainly a result of the attack on the Parliament.

The attack in itself came as a rude shock as it was the first time any such attack had taken place in the ‘heart’ of the Indian democratic system. Never before had the entire political leadership been targeted together with the sole purpose of destroying not only the buildings but also the political leadership. As a result, the reaction pertaining to the entire incident was also, from the state’s perspective, something that was the need of the hour as a reaction of a state.

The attack on the Indian Parliament was conducted by non-state actors from Pakistan, but it was alleged by the Indian intelligence that the Pakistani intelligence agencies were involved in the planning and execution of the said event. This led to India levelling accusations on the Pakistani side, with Pakistan vehemently denying the charges against it. While Pakistan was denying these allegations, the Indian side decided to take action and not just make the customary noises which result in nothing. India decided to showcase its capability and its anger by positioning its Army in the border areas. With Pakistan not one to back off, it also started getting ready for the confrontation. This led to a build-up that kept on increasing till it reached the point of no return for both the states and the people who were directly involved in the incident.

Finally, international intervention took place with the then US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice speaking with senior politicians on both sides of the border, and this helped mellow down the situation. But the anger was running so high on both sides that it was the closest India and Pakistan have come to a nuclear standoff. The entire incident was also an important one as it was the first time a government institution had been attacked so brazenly, in broad daylight, not by a group of highly trained men, but men who were against the Indian government but not necessarily the top brass in a chain of command. The incident finally came to a closure with the death sentence of one of the accused in the case, Afzal Guru, more than a decade later in 2013. An important aspect of the incident was the reaction of the Indian government, which was not passive or defensive, but reactionary, which is why the attribution theory will help explain how the Indian government, and the Pakistan government, too, kept on building on
a situation even though no government was directly involved in the situation to begin with. Both states were bound by the security dilemma and could not afford to back out of the deployment in the military race, which for Pakistan would have meant accepting the superiority of India and giving in, and for India, it would have meant not being able to stand up and make a statement about its anger regarding the attack on a symbol of its democracy.

CONCLUSION
The attribution theory contends that people make sense of their surroundings on the basis of what they consider is the cause and effect of a phenomenon. It suggests that individuals observe their own behaviour or experience, try and figure out what caused it, and then (irrespective of whether or not their conclusion is, in fact, correct) shape their future behaviour accordingly. Keeping in mind that the state is a single unit that reacts and takes decisions (as has been pointed out in the previous sections of the paper), both India and Pakistan have tended to jump the gun and take decisions that have not been beneficial for the state, leading to loss of people, money and effort on both sides.

When India was under attack by members of a militant organisation in December 2001, it was severe enough for the escalation of war to last almost a year—it subsided only in October 2002 and that too after international intervention. The initial reaction of the Indian state had been to blame the Pakistani side for its fallacies and to put the blame for the attack on certain militant organisations that were situated in Pakistan. And although Pakistan condemned the attack officially, it still led to a build-up of the army on both sides. Thus, one sees how India started to associate internal attributions to the Pakistani side; whereas the reaction of the Indian side was completely justified by its external situation, i.e., the attack on the Parliament, making it circumstantial, that led to a stage of nuclear standoff between the two nations.

A major concept of attribution theory is ‘locus of control’, whether the locus of control is internal or external. It is almost a rule

of the book to say that no state has ever stated its locus of control to be internal when the repercussions of the incident are not pleasant and has always stated that the locus of control is internal when the repercussions of an incident are favourable. With respect to Pakistan, its government denied any links with the militant organisations and any role in the planning or execution of the attacks on the Parliament as admission of such an incident that would have meant a full scale war between the two states. Although it is a well known fact that there are links between the Pakistani government and the various militant groups that are allowed to exist in their state, the vehement denial of the Pakistani government denying any links, but providing no support in helping to catch the masterminds, did not help build its case, and made India want to take coercive action.

After the attack on the Parliament, the Indian government perceived the action as an attack on the very ethos of the Indian state. In making its judgment of the action, the association was immediately made with Pakistan considering its history with the state; causality was considered by many to be the failure of the Agra Summit for which the Pakistaniis blamed the Indian government; the intent was to create havoc and chaos by doing something so dramatic that the attention of all would be focussed on such an incident. And the final step in the attribution process was attribution of disposition, i.e., the deployment of its military on its borders.

Thus, if the war was escalated to the point of a nuclear standoff, it was not because of either of the states, it was because of both states and their desire to make a quick cause and effect analysis and blame an external source for a situation that occurred, so that they would not have to deal with their own inadequacies or problems.
The war in Afghanistan by the United States (US) and its allies in response to the 9/11 attacks saw the quick dismantling of the Taliban regime. While the institutional framework of the same could not withstand the military might of the US, the war in Afghanistan quickly transformed into an insurgency with the extremist religious group and its affiliates becoming increasingly dispersed and hard to spot in an extremely inhospitable topography.\(^1\) The dispersing of these terrorist groups led to a visible armed force now fighting an invisible enemy, which thoroughly understood and took advantage of the same. The *modus operandi* of the terrorist groups now transformed into using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) allowing it to target one troop (or one vehicle) of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at a time. Not only did this lead to an exponential rise in ISAF casualties, it also impacted their mobility, thereby allowing all potential terrorist targets sufficient time to cross into Pakistan through a porous border.\(^2\)

**Shiv Ram Krishna Pande** is a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.

1. The linkages between the working relationship of the Taliban, the Al Qaeda and their affiliated bodies are beyond the scope of this paper. Hence, for the sake of simplicity, the paper uses terms such as religious extremists and terrorist groups.
The United States-led ISAF turned to technology to counter this problem. The arming of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with missiles such as the Hellfire saw the reconnaissance vehicles now being christened as Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles (UCAVs). The use of UCAVs, militarily speaking, proved to be a game changer in the war turned insurgency.\(^3\) It allowed the US to engage any target on either side of the Durand Line. While UCAVs are extremely susceptible to radar and air defence systems, the non-availability of both with the target Non-State Actor (NSA) allowed the US to go about with the use of these UCAVs totally unchallenged. With a constantly increasing success rate, the use of these UCAVs grew and slowly started to expose the problems within which would quickly make their way into the international media. Two problems which stood out were the killing of non-combatants and breaching of state sovereignty while carrying out these strikes. These two problems have been central to US-Pakistan relations reaching an all time low and which continue to be severely strained till date. At first go, one may believe that since the above mentioned issue pertains to the military, hence, the remedy for the same could be obtained by referring to the rules of engagement, international and/or domestic law. However, as usage of drones in conflict is a relatively new form of war-making and fighting, there exists no law pertaining to the use of the same. Thus, as of today, these drone strikes are bound by no framework through which they can be made accountable.

With regard to issues such as killing of non-combatants, breaching the territorial sovereignty of a state that is not in an armed conflict with the US and the non-provision of a military code of justice or rules of engagement regulating the use of drones, this paper explores if the drone strikes carried out by the US military in Pakistan directed against terrorist groups such as the Al Qaeda are legal under international law or not. The paper provides both sides of the argument and makes the case that the drone strikes, broadly speaking, keeping in mind the geo-political scenario, are legal under the present provisions of international law. To analyse the same, the paper looks at certain major areas of concern and analyses their legal status to shed further light on the issue. Before

discussing the legal points, one has to locate the background of the subject.

BACKGROUND

Strikes by drones were not a regular feature of the war in Afghanistan that began in October 2001. They were introduced during the second term of President George W. Bush and the policy of using them has grown exponentially during the tenures of President Obama of the US. The drone strikes were carried out by the US forces in response to Al Qaeda reorganising itself as a dispersed network and converting the war against the US into an insurgency. Systematic ambushes and use of IEDs were killing Coalition troops in increasing numbers which led to the view that the Western powers were quickly losing the war in an area christened the “Graveyard of Empires”. The US responded to this by reducing the human element required at the front to engage a high value target. By using boots on the ground to provide information about the possible location of the targets and unmanned drones possessing extremely powerful onboard cameras, with missiles boasting of the “fire and forget” capability, the US forces started to recover lost ground in the war. However, given the historically deep institutional links between the Pakistani military and the terrorist groups in Afghanistan, coupled with a porous border between these two states, the US found itself caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, was an increasing amount of evidence about the Pakistani forces training, equipping, aiding terrorists from its soil and even helping them escape. On the other, the support of Pakistan, a non-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ally for the US, was crucial for the successful conduct of the military operations in Afghanistan. As more information about the drone strikes made its way into the media, it became clear that while the Pakistani agencies were not being fully cooperative with the US, on certain occasions, their

permission had been obtained and that the Pakistani establishment was informed about the drone strikes.\(^8\) This again presented a unique problem. While the permission to carry OUT a drone strike was obtained, the nature and extent of the same remained under wraps. At certain points of time, Pakistani agencies passed on credible intelligence to the US forces to carry out a strike; on others, the information of an about to be conducted drone strike passed on by the US to Pakistan saw the drones targeting empty areas. Such a dichotomy gave weight to the view that there was a strong possibility of Pakistani state agencies being hand-in-glove with the terrorist GROUPS.\(^9\)

Given the dilemmas that the geo-political scenario presented between the two states in question, the drone strikes themselves presented another set of problems. The drone strikes are usually carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and at least some of them have to be cleared directly by the President. This, for one, saw a reduction in the ratio of strikes authorised to the number of strikes demanded by the troops on the ground, even as the number of strikes carried out increased steadily. Two, since the President had to personally permit some of the strikes, there was room for potential delay in carrying them out which could give the intended target enough time to escape. Three, any civilian casualties due to the same put America at the centre-stage of the international community and media for undesirable reasons. Four, given that the drone is unmanned and cannot possibly lead to a human casualty on the side of the US, it appeared to be an “easy” method of using deadly force.\(^10\)

Given that the drone strikes do not have a distinct place in the rules of military engagement and there is no domestic legislation in the US governing the same, the case of drone strikes is not an open and shut one based upon a plain reading of legal texts. It is rather a matter of interpretation in the existing provisions governing issues such as the use of force and sovereignty in international law. Hence, the focus now turns to the arguments against and for the drone strikes pertaining to a few selected areas of concern.

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9. n. 7.

FROM GWOT TO COIN?
The camp that vouches for the illegality of drone strikes starts off with the argument that Afghanistan now has a globally accepted democratic government; the US is fighting terrorists rather than an organ of the state; and terrorism is an issue of law enforcement rather than a military matter.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks by Afghanistan-based terrorist agencies, the Bush Administration officially adopted the terminology of Global War Against Terror (GWOT) in order to justify its actions (to both the domestic and international audience) as well as to gain legitimacy for the use of force. Given the fall of the Taliban as the state representative of Afghanistan, along with the installation of a democratically elected government in the country, the US was now fighting an enemy that had reorganised itself as a shadow network rather than an armed force. This change in strategy saw casualties in the thousands on the side of the ISAF forcing the US-led Coalition to modify its modus operandi as well. A change in the modus operandi of the Coalition forces, coupled with a change in leadership in the US, saw it dropping the terminology of GWOT and adopting COnter INsurgency (COIN) instead. The adoption of this terminology in the literal reading of international law makes the actions of the US in states like Afghanistan highly questionable since, as mentioned above, terrorism is a matter of law enforcement and not the military. However, groups like the Al Qaeda have publicly declared every American citizen as a target. This, along with the level of sophistication that such groups have shown in conducting strikes causing unacceptable damage to states, it seems almost absurd to classify terrorism as a matter of law enforcement. Given that terrorism has acquired a global nature and is a direct threat to international peace and security, a more teleological reading of the international law, keeping in mind the drone strikes, with the widespread support that the US has received since 2002 on the subject of the war in Afghanistan, should be seen as the first signs signalling a change in customary international law.

STATE AND CONSENT; SOVEREIGNTY AND RESPONSIBILITY
The drones that are being used across the border are in a clear breach of the territorial sovereignty of Pakistan and have led to the death of its

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12. Orr, n.10.
civilians as well. Given that Pakistan and the US and its allies are not in a state of war with each other, the drone strikes constitute an action in breach of the Geneva Conventions. Secondly, the strikes by the drones are often, if not always, conducted by officials of the CIA, whose officials are neither a part of the armed forces nor have a uniform. Given the murky state that espionage has in international law, Pakistan has an option to sue these officials in case of civilian casualties on its side even after granting consent.

Recent revelations by the former Pakistani President, General Musharraf make it indisputable that the US had the permission of the state of Pakistan for carrying out drone strikes on its soil. Even if this claim is doubted or disregarded, a strong case is still made of the US breaching Pakistani sovereignty. The Responsibility to Protect report, commonly referred to as the R2P, that was adopted by the UN in 2005, makes it clear that the sovereignty of a state should be a measure of “responsibility” rather than “control”. Given that Pakistan has failed in its duty of ensuring that its soil is not used by terrorists in any way, either against itself or any other state, the actions of the US can be termed and viewed as being legitimate. Also, given the unearthing of evidence pertaining to the links between Pakistani state organs and the terrorists, Pakistan can be held accountable under the International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility (ILCSAR) of 2001 which regard the actions of the state organs or members under the control of the state as the actions of the state itself.

UNDERSTANDING AS PER THE UN CHARTER

The UN Charter upholds the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a state under Article 2(7) of its Charter. However, it does make an exception under Article 42 of Chapter 7 of its Charter in case a state is not following a legally binding obligation that it is responsible for. The Charter also authorises the use of physical force against states as an act of self-defence in case international peace and security are threatened by invoking Article 51 of the same Chapter. In sum, while armed attacks are generally prohibited under

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15. International Law Commission. International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility. All the details of the same are available through http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/53sess.htm
international law, Article 51 is one of the few, and commonly turned to, exception that legally allows physical force to be used by member states of the UN. This Article was successfully invoked by the UN under the backdrop of the 9/11 attacks on the US. Now that the Taliban regime has fallen in the state, the application of Article 51 in the light of drone strikes finds itself under question and scrutiny.\textsuperscript{16}

If one follows the interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter as per the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the famous Nicaragua case, the ICJ drew a distinction between “mere frontier incidents” and “grave forms of the use of force”. The Hague noted that only the latter constituted a valid reason for Article 51 to be employed. By this standard, the drone strikes do not meet the criteria of self-defence as the Al Qaeda has not launched a full scale military offensive against the US. However, the difference here being that the Al Qaeda deliberately changed its strategy of converting the war more along the lines of an insurgency. It is also directly or indirectly responsible for the death of thousands of non-combatants in many parts of the globe. Mere dislocation of the Al Qaeda from the seat of power does not restore the state of international security that existed before the September 11 attacks of 2001. On the legal turf, the Vienna Convention Law of Treaties states that treaties “shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty”. An ordinary reading of Article 51 does not prohibit a state to take action against a non-state actor when it is recognised as a clear danger to peace and security as an identified international terrorist organisation. Hence, a compelling case can be made for the extension of Article 51 invoked in the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 to be extended to drone strikes till the entire terrorist network prevalent in Afghanistan, or seeking refuge in Pakistan, is dismantled.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{LAWS OF WAR}

The law of war is a body of law that articulates the laws pertaining to justification to engage in warfare (\textit{jus ad bellum}) and conduct to be followed by the belligerent parties during warfare (\textit{jus in bello}, also known as International Humanitarian Law or the IHL). As discussed above, the usage of drone strikes as a constituent of the ongoing war

\textsuperscript{16} Orr, n. 10.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
in Afghanistan is seen from the stand-point of a continuing feature of self-defence that was attributed to the US as a part of the UNSCR 1373.\(^{18}\) To accept that line of argumentation provides for a sufficient condition to claim that the principle of *jus ad bellum* stands. However, the answer is not that clear in the case of *jus in bello*. The principle of *jus in bello* or IHL rests on two basic premises: distinction and proportionality.\(^{19}\) While a number of estimates present different statistics about falling (or rising) number of civilian casualties during a drone strike, there are no doubts about them occurring.\(^{20}\) This brings into focus the question of whether the US is indeed focussed about protecting non-combatants from their intended targets during a drone strike or not. The same thought process engulfs the matter of proportionality as well. Drones are extremely sophisticated pieces of defence equipment and are being used to target individuals in response to the use of ambush tactics or IEDs by the terrorist groups.

Thus, there prevails a dichotomy when it comes to the question of drone strikes and *jus in bello*. Drones, given the powerful panchromatic cameras onboard, do possess the capability to make a distinction and target individuals only. However, there are still deaths of non-combatant in the process. At the same time, it becomes problematic to weigh the lethality of the strikes against the importance of eliminating a high value target, if, indeed, the target can be classified as the same or not. The issue of *jus in bello* can be only resolved on a case by case basis which shall require the White House to make drone strikes accountable, as a first step, to the US Congress.\(^{21}\) Thus, in totality, there are very strong arguments pertaining to the legality of a weapon that has no specific law governing its use. At the same time, there are certain unresolved questions that can be answered only with the provision of a mechanism pertaining to the accountability of the same. It shall be in the interest of the US to furnish all the required details pertaining to the drone strikes if it wishes to achieve complete domestic and international legitimacy regarding the use of the same.

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